Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
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tucumseh
Sir Malcolm Pledger told the Review, candidly, that he did not believe that he was fully qualified for the job of CDL. He said this was one of the reasons why he attended a two-week course at the IMD Business School in Switzerland.
He was not a logistician or an engineer; he was a career helicopter pilot who had only brief hands-on logistics experience and no business experience.
If the RAF/MOD was a commercial business he would never have been considered for the job.
training, experience, knowledge and ability
He was not a logistician or an engineer; he was a career helicopter pilot who had only brief hands-on logistics experience and no business experience.
If the RAF/MOD was a commercial business he would never have been considered for the job.
The RAF has become an organisation populated by careerist individuals to concerned with promotion to always do the right thing.
Having been involved with an initiative in maintenance flight safety, I have been astonished by the response. This has varied between cynicism and distrust to a complete inability to comprehend how big a cultural change is required to improve. The 'learned helplessness' engendered by successive failures in leadership makes what is a difficult task, even harder.
Leaders of men with some bottle & the ability to say we ‘Can’t do it’ are required.
Having been involved with an initiative in maintenance flight safety, I have been astonished by the response. This has varied between cynicism and distrust to a complete inability to comprehend how big a cultural change is required to improve. The 'learned helplessness' engendered by successive failures in leadership makes what is a difficult task, even harder.
Leaders of men with some bottle & the ability to say we ‘Can’t do it’ are required.
Tuc said:
"And there’s the rub – they have been made before and the same people who have most to lose by looking pre-1999 rejected them, time and again."
Welcome to my world!
TD said:
"If the RAF/MOD was a commercial business he would never have been considered for the job."
That's a consideration that should ensure the RIGHT person for the job rather than just the next in line. Some might think the same of the unassailable need to place a pilot at the top. Why?
And finally, woptb said:
"....a complete inability to comprehend how big a cultural change is required to improve."
Gents,
That thin white line, currently just visible on your horizon, is a Tsunami coming your way.
Having brought all these issues very publicly to yours and everyone's attention, H-C has raised the expectations of lots of military personnel, in all strata, that may soon see what's missing from their "superiors" and their so-called military "contract".
"And there’s the rub – they have been made before and the same people who have most to lose by looking pre-1999 rejected them, time and again."
Welcome to my world!
TD said:
"If the RAF/MOD was a commercial business he would never have been considered for the job."
That's a consideration that should ensure the RIGHT person for the job rather than just the next in line. Some might think the same of the unassailable need to place a pilot at the top. Why?
And finally, woptb said:
"....a complete inability to comprehend how big a cultural change is required to improve."
Gents,
That thin white line, currently just visible on your horizon, is a Tsunami coming your way.
Having brought all these issues very publicly to yours and everyone's attention, H-C has raised the expectations of lots of military personnel, in all strata, that may soon see what's missing from their "superiors" and their so-called military "contract".
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Further to my posting #163, it is now clear that Nimrod Mk2 flight trials were carried out at Woodford, but A&AEE Boscombe Down were responsible for the clearance of all systems. A&AEE issued the Release to Service recommendations, not BEA Systems. Does this fact get mentioned in any report/review?
DV
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 28th Dec 2009 at 17:54.
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QinetiQ
QinetiQ to create new role of Group Safety Director following independent review
QinetiQ to create new role of Group Safety Director following independent review by Sir Robert Nelson QC
QinetiQ to create new role of Group Safety Director following independent review by Sir Robert Nelson QC
Unfortunately, nowadays it is the norm for big or (for Qinetiq) rich companies to pay other people to collate information readily available and within their own grasp.
As you say...stunning
...and me and my mate would have done it for just 250K!
As you say...stunning
...and me and my mate would have done it for just 250K!
While I agree with the recent posts, it should be remembered that most of the damage was done when "QinetiQ" were part of MoD and subject to the rulings of MoD(PE); in particular those senior staffs in PE who sat above the boss of, for example, Boscombe Down.
I have questioned before why Mr Haddon-Cave baselined his report at 1999 when all the evidence submitted to him clearly showed the systemic failings went back many years before this.
For example, what rulings were made by CDP (4 Star) the previous year (1998)? Here's one - a project or programme manager in PE can declare his project complete and make full an final payment despite Boscombe advising him that the aircraft is not functionally safe. And that the same company can be contracted and paid again to "finish" the job, and receive full payment despite failing to do so. And a 3rd and 4th contract.........
