Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
more thots from a dinosaur
Salute!
I have to add to the many accolades about C-SAR's exemplary inputs.
+++++++++++++++++++++++
I also wonder about all the modes and laws and such that seem to be the vogue, or even the basics of flying the Airbus.
Is there any button the pilot can hit that allows him/her to fly an approach using only the basic flight control computer laws and basic navaids? In other words, hit the outer marker or whatever the final approach fix and simply use the stick and power to fly the "bug", or even descend at a reasonable angle/descent rate until reaching minima?
I understand all the automation and such to "help" the pilot in command. OTOH, we're not talking about the single-seat planes I flew for many hours ( and they had cosmic nav gear and such, and the last one was the first fly-by-wire jet). The heavies seem to have someone else in the other seat to "help". What is going on with crew coordination and monitoring by the "crew" of the guy that has the ultimate responsibility?
I am becoming scared, and I believe I have the background and right to do so.
Gums sends ....
I have to add to the many accolades about C-SAR's exemplary inputs.
+++++++++++++++++++++++
I also wonder about all the modes and laws and such that seem to be the vogue, or even the basics of flying the Airbus.
Is there any button the pilot can hit that allows him/her to fly an approach using only the basic flight control computer laws and basic navaids? In other words, hit the outer marker or whatever the final approach fix and simply use the stick and power to fly the "bug", or even descend at a reasonable angle/descent rate until reaching minima?
I understand all the automation and such to "help" the pilot in command. OTOH, we're not talking about the single-seat planes I flew for many hours ( and they had cosmic nav gear and such, and the last one was the first fly-by-wire jet). The heavies seem to have someone else in the other seat to "help". What is going on with crew coordination and monitoring by the "crew" of the guy that has the ultimate responsibility?
I am becoming scared, and I believe I have the background and right to do so.
Gums sends ....
Gums,
You can just turn the automatics off and hand fly it if you want to.
Least accurate and highest risk method though.
In increasing order of accuracy (and reducing workload and risk):
All though require monitoring of the raw data - because it is still an NDB approach. Just some methods are more accurate than others.
You can just turn the automatics off and hand fly it if you want to.
Least accurate and highest risk method though.
In increasing order of accuracy (and reducing workload and risk):
- Hand fly using raw data. Cigar in mouth and amusing hat donned. It is mandatory to remind the white faced FO on the way down that you have 38,000 hours and nothing beats experience.
- Hand fly using flight directors programmed with something useful. Pointless.
- Automatics in conventional modes (hdg and v/s). Like a basic 737.
- Automatics using track and FPA mode.
- Automatics using NAV (FMC lateral) and FPA mode.
- Automatics following a pre-programmed and checked database lateral and vertical flight path.
All though require monitoring of the raw data - because it is still an NDB approach. Just some methods are more accurate than others.
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Hand fly using raw data. Cigar in mouth and John Wayne hat on. It is mandatory to remind the white faced FO on the way down that this is what you signed up for when you decided to fly and 38,000 hours later you still need to respect the airplane and the process and not take any shortcuts. You always fly the plane and never let it fly you...
Most accurate and lowest risk method, after all the plane will do exactly what the pilot commands.
Most accurate and lowest risk method, after all the plane will do exactly what the pilot commands.
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Hand fly using raw data. Cigar in mouth and John Wayne hat on. It is mandatory to remind the white faced FO on the way down that this is what you signed up for when you decided to fly and 38,000 hours later you still need to respect the airplane and the process and not take any shortcuts. You always fly the plane and never let it fly you...
Most accurate and lowest risk method, after all the plane will do exactly what the pilot commands.
Most accurate and lowest risk method, after all the plane will do exactly what the pilot commands.
What amuses me in all these "perils of automatics" diatribes is that the posters never actually get around to any real quantification or analysis of the relative risks, nor do they reference the substantially lower accident rate associated with today's operations versus those of yesteryear. Automatics do bring with them their own risks, lowered manual proficiency and automation complacency being two of them. Those risks are, however, several degrees of magnitude lower in terms of their prevelance as causal factors than the risks that automation was intended to address.
