Mid-air collision over Brasil
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Confusio Helvetica
Posts: 311
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TCAS is a failsafe system. When a failsafe engages, that means the normal system has failed.
Design-wise, you do not run the normal system on the assumption that the failsafe will "fill in the gaps"; the failsafe is not part of the system. Nor do you go against a failsafe in favor of the (failed) normal system.
So, no, philosophically one should never operate ATC on the assumption that "TCAS will save my bacon if I'm wrong". That is counting on failure.
And yeah, sending folks to jail isn't going to make the skies any safer. It'll just increase stress, turnover, and ultimately accidents.
Design-wise, you do not run the normal system on the assumption that the failsafe will "fill in the gaps"; the failsafe is not part of the system. Nor do you go against a failsafe in favor of the (failed) normal system.
So, no, philosophically one should never operate ATC on the assumption that "TCAS will save my bacon if I'm wrong". That is counting on failure.
And yeah, sending folks to jail isn't going to make the skies any safer. It'll just increase stress, turnover, and ultimately accidents.
foxtrot xray
Join Date: Jan 2002
Location: Midwest USA
Posts: 84
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
arcniz
Perhaps,perhaps, perhaps...................................
TCAS is a supplementary system...a safety enhancement .......and when it works (including the pilot interface) it gets the job done; there have been some notable cases where a lot of bacon was saved.
It is not a substitute for ATC.
Perhaps the ATC controller should have coordinated with the adjoining sector to advise of the situation. Perhaps the ATC equipment should have been configured to prominently display/flag loss of Mode C as it is in the US implementations. Perhaps ATC should have instituted lost comm actions 30 minutes before impact considering the failed attempt to communicate, lost secondary radar and mode C, and intermittent primary returns
Regardless of TCAS status, known or unknown, basic ATC procedures must always be followed and it appears that they were not in this case.
TCAS is a supplementary system...a safety enhancement .......and when it works (including the pilot interface) it gets the job done; there have been some notable cases where a lot of bacon was saved.
It is not a substitute for ATC.
Perhaps the ATC controller should have coordinated with the adjoining sector to advise of the situation. Perhaps the ATC equipment should have been configured to prominently display/flag loss of Mode C as it is in the US implementations. Perhaps ATC should have instituted lost comm actions 30 minutes before impact considering the failed attempt to communicate, lost secondary radar and mode C, and intermittent primary returns
Regardless of TCAS status, known or unknown, basic ATC procedures must always be followed and it appears that they were not in this case.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Spain
Posts: 82
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It's a Jungle Down There
take a look at this article
http://www.avweb.com/news/pelican/193965-1.html
http://www.avweb.com/news/pelican/193965-1.html
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: flyover country USA
Age: 82
Posts: 4,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
More to the point, it is one of several layers of separation redundancy.
ATC is first, but it relies on functioning transponders. TCAS also relies on two functioning transponders.
Transponders can "go dark", in a stealthy manner, removing both layers of protection. "Common-point failure" is the lingo.
There is another available level of separation redundancy, namely track offset, that has been discussed thoroughly in this forum. Some pilots think it's great. Some ATC think it's "unprofessional" and reflects poorly on their - ummm - "control".
The proof is left to the student.
ATC is first, but it relies on functioning transponders. TCAS also relies on two functioning transponders.
Transponders can "go dark", in a stealthy manner, removing both layers of protection. "Common-point failure" is the lingo.
There is another available level of separation redundancy, namely track offset, that has been discussed thoroughly in this forum. Some pilots think it's great. Some ATC think it's "unprofessional" and reflects poorly on their - ummm - "control".
The proof is left to the student.
There is a deeper software problem.
How is it that when the Legacy was cleared to Manaus at FL370, the flight plan was not amended with FL370 to Manaus?
If that had happened the radar target on the scope would have been showing 370 all the way to Manaus, at least until ATC intervened with a new altitude.
That most likely would have clued in the controller(s) in charge of the sector that they needed to change somebody's altitude.
It's not a TCAS-aided collision, it's an ATC software-aided collision.
How is it that when the Legacy was cleared to Manaus at FL370, the flight plan was not amended with FL370 to Manaus?
If that had happened the radar target on the scope would have been showing 370 all the way to Manaus, at least until ATC intervened with a new altitude.
That most likely would have clued in the controller(s) in charge of the sector that they needed to change somebody's altitude.
It's not a TCAS-aided collision, it's an ATC software-aided collision.
