BA 744 Diversion to MAN (Merged)
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Been away for 10 days in the bush...get back and ....what is top of the list...... ?????....was at least hoping that a report had come out and the discussion had moved on....
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Thank you Doves- that was most interesting. Are those JAROPs 1.505 (a) current? I read that as giving even Trijets a form of ETOPS limitation? The nor,al route back from LAX goes over the Great Lakes, up to near Gander, then out across the Atlantic. This is more or less the route even Trijets follow. The 747 was, in effect, a 'Trijet', thus had no more limitations than an MD11 doing this route.
As far as fuel reserves go, the way it was reported was that they were on course for LHR landing, but because of fuel feed problems, it became apparent that a large quantity of the remaining fuel may become unuseable, therefore an earlier landing at MAN was carried out.
Inexperienced people have voiced opinions that they should have returned. Returning would have involved extensive fuel dumping, something that adds additional risk and time, and pollution, to a station with ordinary engineering cover. We don't do that unless we have to. Another opinion is that a diversion to JFK should have been carried out. Again, no special engineering cover, no great access to spares, and big parking problems.
To those divorcing this from the ETOPS problem, so you are still very unlikely to lose another engine having already lost one? Explain that to the Eastern Tristar Miami! The replacement engine on this aeroplane failed next trip. Now I have an idea about possibilities, and this was not coincidence. The replacement engine may very possibly have had an engineering woopsie. That is why in this case, the crew would have closely examined the possibility of their actions if another was to fail. They had thousands of close diversions possible for the width of North America to satisfy themselves that all was well for the crossing. Travel on that- anytime. On two engines across the Pacific (to allegedly save a few pounds!)? No thank you!
As far as fuel reserves go, the way it was reported was that they were on course for LHR landing, but because of fuel feed problems, it became apparent that a large quantity of the remaining fuel may become unuseable, therefore an earlier landing at MAN was carried out.
Inexperienced people have voiced opinions that they should have returned. Returning would have involved extensive fuel dumping, something that adds additional risk and time, and pollution, to a station with ordinary engineering cover. We don't do that unless we have to. Another opinion is that a diversion to JFK should have been carried out. Again, no special engineering cover, no great access to spares, and big parking problems.
To those divorcing this from the ETOPS problem, so you are still very unlikely to lose another engine having already lost one? Explain that to the Eastern Tristar Miami! The replacement engine on this aeroplane failed next trip. Now I have an idea about possibilities, and this was not coincidence. The replacement engine may very possibly have had an engineering woopsie. That is why in this case, the crew would have closely examined the possibility of their actions if another was to fail. They had thousands of close diversions possible for the width of North America to satisfy themselves that all was well for the crossing. Travel on that- anytime. On two engines across the Pacific (to allegedly save a few pounds!)? No thank you!
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Rainboe
Are you saying people should think twice about travelling on BA 777/767 aircraft if they will be operating an ETOPS sector?
It seems hypocritical to have a strong opinion about something you have no experience of while castigating others for expressing similar concerns about the 744 flight.
Perhaps it means that some things can seem 'instictively' wrong whether we are type rated or not. Maybe we should all listen to the 'inexperienced' a little more, they may have some useful input.
Are you saying people should think twice about travelling on BA 777/767 aircraft if they will be operating an ETOPS sector?
It seems hypocritical to have a strong opinion about something you have no experience of while castigating others for expressing similar concerns about the 744 flight.
Perhaps it means that some things can seem 'instictively' wrong whether we are type rated or not. Maybe we should all listen to the 'inexperienced' a little more, they may have some useful input.
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What it means is I have no understanding of people here who so freely personally abuse and criticise a crew following guidelines and carrying out a process that to my mind has no risk whatsoever, 'FAA spokesperson' included (who evidently has little natural aptitude for the job) when they remain so stunningly silent about a procedure that I feel does carry significant risks to the travelling public in relation to the events we are talking about. Sometimes people worry about the wrong things.
What relative risks people are willing to undergo on a journey (for some, 'to save a few pounds'!) is completely up to them. I think I have to feel some misgivings about the ever upward pressure on ETOPs limitations 'because that is the aeroplane you are building'. There is a reason for more than 2 engines. To achieve the savings of just having 2 engines then to try and remove all the limitations of that sort of operation may be a step too far, especially in the light of its ever increasing range. With increasing range will come longer over water flights.