With respect to this accident, up until Sitting Bull's recent post there has been nothing much to really go on but suppositions that were unanchored to any established facts,. And though some have done valiant work trying to find facts, the contributions of the "grumbling grandpas" and the "low skill libyan" contingent have really dragged the thread down. There may ultimately be some truth to both assertions, but so far there are no known facts that suggest either, and it just gets tiresome reading the same old dogs banging the same old drums again and again.
If we accept the following as reported by Sitting Bull:
-AAW771 was cleared for and executing the NDB 09 approach
-they did not report any problems nor did they request any medical assistance
-they announced and initiated a go-around at low level (tower radar and Alitalia TCAS)
-according to the official statement of the Alitalia crew that witnessed the crash, AAW771 descended out of the low clouds nose down, wings level and in one piece
-after violently hitting nose first it disintegrated with the tail separating and tumbling over
Then this, along with some previously suggested information regarding the crew's experience on type produces a plausible hypothesis that was suggested earlier on: somatogravic illusion.-they did not report any problems nor did they request any medical assistance
-they announced and initiated a go-around at low level (tower radar and Alitalia TCAS)
-according to the official statement of the Alitalia crew that witnessed the crash, AAW771 descended out of the low clouds nose down, wings level and in one piece
-after violently hitting nose first it disintegrated with the tail separating and tumbling over
The A330 (like many other heavy twins) has very substantial excess power available when operating on both engines at typical landing weights. When the pilot selects TOGA all of that power is brought to bear, causing both a pitch up moment and rapidly accelerating airspeed. Managing the change in attitude and airspeed, especially at lighter weights is more of a challenge (and much less practiced) than doing the same on one engine.
The significant acceleration involved can create a very convincing sensation of a more rapid than desired pitch up that can be quite disturbing for a pilot unprepared for it. This would be especially the case for a pilot with limited experience on the A330 but lengthy experience with 4 engined or lower powered twin engined aircraft.
Per the Alitalia crew's observations (TCAS) it would appear that a normal go-around (the crew called out that they were going around as opposed to a terrain avoidance manouever case which wouldn't likely have been called out) had been positively commenced and that the aircraft had begun to climb only to be observed descending with a substantial nose down attitude moments later.
The simplest explanation for how the aircraft got from A (climbing, hence nose up) to B (descending with nose down) is that either the pilot or the autopilot introduced a very large scale nose down pitch input shortly after commencing the go-around. It is not impossible that the source of the input was the autopilot, but it is much more likely that the source of the input will be found to be a pilot suffering from and responding to a somatogravic illusion during the go-around. This would also explain the degree of destruction of the airframe which is consistent with a high G impact (nose down attitude + TOGA = high vertical rate).
If this should all prove to be the case, the sad irony is that some of the old dogs and grumbling grandpas will have got it entirely wrong. The airplane may well have crashed, not because the crew relied on the automation too much, but rather because at the critical moment, they relied on the automation too little.
The somatogravic illusion has been around as long as there have been airplanes in the sky and its claimed victims from both old fashioned steam driven aircraft and now new-fangled electric jets. The problem is that no matter how big you make the primary flight display (ADI), how capable the autopilot, or even how often you hand fly your approaches all the way from TOD, you can't prevent the pilot from experiencing the illusion, you can only train him in how to recognize it and how to respond to it ... including by using an autopilot that does not experience the illusion in the first place.
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I believe that any pilot incapable of safely and confidently handflying a commercial jet under extreme and challenging circumstances (USAIR 1549) should not be in command of said aircraft. The swampland has already been purchased by all of those who mistakenly believe a complex and unforgiving system can be engineered to the lowest common denominator.
Sadly the bill is going to continue to be paid by those unlucky enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time for a decade or more to come. The 1st time this argument ever occurred was in 1959 at the beginning of project Mercury. I've got no issues with automation but I have a question for all of you advocates...
How many of you would sit in the right seat with the lowest time Captain (A320 Qualified) from any random airline and put your fate in his hands under those exact circumstances. We are repeatedly seeing pilots apparently incapable of basic unusual attitude recovery or basic proficiency in cockpit scan and basic IFR procedures...just looking here at this board right now not one of the three current tragedies can have happened (based on what we currently know) with the combination of proper scan and procedures...yet all of you are ignoring the basic fact that all to often the PF isn't even the PM and the other guy in the pointy end might as well be in the back with me...
