BA 744 Diversion to MAN (Merged)
Doves wrote:
Good research you have found the words that I wrote several years ago.
However in regard to the bolded questions above, the engine experts also considered the symptomatic response, to the crew, of combinations of those events that you question. These symptoms taken together with the likelihood of a serious degradation of the aircraft's airworthiness were embodied in the recommended actions to the flight crews regarding continued operation of the aircraft.
I am not saying that we recommended the operation of the aircraft to its original destination, but only that the aircraft is likely safe to fly for an extended period of time with proper consideration of all the symptoms or event conditions to the crew.
Again and again in this thread I am not making a judgement about the crew's actions (I leave that to the CAA) but only am pointing out that the decision making process can be soundly performed with the data and ground advice available to the crew.
Doves wrote:
First of all I’m not exactly a spotter (try to figure out!)
Second: Perhaps I am saying, among the others, the same thing like sombody else:
ETOPS are to be revised some way.
From the BIBLE:
In modern turbofan engines, compressor surge is a rare event. If a compressor surge (sometimes called a compressor stall) occurs during high power at take off, the crew will hear a very loud bang, which will be accompanied by yaw and vibration. The bang will likely be far beyond any engine noise, or other sound, the crew may have previously experienced in service.
Compressor surge has been often mistaken for blown tires, or a bomb in the airplane.
The flight crew, may be quite startled by the bang, and in many cases, this has led to a rejected take off above V1, which have sometimes resulted in injuries, loss of the airplane, and even passenger fatalities.
Compressor stall may be caused by engine deterioration, or may be the result of ingestion of birds, ice, or foreign objects. Its effects may be the final sound from a “severe engine damage”.
In a turbine engine compression is accomplished as the air passes through the stages of the compressor. The air flowing over the blades can stall just like the air over the wing. When this occurs, the passage of air through the compressor becomes unstable and the compressor can no longer perform its duty. This means that there is no more the correct relation between the fuel and the air in the the engine.
Engine surge can be accompanied by visible flames forward out the inlet and rearward out the tailpipe. Instruments may show high EGT, EPR or rotor speed changes.
Depending on the reason for the compressor stall, there many types of surges:
- A single self-recovering surge (the only one I have ever experienced a few times in 40 years, during landing on an MD-80 and the reverse was still deployed by 60 kts)
- Multiple surge prior to self-recovery
- Multiple surges requiring pilot action in order to recover
- A non-recoverable surge
When a compressor surge is not recoverable, the engine will decelarate to zero power as if the fuel had been chopped. This type of surge can accompany a severe engine damage.
Now I am asking:
Who told the crew of BA268, that:
1) There has not been an ingestion of bird/s, pieces of tyre or any other foreign object by the engine number 2?
2) The engine had not been severely damaged?
3) The flames (many feet long) and the sparks (incandescent pieces of metal) did not invest some vital part of the aicraft?
4) One or more of the tyres did not blow out?
5) The cause of the explosions had not been an explosive device?
First of all I’m not exactly a spotter (try to figure out!)
Second: Perhaps I am saying, among the others, the same thing like sombody else:
ETOPS are to be revised some way.
From the BIBLE:
In modern turbofan engines, compressor surge is a rare event. If a compressor surge (sometimes called a compressor stall) occurs during high power at take off, the crew will hear a very loud bang, which will be accompanied by yaw and vibration. The bang will likely be far beyond any engine noise, or other sound, the crew may have previously experienced in service.
Compressor surge has been often mistaken for blown tires, or a bomb in the airplane.
The flight crew, may be quite startled by the bang, and in many cases, this has led to a rejected take off above V1, which have sometimes resulted in injuries, loss of the airplane, and even passenger fatalities.
Compressor stall may be caused by engine deterioration, or may be the result of ingestion of birds, ice, or foreign objects. Its effects may be the final sound from a “severe engine damage”.
In a turbine engine compression is accomplished as the air passes through the stages of the compressor. The air flowing over the blades can stall just like the air over the wing. When this occurs, the passage of air through the compressor becomes unstable and the compressor can no longer perform its duty. This means that there is no more the correct relation between the fuel and the air in the the engine.
Engine surge can be accompanied by visible flames forward out the inlet and rearward out the tailpipe. Instruments may show high EGT, EPR or rotor speed changes.
