BA 744 Diversion to MAN (Merged)

[411A]

In reality, there are really quite a few diversion airports available, especially in the south Pacific.

UAL, as I recall, has already had at least one 777 diversion, a three-hour plus affair, not all that long ago.

[Animalclub]

3 hours plus seems a little over what is allowed for ETOPS isn't it?

[VeeBee]

There have been ETOPS oerations through the Pacific for at least 15 years. The number of single engine diversions over that time is not surprisingly less than the IFSD diversion rate for quads. The single engine diversions can probably be counted on the fingers of one hand.

[ETOPS]

Animalclub

3 hours plus seems a little over what is allowed for ETOPS isn't it?

Remember the whole ethos behind ETOPS (or EROPS) is that of pre-planning.

Thus before take-off, suitable diversion airfields are nominated, alternate minima are "stepped up" etc etc. In the same way the aircraft is certified for 120/180mins diversion but on the day you have to fly to your nearest airport regardless of how long it takes. You can't "clock off" at exactly 180 mins into your diversion if that leaves you a few miles short!

[oldebloke]

As the other gents have been saying ETOPS twins have been traversing the Pacific foryears....2 co's I know of with B737's(aloha+)from CYVR-HNL..Alot o'the traffic is only twins,and not too much has beenreported of the occasional 'shutdown'..The widest part ,I believe,is between the west coast and Hawaii..
Once your by HNL enroute to SYD one has lots o'diversion points..

[Tallbloke]

I think the United diversion exceeded 3 hours because they encountered stronger than forecast winds on the diversion. Proposed rules will mean that operators will update the weather and therefore the route in flight, apparently.

What I have asked in the past is, given that the majority of engine failures occur at high power settings, what captain will set his one remaining engine to MCT when he has a failure at the critical point? ETOPS preplanning assumes best single engine speed at MCT. Is it not more sensible to continue at some lower setting (but at a lower cruising speed)? This would however have commercial implications.

[Offchocks]

Tallbloke & cavortingcheetah

ETOPS does not have to mean flying continuously at MCT when you loose an engine.
It does mean targeting a higher TAS at a slightly lower altitude rather than MCT at max single engine altitude and step climbs maintaining MCT.
On an ETOPS diversion with an engine shut down, you descend to your ETOP's altitude at your ETOP's diversion speed and cruise at that speed (TAS). You may need MCT to start off with but as the weight reduces so does the thrust.
This is quicker and less demanding on the remaining engine than when operating at MCT at max single engine altitude, the cost is a little more fuel burn.
Of course engine failure is not the only thing that will cause an ETOP's diversion.

[Rainboe]

The whole 40 pages of that dreadful thread about the B747 engine failure has made us all think more about preparation for an engine failure. I have to say I was very frustrated by the abuse thrown at a pilot for continuing on 3 engines when you compare that to current accepted ETOPs practice whereby one may find oneself flying for 3 hours on one engine over the ocean. I know which is 'safe' and which is not! It's actually made me review what I would do were I to fly my own carcase as passenger on one of these routes, and I would be questioning the reservations department damn hard!

Offchocks- if you are down to one, with up to 300 on board, and a long way from home, you will need damn near MCT to keep as much altitude as you can for speed and fuel economy!

[phillipas]

This thread is in response to a 'challenge' posed by Rainboe in the Manchester/747 thread.

And thanks for starting it. It was for the purpose of chipping in that I registered, and then i found the thread had been locked.

Answering the question of how happy I would be flying across the Pacific on a twin jet, the answer is 'pretty happy'.

Speaking sltictly from the SLF perspective I accept that there is no such thing as an absloutly 'safe' flight. Everytime I get on a plane I'm taking a chance, however small it might be.

The whole question of 2vs4 engines isn't to my mind very relevant, it's more a case of 1vs3 which is the situation you find yourself one has given up for the day. Certainly 3 is prefereably to 1, but the chances of getting into the 1 engine situation are extremely small, and the chances of that 1engine also giving up is extremely small again.

And I'm just talking about the multiple unrelated engine failure way of meeting my maker from 30,000ft. There's obviously a mulittude of other ways - fire, contaminated fuel, failure of wing spar, etc.