Sadly the bill is going to continue to be paid by those unlucky enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time for a decade or more to come. The 1st time this argument ever occurred was in 1959 at the beginning of project Mercury. I've got no issues with automation but I have a question for all of you advocates...
How many of you would sit in the right seat with the lowest time Captain (A320 Qualified) from any random airline and put your fate in his hands under those exact circumstances. We are repeatedly seeing pilots apparently incapable of basic unusual attitude recovery or basic proficiency in cockpit scan and basic IFR procedures...just looking here at this board right now not one of the three current tragedies can have happened (based on what we currently know) with the combination of proper scan and procedures...yet all of you are ignoring the basic fact that all to often the PF isn't even the PM and the other guy in the pointy end might as well be in the back with me...
I believe that anyone (especially SLF), who has not been at the pointy end and experienced the disorientation of the competing demands of the senses in marginal visual conditions, especially when combined with fatigue (and who knows what other variables at any particular moment), and still espouses the merits of hand-flying, has no real concept of the incredible range of variables that can be encountered, not all of which can ever be covered in even the most exhaustive pilot training.
I remember one of the great lessons in disorientation that I read years ago. The pilot telling the story was flying formation with another Tiger Moth in late afternoon haze with little or no reference horizon, just the orb of the sun off to one side. As he flew along in straight and level flight he was amazed to see the other Tiger Moth perform a slow and gentle barrel roll around his aircraft and then resume level flight as if nothing had happened.
After landing he raised the topic of the strange maneuver with the other pilot who told him in no uncertain terms that it was in fact he who had rolled around the other aircraft. Both pilots were adamant they had continued flying straight and level and it was the other aircraft that had performed the unexpected maneuver.
I remember one of the great lessons in disorientation that I read years ago. The pilot telling the story was flying formation with another Tiger Moth in late afternoon haze with little or no reference horizon, just the orb of the sun off to one side. As he flew along in straight and level flight he was amazed to see the other Tiger Moth perform a slow and gentle barrel roll around his aircraft and then resume level flight as if nothing had happened.
After landing he raised the topic of the strange maneuver with the other pilot who told him in no uncertain terms that it was in fact he who had rolled around the other aircraft. Both pilots were adamant they had continued flying straight and level and it was the other aircraft that had performed the unexpected maneuver.
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In the hand flying versus automation debate - in my opinion it is not so much the automation that has improved safety, it is the integrated display of information.
"I love the magenta line" in the sense that the navigation display gives in one glance a complete picture where I am in relation to (objects/places in) the real world - that's a lot easier than puzzling it all together from a set of needles and dials giving directions and distances towards beacons.
At the same time, common sense is required to deal e.g. with faulty waypoint sequencing, such as often occurs during close-in vectoring on approach. If that common sense is missing, than you are a slave, rather than a lover, of the magenta line.
The somatographic illusion - yes, it exists. Should you be able to counter it, well with a big artificial horizon in front of you and a simple, basically wings level attitude as a start point, yeah, one should be capable to deal with that one. It takes discipline, that's for sure and perhaps a bit of hands-on experience (... perhaps a little handflying, and not only in 100 nm vis, CAVOK weather ...)
Automation, be it Airbus or Boeing, beautiful, makes life easy, but still, if the machine doesn't perform as you want, two clicks and you are back in charge.
Edit for typo.
"I love the magenta line" in the sense that the navigation display gives in one glance a complete picture where I am in relation to (objects/places in) the real world - that's a lot easier than puzzling it all together from a set of needles and dials giving directions and distances towards beacons.
At the same time, common sense is required to deal e.g. with faulty waypoint sequencing, such as often occurs during close-in vectoring on approach. If that common sense is missing, than you are a slave, rather than a lover, of the magenta line.
The somatographic illusion - yes, it exists. Should you be able to counter it, well with a big artificial horizon in front of you and a simple, basically wings level attitude as a start point, yeah, one should be capable to deal with that one. It takes discipline, that's for sure and perhaps a bit of hands-on experience (... perhaps a little handflying, and not only in 100 nm vis, CAVOK weather ...)