Depending on the reason for the compressor stall, there many types of surges:
- A single self-recovering surge (the only one I have ever experienced a few times in 40 years, during landing on an MD-80 and the reverse was still deployed by 60 kts)
- Multiple surge prior to self-recovery
- Multiple surges requiring pilot action in order to recover
- A non-recoverable surge
When a compressor surge is not recoverable, the engine will decelarate to zero power as if the fuel had been chopped. This type of surge can accompany a severe engine damage.
Now I am asking:
Who told the crew of BA268, that:
1) There has not been an ingestion of bird/s, pieces of tyre or any other foreign object by the engine number 2?
2) The engine had not been severely damaged?
3) The flames (many feet long) and the sparks (incandescent pieces of metal) did not invest some vital part of the aicraft?
4) One or more of the tyres did not blow out?
5) The cause of the explosions had not been an explosive device?
However in regard to the bolded questions above, the engine experts also considered the symptomatic response, to the crew, of combinations of those events that you question. These symptoms taken together with the likelihood of a serious degradation of the aircraft's airworthiness were embodied in the recommended actions to the flight crews regarding continued operation of the aircraft.
I am not saying that we recommended the operation of the aircraft to its original destination, but only that the aircraft is likely safe to fly for an extended period of time with proper consideration of all the symptoms or event conditions to the crew.
Again and again in this thread I am not making a judgement about the crew's actions (I leave that to the CAA) but only am pointing out that the decision making process can be soundly performed with the data and ground advice available to the crew.
I've only made a few posts so I don't feel the need to order a Personal Title and help support PPRuNe
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I have to agree that there are far too many 'experts' (not) posting on this thread. Having flown ETOPS in the past and now in the middle of a conversion onto the B744, I can see why those of us who operate that a/c are getting frustrated with some of the comments coming from the 'experts'.
From now on, I propose that we let the pilots of the B744 post on this thread. The obvious lack of understanding about 4 engine LROPS by some people on here is truly amazing, especially considering that some of them are, allegedly, pilots too!
In the meagre hope of preventing any more wild speculation and hand wringing from those who are not 4 engined qualified or experienced, especially about how the crew identify whether an engine has actually 'failed' or is just surging after take-off AND when the decision to shut down the engine takes place AND how they then come to a decision as to whether the engine has suffered damage that would warrant an immediate landing OR how the crew would figure out whether they could continue on 3 engines and still make an alternate should a second engine have to be shut down because they still have a performance manual available in the F/D library... I think it is time to ask those who obviously don't fully understand the difference between what happened after take off, the decision to continue and the separate situation that developed towards the end of the flight to please refrain from posting any more statements or pronouncements with regard to their opinion unless it is a question to experienced 4 engined LROPS pilots. (phew!)
The number of statements from what appear to be either enthusiasts trying to impress the rest of us or 'PC Sim experts' that have no in-depth understanding of actual 4 engined LROPS, such as questioning about secondary damage or bird strikes or fuel-tank leaks or burst tyres is getting to be a bit too bothersome. If you are not able to understand how pilots assess these situations after reading through this whole thread then please leave your inane questions to yourself as all you are doing is pi$$ing the rest of us off and fueling the media luvvies who thrive on this kind of ignorance.
From now on, I propose that we let the pilots of the B744 post on this thread. The obvious lack of understanding about 4 engine LROPS by some people on here is truly amazing, especially considering that some of them are, allegedly, pilots too!
In the meagre hope of preventing any more wild speculation and hand wringing from those who are not 4 engined qualified or experienced, especially about how the crew identify whether an engine has actually 'failed' or is just surging after take-off AND when the decision to shut down the engine takes place AND how they then come to a decision as to whether the engine has suffered damage that would warrant an immediate landing OR how the crew would figure out whether they could continue on 3 engines and still make an alternate should a second engine have to be shut down because they still have a performance manual available in the F/D library... I think it is time to ask those who obviously don't fully understand the difference between what happened after take off, the decision to continue and the separate situation that developed towards the end of the flight to please refrain from posting any more statements or pronouncements with regard to their opinion unless it is a question to experienced 4 engined LROPS pilots. (phew!)
The number of statements from what appear to be either enthusiasts trying to impress the rest of us or 'PC Sim experts' that have no in-depth understanding of actual 4 engined LROPS, such as questioning about secondary damage or bird strikes or fuel-tank leaks or burst tyres is getting to be a bit too bothersome. If you are not able to understand how pilots assess these situations after reading through this whole thread then please leave your inane questions to yourself as all you are doing is pi$$ing the rest of us off and fueling the media luvvies who thrive on this kind of ignorance.