Join Date: Dec 2005
Location: No. Cal, USA
Age: 72
Posts: 112
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I beg to differ with you. The classical definition of a failsafe system is one that fails safe. For example, RAIM GPS where the integrity of the information is constantly monitored and a warning is issued if the information is corrupt or invalid.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Chile
Posts: 61
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Today Federal Police said that at least 3 controllers had important responsability in the collision (1 of São José dos Campos and 2 from Brasilia).
foxtrot xray
Join Date: Jan 2002
Location: Midwest USA
Posts: 84
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
caos
au contraire mon ami
The Legacy was initially cleared to Manaus to maintain FL 370. No element of its clearance instructed it to do otherwise.
The controllers should have amended the clearance when 600XL checked-in just a few minutes prior to crossing BRS to either "cross BRS at and maintain 360" or "after BRS descend to and maintain 360' or just plain descend to and maintain 360". As previously noted, the obligation for 600XL to descend on its own to 360 materializes only after IT determines that a lost comm .situation exists.
The Legacy was initially cleared to Manaus to maintain FL 370. No element of its clearance instructed it to do otherwise.
The controllers should have amended the clearance when 600XL checked-in just a few minutes prior to crossing BRS to either "cross BRS at and maintain 360" or "after BRS descend to and maintain 360' or just plain descend to and maintain 360". As previously noted, the obligation for 600XL to descend on its own to 360 materializes only after IT determines that a lost comm .situation exists.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Chile
Posts: 61
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
au contraire mon ami
The Legacy was initially cleared to Manaus to maintain FL 370. No element of its clearance instructed it to do otherwise.
The controllers should have amended the clearance when 600XL checked-in just a few minutes prior to crossing BRS to either "cross BRS at and maintain 360" or "after BRS descend to and maintain 360' or just plain descend to and maintain 360". As previously noted, the obligation for 600XL to descend on its own to 360 materializes only after IT determines that a lost comm .situation exists.
The Legacy was initially cleared to Manaus to maintain FL 370. No element of its clearance instructed it to do otherwise.
The controllers should have amended the clearance when 600XL checked-in just a few minutes prior to crossing BRS to either "cross BRS at and maintain 360" or "after BRS descend to and maintain 360' or just plain descend to and maintain 360". As previously noted, the obligation for 600XL to descend on its own to 360 materializes only after IT determines that a lost comm .situation exists.
From preliminar report:
" At 3:56pm the Legacy N600XL passed BRS level at FL370. There is no record of a request from N600XL to the control agencies to conduct a change of altitude, after reaching flight level 370. The airplane made calls, but there is no communication in which it requested a change of flight level. There is also no record of any instruction from air traffic controllers at Brasilia Center to the aircraft, directing a change of altitude. "
This should be the exactly point of why Federal Police stablish "important responsability" to the Controller of SBSJ and was mentioned in the media several days ago.
amitiés
According to the reports, the clearance to Manaus at FL370 was relayed to the Legacy by the São José dos Campos controller. Until otherwise informed, I have to expect he was passing on what center had told him.
Right now, it looks to me that the filed flight plan was amended by center (as centers do with great frequency) without amending the active flight plan in the computer so that the radar display would maintain the amended cleared altitude to Manaus.
Right now, it looks to me that the filed flight plan was amended by center (as centers do with great frequency) without amending the active flight plan in the computer so that the radar display would maintain the amended cleared altitude to Manaus.
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: Somewhere Over America
Posts: 192
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
An interesting synopsis of the whole twisted affair can be found at:
http://joesharkeyat.********.com/
http://joesharkeyat.********.com/
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Confusio Helvetica
Posts: 311
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It is not really a redundancy, since that would imply providing the same functionality. TCAS does not ensure separation, it helps prevent collision.
That part of the Legacy story is clear: Transponder (and TCAS) and Radio were not operational. The crew may have made an error, but it wasn't a gross error (as in "hey, let's join the 410 club! better switch that off!).
ATC's job is to maintain separation. No contact was made with the Gol flight. The most charitable reading of the events is that the folks down at the ATC were so caught up in trying to resolve the communication issue that they failed to maintain separation.
As an analogy: a large aircraft tries to take off with flaps and slats up, with disastrous results. The takeoff configuration horn turns out to be INOP. Do you blame the maintenance guy last touched it, or the flight crew that didn't pay attention to the checklist?