What relative risks people are willing to undergo on a journey (for some, 'to save a few pounds'!) is completely up to them. I think I have to feel some misgivings about the ever upward pressure on ETOPs limitations 'because that is the aeroplane you are building'. There is a reason for more than 2 engines. To achieve the savings of just having 2 engines then to try and remove all the limitations of that sort of operation may be a step too far, especially in the light of its ever increasing range. With increasing range will come longer over water flights.
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...they remain so stunningly silent about a procedure that I feel does carry significant risks to the travelling public in relation to the events we are talking about. Sometimes people worry about the wrong things.
Typically for a passenger the thing they should worry about most is the car journey to/from the airport at either end. I'm firmly of the impression that, in the GLOBAL scheme of things, spending as much time as possible in a plane is probably the best way to avoid accidents (overall rather than aviation!).
Finally I consider it a great testimony to the professionalism of the pilots here that, despite the incredible level of flight safety that currently exists, you are constantly looking to push safety levels higher.
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Rainboe,
In this era of fuel conservation, i cannot see how a 4 engined aircraft with a planned fuel to LHR could have hoped to reach that destination on 3 engines.
Would you care to educate me about the differences in fuel allowances for 4 and 3 engine flight that would have made this destination possible?
Mutt.
In this era of fuel conservation, i cannot see how a 4 engined aircraft with a planned fuel to LHR could have hoped to reach that destination on 3 engines.
Would you care to educate me about the differences in fuel allowances for 4 and 3 engine flight that would have made this destination possible?
Mutt.
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There are a number of extra considerations that may apply. I have no hard information, but these would have been examined:
1- Carriage of extra fuel above normal reserves and contingency is common if any factors like adverse weather or holding delays are anticipated. It is not frowned on in BA.
2- Nomination of diversion fuel for MAN is frequent. We don't use LGW fuel as a diversion for LHR very often. Thus you could decide en route to make LGW your nominated diversion after reviewing the weather forecast, saving yourself that excess of diversion fuel.
There are a few tricks for replanning in flight to 'stretch' a LH operation. Many people seem to think cruise flying is sitting back looking out of the window- it is very dynamic sometimes with constant reviews on critical flights. When you are close to destination, you can throw away your alternate if there is another runway as long as there are no weathr problems. All these things would have been kept in mind as the aeroplane was planning to overfly MAN en route to LHR. From what I understand, fuel reserves were planned to keep within safe paramenters when the possible fuel supply problem cropped up. I think I would have followed the safe procedure they apparently carried out by diverting to MAN with appropriate calls for the condition they suddenly found themselves in.
Longhaul operations can inevitably end up using fuel significantly outside plan due to factors such as:
lower cruising levels over many hours
worse than forecast winds
higher or lower speeds due to ATC constraints
extended delays before takeoff
worse arrival holding than expected.
Sometimes the fuel may not be enough on the day. We work to a formula of burning 3-4%/hour of extra fuel carried. So over a 10 hour flight, if you nominated 5 tonnes extra, you would burn about 1.2- 2 tonnes just taking that extra fuel. At $250+/tonne, it is a luxury you should try and avoid without good reason- for the vast majority of flights it is plainly being extravagant. We all have infrequent low fuel events. Many of us have had 'Pan' calls when you may end up with close to Reserve fuel (about 4.4 tonnes on a 747), 'Mayday' with less than that.
I see the operation as well planned, with correct procedures being followed when an additional problem occured late in the flight.
1- Carriage of extra fuel above normal reserves and contingency is common if any factors like adverse weather or holding delays are anticipated. It is not frowned on in BA.
2- Nomination of diversion fuel for MAN is frequent. We don't use LGW fuel as a diversion for LHR very often. Thus you could decide en route to make LGW your nominated diversion after reviewing the weather forecast, saving yourself that excess of diversion fuel.
