Mid-air collision over Brasil
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Brazil air chaos follows strike
Brazil air chaos follows strike
There have been chaotic scenes at most of Brazil's airports as airlines tried to find flights for thousands of passengers caught up in a strike.
Airports resumed flights after air traffic controllers suspended a strike to protest about working conditions.
The strike briefly halted all flights out of the country's airports.
The action spread across Brazil after air traffic controllers went on hunger strike in the capital, Brasilia, leaving thousands stranded.
For several hours, Brazil's huge air traffic network was at a total standstill as controllers refused to authorise any take-offs or landings.
Long queues snaked outside airport halls, particularly in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, after nearly 100 domestic and international flights were cancelled and many more were delayed.
"The situation will not return to normal before three days," the head of the state airport authority Infraero, Jose Carlos Pereira, said.
Police were called to the main airports to help deal with passengers furious at the delays, reports say.
In Brasilia, a group of passengers invaded the tarmac when their plane for the south-eastern city of Belo Horizonte was rerouted to a different city, the Associated Press news agency reports.
Brasilia is the main traffic control centre for all flights through central Brazil.
Ongoing crisis
It was the culmination of a crisis in the system that has created major delays across the country for several months.
In the early hours of Saturday, the controllers agreed to resume work after the government agreed to begin negotiations on increasing the salaries of the controllers and to discuss removing at least part of the system from the control of the military - a key demand of the unions.
The striking controllers had said they had lost all confidence in their commanders and the equipment at their disposal.
Air traffic controllers in Brazil have staged similar protests since last September, when 154 people were killed in the country's worst air disaster.
The BBC's Tim Hirsch in Sao Paulo says internal flights have been in a state of chaos since the crash.
Air traffic control in Brazil is under the control of the air force, and most controllers are military and non-unionised.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/h...as/6514999.stm
There have been chaotic scenes at most of Brazil's airports as airlines tried to find flights for thousands of passengers caught up in a strike.
Airports resumed flights after air traffic controllers suspended a strike to protest about working conditions.
The strike briefly halted all flights out of the country's airports.
The action spread across Brazil after air traffic controllers went on hunger strike in the capital, Brasilia, leaving thousands stranded.
For several hours, Brazil's huge air traffic network was at a total standstill as controllers refused to authorise any take-offs or landings.
Long queues snaked outside airport halls, particularly in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, after nearly 100 domestic and international flights were cancelled and many more were delayed.
"The situation will not return to normal before three days," the head of the state airport authority Infraero, Jose Carlos Pereira, said.
Police were called to the main airports to help deal with passengers furious at the delays, reports say.
In Brasilia, a group of passengers invaded the tarmac when their plane for the south-eastern city of Belo Horizonte was rerouted to a different city, the Associated Press news agency reports.
Brasilia is the main traffic control centre for all flights through central Brazil.
Ongoing crisis
It was the culmination of a crisis in the system that has created major delays across the country for several months.
In the early hours of Saturday, the controllers agreed to resume work after the government agreed to begin negotiations on increasing the salaries of the controllers and to discuss removing at least part of the system from the control of the military - a key demand of the unions.
The striking controllers had said they had lost all confidence in their commanders and the equipment at their disposal.
Air traffic controllers in Brazil have staged similar protests since last September, when 154 people were killed in the country's worst air disaster.
The BBC's Tim Hirsch in Sao Paulo says internal flights have been in a state of chaos since the crash.
Air traffic control in Brazil is under the control of the air force, and most controllers are military and non-unionised.
Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/h...as/6514999.stm
Under pressure from the airforce and the rest of the military, Lula has "de-authorised" the agreement his Planning minister, on his behalf, signed with the striking ATCers last Friday night.
The airforce want to court-martial the sergeants who stopped work and had already begun arresting them when Lula, enroute to the US, ordered negotiations.
The airforce want to court-martial the sergeants who stopped work and had already begun arresting them when Lula, enroute to the US, ordered negotiations.