Would you arrest any of them?
foxtrot xray
Join Date: Jan 2002
Location: Midwest USA
Posts: 84
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
CAOS
Thanks for the quotations and updates.
Looks like it came from the police or some other non-aviation entity because of the quote regarding the fact that the Legacy did not request a level change.
The Legacy was cleared to maintain FL370. That's it. It was under no obligation nor would it have beeen expected to request a different level after passing BRS(at which time it was under radar surveilance with an ATC acknowledgement that it was maintaining 370).
The real failure of ATC in this situation is not that it could not effect a change or confirm the level of 600XL, but its failure to assure that the GOL flight (or any other conflicting traffic in its sector or adjoining sectors) was properly informed of the situation so that appropriate adjustments(heading/level)could have been made on a contingency basis.
Looks like it came from the police or some other non-aviation entity because of the quote regarding the fact that the Legacy did not request a level change.
The Legacy was cleared to maintain FL370. That's it. It was under no obligation nor would it have beeen expected to request a different level after passing BRS(at which time it was under radar surveilance with an ATC acknowledgement that it was maintaining 370).
The real failure of ATC in this situation is not that it could not effect a change or confirm the level of 600XL, but its failure to assure that the GOL flight (or any other conflicting traffic in its sector or adjoining sectors) was properly informed of the situation so that appropriate adjustments(heading/level)could have been made on a contingency basis.
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: Somewhere Over America
Posts: 192
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: Somewhere Over America
Posts: 192
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The following letter was sent to the CAL CEO and the National Officers at ALPA.
Gentlemen,
On Saturday December 9th First Officer Doug Marotta and I were honored to represent Continental Airlines and the Airline Pilots Association in welcoming back fellow pilots Joe Lepore and Jan Paladino.
Doug and I were graciously invited by ExcelAire Service CEO and President Bob Sherry to join more than two hundred family members, friends and colleagues to welcome back Joe and Jan. We all waited for the Embraer Legacy, the same type of aircraft involved in the mid-air collision, which carried Joe and Jan from Brazil at ExcelAire’s hangar at Long Island MacArthur in Ronkonkoma, N.Y.
This was truly an experience both Doug and I will remember for the rest of our lives. We participated and witnessed a very emotional homecoming, one that left very few with dry eyes. After Joe and Jan were so emotionally greeted, a press conference began. Afterwards we all enjoyed a catered lunch in the ExcelAire hangar.
Doug and I had the opportunity to talk at length with both Joe and Jan. We told both of them how very proud we all were, not only of their heroic landing of a severely damaged aircraft in the middle of the Amazon jungle, but also of how they handled themselves for the next seventy days of virtual incarceration in an extremely hostile environment. We expressed that they both represented the very best of professional aviation. Joe and Jan expressed sincere gratitude for all of the assistance provided by ALPA and their fellow peer pilots. I told them ALPA isn't just about negotiating and enforcing contracts, a big part of ALPA is pilots helping pilots.
We were also able to talk extensively with three individuals who were primarily responsible for Joe and Jan’s safe return. Mr. Robert Torricella , Joe and Jan’s Miami attorney, who was nothing short of amazing. He more closely resembled a friend of Joe and Jan’s with a life long bond than anything like the normal attorney-client type of relationship.
Robert, incredibly, spent seven of the ten weeks Joe and Jan were held captive in Brazil in the same hotel suite at the JW Marriott in Cabana Beach in Rio. The only reason he left their side was when it was absolutely necessary to return to the United States to attend to their defense. Robert told us he ate the same food, slept at the same time and constricted himself to the same physical and mental limitations as Joe and Jan. Sometimes that meant eating dinner at two in the afternoon or two in the morning as Joe and Jan’s body clock changed. He recalled one two-week period in which the three of them remained in one suite with the curtains closed never opening the door.
Robert stated that there would be no way he could ever express his gratitude to the staff at the JW Marriott Cabana Beach. He said that whatever Joe and Jan needed the staff bent over backwards to accommodate. This included clearing out the entire 17th floor by moving guests immediately out and providing security upon Robert’s request because the hotel was being infiltrated by the Brazilian paparazzi. When Joe and Jan needed to go outside, the staff secured the roof and provided security to allow Joe and Jan to get much needed fresh air. They also provided decoy cars out of the hotel to the Federal Court house for the media to follow when it was needed to safely and securely move Joe and Jan to other locations.