I'll accept though that if you ask me whilst sat 3 hours from an airport on a 777 with an engine out my answer might be slightly different!

Few people, I believe, choose flights according to some rational safety related thought process. People tend to choose on a combination of price, service and schedule. As far as selecting a flight based on safety people tend to work accoridng to whther the media has generally deemed a carrier to be 'safe' or 'unsafe' (think Korean or Aeroflot a few years ago).

In summary I think the example to quote is a flight I took last year. LHR to SIN. I choose LH based on them offering a good price. From a safety perspective the decision was a stupid one - flying LH from LHR to SIN is basically TWICE AS DANGEROUS as flying BA on the same route.

Why?

2 flights instead of 1.

But hey, I'm lived through the experience and saved myself a few quid compared to BA.

[sky9]

Tallbloke.

You might be right that the majority of engine failures are at high power settings however a number are at max rpm for the N1 which is around the 20,000ft level.

[BusyB]

Rainboe,

I had sympathy for you on the previous thread as I felt you were correct. Now I see you making crass comments about ETOPS ops about which you are obviously less well informed.

[hobie]

What the $$$$ has ETOPS got to do with this thread?

..... absolutely nothing !!!!

[Rainboe]

hobie- You've obviously missed the point of the later 20 pages of this thread! I have been asking again and again, why so much abuse thrown at a pilot for continuing on 3 engines when we accept the premise of ending up on 1 engine for 3 hours over the Pacific as an 'acceptable risk'? Compared to this, why so much castigation of pilot A on 3 engines?

BusyB- I accept you may disagree, but pray tell me where I am incorrect please?

[cavortingcheetah]

Thank you Offchocks.
hobie: I believe that this is a merged thread. The 747/Manchester line with one I started on ETOPS over The Pacific. I am not guilty for the merger but I suspect that there may lie the confusion. Be not muddled any longer

[lomapaseo]

I am sorry to see this thread now expanding into even more imaginative what-ifs about ETOPS and/or engine failure conditions.

ETOPs discussions have been haggled to death elsewhere on this forum, why reopen them here.

The speculation on more likely engine failures at MCT conditions is not supported by data and certainly has been discussed before under ETOPs.

[DOVES]

RAINBOE wrote so many times:
Please answer my question- what is your opinion of B777 being accepted for ETOPS when they may have to fly for 3+ hours over the Pacific on one engine? I keep asking, but nobody who is so critical of BA over this will say how happy they are with that ETOPs operation over the Pacific!
He deserves an answer:
Thanks to GOD I've never flown ETOPS so I had to make a bibliographic research on that subject; I'm inviting you to correct me if I'm wrong:
A twin engine aircraft has to meet many criteria/limitations to be allowed to fly ETOPS.
Company, Maintenance (in terms of more stringent MEL etc.) and Flight Operations have to be certified to conduct such an operation on a certain type of aircraft, with a maximum diversion time, in a useable geografic area, with qualified and recurrently trained crews.
Once a twin was requested not to be at any point of her route at a distance greater than 60 minutes flight time, with one engine out, in Long Range cruise, from a suitable airport. And that hour was already a gift we 'brave aviators' had given to Manufacturers and Carriers. I’ll show you why.
We all know that without engine thrust, from normal cruising altitude, we are going to meet somewhere, someway mother Earth in no more than 20-25 minutes.
And: 60 minus 25 makes 35. The point is: Who is signing the Guarantee that in those 35 minutes after the first engine failure we won’t have a second one? “Statistics!” Someone has answered. “Engines are becoming ever more infallible. So the chance to have a second engine failure is 1/ fantastilions”. It reminds me a story TOTO’, a famous Italian comedian, used to tell a long time ago: “Statistics say that we eat a chicken a week. But there is someone for sure who eats two...: also mine”.
So who’s next?...: don’t complain!!!
Then those 60 minutes became 120; and now somebody dare to stretch it to 180????
“Appetite comes eating”. When will they stop? I fully agree with you: RAINBOE.
They are pulling too much the rope: “USQUE TANDEM CATILINA ABUTERE PATIENTIAM NOSTRAM?”
But I think that all of this has nothing to do with this thread.
Let's go back to it:
JAR–OPS 1.505 En-route
– Aeroplanes With Three Or More Engines, Two Engines Inoperative
(a) An operator shall ensure that at no point along the intended track will an aeroplane having three or more engines be more than 90 minutes, at the all-engines long range cruising speed at standard temperature in still air, away from an aerodrome at which the performance requirements applicable at the expected landing mass are met unless it complies with sub-paragraphs (b) to (f) below.
(c) The two engines are assumed to fail at the most critical point of that portion of the route where the aeroplane is more than 90 minutes, at the all engines long range cruising speed at standard
temperature in still air, away from an aerodrome at which the performance requirements applicable at the expected landing mass are met.

