Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
Tallsar:
Include me out there, for I left the RAF in 1973! Hence my angry old man tendency to hold each and everyone younger than I to be personally responsible for what's happened to my baby - RAF Flight Safety! Out of order, totally unjustified and uncalled for, I have to admit. The guilty parties are relatively few, even over such a long time frame, but their effect has been devastating and deadly, literally. Nonetheless let me quickly add that I fully agree with you that the business of the Armed Forces is war and the winning of it. Flip reminds us of his personal experience as a tactical commander in that respect. If he or his ilk requires three engined take offs, people clinging to the outside of an aircraft in flight, overload operation or whatever to achieve the tactical goal so be it. The MAA should not in anyway inhibit that choice, other than to be advised of such operation outside of the RTS envelope in such circumstances no doubt. What such commanders don't want is that their aircraft are unfit for the purpose, are likely to fly out of control or spontaneously explode with no help from the enemy! That used to be a given, but not any more it would seem. What have you lot done to my baby? Oh, there I go again, sorry!
Many of us have been part of an organisation that has avoided doing precisely that over the last 3 decades.
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themightyimp:
I think that's an incorrectly narrow view of "current MAA work" though I would always expect much of the MAA's work to be based on audit and review. And I agree that one of the MAA's biggest challenges is to build up a large competent staff (imo, it does already have many competent staff but not enough). Perhaps (either as a short-term or permanent feature), the MAA will contract out where it is lacking in competence and/or resource, just as the CAA does.
What I am keen to know is what are the MAA's teeth like? Does it have any? The closest I can find is in:
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/92B43..._statement.pdf
"The Authority will employ a system of approvals, permissions and, if necessary, sanctions to ensure compliance with laid-down regulations, rules and procedures ..."
Personally, I think it should be a relatively urgent requirement for the MAA to define those "sanctions". Specifically (and simplistically):
Changing subject, tucumseh wrote:
Just for the record, my reasonably extensive experience is very different to tucumseh's For the aircraft I am familiar with, very large amounts of work are done (quite properly) to assess the impact of and, if necessary, update the Safety Case in response to every change in design. It's also done in response to every "abrupt" change in use. However, it's not always done as coherently as it should be and I do have a concern over "slow" changes in use. I think the latter ought to be captured by regular review of the SOIU but those regular reviews don't happen as often as they should.
If the current MAA work is anything to go by it is just another audit process (and thus another 'hoop' - again the operative word) and IMHO does not have the staff with the required competencies to provide advice on best practice or, indeed, actually qualified auditors. Of course, it is early days and hopefully this will change...
What I am keen to know is what are the MAA's teeth like? Does it have any? The closest I can find is in:
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/92B43..._statement.pdf
"The Authority will employ a system of approvals, permissions and, if necessary, sanctions to ensure compliance with laid-down regulations, rules and procedures ..."
Personally, I think it should be a relatively urgent requirement for the MAA to define those "sanctions". Specifically (and simplistically):
under what circumstances will the MAA stop or limit aircraft operation?
The last thing we need is another "hoop", as themightyimp describes it, that has no teeth.Changing subject, tucumseh wrote:
there is a requirement to upissue the Safety Case at every such change in use or design, but this is almost totally ignored
Tallsar said:
"...No, any operational risks taken should and must be confined to their specific context and then not run on (in ignorance or due to financial stringency) when the neccessity to take such risks is gone. "
Agreed - But should you add to that 'operational' risk by going to war in an aircraft that doesn't meet the spec for the mission?
I believe you confuse "operations" with "maintenance" and the two are very different beasts when we talk of aircraft.
I have never seen any Fixed Wing "maintenance" done in a combat area... Combat 'Zones' - yes, but 'Areas'? (and I have done rotary wing maintenance in combat areas where no plank dared stop)
I wholeheartily agree that every 'operational' necessity should indeed be taken to defeat an enemy. But that this is best done in an operationally fit aircraft and not one of a "near enough" nature.
The military do not hold the monopoly of "Live Ops", nor are they the only ones in danger of being shot at - though they are more exposed to that.
