Mid-air collision over Brasil
Chris2000, It seems likely, from what's reported here, that the controller/s weren't aware the transponder had failed. Seems likely the pilots weren't aware of that, either. Have a look at the IFATCA link in the post by caos a few up, goes a long way to explaining why this could be overlooked.
I have no idea how an area well known for radar and communications "holes" could be approved for RVSM.
Hopefully this, and the many other questions, will be answered by the investigation. We'll see.
I have no idea how an area well known for radar and communications "holes" could be approved for RVSM.
Hopefully this, and the many other questions, will be answered by the investigation. We'll see.
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Chris2000, It seems likely, from what's reported here, that the controller/s weren't aware the transponder had failed. Seems likely the pilots weren't aware of that, either. Have a look at the IFATCA link in the post by caos a few up, goes a long way to explaining why this could be overlooked.
I have no idea how an area well known for radar and communications "holes" could be approved for RVSM.
Hopefully this, and the many other questions, will be answered by the investigation. We'll see.
I have no idea how an area well known for radar and communications "holes" could be approved for RVSM.
Hopefully this, and the many other questions, will be answered by the investigation. We'll see.
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What take my atention is just there you can find the Cachimbo Air Force base for "air training" (Campo de Treinamento Aéreo Brigadeiro Velloso), but was used to test weapons and missiles. Also under suspect was build to do underground nuclear tests.
Watch it at 9º 20' S 54º 58' W in Google Earth.
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On/Off/Standby
The point seems to be the xpdr went to standby and the ATC radar displays showed that, but nobody in ATC caught the obscure symbology and let the Legacy pilots know that their xpdr was not replying
According to the pilots' interview, they were hearing ATC talking to everybody else in Portugese; so, had no reason to suspect ATC had a problem with them.
According to the pilots' interview, they were hearing ATC talking to everybody else in Portugese; so, had no reason to suspect ATC had a problem with them.
In the nowadays all solid state technology, is it still the case,if not,why to keep this position,rather confusing.
Since this equipment is essential for security,how about a condition to allow ,in flight of course,only momentary OFF push button which would restore itself to ON after a timed delay.
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RVSM is about Height keeping accuracy . You do not need radar for RVSM. The mandatory transponder operation is to verify heigh reported/ by height measured and broadcast, and to provide ACAS protection.
If the controller would have noticed the loss of SSR of the Legacy and could not reach it on VHF ( which was apparently the case) then it is not 2000 ft but lateral separation that was needed with the Gol.
This is not an RVSM accident. Same would have happened if the Legacy had been coordinated at 350 instead of 36. The problem was that he was still at 37 UNDETECTED and the ATC Technical system in Brasilia showed the aircraft at the coordinated level , not his actual level.
Overhead the ocean the airspace is not RVSM because there is no Radar coverage and bad radio transmission. And in the same way that every aircraft need special equipment to enter RVSM airpace, every center also needs special equipment to operate as RVSM airspace.
You do not need any " special equipment" in ATC centres to operate RVSM, it is is just an extension of what you have been doing for years below FL285.
Proper training and procedures are definitively another matter.
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fellow pilots and other aviation lovers:
I think this thread has been a very useful one. While we all seem to fly planes, each cockpit is different. I have never been in a Legacy ( sorry, Brazilian planes just don't do IT for me) and didn't know how confusing some of the displays can be.
In the last 2 jets I flew, the TCAS display was right on the wx radar either as a dedicated display or overlayed to the wx radar when in use. We could select ranges just like the WX radar. When the TCAS went out of service, the display would go blank except for a TCAS operational status readout.
There are other TCAS systems that are the minimum required installations and have so little data, I can't imagine a pilot enjoying it (just on VSI with max range 6 miles or so)
Our old planes did have reply lights on the transponders/tcas . These were so called "steam gauge" instrumented planes.
I think we are seeing what many of us have worried about for years...that the engineers and designers have taken over and the pilot/machine interface leaves us vulnerable in new ways.
I think this thread has been a very useful one. While we all seem to fly planes, each cockpit is different. I have never been in a Legacy ( sorry, Brazilian planes just don't do IT for me) and didn't know how confusing some of the displays can be.
In the last 2 jets I flew, the TCAS display was right on the wx radar either as a dedicated display or overlayed to the wx radar when in use. We could select ranges just like the WX radar. When the TCAS went out of service, the display would go blank except for a TCAS operational status readout.