From today’s Estado de Sao Paulo after an interview with a line pilot on the Rio-Sao Paulo shuttle. Liberal translation; apologies for any inaccuracies
Pilots and controllers disagree on procedures; mid-air arguments
Captains reveal: some ATC instructions against air safety
Mariana Barbosa (O Estado de Sao Paulo)
A happy pilot, at ease with life, is all passengers could ask for when entering an aircraft. And for the majority of pilots, flying has always been a great source of pleasure. That’s how it had been throughout the 28 year career of the Rio-Sao Paulo pilot of a large Brazilian airline. For the last six months, though, the job’s become stress itself. “I was always happy to go to work. But now, three hours before I leave home, I’m worried about how I’m going to handle the situations that arise, how I’m going to end the day, what time I’ll get home. My relationship with the job has changed entirely”, says the pilot, who prefers not to be named.
So-called safety procedures adopted by ATC after the Gol accident on 29th September and which have resulted in widespread delays and cancellations throughout Brazilian commercial aviation, have altered a longstanding relationship of trust between pilots and controllers. “We’ve always had a good relationship, controllers were our guardian angels”, says the captain, “and they still are, despite the crisis. But much of the trust is gone. You just don’t know whether what he’s asking for is really for the sake of safety or just to screw us up”.
These situations are now frequently winding up in heated arguments. And, since stronger language tends to generate infringement reports, pilots and controllers are going heavy on the irony and sarcasm, with pilots swearing only when there’s no risk of identification. Phrases like “that’s a lie”, “bull****”, “son of a bitch” tend to come from other aircraft on the frequency and who can’t be identified. When it reaches that level controllers are left with no option but to try to recover control with “let’s keep to standard phraseology”.
Pilots are complaining that some ATC instructions are unjustifiable and, often, run contrary to flight safety. For example, ATC authorize a departure but then order the aircraft to orbit for thirty minutes at low altitude until the requested airway is free or until the single controller has less than fourteen aircraft to handle.
The heavier the aircraft and the lower the flight level, the greater the fuel consumption. That generates cost for the airline; fuel is at least 30% of operating cost. But not just that; safety demands that an aircraft take off with sufficient fuel to reach its destination with sufficient reserves to land at an alternate, plus fuel for a further 30 minutes. “Circling for thirty minutes while heavy, at low altitudes, has a direct impact on flight safety”, says the captain.
According to him, instructions to circle at low levels right after takeoff were more commonplace early on in the crisis. “We explained to them how this procedure affected safety and that it was not the proper way to go about applying pressure. They no longer do that; now they ask us to circle nearer the destination. It’s not as bad but it’s still costly”.
Often, when the landing delay is too long, airlines opt to deviate flights to another airport. “Planes are deviating too often and there are too many landing at the limit in terms of fuel remaining”, the pilot says. The result is angry passengers who have to complete their journeys by bus. For crews it often means another day away from home. “My roster’s become an abstraction. We’ve been living in a state of emergency for six months now”.
According to the captain, these situations now occur more frequently on Fridays, at peak hours or when ATC is working to rule.
He also questions the veracity of some information transmitted by controllers to justify holdups: “Many times you might be approaching Congonhas and they ask you to hold over Santos because the apron’s full. When we check with our own ground staff they say it’s not true. The controller then says he got that information from the tower and that there are x aircraft in the hold ahead of us. That happens every day and it gets to a point that would try the patience of a Buddhist monk.”
Ends.
Comment:
Since the Gol accident pilots have been very quiet on the ATC subject. Less so now, nudged, perhaps, by the IFALPA release and by flight crew strike threats in Argentina, also related to ATC deficiencies.
Articles like the one above are appearing more frequently in the dailies and in weekly newsmagazines. Some, like this one, fairly straightforward, others a good deal more sensational. All of them bombarding the traveling public and, to some extent, "the other side"; this one critical of ATC which may, in turn, require someone in ATC to criticize pilots etc.
ATC staff, military and civil, don’t know which way to turn. Different factions have different objectives and they’ve now become pawns in a political struggle between the military – with their own internal differences of opinion – and the executive who, at first, signaled privatization but now dither.