Warning Toxic!
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Sorry BEagle, I stand by that! A 747 can go down to one engine (less sweat if it is an inboard) just as a trijet can go down to one engine. At least it is still flying. The difference is when it starts the journey, your 747 is on four to begin with!
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Thank you very much 'Cargo boy':
'Referrals: 0; Occupation: pilot.'
You gave us, with your arrogance, a perfect lesson on Crew Resource Management.
"What not to do in case of abnormal situation. How not to gather all the available information (i.e. 'do you think Hoskin if it's the case to call the tower and ask them if they found any debris, bird or rudder on the runway... Can you please call the purser and ask him if they saw anything wrong with that engine? And how's the passenger mood? Is it necessary to make a low pass over the tower to make them assess the landing gear/flaps situation? Did ,via the ACARS at home base, they noticed anything wrong with the huge number of data they have collected? etc.).
For you ther's a very simple solution: "Shut up your trap! You boy let me work alone!".
I think that I was flying over the Atlantic when you were not yet born and with those people from WWII used to talk to the people from the heights (just like you). For instance: did anybody out there, in the USA ATC, know Captain Drago? A real generation gap.
And before I close my mouth wide open, I want to remember that an accident is seldom caused by a single cause.
And it's silly to open the first ring of a chain of events. I beg everybody of You to excuse my bad English, and now I'm looking forward to read a report, recommendations and suggestions from the Authority to learn something more.
Regards
DOVE
'Referrals: 0; Occupation: pilot.'
You gave us, with your arrogance, a perfect lesson on Crew Resource Management.
"What not to do in case of abnormal situation. How not to gather all the available information (i.e. 'do you think Hoskin if it's the case to call the tower and ask them if they found any debris, bird or rudder on the runway... Can you please call the purser and ask him if they saw anything wrong with that engine? And how's the passenger mood? Is it necessary to make a low pass over the tower to make them assess the landing gear/flaps situation? Did ,via the ACARS at home base, they noticed anything wrong with the huge number of data they have collected? etc.).
For you ther's a very simple solution: "Shut up your trap! You boy let me work alone!".
I think that I was flying over the Atlantic when you were not yet born and with those people from WWII used to talk to the people from the heights (just like you). For instance: did anybody out there, in the USA ATC, know Captain Drago? A real generation gap.
And before I close my mouth wide open, I want to remember that an accident is seldom caused by a single cause.
And it's silly to open the first ring of a chain of events. I beg everybody of You to excuse my bad English, and now I'm looking forward to read a report, recommendations and suggestions from the Authority to learn something more.
Regards
DOVE
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I thought this thread was all about why the flight in question turned into a "Mayday" situation? .......
loosing an engine on a 747 doesn't create a "Mayday" ...... BA's IFSD SOP's don't create Maydays .....
loosing an engine on a 747 doesn't create a "Mayday" ...... BA's IFSD SOP's don't create Maydays .....
Warning Toxic!
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DOVES- I can't believe you are saying all that!
<if they found any debris, bird or rudder on the runway>- how do you know it came from your aeroplane?
<Can you please call the purser and ask him if they saw anything wrong with that engine?>- I don't think any pilot would trust a cabin crew member to assess damage on an engine! Would they know where to look? Would they be looking at the right engine? Would they know what to look for? The only way is for a pilot to go look himself.
<And how's the passenger mood?>- who cares? It's MY mood and MY safety I'm always most concerned about! The passengers will be OK if I look after #1. I think the best way to look after #1 would be to get my ass back to LHR.
<Is it necessary to make a low pass over the tower to make them assess the landing gear/flaps situation?>- I'm sorry, but you cannot be serious! What would they see from 1000'? Nothing! It is NEVER recommended to do a pass of the tower- they cannot see anything.
<via the ACARS at home base, they noticed anything wrong with the huge number of data they have collected?>- I have little doubt they would have done this already.
I get the feeling you are a nervous flyer. At the slightest possibility of any damage whatsoever, you seem to want to dump fuel and return. Birds hit wings and damage flaps, bits break off, tyres deflate. You do your best to work around these things and follow advice. Advice here was to continue. The crew would not have done so without being happy it was safe for them and their passengers. I would do exactly the same. Our job is to get you there, not to find a million reasons not to.