Automation, be it Airbus or Boeing, beautiful, makes life easy, but still, if the machine doesn't perform as you want, two clicks and you are back in charge.
Edit for typo.
Salute!
TNX for the list of priorities, 100%.
I don't have multi-dozens of thousand hours. I was only a lite puke and we had many more landings than hours. Sorry, but that's the best I was offered and I did it.
I flew "coupled" autopilot ILS approaches in the VooDoo back in the 60's, and it was neat. OTOH, I had a paddle switch on the stick that disconnected everything except the basic control laws the jet had. So if I saw something that didn't look right I could squeeze the paddle and level, land or go around ( TOGA mode, but no computers).
I appreciate all the aids that the current folks have. Make no mistake. I debated use of the HUD with many folks that were the "cigar-chomping" mossbacks that claimed you had to fly the approach using the steam gauges. I could do that. I also enjoyed cross-checking the steam gauges with the fancy HUD display of the approach angles and such. No autopilot connect for the SLUF and the Viper.
I just worry about the new folks that might be tempted to rely too much on the automation. I am worried about basic flying skills that can be degraded by using all the gizmo's so much that basic airmanship will come into question when a crash occurs. Should not be that way. Sully proved you can fly the Airbus very well with virtually zero assistance from all the avionic connections. So the plane must have decent basic flight control laws. It's all the other connections with the flight controls that bugs me.
My last fear is that the "other guy/gal" might not speak up when the pilot-in-command is doing something screwy. My NWA buddy has talked about a philosophy of using both folks at the pointy end to cross-check each other and speak up when something didn't look right. My only experience in two-seaters was a navigator in the back seat that would calmly mention I was "pressing". Heeded his advice a few times and am still here to relate war stories.
I'll sit back now and look for the CVR and DFR to figure this one out.
Thanks to all the current professional folks here that fly these new planes and have contributed to this thread.
Gums sends ...
TNX for the list of priorities, 100%.
I don't have multi-dozens of thousand hours. I was only a lite puke and we had many more landings than hours. Sorry, but that's the best I was offered and I did it.
I flew "coupled" autopilot ILS approaches in the VooDoo back in the 60's, and it was neat. OTOH, I had a paddle switch on the stick that disconnected everything except the basic control laws the jet had. So if I saw something that didn't look right I could squeeze the paddle and level, land or go around ( TOGA mode, but no computers).
I appreciate all the aids that the current folks have. Make no mistake. I debated use of the HUD with many folks that were the "cigar-chomping" mossbacks that claimed you had to fly the approach using the steam gauges. I could do that. I also enjoyed cross-checking the steam gauges with the fancy HUD display of the approach angles and such. No autopilot connect for the SLUF and the Viper.
I just worry about the new folks that might be tempted to rely too much on the automation. I am worried about basic flying skills that can be degraded by using all the gizmo's so much that basic airmanship will come into question when a crash occurs. Should not be that way. Sully proved you can fly the Airbus very well with virtually zero assistance from all the avionic connections. So the plane must have decent basic flight control laws. It's all the other connections with the flight controls that bugs me.
My last fear is that the "other guy/gal" might not speak up when the pilot-in-command is doing something screwy. My NWA buddy has talked about a philosophy of using both folks at the pointy end to cross-check each other and speak up when something didn't look right. My only experience in two-seaters was a navigator in the back seat that would calmly mention I was "pressing". Heeded his advice a few times and am still here to relate war stories.
I'll sit back now and look for the CVR and DFR to figure this one out.
Thanks to all the current professional folks here that fly these new planes and have contributed to this thread.
Gums sends ...
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"How did the nose eradicate the electrical poles (if it was the nose)?; How did the electrical wire ended in the tail cone?"
First, let me also give my thanks for CSAR for all his 'on the ground' reports!
Now...forgive me for posting this, however I thought it might have some relevance to the above questions....
During my primary training (about 300 years ago!), I watched a NASA video on wake turbulence. They had set up a series of poles at the departure end of a runway and then had a 747 take off. The film showed the poles begin swaying more and more wildly, until finally several of them ripped out of the ground. HOWEVER, they didn't go very far....simply popped out of the ground and fell over.