There’s a phrase in Brazil, “Empurrar com a barriga”, literally translated as “To push with the belly”, i.e. nudge things along in the expectation that the opposition has no knives on his person – or in the hope they won’t be used. It’s a euphemism for lack of leadership or planning. The executive – and the military – have been doing that since well prior to the Gol accident. When knives do appear, though, it’s not always from the expected quarters; some rather large ones can be wielded by individual players – in ATC or on the flight deck.
Pilots and controllers disagree on procedures; mid-air arguments
Captains reveal: some ATC instructions against air safety
Mariana Barbosa (O Estado de Sao Paulo)
A happy pilot, at ease with life, is all passengers could ask for when entering an aircraft. And for the majority of pilots, flying has always been a great source of pleasure. That’s how it had been throughout the 28 year career of the Rio-Sao Paulo pilot of a large Brazilian airline. For the last six months, though, the job’s become stress itself. “I was always happy to go to work. But now, three hours before I leave home, I’m worried about how I’m going to handle the situations that arise, how I’m going to end the day, what time I’ll get home. My relationship with the job has changed entirely”, says the pilot, who prefers not to be named.
So-called safety procedures adopted by ATC after the Gol accident on 29th September and which have resulted in widespread delays and cancellations throughout Brazilian commercial aviation, have altered a longstanding relationship of trust between pilots and controllers. “We’ve always had a good relationship, controllers were our guardian angels”, says the captain, “and they still are, despite the crisis. But much of the trust is gone. You just don’t know whether what he’s asking for is really for the sake of safety or just to screw us up”.
These situations are now frequently winding up in heated arguments. And, since stronger language tends to generate infringement reports, pilots and controllers are going heavy on the irony and sarcasm, with pilots swearing only when there’s no risk of identification. Phrases like “that’s a lie”, “bull****”, “son of a bitch” tend to come from other aircraft on the frequency and who can’t be identified. When it reaches that level controllers are left with no option but to try to recover control with “let’s keep to standard phraseology”.
Pilots are complaining that some ATC instructions are unjustifiable and, often, run contrary to flight safety. For example, ATC authorize a departure but then order the aircraft to orbit for thirty minutes at low altitude until the requested airway is free or until the single controller has less than fourteen aircraft to handle.
The heavier the aircraft and the lower the flight level, the greater the fuel consumption. That generates cost for the airline; fuel is at least 30% of operating cost. But not just that; safety demands that an aircraft take off with sufficient fuel to reach its destination with sufficient reserves to land at an alternate, plus fuel for a further 30 minutes. “Circling for thirty minutes while heavy, at low altitudes, has a direct impact on flight safety”, says the captain.
According to him, instructions to circle at low levels right after takeoff were more commonplace early on in the crisis. “We explained to them how this procedure affected safety and that it was not the proper way to go about applying pressure. They no longer do that; now they ask us to circle nearer the destination. It’s not as bad but it’s still costly”.
Often, when the landing delay is too long, airlines opt to deviate flights to another airport. “Planes are deviating too often and there are too many landing at the limit in terms of fuel remaining”, the pilot says. The result is angry passengers who have to complete their journeys by bus. For crews it often means another day away from home. “My roster’s become an abstraction. We’ve been living in a state of emergency for six months now”.
According to the captain, these situations now occur more frequently on Fridays, at peak hours or when ATC is working to rule.
He also questions the veracity of some information transmitted by controllers to justify holdups: “Many times you might be approaching Congonhas and they ask you to hold over Santos because the apron’s full. When we check with our own ground staff they say it’s not true. The controller then says he got that information from the tower and that there are x aircraft in the hold ahead of us. That happens every day and it gets to a point that would try the patience of a Buddhist monk.”
Ends.
Comment:
Since the Gol accident pilots have been very quiet on the ATC subject. Less so now, nudged, perhaps, by the IFALPA release and by flight crew strike threats in Argentina, also related to ATC deficiencies.