Then go back to September 1993 when Boscombe advised PE (same 2 Star as Nimrod) that the Chinook HC Mk2 was "positively dangerous" and recommended that it NOT be released to service. What happened? Boscombe were completely ignored and senior staffs in PE falsely misrepresented this recommendation by issuing a CA Release purporting to be a statement by Boscombe that she WAS fit for release.
Against that background, is it any wonder those in DERA/DRA/QinetiQ simply didn't know where they stood with their "customer"? The two men directly responsible for oversight of aircraft safety management in PE routinely ruled safety could be ignored.
None of this emerged in the report due to the simple deceit of implying the problem only started in 1999. I do hope these verifiable facts are aired during the ongoing investigation into the 2 RAF officers from the Nimrod IPT.
I have questioned before why Mr Haddon-Cave baselined his report at 1999 when all the evidence submitted to him clearly showed the systemic failings went back many years before this.
For example, what rulings were made by CDP (4 Star) the previous year (1998)? Here's one - a project or programme manager in PE can declare his project complete and make full an final payment despite Boscombe advising him that the aircraft is not functionally safe. And that the same company can be contracted and paid again to "finish" the job, and receive full payment despite failing to do so. And a 3rd and 4th contract.........
Then go back to September 1993 when Boscombe advised PE (same 2 Star as Nimrod) that the Chinook HC Mk2 was "positively dangerous" and recommended that it NOT be released to service. What happened? Boscombe were completely ignored and senior staffs in PE falsely misrepresented this recommendation by issuing a CA Release purporting to be a statement by Boscombe that she WAS fit for release.
Against that background, is it any wonder those in DERA/DRA/QinetiQ simply didn't know where they stood with their "customer"? The two men directly responsible for oversight of aircraft safety management in PE routinely ruled safety could be ignored.
None of this emerged in the report due to the simple deceit of implying the problem only started in 1999. I do hope these verifiable facts are aired during the ongoing investigation into the 2 RAF officers from the Nimrod IPT.
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Dates
Given the scope and remit of the Haddon Cave report, it should have gone back to at least Feb 1997 (when work began on refurbishing the first 3 MR2 airframes) or, ideally, if the real systemic issues were to explored, 25 July 1996, when the contract was awarded to BAES.
Sun.
Sun.
Sun
His remit was slightly vague but I know assurances were sought in Parliament (as I've seen the Ministerial replies) that BOTH ACM Sir Clive Loader's recommendations would be addressed. That is (a) the systemic failings on Nimrod and (b) other aircraft should be assessed (as the regulations apply equally to them, and the same individuals were involved - and I don't mean junior officers like Gp Capt Baber).
Also, Coroner Walker had stated, rightly or wrongly, that these problems had existed on Nimrod since 1969. This should have been verified.
My own opinion is that, because the safety management regulations apply in all domains (Air, Land and Sea), only diverging late in the day when airworthiness must be considered on Air platforms, it was patently obvious the systemic failings applied elsewhere as well.
So, it should be asked why, given the above, H-C didn't go back further than 1999 - especially as the evidence presented to him was irrefutable. One answer - it protected certain current serving staffs.
The most obvious outcome was him naming and shaming individuals connected with Nimrod, while failing to name those more senior who had actually issued orders that safety could be ignored; who, notoriously, took disciplinary action against those who disobeyed. I don't want to seem flippant but, if anything, Baber's "offence" was to disobey this stated policy and let a (very badly managed) Safety Case task. Many others considered this a complete waste of money and didn't bother.
I have said before that anyone reading the H-C report is left thinking there must be a classifed version with a broader scope which is even more damning. Having managed to compartmentalise the report, in doing so protecting the usual suspects, it is telling that we now have a Military Airworthiness Authority, not a Nimrod Airworthiness Authority or a dose of salts run through the Nimrod IPTs. Also, across all domains, we are seeing a resurrection of Quality Control and Assurance not seen since the disbanding of DGDQA. What remains unclear is if MoD are implementing the recommendations of previous reports which I can assure you were infinitely more damning that Haddon-Cave. (Something else H-C didn't mention).
