Nice idea, but probably going to be a hard sell to Vlad the impaler.

A reasonable alternative is a parade down the main road of Kiev, of tractors pulling Russian tanks, tractors pulling low-loaders with the carcasses of the Russian MBTs or just the lollypops, and a bunch of the babushkas armed with pierogi, who took the surrender of Russian troops. That would make a headline. Ir's too much work to drag the Moskva down the road, her barnacles would tear up the tarmac anyway.

May Day

The Russians still have a large amount of armor to throw forward down an axis if they can work out which one to go with, and just on numbers alone, they force the defenders to have a huge supply of anti-armor capability as we head off towards May Day. The reconstitution of some BTGs that got mauled has had enough time for developing a couple of motivated groups, instead of the low morale and understrength volume of groups. The map below uses NATO standard Allied Procedural Publication 6A (APP-6A) notation. How accurate it is is unknown, but the source producer is putting out some interesting info on his twitter account. The understrength status is not indicated, and some of the Red groups had very high loss levels. The Red team doesn't have a ready reserve on hand, an assumption that arises from the inability to swap combat groups out after Act I, instead of running severely damaged groups back into the current order of battle. A guess is that the Reds are running around 35-40% of normal establishments in their units. Relying on a guess would be unwise for a defender, so NATO, keep them munitions coming, the next 10 days are going to be critical to the next 30 years of Europe's history. It may be time to start running more creative supply lines to get gear to the front. IMHO... It is possible that the last 2 weeks has mainly been reconnaissance compared to a Soviet-style mass breakout. The reserves to do a soviet type attack are already depleted, but there is nothing to suggest that the butcher of Aleppo won't throw away his remaining forces to make Vlad happy for May Day. To that end, the supply officer position of the US DOD on limiting javelins etc seems to be a little on the short-sighted side; the choice is to stop Vlad now in Ukraine, or to stop him in 6 months' time in Warsaw, either way, there is going to be a lot of Javelins loosed off across the paddocks. Personally, I think it is time to get a "practice" Reforger underway, that might get the Red generals to accept that Russia has a better future without Vlad than with him. Just thoughts. E&OE.

So, today isn't 1941 or '43, the defenders have access to much better intelligence, and real-time ISR. I would think that the keyhole coverage needs to get full time for the next 10 days, as much as possible, and RQ-4, Rivet Joint, JSTARS (don't retire them... ) and everything else that can be put up needs to be put up, to determine the MLA that may develop from the East. Ukraine has expended around 1/3rd of the ATWs that have been handed to them, and for what it is worth, the Stugna-P has done a darn good job, so some organic capability is helping, but the expenditure rate in a full-scale attack is going to be prodigious, the rest of the NLAWS/Javelins/Starstreaks etc need to be available within a rapid response time of Ukraine to get resupply done.

To point this post back to being about aviation, the one aircraft that would make a difference right now to the front end is the old AN-2 style low/slow low IR signature platforms, to get stuff near the front in a timely manner. It can be expected to have a huge number of attacks against all airports in Ukraine to interdict direct resupply, so planes that can land in dirt roads seem to be a handy little thing to have. Caravans would suffice too, but they are less suited to rough field landings or roads than the old AN-2. It might seem wasteful to throw away so many aircraft and crews (1 driver per plane) but it would be as nothing compared to a re-energized Vlad ego attempting to push into Poland, Lithuania or even neighboring Moldova.

Justification

Vlad started a flawed campaign on the hope (or expectation) that his opponent was incapable of the political cohesion and military capability to put up a meaningful defense. Ooops. Hope is not a plan, and Vlad is the one person in a seat of power that has no excuse for a catastrophic failure of awareness of his opponent, or his own sides capability, and those failures are his alone, arising from the would-be Emperor's sociopathic characteristics that have blossomed since the drunkard Boris Yeltsin elevated him from obscurity to Prime Minister. As soon as that flower parade was shown to be contraindicated, there was no abort plan, there was only pile on force, so there was no obvious decision that Putin made that wasn't preordained by his stunning intelligence failure and hubris. (sound familiar?)