I have recent experience of civil maintenance (perceived as rigid and unwavering by most military personnel) standards for state aircraft operations at a constant 5 minutes readiness, 24/7/365 (yes, 5 minutes.) It can be done - and relatively easlily, with very few aircraft.
The use of 'normal' and 'proper' maintenance practices increases the reliability of most aircraft by a factor of five or six and reduces the risk of mission cancellations due to airborne system failures by an enormous amount.
There are almost no circumstances where proper and correct maintenance practices cannot be conducted. Being somewhere hot, dry and remote with a threat of incoming munitions isn't one of them.
What I describe above is known as "Continued Airworthiness". Some of which can be found in Def-Stan 05-130 (MAOS) - or - if you want the full story, read EASA 2042/2003.
Believe it or not - even in the civil world it is possible to move away from the required maintenance and 'go wild' (Contingency Maintenance?) - but you have to say when you do it and do a formal recovery afterwards.
"...No, any operational risks taken should and must be confined to their specific context and then not run on (in ignorance or due to financial stringency) when the neccessity to take such risks is gone. "
Agreed - But should you add to that 'operational' risk by going to war in an aircraft that doesn't meet the spec for the mission?
I believe you confuse "operations" with "maintenance" and the two are very different beasts when we talk of aircraft.
I have never seen any Fixed Wing "maintenance" done in a combat area... Combat 'Zones' - yes, but 'Areas'? (and I have done rotary wing maintenance in combat areas where no plank dared stop)
I wholeheartily agree that every 'operational' necessity should indeed be taken to defeat an enemy. But that this is best done in an operationally fit aircraft and not one of a "near enough" nature.
The military do not hold the monopoly of "Live Ops", nor are they the only ones in danger of being shot at - though they are more exposed to that.
I have recent experience of civil maintenance (perceived as rigid and unwavering by most military personnel) standards for state aircraft operations at a constant 5 minutes readiness, 24/7/365 (yes, 5 minutes.) It can be done - and relatively easlily, with very few aircraft.
The use of 'normal' and 'proper' maintenance practices increases the reliability of most aircraft by a factor of five or six and reduces the risk of mission cancellations due to airborne system failures by an enormous amount.
There are almost no circumstances where proper and correct maintenance practices cannot be conducted. Being somewhere hot, dry and remote with a threat of incoming munitions isn't one of them.
What I describe above is known as "Continued Airworthiness". Some of which can be found in Def-Stan 05-130 (MAOS) - or - if you want the full story, read EASA 2042/2003.
Believe it or not - even in the civil world it is possible to move away from the required maintenance and 'go wild' (Contingency Maintenance?) - but you have to say when you do it and do a formal recovery afterwards.
Squidlord said:
"I think that's an incorrectly narrow view of "current MAA work" though I would always expect much of the MAA's work to be based on audit and review. And I agree that one of the MAA's biggest challenges is to build up a large competent staff (imo, it does already have many competent staff but not enough). Perhaps (either as a short-term or permanent feature), the MAA will contract out where it is lacking in competence and/or resource, just as the CAA does."
In my personal view the former MAR had little or no real control over their remit. They either misinterpreted the values they promulgated in manuals or didn’t understand that many were interpreting them in other ways – or just not following them. All a sign of not monitoring the effectiveness of regulation at ground level and enforcing a change of behaviour to the required pattern.
It is a classic mistake to assume that the processes written are actually being performed. Still, it’s much cheaper to just sit back and assume…
The MAOS rules, apparently written by the old MAR incumbents, plainly don’t make any real sense and even include forms that just don’t exist, and never have done (another classic assumption). But they expect people (well, civvies) to work to them anyway – and possibly, they wonder why there’s some questioning of what is required.
That the old rule makers have moved to new positions within the new MAA organisation doesn’t put much faith into that organisation’s future successes!
As for the competence of MAA personnel…if 80% are military - they will almost all move away from the fires they start when in office.
I would rudely assume that most will not want to go into the Abbeywood blocks as a matter of choice - So an individual's morale may be at a low when incumbents start - and may continue through their tour!