So...since the poles were only about 3-4 meters in height (as per previous posts)...could it have been wake vortex as the aircraft flew over that damaged the poles? Then, perhaps, 'dragged' the wires behind the aircraft in it's wake?
Just curious....this video had a BIG impact on me during my initial training and I've never forgotten it.
First, let me also give my thanks for CSAR for all his 'on the ground' reports!
Now...forgive me for posting this, however I thought it might have some relevance to the above questions....
During my primary training (about 300 years ago!), I watched a NASA video on wake turbulence. They had set up a series of poles at the departure end of a runway and then had a 747 take off. The film showed the poles begin swaying more and more wildly, until finally several of them ripped out of the ground. HOWEVER, they didn't go very far....simply popped out of the ground and fell over.
So...since the poles were only about 3-4 meters in height (as per previous posts)...could it have been wake vortex as the aircraft flew over that damaged the poles? Then, perhaps, 'dragged' the wires behind the aircraft in it's wake?
Just curious....this video had a BIG impact on me during my initial training and I've never forgotten it.
I really don't understand this automation debate... look up the accident statistics. ~ 70% of all aviation accidents in RPT resulting in death or serious injury are caused by operator error (pilots) and not by automation flaws. There is no evil autopilot that flys you into the mountainside. Unless you told it to do so.
Thousands of hours of single pilot IFR have taught me a few lessons. One of them is to always rely on, and crosscheck, the instruments. I've had a few spectacular instrument failures in IMC that could easily have resulted in my demise (hence categorised as spectacular), but never did all of the instruments cheat on me. So, before pushing on the stick like mad you might want to take a glance at that PFD... then at the standby cluster if the data you see still doesn't make sense. Then make an informed choice, and fly out of it. I'm not too familiar with MCC, but isn't the idea that the PNF monitors instruments and takes care of comms? I would hope that at least one of the two doesn't fall for somatographic illusion, and can snap the other one out of it. Unless, of course:
- they busted MDA knowingly, and not by just a few feet.
- frightened themselves when the TCAS RA went off (what did that tell them to do, possibly: Don't climb? Maintain vertical speed?)
- they now know that they will get caught busting the minimum.
- initiated the G/A
- were so low below the minimum that a piloting error resulted in the photographic evidence we have all seen.
It would be really useful if they published a decent subset of DFDR parameters to the public so we can make a more educated assessment of what was going on.
Thousands of hours of single pilot IFR have taught me a few lessons. One of them is to always rely on, and crosscheck, the instruments. I've had a few spectacular instrument failures in IMC that could easily have resulted in my demise (hence categorised as spectacular), but never did all of the instruments cheat on me. So, before pushing on the stick like mad you might want to take a glance at that PFD... then at the standby cluster if the data you see still doesn't make sense. Then make an informed choice, and fly out of it. I'm not too familiar with MCC, but isn't the idea that the PNF monitors instruments and takes care of comms? I would hope that at least one of the two doesn't fall for somatographic illusion, and can snap the other one out of it. Unless, of course:
- they busted MDA knowingly, and not by just a few feet.
- frightened themselves when the TCAS RA went off (what did that tell them to do, possibly: Don't climb? Maintain vertical speed?)
- they now know that they will get caught busting the minimum.
- initiated the G/A
- were so low below the minimum that a piloting error resulted in the photographic evidence we have all seen.
It would be really useful if they published a decent subset of DFDR parameters to the public so we can make a more educated assessment of what was going on.
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Hi,
I understand very well this debate.
The automation is the third crew member (as usually today commercial jets are provided so far with two humans pilots)
This third crew member is the most busy of the 3 during the flight operations.
So .. not astonished this third crew member can be also implicated in case of problems.
I really don't understand this automation debate
The automation is the third crew member (as usually today commercial jets are provided so far with two humans pilots)
This third crew member is the most busy of the 3 during the flight operations.
So .. not astonished this third crew member can be also implicated in case of problems.
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Poles
Hi C-SAR
About the poles.
Here are 2 pics of the poles before the crash that I found.