Arising from his disastrous misreading, he has led his army to ruin, caused the deaths of 22,000+ Russian soldiers who didn't have a real choice in the matter, destroyed his economy for the next 5 years, likely caused global famine later this year including in countries that are tacitly supporting him, and permitted his troops to conduct widespread war crimes and acts of murder and genocide. The rapes and murders have also been by his troops of the population that he supposedly went to help. With friends like Putin, you don't need enemies. All of that before lunchtime. Wonder what he can do by borsch 'o clock.

Simply put, Russia has no moral high ground for their actions. They have a historical fear of attack from any or all of the 9 gateways to Russia, but there has not been a threat to Russia in the last 75 years that didn't arise from within their own actions. Russia was an accepted global nation, and Putin has rescinded that condition for the near future.

Aviation

Russia's actions have been catastrophic to their own country and made worse by the counters they employed. How many lessors are going to ever pick up a phone call from a Russian number? Same with banks. What is the risk spread on a commercial loan to a country that has disregarded the conventions of contracts?

Defence exports

Russia has half of its economy roughly related to defense exports. Apart from the glaring examples of the poor performance of the Russian weapon systems (at least in part a reflection of Russian training of troops) how many countries will be prepared to have a supply line of junk systems from an unreliable partner, as there is no obvious way to recover the economy of Russia in the short term with Putin holding the keys to the empire.

Energy Exports

Russia has the other half of their economy based on energy exports. They just screwed over the partner companies that provided the technical skills to their system, and the thinking Russians, the technically competent ones, are way overrepresented in the brain drain from Russia. This isn't a case like NZ to AUS where PM "Piggy" Muldoon quipped that "every kiwi that leaves NZ for AUS increases the IQ of both countries...". Nope, Russia is forcing the evacuation of it's talent, those that don't believe the hype, and who want to see Russia succeed as a stable country not kept as "kleptocracy". It isn't just missing McD's, there are people like Navalny who believe in what Russia can be, contrary to Putin's kleptocracy and paranoid vision of the world. In the face of the unstable nature of Russia under Putin, any country with a choice is going to say no thanks to Russian energy. The damage to the energy sector is going to be widespread and long-lasting, and adds to the coming famine state as food costs rise on the scarcity of supply and cost of production and distribution. Thanks, Vlad.

TNWs

Sure a psycho can loose off some. That there is a disregard for their own safety was shown up at Chornobyl, and Zaporizhia. There are going to be bug-eyed Russian babies being born over the next few years. Every target would be upwind of Russia, so, well, that suuucks to be Russian. It's also upwind of China, so there would be a bit of a tiff over that, China has enough issues going on already. The Russian troops are not o the same stock as the great patriotic war; this is the Gen-Z group, who are not interested in taking risks that affect themselves, they want their western-style life back, and half of the troops are contracted as they were wanting to get paid for 2 years instead of being subsistence salary for 1 year as a conscript. they don't want to be there, and as much fun as it is apparently shooting civilians, there doesn't seem to be the same appetite for receiving incoming fire. Asking the conscripts and contracted troops to go into a fallout zone is probably going to get a lot 'o nyets. This is a group that may have forgotten about what happened ti the liquidators at Chernobyl, but they can google... TNWs are probably the fastest way for the Reds to lose the war, and they certainly guarantee the isolation of their country for the next century. This doesn't come close to the questionable decision to drop 2 x buckets on Japan in '45. There is a fairly large amount of literature on that subject, Alperovitz is worth the read, as is Henry Stimson's notes. (See refs below). It is interesting that one compelling justification was to stop Stalin without resorting to war with Stalin, and if so, we seem to come full circle.

2022 is an interesting year.