There are other TCAS systems that are the minimum required installations and have so little data, I can't imagine a pilot enjoying it (just on VSI with max range 6 miles or so)
Our old planes did have reply lights on the transponders/tcas . These were so called "steam gauge" instrumented planes.
I think we are seeing what many of us have worried about for years...that the engineers and designers have taken over and the pilot/machine interface leaves us vulnerable in new ways.
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The need for a STAND-BY position on the switch is/was needed to keep the filament of the transmitting vacuum valve hot in case of immediate need(filaments could take up to a minut to be ready).
In the nowadays all solid state technology, is it still the case,if not,why to keep this position,rather confusing.
Since this equipment is essential for security,how about a condition to allow ,in flight of course,only momentary OFF push button which would restore itself to ON after a timed delay.
In the nowadays all solid state technology, is it still the case,if not,why to keep this position,rather confusing.
Since this equipment is essential for security,how about a condition to allow ,in flight of course,only momentary OFF push button which would restore itself to ON after a timed delay.
Another option would be to trip the Master Caution system when transponder goes to Standby in flight. Whatever, this accident may well cause some change in all flight decks.
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Broadreach and ATC Watcher :
Some ten or fifteen years ago Italian ATC was changed from a military organisation into a civil one, which is called ENAV. I don't think this operation brought many difficulties. Staff remained the same, no uniforms anymore. Management was changed. But for the details we would need an Italian contribution. I'll try to find something on the web.
While I am on line on this thread I'd like to thank the Brazilian and other members who master the Portuguese language for their input to keep us updated on progress (or lack of, if one prefers). Please continue, really appreciated.
Some ten or fifteen years ago Italian ATC was changed from a military organisation into a civil one, which is called ENAV. I don't think this operation brought many difficulties. Staff remained the same, no uniforms anymore. Management was changed. But for the details we would need an Italian contribution. I'll try to find something on the web.
While I am on line on this thread I'd like to thank the Brazilian and other members who master the Portuguese language for their input to keep us updated on progress (or lack of, if one prefers). Please continue, really appreciated.
For anyone who’s been stuck for hours waiting for a flight in Brazil during the last few months and thought things couldn’t possibly get worse, it seems they are.
Tam, Gol and Varig operate, respectively, 96 (Airbus and F-100s), 96 (Boeing 73*) and (5-10 Boeing 73*, not sure). From Jan through Nov their collective share of domestic passenger miles carried was 92%. Gol, modelled on Southwest, may get better overall utilisation than the other two. Both Tam and Gol are said to be hard taskmasters and what I have heard is that pay is not fantastic. That’s not too surprising given the numbers Varig shed during its prolonged collapse, and the numbers of aspirants from a large GA fleet.
Up until the Gol/Legacy collision at the end of September, Brazil had an ATC system that, to all outward appearances, worked just the way it was supposed to, quietly and invisibly.
Enough has been said on this thread as to how it all came to pieces after the collision. This week’s chaos, though, has the airforce and ANAC and the president saying “this time it’s not our fault, it’s the airlines’” while pointing at TAM who removed six aircraft from service ostensibly for tech reasons.
I won’t say there’s a gleeful tone in the accusations, just “isn’t it great to be back on the offensive”.
On Friday ANAC ordered TAM to suspend ticket sales until Monday because of overbooking, and made a big show of putting the air force’s two 707s and two 732s (respectively nicknamed “Big Scrapheap” and “Little Scrapheap”) and four smaller Embraer jets at the disposal of the airlines. TAM reportedly spot-chartered the two 707s. Cynics say that all they’re really doing is providing a cover to get politicians out of Brasilia for the holidays. Others might observe that the capacity of all these aircraft together is less than 1% of the Brazil’s scheduled fleet and that Gol took delivery of two more 737s this week, with one more due next week.
One does wonder whether “tech reasons” is strictly true or if taking a larger number of aircraft out of service than usual might not be the payoff for three months of stretching duty times and cutting planned maintenance times to cope with the crisis.
How long a tail would the recent/current US/UK weather-related disruption leave after operational conditions returned to normal? A week? Presumably, when all those flights are cancelled, crews are stood down; they don’t just hang around the aircraft waiting for the weather to improve. Weather permitting, would everything not return to normal with a fortnight at most?
Picture the situation in Brazil. For nearly three months now it’s not been the weather but ATC holding things back. So, for all that time, crews have been standing by, waiting and inevitably going over the limit, but almost always continuing, i.e. better to get home while we can than wait a day or more downline for another crew who are probably stuck somewhere on the line themselves. How long can that be held together? Can any of you who were flying in the US during the Reagan/ATC faceoff relate?