Articles like the one above are appearing more frequently in the dailies and in weekly newsmagazines. Some, like this one, fairly straightforward, others a good deal more sensational. All of them bombarding the traveling public and, to some extent, "the other side"; this one critical of ATC which may, in turn, require someone in ATC to criticize pilots etc.
ATC staff, military and civil, don’t know which way to turn. Different factions have different objectives and they’ve now become pawns in a political struggle between the military – with their own internal differences of opinion – and the executive who, at first, signaled privatization but now dither.
There’s a phrase in Brazil, “Empurrar com a barriga”, literally translated as “To push with the belly”, i.e. nudge things along in the expectation that the opposition has no knives on his person – or in the hope they won’t be used. It’s a euphemism for lack of leadership or planning. The executive – and the military – have been doing that since well prior to the Gol accident. When knives do appear, though, it’s not always from the expected quarters; some rather large ones can be wielded by individual players – in ATC or on the flight deck.
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From FSI:
GOL 737 crash update -- NTSB report
The pilots of the business jet apparently were not aware that the jet's
transponder was set to STANDBY mode and in this mode it was not transmitting data. This meant the jet's collision avoidance system, TCAS, could not display vital information that would have alerted the pilots that the Gol 737 was headed their way.
Here is a link to the NTSB letter:
http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2007/A07_35_37.pdf
This is some of what the NTSB had to say about what was happening on the
private jet:
CVR data from the Legacy airplane indicate that, during the crew's emergency descent to Cachimbo Air Base, the crew made a series of comments related to whether or not the TCAS was on. ATC radar data indicate that the transponder return for the airplane was again visible to ATC radar less than 30 seconds after these comments. About 2 minutes later, the crew made a comment related to setting the transponder to the emergency code (7700); ATC radar subsequently indicated the emergency code.
GOL 737 crash update -- NTSB report
The pilots of the business jet apparently were not aware that the jet's
transponder was set to STANDBY mode and in this mode it was not transmitting data. This meant the jet's collision avoidance system, TCAS, could not display vital information that would have alerted the pilots that the Gol 737 was headed their way.
Here is a link to the NTSB letter:
http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2007/A07_35_37.pdf
This is some of what the NTSB had to say about what was happening on the
private jet:
CVR data from the Legacy airplane indicate that, during the crew's emergency descent to Cachimbo Air Base, the crew made a series of comments related to whether or not the TCAS was on. ATC radar data indicate that the transponder return for the airplane was again visible to ATC radar less than 30 seconds after these comments. About 2 minutes later, the crew made a comment related to setting the transponder to the emergency code (7700); ATC radar subsequently indicated the emergency code.
Thanks F4F.
Brazilian media have picked it up but are, so far, handling it without sensationalism. The focus here has moved on to a congressional investigation into ATC, the airforce, Infraero etc. Govt trying to block/neutralize, opposition.. well you know...
Brazilian media have picked it up but are, so far, handling it without sensationalism. The focus here has moved on to a congressional investigation into ATC, the airforce, Infraero etc. Govt trying to block/neutralize, opposition.. well you know...
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The bottom line is that flying down here sucks right now. I totally agree with the article posted above. It's total bull. Brazil does not have the amount of traffic to require gate hold procedures and sequencing. We don't have that many planes. ATC work sucks. They can't handle more than 3 planes at a time. Often we have to wait at the gate because the hold short area is too "crowded" with 4 planes waiting for take off. They give you a 7 mile separation and even then it's not "safe" enough to take off between landing traffic. It's pathetic. I've never seen anything worse.
It seems from the report linked to above that this is a police action, no mention of the initial findings of the accident investigation.
Allowing this level of ignorance of aviation procedures into the mix is ridiculous. Unfortunately, it's happened before, in my country too.
Hopefully the official accident investigation won't be affected by these charges.
Allowing this level of ignorance of aviation procedures into the mix is ridiculous. Unfortunately, it's happened before, in my country too.
Hopefully the official accident investigation won't be affected by these charges.