Robert asked me to forward to all of you that if there is any way in the future it would be possible you for you to provide business to the JW Marriott Cabana Beach, including booking airline crews for layovers, he would sincerely appreciate it.
Mr. Robert Sharkey, a reporter for the New York Times and fellow mid-air survivor on the Legacy, accurately documented the entire seventy-day ordeal. During this time period, there wasn't a day that he didn't update his blog at www.joesharkey.com or write an article in order to continue to keep media attention on this terrible injustice and help provide a medium for the huge support for so many, not only New York residents, but for people from all over the world.
Mr. Bob Sherry made sure every base was covered to bring home his two employees. His company paid $75,000 for the Legacy charter because he was very concerned about Joe’s and Jan’s safety and didn't want the two of them to spend a minute longer in Brazil than they had to. Even though this was Jan’s first trip with his company he was treated like he had been an employee with many years of longevity.
Bob wanted to make sure everyone understands that even though Joe and Jan are home the battle is far from over. Joe and Jan are still criminally charged and face extradition back to Brazil. The precedent of criminalization of US pilots flying abroad is significant and he asks that ALPA and Continental continue to use their political muscle to make sure this terrible injustice never happens again to anyone else. Bob also wanted everyone to know that U.S. Representative Peter King (NY) was the only politician to get involved and play a significant role in Joe’s and Jan’s return. Despite the many requests for assistance and many personal calls Bob had placed to New York Senators Clinton and Schumer pleading for help, never once did either of them take a moment to respond.
Thank you, everyone, for your significant assistance helping bring my new friends Joe and Jan safely back home. As stated in a sign a little girl was holding at the welcome home celebration, “you are the best holiday gift ever”.
I wish you and your families a safe and happy Holiday season.
Sincerely,
Captain Jayson Baron
Gentlemen,
On Saturday December 9th First Officer Doug Marotta and I were honored to represent Continental Airlines and the Airline Pilots Association in welcoming back fellow pilots Joe Lepore and Jan Paladino.
Doug and I were graciously invited by ExcelAire Service CEO and President Bob Sherry to join more than two hundred family members, friends and colleagues to welcome back Joe and Jan. We all waited for the Embraer Legacy, the same type of aircraft involved in the mid-air collision, which carried Joe and Jan from Brazil at ExcelAire’s hangar at Long Island MacArthur in Ronkonkoma, N.Y.
This was truly an experience both Doug and I will remember for the rest of our lives. We participated and witnessed a very emotional homecoming, one that left very few with dry eyes. After Joe and Jan were so emotionally greeted, a press conference began. Afterwards we all enjoyed a catered lunch in the ExcelAire hangar.
Doug and I had the opportunity to talk at length with both Joe and Jan. We told both of them how very proud we all were, not only of their heroic landing of a severely damaged aircraft in the middle of the Amazon jungle, but also of how they handled themselves for the next seventy days of virtual incarceration in an extremely hostile environment. We expressed that they both represented the very best of professional aviation. Joe and Jan expressed sincere gratitude for all of the assistance provided by ALPA and their fellow peer pilots. I told them ALPA isn't just about negotiating and enforcing contracts, a big part of ALPA is pilots helping pilots.
We were also able to talk extensively with three individuals who were primarily responsible for Joe and Jan’s safe return. Mr. Robert Torricella , Joe and Jan’s Miami attorney, who was nothing short of amazing. He more closely resembled a friend of Joe and Jan’s with a life long bond than anything like the normal attorney-client type of relationship.
Robert, incredibly, spent seven of the ten weeks Joe and Jan were held captive in Brazil in the same hotel suite at the JW Marriott in Cabana Beach in Rio. The only reason he left their side was when it was absolutely necessary to return to the United States to attend to their defense. Robert told us he ate the same food, slept at the same time and constricted himself to the same physical and mental limitations as Joe and Jan. Sometimes that meant eating dinner at two in the afternoon or two in the morning as Joe and Jan’s body clock changed. He recalled one two-week period in which the three of them remained in one suite with the curtains closed never opening the door.
Robert stated that there would be no way he could ever express his gratitude to the staff at the JW Marriott Cabana Beach. He said that whatever Joe and Jan needed the staff bent over backwards to accommodate. This included clearing out the entire 17th floor by moving guests immediately out and providing security upon Robert’s request because the hotel was being infiltrated by the Brazilian paparazzi. When Joe and Jan needed to go outside, the staff secured the roof and provided security to allow Joe and Jan to get much needed fresh air. They also provided decoy cars out of the hotel to the Federal Court house for the media to follow when it was needed to safely and securely move Joe and Jan to other locations.