Have they always been no more than 600-700 NM from Gander, Prinz Christian Sund (if my memory don’t fail), Shannon? Uhhmm????

And:

SECTION 1 JAR-OPS 1 Subpart D
Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.375
In-flight fuel management
(a) In-flight fuel checks.
(1) A commander must ensure that fuel checks are carried out in flight at regular intervals. The remaining fuel must be recorded and evaluated to:
(i) Compare actual consumption with planned consumption;
(ii) Check that the remaining fuel is sufficient to complete the flight; and
(iii) Determine the expected fuel remaining on arrival at the destination.
(2) The relevant fuel data must be recorded.
(b) In-flight fuel management.
(1) If, as a result of an in-flight fuel check, the expected fuel remaining on arrival at the destination is less than the required alternate fuel plus final reserve fuel, the commander must take into account the traffic and the operational conditions prevailing at the destination aerodrome, along the diversion route to an alternate aerodrome and at the destination alternate aerodrome, when deciding whether to proceed to the destination aerodrome or to divert, so as to land with not less than final reserve fuel.

From the very first moment when they got the Oceanic crossing clearance they knew they couldn’t make it to London, and they kept going.
But over Shannon they were compelled to land ASAP.
Fly Safe
DOVE

[Idle Thrust]

Having experience flying 2, 3, and 4 engine aircraft on long haul ops, I have found all 42 pages of this thread to be very interesting reading. Of particular note is the fact that most supporters of the BA crew’s decision to continue are experienced 744 long haul pilots whereas the opponents would appear to have little or no experience on either the airplane or the route.

I have asked myself, “What would I do in the same situation?” and the answer has always come up a qualified “Continue”. That's in a 744. In another airplane, I think I would dump and return, or at the very least plan an east coast operation of some sort. In a 340, for instance, the redundancy in the hydraulic system is just not as good - any time you have to assess the consequences of a second engine failure in terms of which one has failed and which one goes next, there’s a message for you. The 744 on three is lacking the thrust produced, nothing else.

Having said all of the above, I’m sad to say that were it to happen tomorrow, I would perforce return if only to avoid being pilloried in forums like this and, even worse by regulatory bodies that are looking for trouble where none exists. Even if safety is not compromised, PR sometimes rules.

[BusyB]

Rainboe,
Offchocks was being honest and when you made your reply I don't really think that you meant your comment seriously.

[Max Angle]

Even if safety is not compromised, PR sometimes rules.

It's a sad fact but very true, this is not the first time a BA 747 has come from the West coast of the US on 3 but may well be the last.

PS. I know it's happened before coz. a collegue of mine nearly got dumped back into LA a few years back. All he could think about after the bang was how he was going to get on the next flight with an ID90 and how he was going to explain it to crewing. To his intense relief the crew announced about 15 minutes later that they carrying on.

[frangatang]

I do recall a BA 744 some years back suffering an engine failure
out of lax and they continued to JFK. The company staff there were peed off for more hassle heading their way and made it clear they would appreciate it in future if a diversion went elsewhere. Picked on the wrong FO, he could swipe your head off with one blow of his japanese stick.
On another subject, more than one engineer has said that if you knew what goes on in engineering you would never fly again.
Just remember planes are mechanical and mechanical things fail