Tam, Gol and Varig operate, respectively, 96 (Airbus and F-100s), 96 (Boeing 73*) and (5-10 Boeing 73*, not sure). From Jan through Nov their collective share of domestic passenger miles carried was 92%. Gol, modelled on Southwest, may get better overall utilisation than the other two. Both Tam and Gol are said to be hard taskmasters and what I have heard is that pay is not fantastic. That’s not too surprising given the numbers Varig shed during its prolonged collapse, and the numbers of aspirants from a large GA fleet.
Up until the Gol/Legacy collision at the end of September, Brazil had an ATC system that, to all outward appearances, worked just the way it was supposed to, quietly and invisibly.
Enough has been said on this thread as to how it all came to pieces after the collision. This week’s chaos, though, has the airforce and ANAC and the president saying “this time it’s not our fault, it’s the airlines’” while pointing at TAM who removed six aircraft from service ostensibly for tech reasons.
I won’t say there’s a gleeful tone in the accusations, just “isn’t it great to be back on the offensive”.
On Friday ANAC ordered TAM to suspend ticket sales until Monday because of overbooking, and made a big show of putting the air force’s two 707s and two 732s (respectively nicknamed “Big Scrapheap” and “Little Scrapheap”) and four smaller Embraer jets at the disposal of the airlines. TAM reportedly spot-chartered the two 707s. Cynics say that all they’re really doing is providing a cover to get politicians out of Brasilia for the holidays. Others might observe that the capacity of all these aircraft together is less than 1% of the Brazil’s scheduled fleet and that Gol took delivery of two more 737s this week, with one more due next week.
One does wonder whether “tech reasons” is strictly true or if taking a larger number of aircraft out of service than usual might not be the payoff for three months of stretching duty times and cutting planned maintenance times to cope with the crisis.
How long a tail would the recent/current US/UK weather-related disruption leave after operational conditions returned to normal? A week? Presumably, when all those flights are cancelled, crews are stood down; they don’t just hang around the aircraft waiting for the weather to improve. Weather permitting, would everything not return to normal with a fortnight at most?
Picture the situation in Brazil. For nearly three months now it’s not been the weather but ATC holding things back. So, for all that time, crews have been standing by, waiting and inevitably going over the limit, but almost always continuing, i.e. better to get home while we can than wait a day or more downline for another crew who are probably stuck somewhere on the line themselves. How long can that be held together? Can any of you who were flying in the US during the Reagan/ATC faceoff relate?
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First post, and maybe the last, because I’m no longer flying and as a “layman” don’t have any technically constructive comments that haven’t already been addressed.
I have been reading this thread with great interest, particularly because it is constructive and devoid of the garbage found in other non-aviation forums regarding this unfortunate accident. I have seen many interesting points raised that can only improve aviation safety.
I am wondering if there is any member of the official investigation team reading this forum; certainly I haven’t seen any posts to that effect.
As with any professional activity, sometimes points are overlooked that are important but not necessarily apparent to those closest to the problem.
Is there anyone out there that can at least provide a summary of the salient features raised in this forum as an input to the official investigation? I unfortunately, don’t have any contacts.
Keep up the good work guys for the sake of us all, pax included.
I have been reading this thread with great interest, particularly because it is constructive and devoid of the garbage found in other non-aviation forums regarding this unfortunate accident. I have seen many interesting points raised that can only improve aviation safety.
I am wondering if there is any member of the official investigation team reading this forum; certainly I haven’t seen any posts to that effect.
As with any professional activity, sometimes points are overlooked that are important but not necessarily apparent to those closest to the problem.
Is there anyone out there that can at least provide a summary of the salient features raised in this forum as an input to the official investigation? I unfortunately, don’t have any contacts.
Keep up the good work guys for the sake of us all, pax included.
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statics
Last edited by caos; 24th Dec 2006 at 16:04.
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Great observation. A lot of experienced people, both pilots and ATC folks (and me not being one of them) have brought great insight to this thread. Congrats to all of them.
Thanks Caos,
How much attention Pprune's received over the last few months as a result of the collision is hidden in the "others" of that pie chart. In any case I'm sure the balanced posts and hypotheses suggested in this long thread will have been noted.