Robert asked me to forward to all of you that if there is any way in the future it would be possible you for you to provide business to the JW Marriott Cabana Beach, including booking airline crews for layovers, he would sincerely appreciate it.
Mr. Robert Sharkey, a reporter for the New York Times and fellow mid-air survivor on the Legacy, accurately documented the entire seventy-day ordeal. During this time period, there wasn't a day that he didn't update his blog at www.joesharkey.com or write an article in order to continue to keep media attention on this terrible injustice and help provide a medium for the huge support for so many, not only New York residents, but for people from all over the world.
Mr. Bob Sherry made sure every base was covered to bring home his two employees. His company paid $75,000 for the Legacy charter because he was very concerned about Joe’s and Jan’s safety and didn't want the two of them to spend a minute longer in Brazil than they had to. Even though this was Jan’s first trip with his company he was treated like he had been an employee with many years of longevity.
Bob wanted to make sure everyone understands that even though Joe and Jan are home the battle is far from over. Joe and Jan are still criminally charged and face extradition back to Brazil. The precedent of criminalization of US pilots flying abroad is significant and he asks that ALPA and Continental continue to use their political muscle to make sure this terrible injustice never happens again to anyone else. Bob also wanted everyone to know that U.S. Representative Peter King (NY) was the only politician to get involved and play a significant role in Joe’s and Jan’s return. Despite the many requests for assistance and many personal calls Bob had placed to New York Senators Clinton and Schumer pleading for help, never once did either of them take a moment to respond.
Thank you, everyone, for your significant assistance helping bring my new friends Joe and Jan safely back home. As stated in a sign a little girl was holding at the welcome home celebration, “you are the best holiday gift ever”.
I wish you and your families a safe and happy Holiday season.
Sincerely,
Captain Jayson Baron
foxtrot xray
Join Date: Jan 2002
Location: Midwest USA
Posts: 84
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
CAL/ALPA Letter
First cabin all the way........this goes a long way to keeping the matter on a professional level. During this period of further investigation, analysis, retrospection and finger pointing, ALPA and the AAL unit should keep the heat on as the well being of its members flying to places like Brazil is now in serious doubt. Also, in all of this we would all do well not loose sight of the primary victims here...the passengers and crew lost on the GOL flight (and their families) for whom there will be no joyful homecomings but whose losses will pave the way for major changes in the system that failed them.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Chile
Posts: 61
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A310driver
Thanks for the quotations and updates.
Looks like it came from the police or some other non-aviation entity because of the quote regarding the fact that the Legacy did not request a level change.
The Legacy was cleared to maintain FL370. That's it. It was under no obligation nor would it have beeen expected to request a different level after passing BRS(at which time it was under radar surveilance with an ATC acknowledgement that it was maintaining 370).
The real failure of ATC in this situation is not that it could not effect a change or confirm the level of 600XL, but its failure to assure that the GOL flight (or any other conflicting traffic in its sector or adjoining sectors) was properly informed of the situation so that appropriate adjustments(heading/level)could have been made on a contingency basis.
Looks like it came from the police or some other non-aviation entity because of the quote regarding the fact that the Legacy did not request a level change.
The Legacy was cleared to maintain FL370. That's it. It was under no obligation nor would it have beeen expected to request a different level after passing BRS(at which time it was under radar surveilance with an ATC acknowledgement that it was maintaining 370).
The real failure of ATC in this situation is not that it could not effect a change or confirm the level of 600XL, but its failure to assure that the GOL flight (or any other conflicting traffic in its sector or adjoining sectors) was properly informed of the situation so that appropriate adjustments(heading/level)could have been made on a contingency basis.
http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/2006/061122a.htm .
This point was the first of a serie that cause the collision.
Legacy crew have the right to think they were cleared FL370 to Manaus, but ATC says that this comunication was only to clear FL370 up to Brasilia, of course was a mistake from SBSJ ATC the way they talked to the Legacy's crew (something like .... FL370, Manaus)
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: Didcot, England
Posts: 12
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes, I would, but I would therefore make doubly sure that, when writing an article that would be published into worldwide and high-profile circulation, that at no point did that bias affect its contents, to the point that generalisations were made, truths ignored, and details embellished. This would merely cause any factual parts to be ignored.