There are a few tricks for replanning in flight to 'stretch' a LH operation. Many people seem to think cruise flying is sitting back looking out of the window- it is very dynamic sometimes with constant reviews on critical flights. When you are close to destination, you can throw away your alternate if there is another runway as long as there are no weathr problems. All these things would have been kept in mind as the aeroplane was planning to overfly MAN en route to LHR. From what I understand, fuel reserves were planned to keep within safe paramenters when the possible fuel supply problem cropped up. I think I would have followed the safe procedure they apparently carried out by diverting to MAN with appropriate calls for the condition they suddenly found themselves in.
Longhaul operations can inevitably end up using fuel significantly outside plan due to factors such as:
lower cruising levels over many hours
worse than forecast winds
higher or lower speeds due to ATC constraints
extended delays before takeoff
worse arrival holding than expected.
Sometimes the fuel may not be enough on the day. We work to a formula of burning 3-4%/hour of extra fuel carried. So over a 10 hour flight, if you nominated 5 tonnes extra, you would burn about 1.2- 2 tonnes just taking that extra fuel. At $250+/tonne, it is a luxury you should try and avoid without good reason- for the vast majority of flights it is plainly being extravagant. We all have infrequent low fuel events. Many of us have had 'Pan' calls when you may end up with close to Reserve fuel (about 4.4 tonnes on a 747), 'Mayday' with less than that.
I see the operation as well planned, with correct procedures being followed when an additional problem occured late in the flight.
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Mutt:
At its simplest. Get to your 3 engine cruise level. Make sure Long Range cruise for 3 is selected. Put all the winds into the FMC. Put in any expected FL changes. Crossing levels etc. Sit back for 10 seconds and look to see what fuel you are left with at destination. in almost all situations you are left with about 8 tonnes at destination. (You can do this on 4 for planning purposes without pressing the execute key)
8 tonnes is just about enough....
It would normally be about 13 - 15 tonnes at destination.
Then you sit for 10 hours constantly going, "what if".... The plan is the stepping stones method. Safe alternate to safe alternate. Till you get home. If the fuel begins to head south, or a further problem develops, you go to your stepping stone safe bet.
L337
At its simplest. Get to your 3 engine cruise level. Make sure Long Range cruise for 3 is selected. Put all the winds into the FMC. Put in any expected FL changes. Crossing levels etc. Sit back for 10 seconds and look to see what fuel you are left with at destination. in almost all situations you are left with about 8 tonnes at destination. (You can do this on 4 for planning purposes without pressing the execute key)
8 tonnes is just about enough....
It would normally be about 13 - 15 tonnes at destination.
Then you sit for 10 hours constantly going, "what if".... The plan is the stepping stones method. Safe alternate to safe alternate. Till you get home. If the fuel begins to head south, or a further problem develops, you go to your stepping stone safe bet.
L337
Rainboe,
sorry for the late reply to something you posted a few days ago, but here it goes.
Effectively, yes. That is how I recall dispatching the MD11 vs the A330/767. The A330/767 was much less complex to plan with ETOPS 180 mins than the MD11 which had to stay within the said limits. If you strayed outside, a complex calculation followed to satisfy the limits for 2 engine out ops.
Basically, there were problems on the weekends with BGSF out of action if you loose Keflavik as well as a viable alternate, things can get interesting. ETOPS however, is much more flexible to plan as you are allowed 180 mins. Basically Shannon/Prestwick and Gander/Goose/St.Johns or any combination of those would do nicely, and if you throw in Bermuda and Lajes or even Halifax, you can deal with most weather scenarios the NATL can come up with. On the 3Jets however, things could turn into loads of paperwork and/or rerouting fairly quickly if some combination of enroute alternates went foul on you.
Best Regards
AN2 Driver.
sorry for the late reply to something you posted a few days ago, but here it goes.
Thank you Doves- that was most interesting. Are those JAROPs 1.505 (a) current? I read that as giving even Trijets a form of ETOPS limitation? The normal route back from LAX goes over the Great Lakes, up to near Gander, then out across the Atlantic. This is more or less the route even Trijets follow. The 747 was, in effect, a 'Trijet', thus had no more limitations than an MD11 doing this route.