Flight delays in Brazil pretty much evaporated on the 25th. Most of this week should be quiet. TAM are allowed to sell tickets again. Another test of the system will come this weekend: people returning home and presidential swearing-in in Brasilia. Highways are overloaded now and, pretty much as expected, accident rates are up.
After 1 Jan there should be time for more balanced damage assessment; whether same is accomplished may be open to question: Brazil still tends to slow down between Jan and Carnival (week 8, 19 Feb) and politicians take holidays too.
How much attention Pprune's received over the last few months as a result of the collision is hidden in the "others" of that pie chart. In any case I'm sure the balanced posts and hypotheses suggested in this long thread will have been noted.
Flight delays in Brazil pretty much evaporated on the 25th. Most of this week should be quiet. TAM are allowed to sell tickets again. Another test of the system will come this weekend: people returning home and presidential swearing-in in Brasilia. Highways are overloaded now and, pretty much as expected, accident rates are up.
After 1 Jan there should be time for more balanced damage assessment; whether same is accomplished may be open to question: Brazil still tends to slow down between Jan and Carnival (week 8, 19 Feb) and politicians take holidays too.
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Stats from Ads.
You can find daily stats from Ads here
http://www.pprune.org/demoAdStats.php
At least here you can see South America.
http://www.pprune.org/demoAdStats.php
At least here you can see South America.
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What would be interesting is for the pilot and ATC folks on here to make recommendations on how to improve things, based upon their knowledge of the incident.
I also wonder how people feel about the bigger questions raised by the events, such as the criminal investigation, the detention of the pilots, the military control of ATC, the government officials making public statements blaming the pilots, possible criminal charges for allegedly not noticing a transponder isn't working, etc.
One can only hope that this tragedy serves as a lesson in a lot of ways.
FJ&J
You raise several points.
Regarding recommendations, it would seem that the broad causal factors are now well known and that those involved in the investigation have all the detail. I doubt suggestions from "outside" would be welcomed.
Re “how people feel”, I can only give you an approximate idea of local, i.e. Brazilian, feelings regarding the official statements, criminalisation and ATC under military control. Last first: re military control, nobody except the ATC staff themselves really gives a damn as long as it works. Right now it’s a tremendously emotional and political issue so I don’t think we’re likely to see which direction it’s headed for another few months.
Official statements have served only to expose the officials spouting them to ridicule.
Criminalisation. O Globo, a newspaper, ran a web survey in which it asked whether readers thought the Legacy crew should or should not have been allowed to leave the country. 52% said yes they should. That is presumably the uninformed public so better not to read too much into it. Anybody I’ve spoken with thinks retaining their passports was a cheap, ridiculous gesture. Anybody connected with aviation is horrified.
Yes, many lessons are being learnt - and again, I can only speak "locally". Whether it’s the airforce or a civil organisation in charge of ATC in the future, they won’t be as subservient to the treasury as they have been. Just short of US$ 300 million’s just been granted to close that stable door. The airlines will have learned that when the reservations system is disrupted by external factors like ATC they can’t just go on relying on their standard overbooking algorithms. Airlines might also take a more pro-active stance right from the start rather than keeping their heads down, as they have done, and hoping that most passenger fury would be directed at the government.
You raise several points.
Regarding recommendations, it would seem that the broad causal factors are now well known and that those involved in the investigation have all the detail. I doubt suggestions from "outside" would be welcomed.
Re “how people feel”, I can only give you an approximate idea of local, i.e. Brazilian, feelings regarding the official statements, criminalisation and ATC under military control. Last first: re military control, nobody except the ATC staff themselves really gives a damn as long as it works. Right now it’s a tremendously emotional and political issue so I don’t think we’re likely to see which direction it’s headed for another few months.
Official statements have served only to expose the officials spouting them to ridicule.
Criminalisation. O Globo, a newspaper, ran a web survey in which it asked whether readers thought the Legacy crew should or should not have been allowed to leave the country. 52% said yes they should. That is presumably the uninformed public so better not to read too much into it. Anybody I’ve spoken with thinks retaining their passports was a cheap, ridiculous gesture. Anybody connected with aviation is horrified.
Yes, many lessons are being learnt - and again, I can only speak "locally". Whether it’s the airforce or a civil organisation in charge of ATC in the future, they won’t be as subservient to the treasury as they have been. Just short of US$ 300 million’s just been granted to close that stable door. The airlines will have learned that when the reservations system is disrupted by external factors like ATC they can’t just go on relying on their standard overbooking algorithms. Airlines might also take a more pro-active stance right from the start rather than keeping their heads down, as they have done, and hoping that most passenger fury would be directed at the government.