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....3dda6db06a.png


References:

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Kort, Michael, “The Historiography of Hiroshima: The Rise and Fall of Revisionism,” New England Journal of History 64 (Fall 2007): 31–48Google Scholar
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Takaki, Ronald, Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Bomb (Boston, 1995)
Lifton, Robert Jay and Mitchell, Greg, Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial (New York, 1995)
Bird, Kai and Lifschultz, Lawrence, “The Legend of Hiroshima” in Bird, Kai and Lifschultz, Lawrence (eds.), Hiroshima’s Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy (Stony Creek, CT, 1998)
Alperovitz, Gar, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (New York, 1995)
Wainstock, Dennis D., The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (Westport, CT, 1996)
Nobile, Philip, “On the Steps of the Smithsonian: Hiroshima Denial in America’s Attic,” in Nobile, Philip (ed.), Judgment at the Smithsonian: The Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (New York, 1995)
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Newman, Robert P., Truman and the Hiroshima Cult (East Lansing, MI, 1995)
Allen, Thomas B. and Polmar, Norman, Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan – And Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York, 1995)
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Hellegers, Dale M., We the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution (Stanford, CA, 2001)
Chappell, John D., Before the Bomb: How America Approached the End of the Pacific War (Lexington, KY, 1997)
Alperovitz, Gar and Messer, Robert L., “Correspondence: Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb,” International Security 16 (Winter 1991/1992): 204–14Google Scholar
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what on earth makes people believe Russian claims about the targets they hit.

Large oil depot on fire in Bryansk since 0124 this morning. Confirmed on Rus media who also say that "120th arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense" may also be burning too.. RT.com

There are certainly 2 different and widely separated plumes of smoke.


https://[email protected],53.2,14z

https://www.google.com/maps/@53.2147.../data=!3m1!1e3

Maybe things do catch fire this often in Russia , we just never heard about it in the past

Russia seems to be quite unlucky right now with their OH&S and fire safety, almost an epidemic of fire safety breaches. I would complain to management if I was a resident. If this was a TB-2 attack, then, seriously some more Russian Generals are going to have free board and floggings at Lefortovo, and that's the best that they can expect. Seems the Putin oligarchs and their families have some health problems too, which is pretty distressing. latest report on Bryansk is 2 separate fires in terminals, one being the civil terminal and the other being a smaller military terminal. Boy, someone broke a mirror somewhere in the Kremlin. Still, like the Moskva, it is more likely that kleptocratic negligence is at play, as, heaven forbid, that the Ukrainians were able to ride a bicycle 100 miles with a BB gun to ruin the day at Tansneft. Oil Oligarchs seem to be as unlucky at present as Russian Generals and ships captains.

Russia has a real problem with their energy production, they had a shortage of storage before the 'Speshul Military Operashun". So demand increases the inventory, and the storage tanks seem to be suffering in sympathy and self imolating, Sad

https://www.energyintel.com/0000017f-6982-d580-a37f-f99bdebb0000 ]http://​​​​​​​https://www.energyintel.com/0000017f...f-f99bdebb0000

On troop losses

Assuming just losses from confirmed mechanized equipment losses, with the ORYX database to 16APR, the Russian losses are at least 17,700, and the Ukrainians had a minimum loss of 2330. This doesn't include the large additional losses from troops outside of the equipment, which would add a lot, Pick a number, but it isn't zero. Roughly, the Ukrainian reports of troop estimates seem surprisingly likely. As always, the civilians are bearing the brunt of the pain, so add a huge number of civilian casualties. The Ukrainian numbers of civilian losses seem to be greatly underreported.

On the current red forces in the East

as of about 30 minutes ago, there are a reported 76 BTGs under the red banner in the East. There are efforts to reconstitute a further 22 BTGs. Putting that in perspective, the losses by the Reds to date are around... more than 76 BTGs! That is pretty startling. In August 2021, Russia had a total force of ~170 BTGs... so doing the arithmetic, carry the one, add a bit take a bit, round down, etc.... the total commitment to the effort at present is as % of total forces across the Russian army as of August 2021, is.... about.... 68%. for the current numbers, and that is rising to a max of 81% of their force if they add the additional 22 kitchen sink BTGs.

It would appear that if Georgia is annoyed with Russia, Chechnya, or any other bit of Russia, then there is not much left in the larder at this time. Again putting the situation in perspective, Ukraine has removed from action around 24% of the Russian army force from the menu. That is consistent with the materiel losses, and the expected loss rate from the confirmed materiel losses. Ukraines losses are harder to determine, as a lot of their troops have not been combined armor, they have been in the field.