<if they found any debris, bird or rudder on the runway>- how do you know it came from your aeroplane?
<Can you please call the purser and ask him if they saw anything wrong with that engine?>- I don't think any pilot would trust a cabin crew member to assess damage on an engine! Would they know where to look? Would they be looking at the right engine? Would they know what to look for? The only way is for a pilot to go look himself.
<And how's the passenger mood?>- who cares? It's MY mood and MY safety I'm always most concerned about! The passengers will be OK if I look after #1. I think the best way to look after #1 would be to get my ass back to LHR.
<Is it necessary to make a low pass over the tower to make them assess the landing gear/flaps situation?>- I'm sorry, but you cannot be serious! What would they see from 1000'? Nothing! It is NEVER recommended to do a pass of the tower- they cannot see anything.
<via the ACARS at home base, they noticed anything wrong with the huge number of data they have collected?>- I have little doubt they would have done this already.
I get the feeling you are a nervous flyer. At the slightest possibility of any damage whatsoever, you seem to want to dump fuel and return. Birds hit wings and damage flaps, bits break off, tyres deflate. You do your best to work around these things and follow advice. Advice here was to continue. The crew would not have done so without being happy it was safe for them and their passengers. I would do exactly the same. Our job is to get you there, not to find a million reasons not to.
I know I shouldn't encourage you but I will do it just one last time. In the last few days you have let us all know how much you hate:
Cabin Staff
Security Personnel
Diabetics
Passengers
Me
DC-10s
The FAA
McDonalds Employees
And many other lesser mortals
I don't know whether you are aware of it but you come over as someone who undoubtedly preceded the Wright Brothers by four good years.
Cabin Staff
Security Personnel
Diabetics
Passengers
Me
DC-10s
The FAA
McDonalds Employees
And many other lesser mortals
I don't know whether you are aware of it but you come over as someone who undoubtedly preceded the Wright Brothers by four good years.
Warning Toxic!
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What am I meant to say to that? I mean I've heard of thread creep, but that is ridiculous! Aren't you making this a bit personal? You were the one who made your comments a personal diatribe against BA- presumably from the point of view that you knew the right way and BA was wrong because they were 'indoctrinated' was the expression! You made your post a personal attack on the professional standards of another company- don't expect to be treated with kid gloves as a result!
Having got past 30W the crew must have had a very good idea of how the "Howgozit" was going. I would have thought that it would have been obvious that Heathrow was already an impossibility to any sensible person.
So why did this hard-working crew that had done their level best for BA go past PIK/BFS/SNN etc and end up with a "Mayday" at MAN?
With 11 hours to think about the problem, I would certainly not have got myself in a situation like this.
Perhaps the big worry here is the the way the BA crew were trained or indoctrinated. I have already seen on this thread (and others) ample evidence from BA pilots that they think such situations are perfectly safe and that any criticism is superfluous. Indeed they dismiss the FAA as an irrelevance.
This, having done both with big aeroplanes, is a very arrogant statement. I can say that with a great deal of confidence that the numberof US-registered aircraft exceeds the the rest of the world put together.
Therefore, the posting from "BA God Help Me" should be seen in context.
So why did this hard-working crew that had done their level best for BA go past PIK/BFS/SNN etc and end up with a "Mayday" at MAN?
With 11 hours to think about the problem, I would certainly not have got myself in a situation like this.
Perhaps the big worry here is the the way the BA crew were trained or indoctrinated. I have already seen on this thread (and others) ample evidence from BA pilots that they think such situations are perfectly safe and that any criticism is superfluous. Indeed they dismiss the FAA as an irrelevance.
This, having done both with big aeroplanes, is a very arrogant statement. I can say that with a great deal of confidence that the numberof US-registered aircraft exceeds the the rest of the world put together.
Therefore, the posting from "BA God Help Me" should be seen in context.
Last edited by Rainboe; 16th Mar 2005 at 21:15.
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BA 744 Diversion to MAN
We were in California a couple of weeks ago when this item (it actually happened in February I believe) hit the news. It appears that the details were leaked to the press and it appeared that the FAA was forced to put out a statement, which was carried in most of the major newspapers and the TV news bulletins.
I seldom frequent Pprune, however the coverage in the US piqued my curiosity and the 'opinions' I have read have varied from the defensive to the aggressive to total ignorance (including sarcasm!!) as to the rational behind the safe, expeditious and commercial operation of heavy 4 engined aircraft and how the pilots in the 'hot seat' approach their profession. Dismissing the opinions of contributers because ' they aren't pilots smacks of high arrogance indeed, after all, these are the people that have kept food on my table for 35 years. Pacificum (enough!!)