Right, Markjoy.
The Federal Police (PF) hands over to Justice and now it's up to them. Justice will presumably wait for the official report to emerge and may even wait until the congressional investigation that started this week presents its results.
FP don't investigate ATC because that's military jurisdiction.
The indictment has been covered in the media but without sensationalism. Globo News showed someone carrying the "report", all 24 inches of A4.
The Federal Police (PF) hands over to Justice and now it's up to them. Justice will presumably wait for the official report to emerge and may even wait until the congressional investigation that started this week presents its results.
FP don't investigate ATC because that's military jurisdiction.
The indictment has been covered in the media but without sensationalism. Globo News showed someone carrying the "report", all 24 inches of A4.
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Well IFALPA are not happy see below its Press Release:
IFALPA says Brazilian Polícia Federal recommendation that Legacy crew be prosecuted is fundamentally flawed
Chertsey 10 May: The International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) is outraged to learn that the Brazilian Polícia Federal have recommended prosecution of Joseph Lepore and Jan Paladino, the pilots of the Embraer Legacy that collided with a Gol Airlines 737-800 in September of 2006, under section 261 of the Brazilian Penal Code “for placing a vessel or aircraft in jeopardy”.
The Federation believes that this course of action is flawed on a number of levels:
1. IFALPA strongly insists that, as laid down in ICAO Annex 13, Attachment E, there can be no criminal liability without intent. Brazilian law should respect this fundamental principle in all cases. As there does not seem to be any factual support for a finding that there was any intent by the Legacy crew to place their aircraft in danger, there should be no basis for prosecution under Brazilian law.
2. The decision by the Polícia Federal to exclude the military from their investigation is a staggering oversight. In its own report, the Polícia Federal acknowledges that air traffic controller performance was flawed yet failed to investigate fully the role played by air traffic control, vital to establish the sequence of events that led to the tragedy, claiming the military controllers are outside its jurisdiction.
3. Finally, IFALPA believes that in any accident it is vital that an independent technical investigation carried out by experts in air accident investigation must be completed before any criminal or civil action is pursued. To pre-empt the results of a expert technical investigation with a judicial investigation which may not be technically competent is counter productive to improvement of air safety.
IFALPA calls on the Prosecutor’s Office of Brazilian Ministry of Justice to take the opportunity comply with the guidance of ICAO Annex 13 concerning post accident prosecution and to correct the premature action of the Polícia Federal by waiting until the findings of the technical investigation are reported by CINTRA.
IFALPA says Brazilian Polícia Federal recommendation that Legacy crew be prosecuted is fundamentally flawed
Chertsey 10 May: The International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) is outraged to learn that the Brazilian Polícia Federal have recommended prosecution of Joseph Lepore and Jan Paladino, the pilots of the Embraer Legacy that collided with a Gol Airlines 737-800 in September of 2006, under section 261 of the Brazilian Penal Code “for placing a vessel or aircraft in jeopardy”.
The Federation believes that this course of action is flawed on a number of levels:
1. IFALPA strongly insists that, as laid down in ICAO Annex 13, Attachment E, there can be no criminal liability without intent. Brazilian law should respect this fundamental principle in all cases. As there does not seem to be any factual support for a finding that there was any intent by the Legacy crew to place their aircraft in danger, there should be no basis for prosecution under Brazilian law.
2. The decision by the Polícia Federal to exclude the military from their investigation is a staggering oversight. In its own report, the Polícia Federal acknowledges that air traffic controller performance was flawed yet failed to investigate fully the role played by air traffic control, vital to establish the sequence of events that led to the tragedy, claiming the military controllers are outside its jurisdiction.
3. Finally, IFALPA believes that in any accident it is vital that an independent technical investigation carried out by experts in air accident investigation must be completed before any criminal or civil action is pursued. To pre-empt the results of a expert technical investigation with a judicial investigation which may not be technically competent is counter productive to improvement of air safety.