Basically, there were problems on the weekends with BGSF out of action if you loose Keflavik as well as a viable alternate, things can get interesting. ETOPS however, is much more flexible to plan as you are allowed 180 mins. Basically Shannon/Prestwick and Gander/Goose/St.Johns or any combination of those would do nicely, and if you throw in Bermuda and Lajes or even Halifax, you can deal with most weather scenarios the NATL can come up with. On the 3Jets however, things could turn into loads of paperwork and/or rerouting fairly quickly if some combination of enroute alternates went foul on you.
Best Regards
AN2 Driver.
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I had no idea that Trijets were effectively limited by a form of ETOPs limitations at all!
The relevant section got found, and it transpires that there's a limit on the DC-10 that it can't go above ( I think, it was a good while back now) 70 or 75 N, as in the event of a pressurisation failure, it can't get clear of the FL170 sector safe altitude limitation before the oxygen generators expire, and if they've no pressurisation and no oxygen, they need to get down to FL120 or less. I have to admit, that little nugget gave us some pause for thought when we sat down to think about it in some detail.
Suffice to say that the conversation on the flight deck was sufficiently stimulating to all concerned that we were still there enjoying the view, ( it was a rare VFR day) and the conversation as we passed over the home of Flight Simulation, Chicago Meigs, some good while later.
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Read the article in a aviation magazine. Eng fail at take off at 100ft. Then flying LAX to LHR on three, declaring a fuel emergency at MAN. Whats unbeliveable is the comment made by BALPA President Capt M Grandshaw "Thats standard operations"; Guess who's sleeping with whom?
Guess now that the FAA is on it, BA maybe regretting the decision, as the line of Yank paxs and their lawyers are growing, having suffered "terrible mental trauma".
Guess now that the FAA is on it, BA maybe regretting the decision, as the line of Yank paxs and their lawyers are growing, having suffered "terrible mental trauma".
Last edited by BYOD; 24th Mar 2005 at 01:35.
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Humbug..... I'm gonna start writing my responses in wordpad and posting them here..... Lost the last one due to losing the phone connection....
Irish Steve... Most old INS's had problems aligning themselves above 70°N/S, so that might be a more realisitic reason for the DC10 restriction.
L337 & Rainboe. Thank you for your patient responses..
So what are we left with..
So where is the problem???
Mutt.
Irish Steve... Most old INS's had problems aligning themselves above 70°N/S, so that might be a more realisitic reason for the DC10 restriction.
L337 & Rainboe. Thank you for your patient responses..
So what are we left with..
So where is the problem???
Mutt.
As was said earlier:
Just because it 'can' is not a valid reason for assuming that it necessarily 'should'.....
A bit philosophical, perhaps, but the outcome will be most interesting.
Just because it 'can' is not a valid reason for assuming that it necessarily 'should'.....
A bit philosophical, perhaps, but the outcome will be most interesting.
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Even worse BEagle:
- "should" is perhaps not the right word
- "acceptable in the circumstances" comes to mind (very different from should)
- "defensible" also comes to mind
- or, "falls within the sphere of acceptable judgment"
- mainly because the decision cannot be demonstrated to be "wrong" or "unwise" or "unsafe" - without an "opinion" being offered
In other words, this interesting case has thrown up the contrasting basic assumptions underlying ETOPs, 3-engined and 4-engined operations - and their consequences / impact when it comes to risk management and in-flight operational decision-making.
As someone above said, whatever about the non-pilots, the willingness of some pilots to pontificate here about things of which they know little has easily been the most depressing part of the entire thread.
I am really looking forward to the respective wisdom and findings of BA, the CAA and, especially, the FAA. We can then all redo this entire thread, but throw additional insults at our target of choice!
- "should" is perhaps not the right word
- "acceptable in the circumstances" comes to mind (very different from should)
- "defensible" also comes to mind
- or, "falls within the sphere of acceptable judgment"
- mainly because the decision cannot be demonstrated to be "wrong" or "unwise" or "unsafe" - without an "opinion" being offered
In other words, this interesting case has thrown up the contrasting basic assumptions underlying ETOPs, 3-engined and 4-engined operations - and their consequences / impact when it comes to risk management and in-flight operational decision-making.
As someone above said, whatever about the non-pilots, the willingness of some pilots to pontificate here about things of which they know little has easily been the most depressing part of the entire thread.