It will take approx 12 to 18 months to become properly familiar with the rules and regulations involved in initial and continued airworthiness matters. Given that a Tour can be screened for up to four to five years, only two or three years of meaningful duty time can be expected before an incumbent begins to wind down for his next move. Inefficient at least, but mainly disjointed and inconsistent.
There are some very capable, proficient and able people who are good at regulation and at steering errant organisations in the correct direction for compliance with a single interpretation of a specific rule – but they are not as cheap as existing civil servants or servicemen.
..awaiting the incoming :-}
"I think that's an incorrectly narrow view of "current MAA work" though I would always expect much of the MAA's work to be based on audit and review. And I agree that one of the MAA's biggest challenges is to build up a large competent staff (imo, it does already have many competent staff but not enough). Perhaps (either as a short-term or permanent feature), the MAA will contract out where it is lacking in competence and/or resource, just as the CAA does."
In my personal view the former MAR had little or no real control over their remit. They either misinterpreted the values they promulgated in manuals or didn’t understand that many were interpreting them in other ways – or just not following them. All a sign of not monitoring the effectiveness of regulation at ground level and enforcing a change of behaviour to the required pattern.
It is a classic mistake to assume that the processes written are actually being performed. Still, it’s much cheaper to just sit back and assume…
The MAOS rules, apparently written by the old MAR incumbents, plainly don’t make any real sense and even include forms that just don’t exist, and never have done (another classic assumption). But they expect people (well, civvies) to work to them anyway – and possibly, they wonder why there’s some questioning of what is required.
That the old rule makers have moved to new positions within the new MAA organisation doesn’t put much faith into that organisation’s future successes!
As for the competence of MAA personnel…if 80% are military - they will almost all move away from the fires they start when in office.
I would rudely assume that most will not want to go into the Abbeywood blocks as a matter of choice - So an individual's morale may be at a low when incumbents start - and may continue through their tour!
It will take approx 12 to 18 months to become properly familiar with the rules and regulations involved in initial and continued airworthiness matters. Given that a Tour can be screened for up to four to five years, only two or three years of meaningful duty time can be expected before an incumbent begins to wind down for his next move. Inefficient at least, but mainly disjointed and inconsistent.
There are some very capable, proficient and able people who are good at regulation and at steering errant organisations in the correct direction for compliance with a single interpretation of a specific rule – but they are not as cheap as existing civil servants or servicemen.
..awaiting the incoming :-}
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Hi Flip. There are so many good messages running here now its difficult to know which to respond to. That said, you have by accident or design rasied the one of the other major issues (in talking of the Puma training/awareness issue) that has undermined our RTS process in my time.
One of the significant tensions in the RTS process has been the perception that tps at Boscombe are bereft of operational understanding and really don't get the operational "get arounds" associated with front line ops. Of course they did, having been chosen as above average operators in the first place! - but it was their job as part of the RTS process to provide impartial advice to underpin the operational spectrum and ensure it was safe - not to make amends for poor specification (by MoD) or inadequate design by the maker. Thus MoD air staff have long had the tendency to countermand what they see as very clinical and scientific assessments on such issues as the acceptability or otherwise of poor rotor governing in the Puma etc. IMO this is often driven by the very financial pressures I spoke of earlier - no one likes to be caught out as a desk officer with a problem to be sorted and no budget with which to do it! While there is no doubt that many issues can have their risk impact reduced by good training, awareness and smaller modifications (such as low RRPM audio warning), there comes a point when a qualitative and quantative assessment has to be made (often through trials) of whether there are times when the problem becomes unavoidable, or indeed cannot be recovered from, once enterred (the cliff-edge effect). Professional pride has to be put in the box if risk is to be minimised for a real problem. Of course this also involves understanding the role the ac is used in (often very customer specific) and then being able to relate it to the problem. This was what tps and their boffins used to do at Boscombe - often to the professional atagonism of well worn "operational experts" occupying MoD staff positions - particularly CFS qualified aircrew who believed there was always a training solution for every problem. Puma rotor governing is indeed a case in point..when the Puma was enterring service in 1971, its major deficiency could not be put in the right context by those senior staff officers used to (what was then world class very high tech) accurate analogue computer rotor governing available on the Wessex and Whirlwind, and for an ac type that already had design freeze due to the "anglo-french" helo deal politics of the time. Despite the accidents, the extra training and the incorporation of audio rotor warning, there have still been accidents associated with the rotor governing problem. Why, because in the heat of the operational/tactical moment where situational awareness is at the limit, the very training is (in some cases) of insufficent value to overide the getting into the flight envelope red area(in a single pilot ac in particular), and the rotor warning is too late, close to the ground, to prevent the inevitable accident. Goodness knows thats why even the next variant of the Puma made in the mid 1970s had better rotor governing fitted and its been there for over 30 years in many other operators cabs!!! it will appear at last in the Puma Mk2 upgrade programme emerging now (40 years on!!!!!