IFALPA calls on the Prosecutor’s Office of Brazilian Ministry of Justice to take the opportunity comply with the guidance of ICAO Annex 13 concerning post accident prosecution and to correct the premature action of the Polícia Federal by waiting until the findings of the technical investigation are reported by CINTRA.
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ATC cleared both aircraft to fly at FL370. Legacy crew may or may not have bumped the transponder switch to standby. Last I heard ATC was responsible for separation and the TCAS was a last ditch device in case ATC failed and your aircraft had a conflict with another aircraft. Maybe we should rethink flying in Brazil if they feel other than that.
Pegase Driver
The BBC article is not very accurate.
The crew is not responsible for the collision.With the info retreived so far, they should be cleared soon.
They are howhever part of a rather complex chain of events.The controllers are also a big part of that chain , and so is the ground ATC system sofware used, and the perticular transponder unit ( his history is being carefully investigated , as it turned out it was not a new unit ). ATC failed , yes, but why and how it failed is what is interesting to determine , not who should hang .
TCAS should not be part of the investigation ( it could perhaps have prevented the collision had the Legacy SSR been operational , but this is not a cause of this collision ) TCAS is not an ATC tool, not even part of ATC at all.
The crew is not responsible for the collision.With the info retreived so far, they should be cleared soon. They are howhever part of a rather complex chain of events.The controllers are also a big part of that chain , and so is the ground ATC system sofware used, and the perticular transponder unit ( his history is being carefully investigated , as it turned out it was not a new unit ). ATC failed , yes, but why and how it failed is what is interesting to determine , not who should hang .
TCAS should not be part of the investigation ( it could perhaps have prevented the collision had the Legacy SSR been operational , but this is not a cause of this collision ) TCAS is not an ATC tool, not even part of ATC at all.
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I thought the whole point of the thorough investigations was to fix the system rather than apportion blame and prosecute individuals for a system failure - OK, a pilot (or crew) might have made a mistake but it's more important to understand why he made the mistake and why wasn't there something in place to warn him. In this instance it seems that the Legacy crew managed to switch off the TCAS without being aware of it, so is there something that could be done (big flashing light every few minutes while it's off when high up?) The rest of the problem appears to be ATC assigning both aircraft the same flight level, so something needs to be done there (given remarks on here about the quality of Brazilian ATC, quite a lot) to reduce the chance of it happening again.
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llondel
You gotta be kidding..
Oh, by the way, it seems both aircraft were assigned the same altitude and if, mind you, we have the time, we ought to have a go at that once we get all the other problems solved!
Oh, by the way, it seems both aircraft were assigned the same altitude and if, mind you, we have the time, we ought to have a go at that once we get all the other problems solved!
llondel,
It appears to me that the primary cause of the accident was the failure of ATS to separate the aircraft. There will be many contributing factors to that, including communications coverage, the design of the radar system, and the display of same system, that presents flight planned level as opposed to last cleared level when mode c isn't available, triangulates the altitude crudely using a form of slant radar, and, when the mode c drops out, presents a tiny wee block of info to the controller concerning this. There also appear to be fairly widespread systemic problems within the structure and administration of the organisation.
The TCAS, as has been correctly pointed out, is a last-ditch, last chance technology, relatively new, designed to prevent a collision should the ATS fail, or the crew are at the incorrect level.
It's failure to work and the reasons for that, while extremely significant, should, I believe, be listed as contributory factors.
It appears to me that the primary cause of the accident was the failure of ATS to separate the aircraft. There will be many contributing factors to that, including communications coverage, the design of the radar system, and the display of same system, that presents flight planned level as opposed to last cleared level when mode c isn't available, triangulates the altitude crudely using a form of slant radar, and, when the mode c drops out, presents a tiny wee block of info to the controller concerning this. There also appear to be fairly widespread systemic problems within the structure and administration of the organisation.
The TCAS, as has been correctly pointed out, is a last-ditch, last chance technology, relatively new, designed to prevent a collision should the ATS fail, or the crew are at the incorrect level.
It's failure to work and the reasons for that, while extremely significant, should, I believe, be listed as contributory factors.