BA 744 Diversion to MAN (Merged)

[lomapaseo]

hank you. That is common sense. It is frustrating to me that so many people feel they have to deliver a verdict on the actions of a flight crew on the sparcest of information. I am happy to await the deliberations of the CAA and AAIB which will be used as a basis for future reaction by the industry. The shoot from the hip mouthing off delivered by the FAA is plain incompetent and ill considered, but then they want all the world to play by twin engined rules for obvious reasons.

Now let's be fair. You castigated all the people other than pilots who shoot from the hip, mouth off without the facts and now you castigate the FAA for the same thing.

Now maybe you have a valid point or two among your other posts, you seem to express yourself well. But just because a newspaper quoted hearsay from unattributed FAA folks who obviously don't have the grade level to speak for the FAA, you castigate the whole organization.

That certainly is not anymore correct than castigating the whole B747 pilot community because of all the differing opinions expressed on this forum.

back to lurking mode again

[Carnage Matey!]

and for safetys sake would rather have diverted , and flown on a fully fit aircraft.

There's no such thing as a fully fit aircraft. We are paid to assess the risks once the aircraft is airborne. Perhaps we shoud also refer MEL or fuel decisions to the passengers as well. Perhaps for safetys sake we should all take an extra 20 tonnes of fuel each flight? We could have a vote on it at the departure gate.

but perhaps these 'untrained' passengers rightly felt that they may have been put in danger and that the 'safety priority' was being conveniently sidelined.

No, they wrongly felt that they might have been put in danger. Thats rather the point of this whole 35 page thread in case you hadn't noticed.

an engine out landing is only practised in a simulator - lifelike as it is, nothing beats the real thing... supposing their approach had 'become unstable' in their new found first 'real' experience of this situation, or the weather at Manchester had suddenly closed in - as it was doing over those few wintery days ?

If a three engine approach in the simulator wasn't very close to the real thing then they wouldn't be allowed to train pilots in the simulator. The whole point of the simulator is that it is a very close approximation to the aircraft, it's not just an expensive video game. And so what if the weather had 'closed in' at MAN. What do you thing the aircrafts autoland capability is with an engine out? (You evidently have no idea, so I'll put you out of your misery and tell you its excatly the same as with four engines).

If the engine had failed on pushback 15 mins earlier, they woudln't have continued the flight... so would it not have been prudent to divert to somewhere else heading East rather than make an ocean crossing ending with an emergency diversion ?

You really haven't read the thread, have you? Once you're airborne you don't need the fourth engine for take off requirements, it is perfectly safe and feasible to continue on three, but not to commence the take off roll on three. Thats the difference.

[Slickster]

probably most of the passengers onboard were stressed by the situation/possibility of something else developing, and for safetys sake would rather have diverted , and flown on a fully fit aircraft.

Indeed, I guess they should have put it to the vote, and gone with the expert majority! How do you know how many wanted to do what?

It's a hell of a big plane, and an engine out landing is only practised in a simulator - lifelike as it is, nothing beats the real thing... supposing their approach had 'become unstable' in their new found first 'real' experience of this situation, or the weather at Manchester had suddenly closed in - as it was doing over those few wintery days ?

The aeroplane was going to land on less than four engines regardless of where they went. So most of the above could have happened, regardless of where they went. To wit, it is irrelevant. Needless to say, there must be something in that simulator practice, because it all worked out.

[Valve Kilmer]

Rainboe wrote:

To repeat again, all was going to the new plan until a fuel feed problem occured late into the flight.

Rainboe - what difference would a fuel feed problem make in this case. I mean, 5Ts of onblock fuel at MAN, is 5Ts of fuel - or am I missing something? Are you saying that there could have been considerably less fuel available than the 5Ts? Or - if that fuel feed problem you are talking about wouldn't have occured, are you then suggesting that the flight might have pressed further on to LHR instead, and landed with even less than 5Ts of fuel?

Please enlighten me and my 747 fellowpilots(although you don't give them much credit, I think they deserve an answer. Granted, I know they are not BA aces, and on top of that, some of them even have less that 10000 hrs on 747).