The facts that I saw reported in the US are slightly different from the various 'opinions' that I have read posted by others in this thread however, being now retired, I have no verification one way or another as to the correct details of this particular incident, however I thought that I would offer my thought processes as to how I, as a Captain, would approach handling a similar situation - I would hope in a comparable way to my peers.
It was reported in the US that the engine in question suffered a compressor stall(s) shortly after take off but recovered only to bang away again on the noise abatement power reduction. The decision to shut it down therefore became a 'precautionary' and not an 'emergency' course of action.
Basically when I was a Captain on the 400 there were 3 possible courses of action
1. If an engine either failed on TO (fire/failure etc) or catastrophically during flight requiring an immediate full mergency shutdown the procedure was to call an emergency, carryout an emergency engine shutdown, dump fuel and land ASAP - end of story
2. If an engine exhibited worrying signs - loss of thrust, loss of oil, high temp, overspeed etc leave it to a safe height and throttle back - if it is running OK, but if there are still problems there are then two further 2 options :-
Option 1
Shut it down, possibly dump fuel and then land at a suitable enroute airfield - in this case, to my mind, somewhere (JFK?) in the continental US - with available BA engineering cover and multiple onward flight options so as to disrupt the pax as little as possible
Option2
Have Engineering interrogate the onboard engine real-time parameter database via SatCom - both prior and subsequent to shutting it down - and THEN, and ONLY THEN, decide whether it would be possible (and/or sensible) to continue on 3 engines to destination (which incidentally MUST be a main base) after consultation with both Maintrol and (if possible) the Duty Flight Manager.
It happened to me personally twice in my almost 9 years on the 744, but, in both cases, luckily at a much later stage in the flight - each time it necessitated a 'precautionary' shutdown for an engine low oil warning which, in both cases, subsequently turned out (happily) to have been an indication problem. We continued in one case on 3 engines for seven hours from the Far East
The first question that I always asked myself (and, if possible, always asked Engineering) when a similar situation occurred was :-
"If I shut this engine down - would it be possible to restart and use the engine in a future emergency?" (Eric Moody's incident springs to mind!!)
If the considered answer was 'yes' then I would continue provided that my crew and I were happy there was no structural integrity issues and they ALL agreed to continue to destination. In this situation on my flightdeck democracy reigned and with even just ONE pilot vote against continuing it immediately became re land or divert time!!
If the answer was 'no' then, before deciding to continue, I and my crew would consider the fuel state, predicted fuel burn, achievable flight level, possible enroute alternates, enroute terrain, enroute/destination weather and crew state (lack of sleep, tiredness? etc) in much greater detail before deciding whether or not to continue with the flight
One other point to make (as has been made in several previous posts) is that the B747-400 is in fact certificated as a 3 engined a/c, in fact both the manual and autoland parameters are the same for both 3 & 4 engined approaches (full flap, crosswind, minima and no minima autoland etc etc)
I seldom frequent Pprune, however the coverage in the US piqued my curiosity and the 'opinions' I have read have varied from the defensive to the aggressive to total ignorance (including sarcasm!!) as to the rational behind the safe, expeditious and commercial operation of heavy 4 engined aircraft and how the pilots in the 'hot seat' approach their profession. Dismissing the opinions of contributers because ' they aren't pilots smacks of high arrogance indeed, after all, these are the people that have kept food on my table for 35 years. Pacificum (enough!!)
The facts that I saw reported in the US are slightly different from the various 'opinions' that I have read posted by others in this thread however, being now retired, I have no verification one way or another as to the correct details of this particular incident, however I thought that I would offer my thought processes as to how I, as a Captain, would approach handling a similar situation - I would hope in a comparable way to my peers.
It was reported in the US that the engine in question suffered a compressor stall(s) shortly after take off but recovered only to bang away again on the noise abatement power reduction. The decision to shut it down therefore became a 'precautionary' and not an 'emergency' course of action.