No wonder the guys are feeling a bit sensitive in their communications to home back in Russia. There are few militaries that have recovered as a fighting force with a loss of 25% of not the fielded forces, but of their total national army force at that time. The troop numbers of the Russians that were cited in the leadup to the 24 FEB seem to have been overstated dramatically, they don't add up to the forces that now exist. It isn't like Russia to tell a fib now is it?

What is the chance that the Russian army was a fraud on the Russian people committed by the kleptocracy? The total force is still substantial, but it isn't 800,000 boots on the ground, it isn't close to that. It is reckless and dangerous to underestimate your adversary, but the maths needs to be looked at closely by the intel groups of Ukraine and NATO, and to plan accordingly.

Hmmm

From THE RELATIONSHIP OF BATTLE DAMAGE TO UNIT COMBAT PERFORMANCE, Weinstein, L, 1986, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES [UNCLASSIFIED]



There are five elements the loss of which can "put a unit out of action:"
1. Loss of personnel;
2. Loss of equipment, combat and support, through destruction by the enemy or by maintenance failure;
3. Failure of supply--POL and ammunition;
4. Collapse of the command structure--death of commanders, loss of communications;
5. Loss of morale.

Sound familiar?

it continues...

The "operability" of a formation is a function of the interrelationship of these elements. Of the five the last would seem to be the most important. Only the morale factor d can explain the not uncommon pattern of heavily attrited units continuing to display good combat performance.

Where morale has been high, even very heavy losses will not put a formation out of action. On the other hand, failure of morale can lead to panic or resignation in which defeat can occur with little accompanying battle damage. That morale is composed of many complex elements and is affected by an equal range, from simple lack of sleep to the way battle damage is suffered.

Victory in battle is dependent upon the possession of two capabilities in greater degree than the enemy, namely, the ability to endure and the ability to injure. The former is primarily a function of morale and of the imponderables of leadership, training and fighting style and capacity. There are, to be sure, material factors like replacement flow, logistic supply, and medical services, but above all else is morale. If one's morale is superior to that of the enemy, it may not be necessary to injure him badly. He may collapse after small or moderate losses. There is no shortage of such cases in history. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, in describing the 1973 Middle East War, has written, "The human element has always been important in war, and despite the technology available to both sides, the human element was undoubtedly the most significant feature in this war." The same comment could obviously be made about all the actions described in this paper. ... etc

Interesting reading

p6:
Military analysts have attempted to determine a specific casualty percentage which represents a military formation's limit of effectiveness. Commonly expressed casualty percentages are 25, 30, or 33-1/3 percent. Presumably the unit is then essentially wrecked. The point was made by one American writer:

"The large armored battles of 1943 [Russia] and 1973 [Arab-Israeli] were spent within 18 to 19 days. Tank elements were ground down to 40 percent of their [original] committed strength. Furthermore, combat exhaustion occurs in normal soldiers after 35 percent have become casualties and the combined impact of unexpected events, physical exhaustion, and loss of comrade support creates stress beyond endurance." 1 A Canadian military study states that if one-third of a fighting force become casualties, the unit will be wrecked psychologically, "if the experience is repeated." 2 The last clause represents a major qualification in contrast to the first quote. Yet there is clearly no agreement on the percentage. It is believed that the Soviets would expect a battalion to suffer 70 percent losses before being relieved.3

1 Colonel D. Gans, USA, "Fight Outnumbered and Win...Against What Odds," Military review (January 1981), p.2; 2. Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle, Kluwer Nijhoff, Boston, 1982.
3. Lt. Col. L. W. Grau, "MOUT and the Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion," Infanta (Jan - Feb, 1985, Vol. 75, No. 1,), p. 27.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF BATTLE DAMAGE TO UNIT COMBAT PERFORMANCE