You will see that they are exactly in line with and on the crash site.
The lines run all the way past the little tower that is at the corner of the runway and even run to past where the wings are.
Note that the 2nd pole is a 4-type-box, the others are single.
Look at 4:00 min of YouTube - Landing at Tripoli International Airport, Libya
pic1
pic2
pic3 another 4-pole-box on the right side of the right wing just outside of the fence
pic4 Note that the pole and tower have no damage, while lots of havy debris are located in that area. Most is just in front of the trees and others against the fence. Also that the wings have gone over the pole.
C-SAR, thanks for your help
this was my first post here
About the poles.
Here are 2 pics of the poles before the crash that I found.
You will see that they are exactly in line with and on the crash site.
The lines run all the way past the little tower that is at the corner of the runway and even run to past where the wings are.
Note that the 2nd pole is a 4-type-box, the others are single.
Look at 4:00 min of YouTube - Landing at Tripoli International Airport, Libya
pic1
pic2
pic3 another 4-pole-box on the right side of the right wing just outside of the fence
pic4 Note that the pole and tower have no damage, while lots of havy debris are located in that area. Most is just in front of the trees and others against the fence. Also that the wings have gone over the pole.
C-SAR, thanks for your help
this was my first post here
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Nose down?
Looks like some things have been over looked.
Have a good look at these pics that I have seen.
Some are from the day after NOVA stream.
Here you see that the first large part of debris is a large front part from the fuselarge that is located before the tail cone. It is a part of the right side, juist after the cockpit with the company name. This part is located just before the little house that stand before the mosque .
pic1Day2 FirstLargePiece1
pic2 Day2
pic3 Day 1
pic4 Day 1 later on
Have a good look at these pics that I have seen.
Some are from the day after NOVA stream.
Here you see that the first large part of debris is a large front part from the fuselarge that is located before the tail cone. It is a part of the right side, juist after the cockpit with the company name. This part is located just before the little house that stand before the mosque .
pic1Day2 FirstLargePiece1
pic2 Day2
pic3 Day 1
pic4 Day 1 later on
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It may be worth reminding discussants of two things.
First, I see no reason to suppose that any FDR or CVR data will be made public. Neither would I necessarily expect that the ICAO-required final report will be made public. Let's see first if the required 30-day report is made public.
Second, participants in any of the investigations (Annex 13, or insurer's, or ...) will be under non-disclosure and are very unlikely to participate in any way in public discussion if they value their jobs and life savings. Missives from anyone claiming here that they *know* what went on can most wisely be read with this in mind.
Finally, anyone in favor of the tail-struck-first scenario could please explain the puzzle I posed a few days ago, namely how one can get an AoA of 16°+descent path angle on an A330 at approach-like speeds. So far, no one has tried.
PBL
First, I see no reason to suppose that any FDR or CVR data will be made public. Neither would I necessarily expect that the ICAO-required final report will be made public. Let's see first if the required 30-day report is made public.
Second, participants in any of the investigations (Annex 13, or insurer's, or ...) will be under non-disclosure and are very unlikely to participate in any way in public discussion if they value their jobs and life savings. Missives from anyone claiming here that they *know* what went on can most wisely be read with this in mind.
Finally, anyone in favor of the tail-struck-first scenario could please explain the puzzle I posed a few days ago, namely how one can get an AoA of 16°+descent path angle on an A330 at approach-like speeds. So far, no one has tried.
PBL
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pbl:
Let's hope you're wrong, but I suspect the odds are very high that you are right, particularly in view of the history of the host country (some contrary posts on this forum notwithstanding) and further than the air carrier is carrying the host country flag.
If that is indeed the end result, then all responsible carriers best avoid operating into that country.
It may be worth reminding discussants of two things.
First, I see no reason to suppose that any FDR or CVR data will be made public. Neither would I necessarily expect that the ICAO-required final report will be made public. Let's see first if the required 30-day report is made public.
Second, participants in any of the investigations (Annex 13, or insurer's, or ...) will be under non-disclosure and are very unlikely to participate in any way in public discussion if they value their jobs and life savings. Missives from anyone claiming here that they *know* what went on can most wisely be read with this in mind.