[Rainboe]

Bit heavy on the sarcasm, aren't we? I have tried to answer concisely and accurately on the information so far out. I am not aware of numbers. If you chose to take offence, that's your business, but I will not answer sarcasm, neither do I have a duty to proved answers on demand. I can help with seeking explanations or reasons, but as far as answers are concerned, they will come from the CAA and the AAIB.

[Tallbloke]

Probably old news now, but this weeks Flight reports the same aircraft had another number 2 engine shut down due to "oil pressure problems". The crew shut the engine down 3.5 hours after take-off from Singapore, returning to Heathrow. Captain elected to continue to Heathrow.

[SLFguy]

Two points before I start..

(1) I chose my name precisely so that peeps would know that I'm not pretending I'm something I'm not, (there's a fair bit of that about lol).

(2) I've kept up to date with this thread from Day 1 but may have missed something so forgive me if I'm about to reapeat a previous post/statement.

When this thread kicked off I did have the knee jerk PAX reaction - I wanna get on the floor asap, (er in a controlled stylie I hasten to add).

Having reached page 35 or so I have to say that I have been converted. If the crew assess and continue, I would now have no qualms. (Apparently we can even lose another one same side!).

What really interested me was the mention of statistics and it appears to me that it may in fact be MORE dangerous to dump and return to LAX...

The statisical chances of losing another engine is minute and you then have a fraction of this minute event being the statistical probability of it leading to an accident.

However, if you dump and return to LAX you are going to add one EXTRA landing and one EXTRA take off to the journey.

So the 'dump' option adds two of the more dangerous phases of flight.

Anyone able to quantify the stats?

Dons headgear...

[cavortingcheetah]

That article in this week's FI, page 4, also says that, and I paraphrase: The FAA is staying tight lipped about reported comments of one of its officials that the agency is preparing to take action against BA for careless and reckless operation of an aircraft. The article then goes on to say that BA is surprised at the FAA's quoted comments because the 747-400 is certificated for flight on three engine. Just another Tristar?

[JW411]

This week's Flight International also contains a safety letter from a BA captain who retired in 2002 after 34 years service and who spent his last 5 years on Boeing 747s.

He reckons that the 747 burns 5% more fuel on three engines and 10% more on two engines. I quote from the letter:

"But what about mid-Atlantic or Greenland? Losing a further engine at this point would cause the fuel flow to increase yet again. Did the 747 have sufficient fuel to make the designated destination? I doubt it.

The trouble is the flight management system two-engine page does not open up until you are actually on two engines. For this reason I believe the flight was irresponsible".

[Pinkman]

Rainboe, its not been a total waste of time. Apart from anything else it has confirmed that the general public don't understand 'risk' as applied to aviation, and for the most part don't want to, any more than the risks involvolved in eating peanut butter or barbecued food (surprisingly significant). It also confirms that you may all be ace at flying, but you're pants at communicating in a way that Joe and Jane Public are comfortable with. Thats not a criticism; I'm a scientist - I should be better and I'm just as bad.

If you make a list of (say) environmental risks in order of the amount of people they kill every year and then get Joe or Jane to list them again in order of how alarming they are, you'll end up with two completely different lists; the things that alarm and frighten us are not necessarily the things that kill us, which is why people continue to smoke cigarettes but refuse to board an aircraft if presented with a sign telling them the same numerical risk factors for their flight. Although they are told that the risk is the same, the immediacy of the issue is diffuse in the cancer from smoking issue - they can do something about it tomorrow.

Peter Sandman, the great risk communicator, identified over 20 of these factors which defines attitudes to risk and there is at least a half dozen here that explain why people are getting so upset, including the immediacy of the risk, the lack of control (passenger vs driver), the voluntariness of the risk. In this case there is an (unrealistic) expectation that every aircraft on every flight is 100% serviceable. Joe and Jane dont want to hear about MEL's, but Joe and Jane got their information from the media, who got outraged on their behalf. When you and/or your airline fail to communicate the risk adequately, there is no way, as pilots, that you can stuff that cat back in the bag.

And I suppose me telling you all this doesnt help much either.