I am really looking forward to the respective wisdom and findings of BA, the CAA and, especially, the FAA. We can then all redo this entire thread, but throw additional insults at our target of choice!
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Ignoring the 3-engined continue debate for a moment; look at why the mayday was declared. Personally I feel, if it had not been for the "spotter" (or the equivalent term for a VHF spotter) hearing the Mayday there would have been the normal Pprune... Why was there a BA747 parked at the engineering base at MAN yesterday? thread. The three engined operation from LAX may never have reached these pages!
Back to my post, the Mayday was declared as the commander thought he was going to land without the required minimum fuel. He did the right thing, informed ATC of his plight and received the corresponding level of service (sterile runway etc.)
Why did he feel he was not going to land with the minimum fuel, surely the FMC had been telling him (them) for the last ten hours what the arrival fuel at MAN was going to be, updating it with every change of wind, TAS or FL.
If ever the "plan" was going to operate direct to LHR this must have changed early on to MAN [one of the passengers inputs it was suggested an extra aircraft (no shuttle backup aircraft sitting at MAN with nothing to do nowadays!) had already been sent from LHR to meet our arrival].
Could I suggest that during Fixed Base simulator details, if not on the Full Flight simulator the areas of operation with low fuel state would have been explored. As per the QRH the crossfeed is opened, with all pumps (tanks) being able to feed all engines.
The design of the simulator would have all the pumps producing the rated pressure such that the "balanced" fuel state prior to opening the crossfeed would continue.
But in the real world, with any pump producing higher pressure (and able to satisfy the total demand on its own) would result in that pump (tank) providing all the fuel consumed until the tank was drained empty (less any unusable) when the flow /pressure would drop off, the NRV close, and the next highest pump/tank would continue the fuel feed to all engines.
Have many of us actually had to open the crossfeed in flight due to low fuel levels? The odd MEL requirement "on the approach" for fuel pump failures, or "normal" balancing where the plan is to feed from a specific tank, but for low fuel level I would suggest very very infrequently.
Imagine for a moment, this commander as per the QRH drill opening the crossfeed. From that point on he sees all the fuel coming from one tank (pump with the highest fuel pressure). Have they a situation with one tank (which is not feeding) that has unusable fuel? Are they going to sit there with the other (feeding) tank quantity reducing towards empty and do nothing? I suggest not. Err on the safe side, assume the worst, transmit a Mayday and keep that runway clear!
Perhaps in hindsight OPS should have routed the spare aircraft (and the 747) to GLA/BFS rather than trying to stretch the operation to MAN. Also, if only there had not been the circling out to sea (and using that valuable fuel) at LAX before deciding on continuing .......
Crew 10/10, Operational support ?/10
Back to my post, the Mayday was declared as the commander thought he was going to land without the required minimum fuel. He did the right thing, informed ATC of his plight and received the corresponding level of service (sterile runway etc.)
Why did he feel he was not going to land with the minimum fuel, surely the FMC had been telling him (them) for the last ten hours what the arrival fuel at MAN was going to be, updating it with every change of wind, TAS or FL.
If ever the "plan" was going to operate direct to LHR this must have changed early on to MAN [one of the passengers inputs it was suggested an extra aircraft (no shuttle backup aircraft sitting at MAN with nothing to do nowadays!) had already been sent from LHR to meet our arrival].
Could I suggest that during Fixed Base simulator details, if not on the Full Flight simulator the areas of operation with low fuel state would have been explored. As per the QRH the crossfeed is opened, with all pumps (tanks) being able to feed all engines.
The design of the simulator would have all the pumps producing the rated pressure such that the "balanced" fuel state prior to opening the crossfeed would continue.
But in the real world, with any pump producing higher pressure (and able to satisfy the total demand on its own) would result in that pump (tank) providing all the fuel consumed until the tank was drained empty (less any unusable) when the flow /pressure would drop off, the NRV close, and the next highest pump/tank would continue the fuel feed to all engines.
Have many of us actually had to open the crossfeed in flight due to low fuel levels? The odd MEL requirement "on the approach" for fuel pump failures, or "normal" balancing where the plan is to feed from a specific tank, but for low fuel level I would suggest very very infrequently.