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Controllers to 'share' blame in GOL 737 crash
From AP and other sources:
Air traffic controllers as well as two American pilots are likely to share the blame for Brazil's worst aviation disaster when the country's criminal probe of the September collision wraps up in about a month, a spokeswoman for the federal police said Monday.
The statement by Tamares Carvalho, spokeswoman for lead investigator Renato Sayao, was the first time anyone connected with the criminal investigation has said the controllers would be held responsible for the collision of a Gol airlines Boeing 737 and Embraer Legacy 600 executive jet owned by Ronkonkoma-based ExcelAire and flown by Joseph Lepore, 42, of Bay Shore, and Jan Paladino, 34, of Westhampton Beach. Other Brazilian officials have blamed the pilots and, more recently, the controllers as lapses in the air traffic system have come to light since the Sept. 29 crash that killed 154 people when Gol Flight 1907 crashed. None of the seven people aboard the Legacy were injured.
The controllers could face up to 12 years in prison on homicide charges and exposing an aircraft to danger because they failed to divert the Boeing after the Legacy disappeared from their radar, Carvalho said.
Carvalho said she did not know whether authorities would prosecute the American pilots, who were formally accused by police with exposing an aircraft to danger before their passports were returned last month and they were allowed to leave the country after 71 days.
Because the controllers are military personnel, the police can only submit their findings to the Defense Department, which would decide whether to prosecute, Carvalho said.
Brazilian officials continue to insist that the American pilots should have noticed that their jet's transponder, which transmits the plane's altitude and is a key component of the anti-collision or TCAS system, was not working before the collision.
In a statement released Monday, ExcelAire said it "again affirms that its pilots did not intentionally or inadvertently disengage the Legacy's transponder or TCAS and that there was no indication in the cockpit at any time during the flight that the transponder or TCAS system were not operational. The accident investigators continue to analyze the Legacy's transponder and other avionics systems to determine whether those units suffered from defects or faults that compromised their operation."
Besides the criminal investigation, a civil investigation is being conducted by the Brazilian government aided by the U.S. National Transportation Board and Federal Aviation Administration. That probe on what caused the collision will be completed in the fall.
The statement by Tamares Carvalho, spokeswoman for lead investigator Renato Sayao, was the first time anyone connected with the criminal investigation has said the controllers would be held responsible for the collision of a Gol airlines Boeing 737 and Embraer Legacy 600 executive jet owned by Ronkonkoma-based ExcelAire and flown by Joseph Lepore, 42, of Bay Shore, and Jan Paladino, 34, of Westhampton Beach. Other Brazilian officials have blamed the pilots and, more recently, the controllers as lapses in the air traffic system have come to light since the Sept. 29 crash that killed 154 people when Gol Flight 1907 crashed. None of the seven people aboard the Legacy were injured.
The controllers could face up to 12 years in prison on homicide charges and exposing an aircraft to danger because they failed to divert the Boeing after the Legacy disappeared from their radar, Carvalho said.
Carvalho said she did not know whether authorities would prosecute the American pilots, who were formally accused by police with exposing an aircraft to danger before their passports were returned last month and they were allowed to leave the country after 71 days.
Because the controllers are military personnel, the police can only submit their findings to the Defense Department, which would decide whether to prosecute, Carvalho said.
Brazilian officials continue to insist that the American pilots should have noticed that their jet's transponder, which transmits the plane's altitude and is a key component of the anti-collision or TCAS system, was not working before the collision.
In a statement released Monday, ExcelAire said it "again affirms that its pilots did not intentionally or inadvertently disengage the Legacy's transponder or TCAS and that there was no indication in the cockpit at any time during the flight that the transponder or TCAS system were not operational. The accident investigators continue to analyze the Legacy's transponder and other avionics systems to determine whether those units suffered from defects or faults that compromised their operation."
Besides the criminal investigation, a civil investigation is being conducted by the Brazilian government aided by the U.S. National Transportation Board and Federal Aviation Administration. That probe on what caused the collision will be completed in the fall.
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Brazilian officials continue to insist that the American pilots should have noticed that their jet's transponder
And how professional of the investigators to blame the pilots BEFORE they've finished their report. Typical of these countries (cultures) to have a strong need of finding someone to blame. Pilots fly at their assigned Flight Level. ATC informs the pilots when the XPDR doesn't reply.
Pilot error, my @$$