First, I see no reason to suppose that any FDR or CVR data will be made public. Neither would I necessarily expect that the ICAO-required final report will be made public. Let's see first if the required 30-day report is made public.
Second, participants in any of the investigations (Annex 13, or insurer's, or ...) will be under non-disclosure and are very unlikely to participate in any way in public discussion if they value their jobs and life savings. Missives from anyone claiming here that they *know* what went on can most wisely be read with this in mind.
If that is indeed the end result, then all responsible carriers best avoid operating into that country.
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Nose up?
Hello,
Certainly not there.
Pic3 and Pic4 are not the same piece of wreckage as the front fuselage piece shown in your Pic1 and Pic2. Look at tail orientation and you'll see that this piece is much closer to the airport fences (where another house is visible) and certainly not before the mosque, while the white wreckage shown in Pic3 and Pic4 is from rear fuselage near the tailcone. I already posted something about that several pages back in this thread.
S~
Olivier
Edit: or maybe that's me who was mis-oriented!
Actually, the tail is on the other way that I believed first... you may be right JoeMo!
S~
Olivier
Originally Posted by JoeMo
Looks like some things have been over looked.
Have a good look at these pics that I have seen.
Some are from the day after NOVA stream.
Here you see that the first large part of debris is a large front part from the fuselarge that is located before the tail cone. It is a part of the right side, juist after the cockpit with the company name. This part is located just before the little house that stand before the mosque .
Have a good look at these pics that I have seen.
Some are from the day after NOVA stream.
Here you see that the first large part of debris is a large front part from the fuselarge that is located before the tail cone. It is a part of the right side, juist after the cockpit with the company name. This part is located just before the little house that stand before the mosque .
Pic3 and Pic4 are not the same piece of wreckage as the front fuselage piece shown in your Pic1 and Pic2. Look at tail orientation and you'll see that this piece is much closer to the airport fences (where another house is visible) and certainly not before the mosque, while the white wreckage shown in Pic3 and Pic4 is from rear fuselage near the tailcone. I already posted something about that several pages back in this thread.
S~
Olivier
Edit: or maybe that's me who was mis-oriented!
Actually, the tail is on the other way that I believed first... you may be right JoeMo!
S~
Olivier
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I believe that any pilot incapable of safely and confidently handflying a commercial jet under extreme and challenging circumstances (USAIR 1549) should not be in command of said aircraft.
SLF, this is just blather without meaning. Your initial point was about aircraft handling and instrument flying procedures but in your next breath you are suggesting USAir 1549 as an example of the level challenge that any pilot should be fit for without recognizing that the challenge of that situation had nothing to do with instrument flying skills, little to do with actual aircraft handling skill and a dead nuts zero to do with automation. The challenge there was in decision making. That's a talent that's entirely independent of equipment, though you can be sure that when those rare moments arise any pilot with brains is going be thankful for whatever the airplane can do to help him assess the situation and find the decision with greatest possibility of a safe outcome (which like for 1549 is not necessarily a certainty - you can be sure that at 200' Sully was wondering "What comes next?")
The swampland has already been purchased by all of those who mistakenly believe a complex and unforgiving system can be engineered to the lowest common denominator.
Sadly the bill is going to continue to be paid by those unlucky enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time for a decade or more to come. The 1st time this argument ever occurred was in 1959 at the beginning of project Mercury.
Sadly the bill is going to continue to be paid by those unlucky enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time for a decade or more to come. The 1st time this argument ever occurred was in 1959 at the beginning of project Mercury.
We are repeatedly seeing pilots apparently incapable of basic unusual attitude recovery or basic proficiency in cockpit scan and basic IFR procedures...just looking here at this board right now not one of the three current tragedies can have happened (based on what we currently know) with the combination of proper scan and procedures...yet all of you are ignoring the basic fact that all to often the PF isn't even the PM and the other guy in the pointy end might as well be in the back with me...
Actually, based on what we know so far about the three current tragedies (Polish Air force, Afriqiyah & Air India Express) there is nothing to suggest that a lack of proficiency with "basic unusual attitude recovery or basic proficiency in cockpit scan and basic IFR procedures" had anything to do with any of them.