Imagine for a moment, this commander as per the QRH drill opening the crossfeed. From that point on he sees all the fuel coming from one tank (pump with the highest fuel pressure). Have they a situation with one tank (which is not feeding) that has unusable fuel? Are they going to sit there with the other (feeding) tank quantity reducing towards empty and do nothing? I suggest not. Err on the safe side, assume the worst, transmit a Mayday and keep that runway clear!
Perhaps in hindsight OPS should have routed the spare aircraft (and the 747) to GLA/BFS rather than trying to stretch the operation to MAN. Also, if only there had not been the circling out to sea (and using that valuable fuel) at LAX before deciding on continuing .......
Crew 10/10, Operational support ?/10
Operational support 0
Thats an interesting one,
I wonder what 'may' have been done differnently if a US Dispatcher style of operational control had been in place...any ideas?
I wonder what 'may' have been done differnently if a US Dispatcher style of operational control had been in place...any ideas?
Last edited by LYKA; 24th Mar 2005 at 09:50.
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Well, I will confess that I have only read about 50% of the posts in this thread. I got tired of the bitchy comments and doing down of other posters by some who should know better.
Woodpecker's is, so far, the most sensible. Many of the rest are pure BS, speculation and BA bashing.
Just like reading the Mail (haven't rad anything about this there but I'm sure it would have been a narrowly averted disaster).
Had this been a Virgin flight, there would probably never have been any mention i any papers or criticism of the crew's correct decision to continue. They would be a hero crew.
Have we heard from the operating crew themselves?
None of us really has a right to criticise or judge as we weren't there.
Having made the decision to continue, there must be 100 or so airfields within very easy diversion range OVER LAND before you need to decide to cross the Atlantic.
At decision to cross time, you'd be at optimum 3 engine cruise and know you will reach at least EGCC comfortably, so you make the crossing with the met available for EGCC at the time.... you could always turn back or go to Iceland before the point of no return... the company then has time to dispatch one of it's dozens of idle aircraft and ample spare crew(scoff) to EGCC to pick up the pax to continue to EGLL.
I believe it is standard op for ATC to call local standby for engine out approach?
What did the cursed spotters actually hear? Have we heard from them in this thread?
Speculate away but post carefully.
I'm off now to recreate the flight in FS2004
I agree it should be a poll but only B744 captains should vote. They are the only ones I believe qualified to even comment. The rest of us are just "The General Public"
Woodpecker's is, so far, the most sensible. Many of the rest are pure BS, speculation and BA bashing.
Just like reading the Mail (haven't rad anything about this there but I'm sure it would have been a narrowly averted disaster).
Had this been a Virgin flight, there would probably never have been any mention i any papers or criticism of the crew's correct decision to continue. They would be a hero crew.
Have we heard from the operating crew themselves?
None of us really has a right to criticise or judge as we weren't there.
Having made the decision to continue, there must be 100 or so airfields within very easy diversion range OVER LAND before you need to decide to cross the Atlantic.
At decision to cross time, you'd be at optimum 3 engine cruise and know you will reach at least EGCC comfortably, so you make the crossing with the met available for EGCC at the time.... you could always turn back or go to Iceland before the point of no return... the company then has time to dispatch one of it's dozens of idle aircraft and ample spare crew(scoff) to EGCC to pick up the pax to continue to EGLL.
I believe it is standard op for ATC to call local standby for engine out approach?
What did the cursed spotters actually hear? Have we heard from them in this thread?
Speculate away but post carefully.
I'm off now to recreate the flight in FS2004
I agree it should be a poll but only B744 captains should vote. They are the only ones I believe qualified to even comment. The rest of us are just "The General Public"
Perhaps I was too philosophical?
What I meant was, just because a Perf A a/c 'may' continue under such circumstances, that is not sufficient justification in itself.
As for "What's unbeliveable is the comment made by BALPA President Capt M Grandshaw "That's standard operations"", I agree entirely. The famous words of Mandy Rice-Davies spring to mind!
What I meant was, just because a Perf A a/c 'may' continue under such circumstances, that is not sufficient justification in itself.
As for "What's unbeliveable is the comment made by BALPA President Capt M Grandshaw "That's standard operations"", I agree entirely. The famous words of Mandy Rice-Davies spring to mind!