Basically when I was a Captain on the 400 there were 3 possible courses of action
1. If an engine either failed on TO (fire/failure etc) or catastrophically during flight requiring an immediate full mergency shutdown the procedure was to call an emergency, carryout an emergency engine shutdown, dump fuel and land ASAP - end of story
2. If an engine exhibited worrying signs - loss of thrust, loss of oil, high temp, overspeed etc leave it to a safe height and throttle back - if it is running OK, but if there are still problems there are then two further 2 options :-
Option 1
Shut it down, possibly dump fuel and then land at a suitable enroute airfield - in this case, to my mind, somewhere (JFK?) in the continental US - with available BA engineering cover and multiple onward flight options so as to disrupt the pax as little as possible
Option2
Have Engineering interrogate the onboard engine real-time parameter database via SatCom - both prior and subsequent to shutting it down - and THEN, and ONLY THEN, decide whether it would be possible (and/or sensible) to continue on 3 engines to destination (which incidentally MUST be a main base) after consultation with both Maintrol and (if possible) the Duty Flight Manager.
It happened to me personally twice in my almost 9 years on the 744, but, in both cases, luckily at a much later stage in the flight - each time it necessitated a 'precautionary' shutdown for an engine low oil warning which, in both cases, subsequently turned out (happily) to have been an indication problem. We continued in one case on 3 engines for seven hours from the Far East
The first question that I always asked myself (and, if possible, always asked Engineering) when a similar situation occurred was :-
"If I shut this engine down - would it be possible to restart and use the engine in a future emergency?" (Eric Moody's incident springs to mind!!)
If the considered answer was 'yes' then I would continue provided that my crew and I were happy there was no structural integrity issues and they ALL agreed to continue to destination. In this situation on my flightdeck democracy reigned and with even just ONE pilot vote against continuing it immediately became re land or divert time!!
If the answer was 'no' then, before deciding to continue, I and my crew would consider the fuel state, predicted fuel burn, achievable flight level, possible enroute alternates, enroute terrain, enroute/destination weather and crew state (lack of sleep, tiredness? etc) in much greater detail before deciding whether or not to continue with the flight
One other point to make (as has been made in several previous posts) is that the B747-400 is in fact certificated as a 3 engined a/c, in fact both the manual and autoland parameters are the same for both 3 & 4 engined approaches (full flap, crosswind, minima and no minima autoland etc etc)
Está servira para distraerle.
Before I depart to a far, far, better place; from whence I shall continue to contrive to contribute to Prune; I would just like to second the suggestion of Intrepid Birdman on page 38. In all my aviating; I have never met so many, so nearly so egotistical as myself, as I have on this thread.
DOVE
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Rainboe:
'I get the feeling you are a nervous flyer'
If you mean that I am afraid to fly : Yes! And I have to thank That Prudence if after
almost 40 years and 19000 hrs I'm still flying.
So you want me to shoot at a corpse.
Here you are.
Let's admit that it was permitted, legal, logical and economical not to dump fuel and go back to the departure airport, (after having ascertained that all, I say again 'ALL', resources on board were enough to keep flying). But how do you understand the:
'Land to the First Suitable Airport'?
They overflew so many perfectly organised airports and had so many alarm bells... They even ignored the one by 200 NM from Gander (last chance they had to land before facing the Atlantic): when they received the Oceanic Crossing Clearence with a lower Flight Level than the one they had planned/requested (were they allowed to fly a variable Mach Number according to a Long Range cruise?).
So much they were affected by 'Homitis' that they decided to continue.
And it was between 40 and 30 west that they were in the middle of nothing.
I suppose that they were almost 3 hours to the destination with circa 35000 Kgs of fuel left.
But they had rended many pages from the emergency/abnormal check list, in this sense: in case of one of those situation would have arisen they had to descent to a lower level with
F/F increasing to 200 Kg/min (correct me if I'm wrong, I flew DC-10 and MD-11 not the 74) instead of 150 having not many chances to arrive to an airport. I try to figure out some:
- A second engine failure
- Smoke/fire on board (electrical, from the air conditioning, in a toilet...)
- Depressurization
- One pack trip off
- Fuel temperature low
- Cracked Windshield
You name others.
Don't say that statistically nothing could happen to them, otherwise I tell you: "Why we let so many people bore us with all those numbers and diagrams to take into account an engine
failure in the worst moment of the Flight: V ONE?
And at the end of the Oceanic crossing they still ignored many others hospitable airports, one for all: Shannon.
And as a matter of fact the final bell rang after they declared May Day to Manchester:
2000 of 5000 Kg of fuel ramained trapped on tank number 2,
reducing the endurance to less than 30 minutes.