[Rainboe]

I saw the Flight letter. I disagree with it- is he any more right than anybody else? I'm happy to wait for guidance from the CAA. OK the Flight management 2 engine pages don't open until you are on two- there are actually 2 Performance Manuals behind the Captain with all the information there- driftdown and fuel flows.
Pinkman, I'm not sure what you are asking. My experience is it does not help to tell everybody everything. Unnecessary explanations seem to cause more alarm that enlightenment. Everybody is nervous getting on an aeroplane. I don't like it (unless I'm flying it). It's one of those things bringing out disaster thoughts even though it is outrageously safe. It's safe because of the professionalism and skill and training of the people employed to fly you. It's a high speed environment, there is not time for explanations, votes or excuses. Sometimes you just have to trust your crew to do their best on your behalf, and let them get on with the job. BA/BOAC has never yet lost an aeroplane through lack of fuel or running out of engines.

Now I ask you again to examine flying 3+hours over the Pacific on one engine- and this is accepted as a normal risk of ETOPS (twin) over water, with 300 passengers. What is your opinion of a comparison of the risk?

[Hotel Mode]

Well i dont think he has a very long memeory or he didnt fly the -400. You dont need an FMC for the 2 engine figures they are in tyhe performance manual and would have been checked by all 3 pilots and no doubt people on the ground to confirm they would get the aircraft to a suitable alternate from the critical point.

[Valve Kilmer]

Rainboe wrote:.

I have tried to answer concisely and accurately on the information so far out.

- well then please keep up the good work captain, and answer the question regarding information you have given to us yourself!

Rainboe - I notice however with great interest, that you fail to answer the simple question I adressed to you. Instead YOU chose to take offence. You don't have to answer to sarcasm, no way, but an answer to my very simple question:"What difference would a fuel feed problem make in this case?", would be much appreaciated, if it is not too much to ask from you.

[Rainboe]

I need to see the fuel figures confirmed. I don't know what the landing fuel figure was, all I am aware of was there was a potential unuseable fuel problem to do with Main Tank 2. It is possible they carried out the Low Fuel checklist and didn't like the reaction. Whatever, they took the sensible decision that LHR was too far and elected to land earlier at MAN. This whole question of what happened at the end of the flight was totally irrelevant to the course of the flight up until then. The word filtering down is that it is not as critical as was anticipated, but this is not confirmed.

[Valve Kilmer]

It is possible they carried out the Low Fuel checklist and didn't like the reaction.

Ahaaa - if so, then it might have been a sensible thing to stop the show a little earlier I suppose.

Nevertheless, thanks for the reply! I got the answer I was looking for.

VK is holding fire...

Out

[Rainboe]

It's also possible you are leaping to conclusions. The only 'answer' will come from the CAA and AAIB! Try holding your breath until they deliberate.

[MPH]

Yes, indeed, we will just wait for the investigaion! Let's see what the CAA dictates on this 'incident'.

Just thought that on the 'forums' we, could voice our opinions.

Agree with 'val kilmer's' last comment. I am still of the opinion that the 'outcome' at the 'end' of this flight could have been 'less' of an 'incident' than it was!!

Happy landings!!!

[nicholasw]

A guy I know is a maintenance engineer for United.

He claims to me that the mere characterisation of the engine failure (compressor stall, large flames with sparks, high EGT at idle...) should have been enough by itself to convince the crew to land.

He seems to posit that the crew could not know the aircraft was not suffering from some latent damage and that this is the basis of the FAA's ire.

I am interested to hear responses to this.

[Carnage Matey!]

My response is to say your engineer is talking out of his rear. As has been covered previously in response to someone who made similar spurious claims about NWA mechanics, engine surges are fairly regular occurences. There are checklists to deal with them, Boeings own QRH states that if the condition clears the engine may be operated as normal. There are countless parameters being continually measured and assessed by the EECs, the onboard maintenance computers and the flight crew themselves. The idea that a surging engine spits debris out left right and centre, damaging the aircraft with no indication of vibration or control problem is simply garbage. Can anybody point to a situation where an RB211 surged, ejected debris and damaged the aircraft with no indication to the crew? Ever?

[maxy101]

Should be interesting to see if any BA Flt Ops manager loses his job over this , if eventually BA's SOP's are seen to be incorrect/dangerous. Will the same people calling for the Captain to be brought to account call for the JAROPS signatory to lose their job?