His remit was slightly vague but I know assurances were sought in Parliament (as I've seen the Ministerial replies) that BOTH ACM Sir Clive Loader's recommendations would be addressed. That is (a) the systemic failings on Nimrod and (b) other aircraft should be assessed (as the regulations apply equally to them, and the same individuals were involved - and I don't mean junior officers like Gp Capt Baber).
Also, Coroner Walker had stated, rightly or wrongly, that these problems had existed on Nimrod since 1969. This should have been verified.
My own opinion is that, because the safety management regulations apply in all domains (Air, Land and Sea), only diverging late in the day when airworthiness must be considered on Air platforms, it was patently obvious the systemic failings applied elsewhere as well.
So, it should be asked why, given the above, H-C didn't go back further than 1999 - especially as the evidence presented to him was irrefutable. One answer - it protected certain current serving staffs.
The most obvious outcome was him naming and shaming individuals connected with Nimrod, while failing to name those more senior who had actually issued orders that safety could be ignored; who, notoriously, took disciplinary action against those who disobeyed. I don't want to seem flippant but, if anything, Baber's "offence" was to disobey this stated policy and let a (very badly managed) Safety Case task. Many others considered this a complete waste of money and didn't bother.
I have said before that anyone reading the H-C report is left thinking there must be a classifed version with a broader scope which is even more damning. Having managed to compartmentalise the report, in doing so protecting the usual suspects, it is telling that we now have a Military Airworthiness Authority, not a Nimrod Airworthiness Authority or a dose of salts run through the Nimrod IPTs. Also, across all domains, we are seeing a resurrection of Quality Control and Assurance not seen since the disbanding of DGDQA. What remains unclear is if MoD are implementing the recommendations of previous reports which I can assure you were infinitely more damning that Haddon-Cave. (Something else H-C didn't mention).
tucumseh:
I think we all know the answer to your, no doubt rhetorical, question, tuc. Now, as you have mentioned in a previous post, the challenge to reveal the real truth behind this scandal has passed to the RAF Provost Marshal. It is he who has been tasked to investigate matters arising from the Nimrod Review. In particular he, or a subordinate, will be interviewing the two officers named in the report. Let us hope that what the MOD has done, to limit the extent of the suborning of the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations being revealed, will be discovered by the RAF Provost Branch as a result of their enquiries. A good copper follows the evidence wherever, or to whoever, it leads. Let us all pray for good coppers!
So, it should be asked why, given the above, H-C didn't go back further than 1999 - especially as the evidence presented to him was irrefutable. One answer - it protected certain current serving staffs.
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I know very little about the RAF provo branch but I do know this is a complicated and specialist area of endeavor. I don't see how the Provo Marshall can be properly equipped to investigate it.
Sun.
Sun.
Sun Who:
There is nothing very complicated in knowing if you've been ordered to disregard the Airworthiness Regulations which you are responsible for implementing, but to sign them off as being complied with, Sun. You either have or you haven't. As for the matter of UK Military Aircraft being airworthy or not, it seems these days that it takes HM Coroners to know better than the Royal Air Force the answer to that one. So much for complication and specialism!
this is a complicated and specialist area of endeavor. I don't see how the Provo Marshall can be properly equipped to investigate it.
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I would think given serious nature of the offences,that the Special Investigation Branch would investigate. Then submit their findings to the CO and to the single service Legal Services branch. They then decide if to refer it to the The Service Prosecuting Authority who manage the prosecution of all serious crime within the Services. IMHO
The formalities of the investigation of serious crime within the Services no doubt are clearly laid down TD. What is not clearly laid down is the ability of those formations mentioned in your post and mine to conduct their enquiries and carry out their duties unhindered from above. I seem to recall that the evidence collected in a previous investigation into allegations of serious offences against Military Law was lost overboard on a cross-channel ferry while being conducted to the UK!
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QQ Safety Director
I know it was announced on April Fool's Day, but has anything come of QinetiQ appointing a Group Safety Director?
Internal or External appointment?
5206
Internal or External appointment?
5206
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5206,
No idea, QQ and recruitment aren't 2 words to put together at the moment, expect they'll have to look internally, but I'm not sure who they'd pick.
sw
No idea, QQ and recruitment aren't 2 words to put together at the moment, expect they'll have to look internally, but I'm not sure who they'd pick.
sw