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....a9925a8c70.png
​​​​​​​

Interesting reading. It does find that there is no real discriminator between attack or defending forces as to when they lose effectiveness, but morale is the major determinant of when a force can withstand severe losses and continue to fight. That should not be a surprise to anyone who ever heard of Stalingrad or Mariupol. So Ukraine is fighting against an aggressor nation who has continuously attacked their country for 8 years, annexing much illegally, and causing death amongst their community and now causing widespread destruction, murder and genocide in the country. No wonder Putin is looking sick. Given the timely support in arms, and given the probable case that the force that will be in front of Ukraine in the next 10 days is already well aware of what they are facing, and of the bankruptcy of the ideal that the Russians are purporting to fight for, with luck, ISR and ammo, Russia may yet end up on the East side of the Kerch, within their own boundaries. If that comes to pass, then the insurgency in the Donbas region needs to be negotiated separately to determine in a fair referendum whether having been murdered and raped by Russia, whether they actually wish to be part of Russia in the pre 24FEB lines, or not. Having tasted what Russia's "care" brings, I'm not sure that the separatists will have the stomach for much of a reunion with Count Von Vlad's Soviet empire. Russia will be a long time recovering, Ukraine should not be. They deserve no less than that from us all. As far as NATO goes, a reiteration of non-aggression with Russia should be made, as they apparently think NATO is a belligerent force, not a defense force. Russia needs to cogitate its collective navel and determine if its behavior in Georgia, N-K, and Chechnya stands up to self-scrutiny. The people of Russia deserve better than the B-S that they have got for the last 800 years of corrupt governance... the rest of us could do well to consider the honor or lack of that which we have all had too with things such as imperialism, marginalization of minorities, land grabs etc... most of what has been done for the last 5,000 years doesn't say much for what we have all stood for.

​​​​​​​rant over.

Rumours circulating that some as yet unidentified computer virus (a la Stuxnet) is attacking Russian SCADA systems, prompting these mysterious fires. Maybe the Israelis are more involved than they're letting on?

The USA wants Russia's capabilities so diminished that they will never be able to carry out such an operation against Ukraine ever again.

fdr, exceelent informative stuff, thank you. I hope you don't charge by the hour......

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....bfa1c5df27.png

Usual caveats apply:

"Moment of explosion after alleged Ukrainian airstrike against oil depots in Bryansk, Russia"

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFoota...eb2x&context=3

Is that the sound of a jet in the run up to the explosion or a missile coming in?

To help the Ukrainians, NATO and the USA, I am free; I have offered them free performance enhancement to the TB-2 propellers, and to their helo rotors amongst other items, anything that works to get Putin back inside Russia is worth the effort. They can do it to their fan blades too, but I have only static tested that, suffice it to say that there is a lot of opportunities to improve the performance of airfoils. Please indulge my torrents of commentary, I have more personal Russian friends than Ukrainian ones, all of them being good people, and they have all been horrified by the actions of Putin since 2014. The faster this stops the less damage it does to Ukraine, the rest of the world and Russia. For Russia, paradoxically, the least risk they have is a border directly with NATO countries, where there is a collective need to not cause a cross-border war. Russia deserves to have security, but not at the expense of unilateral action and the deceit that has played out since, well, since I was old enough to read.

@ fdr
Your scholarship is amazing, sir. Thank you.

Difficult to be sure, but I'd be a bit sceptical about the audio. Firstly, there is a very noticeable gap in the audio that happens to be between the bit that sounds like a jet and the bit that sounds like a missile/ explosion. Secondly, there doesn't seem to be a sufficient gap between the flash and the sound of the explosion. Whilst it is hard to judge the distance, I would say that there is at least 300m between the camera and the explosion, so we would expect a noticeable delay. It also seems unusual to have an (apparent) security camera that records audio.

Actually, during Gorbatsjov and Yeltsin, Russia was on an (admitted difficult) road to something like a democracy. In those days, there were even ideas of Russia joining the Nato in a far future.

However, the new guy in power 2000+ did take the wrong crossroad and ended up the enforcement being in charge of the country by suppressing the public, instead of the enforcement serving the public (as is common in the more Western world). And China on the same road to long-term disaster. Power corrupts.

And, once Russia becomes a normal democracy, there suddenly is no longer a military threat between Russia and the Nato.

Depends if whatever struck the complex passed overhead the camera location before impact. Also, 300m is no distance at all re sound delay - fractions of a second.