Information available so far suggests that the PAF TU-154M commander knew very well that he was descending below the minimums for the approach he was conducting. If true that would be an error in decision making that no amount of handling or IFR procedures proficiency could prevent.
Likewise, the Air India Express accident is the result of a runway over-run, the common causes for which are excessive altitude at the threshold or excessive speed at touchdown resulting a long landing, or a degradation in runway or aircraft conditions impeding normal braking ability. The facts to support which it is in this case aren't in, but none of the alternatives involves a failure in proficiency resulting from an over reliance on automation or instrument flying skill. When the facts are known, however, the likliehood is that we will be looking again at a decision making error as opposed to a handling error.
And for the accident that this thread is about, up to this point there has not been a single shred of evidence that points to either automation itself, or piloting skills that have been atrophied by a reliance on automation as a causal factor. So far we know precious little, but what little we do know (allowing that Sitting Bull's info is accurate) suggests that the aircraft was under control until some point just after it initiated a go-around and that it climbed then reversed and descended very quickly. Why is not known, but the fact that the aircraft was wings level is telling. Unintentional losses of control resulting from poor instrument scan almost always result in a departure first in roll followed by pitch, which if it had happened here would have resulted in the aircraft impacting in a banked attitude, not straight ahead nose first as observed by Alitalia.
Pending other evidence being adduced, I'd suggest that an explanation fitting these few facts is a somatogravic illusion, the response to which may have been sufficiently abrupt to place the aircraft into an unrecoverable attitude even if a recovery was attempted. If it was this, there again neither automation nor automation dependency will have played a part. The result would be the same regardless of the size of the dials (they don't get much better than the A330's anyhow) or the qualities of the autopilot.
I suppose you could argue that succumbing to a somatogravic illusion reflects a lack of instrument flying proficiency, but that's a bit facile as it doesn't consider the difficulty of replicating such conditions in a training or line environment, the fact that all the hand flown approaches in the world won't provide you with the same experience if they result (as 99% do) in a landing, or the fact that in the right conditions the illusion can be very, very powerful indeed.
In this last quality it might be comparable to the illusion that reading enough of what's posted on PPRuNe can make some who describe themselves as SLF sitting in the back believe that they are qualified to make such sweeping statements as "We are repeatedly seeing pilots apparently incapable of basic unusual attitude recovery or basic proficiency in cockpit scan and basic IFR procedures."
Truly amazing.
Now can we start sticking to facts known or genuinely relevant operating experience as the basis for future conjecture?
ELAC
Last edited by ELAC; 26th May 2010 at 13:56.
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aterpster,
let me make clear that my comments were general, and do not refer in particular to the host country.
First, most countries which are members of ICAO do not publish details of investigations publically, in particular those with more limited resouces. The NTSBs of this world are the exception, not the rule. (Although the global trend towards publication is to be welcomed.)
Second, all investigators, everywhere, operate under non-disclosure agreements.
So your comment
goes way beyond what I was trying to say. I don't think you can conclude anything about the host country from what I was saying, except that it's not the U.S., France, Britain, Germany or Australia.
PBL
let me make clear that my comments were general, and do not refer in particular to the host country.
First, most countries which are members of ICAO do not publish details of investigations publically, in particular those with more limited resouces. The NTSBs of this world are the exception, not the rule. (Although the global trend towards publication is to be welcomed.)
Second, all investigators, everywhere, operate under non-disclosure agreements.
So your comment
Originally Posted by aterpster
If that is indeed the end result, then all responsible carriers best avoid operating into that country.
PBL
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On the Alitalia observations, I don't believe there has been an official statement released on what they saw. In fact, reading back through this thread, there seem to be conflicting narratives about the sequence as they supposedly observed it.
There is no plot that I have seen of the position and orientation of the Alitalia plane at the time the crew observed the impact, nor has there been any calculation of the distance between the Alitalia plane and the first pole knocked down, nor a correlation of that distance with the visibility at the time.
There is no plot that I have seen of the position and orientation of the Alitalia plane at the time the crew observed the impact, nor has there been any calculation of the distance between the Alitalia plane and the first pole knocked down, nor a correlation of that distance with the visibility at the time.