Do you imagine if they had had (in order of severity):
- Unstabilized approach (all of them were tired)
- Runway incursion
- Bad weather
- Some kind of Hydraulic failure
- Some kind of problem with flight controls or landing gear
In short if they had to go around or simply make a 360°?
After what I said I hope that somebody will extract honestly from this experience the best teachings and spread them among us modest Aviators.
Best Regards
DOVES
'I get the feeling you are a nervous flyer'
If you mean that I am afraid to fly : Yes! And I have to thank That Prudence if after
almost 40 years and 19000 hrs I'm still flying.
So you want me to shoot at a corpse.
Here you are.
Let's admit that it was permitted, legal, logical and economical not to dump fuel and go back to the departure airport, (after having ascertained that all, I say again 'ALL', resources on board were enough to keep flying). But how do you understand the:
'Land to the First Suitable Airport'?
They overflew so many perfectly organised airports and had so many alarm bells... They even ignored the one by 200 NM from Gander (last chance they had to land before facing the Atlantic): when they received the Oceanic Crossing Clearence with a lower Flight Level than the one they had planned/requested (were they allowed to fly a variable Mach Number according to a Long Range cruise?).
So much they were affected by 'Homitis' that they decided to continue.
And it was between 40 and 30 west that they were in the middle of nothing.
I suppose that they were almost 3 hours to the destination with circa 35000 Kgs of fuel left.
But they had rended many pages from the emergency/abnormal check list, in this sense: in case of one of those situation would have arisen they had to descent to a lower level with
F/F increasing to 200 Kg/min (correct me if I'm wrong, I flew DC-10 and MD-11 not the 74) instead of 150 having not many chances to arrive to an airport. I try to figure out some:
- A second engine failure
- Smoke/fire on board (electrical, from the air conditioning, in a toilet...)
- Depressurization
- One pack trip off
- Fuel temperature low
- Cracked Windshield
You name others.
Don't say that statistically nothing could happen to them, otherwise I tell you: "Why we let so many people bore us with all those numbers and diagrams to take into account an engine
failure in the worst moment of the Flight: V ONE?
And at the end of the Oceanic crossing they still ignored many others hospitable airports, one for all: Shannon.
And as a matter of fact the final bell rang after they declared May Day to Manchester:
2000 of 5000 Kg of fuel ramained trapped on tank number 2,
reducing the endurance to less than 30 minutes.
Do you imagine if they had had (in order of severity):
- Unstabilized approach (all of them were tired)
- Runway incursion
- Bad weather
- Some kind of Hydraulic failure
- Some kind of problem with flight controls or landing gear
In short if they had to go around or simply make a 360°?
After what I said I hope that somebody will extract honestly from this experience the best teachings and spread them among us modest Aviators.
Best Regards
DOVES
Last edited by DOVES; 19th Mar 2005 at 09:09.
I've only made a few posts so I don't feel the need to order a Personal Title and help support PPRuNe
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Oh give us a break!
And here we have the problem... another 'expert' on the B744 and FOUR engined LROPS giving everyone the benefit of his 'experience' of operating the type... NOT! 
Here we have someone who considers every option... did anyone suggest that the crew involved didn't? Looks to me that they arrived at MAN and apart from a declaration of a "mayday" as required by their SOP's everyone got home safely.
Why do we have to keep on having your almost paranoid suggestion that you would have done it so differently? We know you would have dumped fuel and returned for an emergency landing if you'd been flying your tri-jet or twin-jet. Please give some credence to the fact that the crew on the FOUR engined B744 took into consideration all the factors that you keep harping on about. The rest of are knowledgeable enough to know that had there been another problem en-route that they would have been able to divert to an en-route alternate.
(correct me if I'm wrong, I flew DC-10 and MD-11 not the 74)
Here we have someone who considers every option... did anyone suggest that the crew involved didn't? Looks to me that they arrived at MAN and apart from a declaration of a "mayday" as required by their SOP's everyone got home safely.
Why do we have to keep on having your almost paranoid suggestion that you would have done it so differently? We know you would have dumped fuel and returned for an emergency landing if you'd been flying your tri-jet or twin-jet. Please give some credence to the fact that the crew on the FOUR engined B744 took into consideration all the factors that you keep harping on about. The rest of are knowledgeable enough to know that had there been another problem en-route that they would have been able to divert to an en-route alternate.