I guess one wouldn't hear an incoming ballistic missile, as is being reported was used. If this recording is correct then I guess the only options are a jet, a cruise/air-to-ground missile, or unguided rocket.

Well yes, but quite a large fraction of a second! It would certainly be noticeable.

Maybe, maybe not (wrt Israel and post 4668). An interesting book on the Cyber arms race is:

"Nicole Perlroth’s sobering investigation into the cyber weapons arms race, This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends, has been named Financial Times and McKinsey Business Book of the Year for 2021"

Cyber capabilities appear to be a lot more widespread than commonly believed. Though the denizens of this forum may well be better informed.

More claimed footage:

Twitter

QUOTE=Wokkafans;11220598]Usual caveats apply:

"Moment of explosion after alleged Ukrainian airstrike against oil depots in Bryansk, Russia"

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFoota...eb2x&context=3

Is that the sound of a jet in the run up to the explosion or a missile coming in?[/QUOTE]

Well, that is interesting. The TB-2 weapons are not powered... There is a flash from another fire first up as a reflection, and then there is the close-up explosion. There sure sounds like a turbofan in the background, Need a longer video to check the spectra though this gets swamped by the explosion, the time before is not quite enough to grab a clean signature. It is not inconceivable that Ukraine reprogrammed the R-360, which would be a remarkable feat of creativity to do that. I doubt that even with ukrainium testicles, that an SU-25 would have penetrated into Russia 100 miles to conduct a strike without detection, but in either case, there will be more free board and flogging for many at Lefortovo, soon to be renamed Count Vlad's Apartelle of ill repute.

Using a sea-skimmer cruise missile over land is a pretty interesting change of employment, akin to neatly setting up a claymore to open a rat pack can of ravioli. Not impossible, just needs some care and attention. Targeting would be a big deal, as you really are dealing with a small warhead, and some residual fuel and kinetic energy, and not much more. The flightpath, whoever would have planned a path for a sea-skimmer to run to Bryansk should be given an honorary ATPL Nav pass, it is an interesting planning item.

It could also just be "... bad luck, could happen to anyone...." . In the meantime, Russia now has a new problem, they need to get point defense sorted out in the areas that are shaded light red and dark red on the map below.... Good luck with that, as it withdraws the limited LL SAM and AAA systems from the area that the Ukrainian airforce needs to defend. We are talking about below 200' semi NOE, or much lower.

Within the range that is possible without modifying the missile, there are a lot of cities and at those there are concentrations in rail systems, and fuel depots. I would think that Count Vlads T-72/80/90s won't go far without fuel, even with the glut that is coming down to the pipeline for Russia now. The neat thing for the Ukrainians is, if they want more range out of the R-360, they already have my email address, there are 3 very easy ways to get more range, one of them would take at least 10 minutes to do, and that would give around... (calculator out...) 15-20% more range for a cost of about 1USD per missile. As before, they can get the needed supplies to do that from the local haberdashery, in fact, they can save on that, and just grab it from some of the discarded material that is littering the place. For Ukraine, that's free. To get say, 35% increase in range, will take a couple of plays, but you can do it in about a day and your guys have everything they need to do it sitting around, many thanks to Russia for donations. To get 50% increase in range takes some additional playing about but may be possible, again, you can do that on-site, but need a dialog to do that one.

Do I think striking Russia is warranted, before Count Vlad had his hordes commit atrocities in February and March and continuing to this day, before I would have said no, I don't think it is a good idea, now I think it is necessary, warranted and appropriate. Vlad has a mobile war based on mechanized BTGs, so energy is a legitimate strike package list addition. Taking out all of the oil tanks would be a good start. The targeting takes out the gas lines and oil lines going to Minsk too, and it is not like Lukashenko should be without some pain for his reprehensible actions. He has a day coming in the future where he will be treated by his own population as Mussolini was.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....7d93ad812f.png

Personally I would avoid anything that may effect Bellarus, They have stayed out of this fight up until now and one can bet Putin has laid on some pressure to get them to commit, the last thing the Ukraine needs is another front.,

This might be relevent to that strike


Russia has announced a ceasefire to evacuate civilians from Maruipol, I do wonder if this is in part to bolster their claims to have taken the city?


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