Too mean to buy a long personal title
DOVES: Let's admit that it was permitted, legal, logical and economical not to dump fuel and go back to the departure airport, (after having ascertained that all, I say again 'ALL', resources on board were enough to keep flying). But how do you understand the:
'Land to the First Suitable Airport'?
They overflew so many perfectly organised airports and had so many alarm bells.
'Land to the First Suitable Airport'?
They overflew so many perfectly organised airports and had so many alarm bells.
I try to figure out some:
- A second engine failure
- Smoke/fire on board (electrical, from the air conditioning, in a toilet...)
- Depressurization
- One pack trip off
- Fuel temperature low
You name others.
- A second engine failure
- Smoke/fire on board (electrical, from the air conditioning, in a toilet...)
- Depressurization
- One pack trip off
- Fuel temperature low
You name others.
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I still can't get past the fact that so many posts seem to be missing the point - as I understand it in this particular case this engine shutdown appears (until, at least, further details emerge!) to have been a PRECAUTIONARY shutdown NOT an emergency shutdown.
Compressor stalls are spectacular and noisy - especially at dusk/night - and consist of large flames usually from the back but also occasionally from the front of the engine concerned. A sort of giant hiccup or backfire usually caused by a sticky relief valve.
Occasionally one is caused by the fuel management computer (EMC) getting its 'knickers in a twist' and can be sorted by stopping and restarting the engine (for those familiar with the Rolls powered 744 I don't need to harp on about the various problems that a shutdown and restart can solve).
If the engine settles down, other than a note in the tech log, the engine is fully serviceable, in this case judging by the reports that the a/c circled LA for 20 minutes before continuing I would assume that Engineering interrogated the engine by the ACARS SatCom datalink (a/c parameters are continuously monitored by the BA engineering computers using burst technology) and they probably advised a PRECAUTIONARY shutdown. This would not have precluded a relight in the event of a second engine failure (please note DOVES - unlike the DC10/MD11 the 744 is extremely robust, has 4 engines, 4 of everything else (hydraulics etc) AND has MUCH MUCH better systems redundancy built in!!).
After all I asume that pilots of 3 engined a/c were happy to fly these sort of routes? Statistically the chances of a second engine failure (excluding for fuel contamination reasons) on a 4 engined a/c is much lower that a single engine failure on a 3 engined a/c and the 744 can continue on one engine if necessary.
Basically what I am trying to convey is that prejudging this decision is neither rational nor fair - the aviation community condemns the press for doing just that - applying experience of a different a/c type to make an (ill informed?) judgement in this case is plainly stupid, as is armchair pontificating.
I think that it would be sensible to wait for the report from those who actually KNOW what decisions were made (and why) and what ACTUALLY happened to the a/c.
Pax vobiscum!
Compressor stalls are spectacular and noisy - especially at dusk/night - and consist of large flames usually from the back but also occasionally from the front of the engine concerned. A sort of giant hiccup or backfire usually caused by a sticky relief valve.
Occasionally one is caused by the fuel management computer (EMC) getting its 'knickers in a twist' and can be sorted by stopping and restarting the engine (for those familiar with the Rolls powered 744 I don't need to harp on about the various problems that a shutdown and restart can solve).
If the engine settles down, other than a note in the tech log, the engine is fully serviceable, in this case judging by the reports that the a/c circled LA for 20 minutes before continuing I would assume that Engineering interrogated the engine by the ACARS SatCom datalink (a/c parameters are continuously monitored by the BA engineering computers using burst technology) and they probably advised a PRECAUTIONARY shutdown. This would not have precluded a relight in the event of a second engine failure (please note DOVES - unlike the DC10/MD11 the 744 is extremely robust, has 4 engines, 4 of everything else (hydraulics etc) AND has MUCH MUCH better systems redundancy built in!!).
After all I asume that pilots of 3 engined a/c were happy to fly these sort of routes? Statistically the chances of a second engine failure (excluding for fuel contamination reasons) on a 4 engined a/c is much lower that a single engine failure on a 3 engined a/c and the 744 can continue on one engine if necessary.
Basically what I am trying to convey is that prejudging this decision is neither rational nor fair - the aviation community condemns the press for doing just that - applying experience of a different a/c type to make an (ill informed?) judgement in this case is plainly stupid, as is armchair pontificating.
I think that it would be sensible to wait for the report from those who actually KNOW what decisions were made (and why) and what ACTUALLY happened to the a/c.
Pax vobiscum!