)
My apologies - I have pontificated for too long
Cheers
One of the significant tensions in the RTS process has been the perception that tps at Boscombe are bereft of operational understanding and really don't get the operational "get arounds" associated with front line ops. Of course they did, having been chosen as above average operators in the first place! - but it was their job as part of the RTS process to provide impartial advice to underpin the operational spectrum and ensure it was safe - not to make amends for poor specification (by MoD) or inadequate design by the maker. Thus MoD air staff have long had the tendency to countermand what they see as very clinical and scientific assessments on such issues as the acceptability or otherwise of poor rotor governing in the Puma etc. IMO this is often driven by the very financial pressures I spoke of earlier - no one likes to be caught out as a desk officer with a problem to be sorted and no budget with which to do it! While there is no doubt that many issues can have their risk impact reduced by good training, awareness and smaller modifications (such as low RRPM audio warning), there comes a point when a qualitative and quantative assessment has to be made (often through trials) of whether there are times when the problem becomes unavoidable, or indeed cannot be recovered from, once enterred (the cliff-edge effect). Professional pride has to be put in the box if risk is to be minimised for a real problem. Of course this also involves understanding the role the ac is used in (often very customer specific) and then being able to relate it to the problem. This was what tps and their boffins used to do at Boscombe - often to the professional atagonism of well worn "operational experts" occupying MoD staff positions - particularly CFS qualified aircrew who believed there was always a training solution for every problem. Puma rotor governing is indeed a case in point..when the Puma was enterring service in 1971, its major deficiency could not be put in the right context by those senior staff officers used to (what was then world class very high tech) accurate analogue computer rotor governing available on the Wessex and Whirlwind, and for an ac type that already had design freeze due to the "anglo-french" helo deal politics of the time. Despite the accidents, the extra training and the incorporation of audio rotor warning, there have still been accidents associated with the rotor governing problem. Why, because in the heat of the operational/tactical moment where situational awareness is at the limit, the very training is (in some cases) of insufficent value to overide the getting into the flight envelope red area(in a single pilot ac in particular), and the rotor warning is too late, close to the ground, to prevent the inevitable accident. Goodness knows thats why even the next variant of the Puma made in the mid 1970s had better rotor governing fitted and its been there for over 30 years in many other operators cabs!!! it will appear at last in the Puma Mk2 upgrade programme emerging now (40 years on!!!!!
)My apologies - I have pontificated for too long
Cheers
Last edited by Tallsar; 9th Jul 2010 at 08:19.
Squidlord
Fully agree. Excellent. This variation in the application of the regulations started when the necessary funding and the posts whose sole role was maintaning airworthiness were cut, in 1990/91. We were posted to various sections in MoD(PE) and AMSO and, depending on the ethos of our new bosses, our experience/expertise (such as it was!) was either used or abused. Overnight, some aircraft and equipment stopped the work altogether, but others continue to do it properly to this day (but often with a fight and by underhand means to hide what we're spending the money on). This fragmentation, the underlying reason and the solution was reported to DPA's Deputy Chief Executive (3 Star) in 2000 (at least - I only mention this example because I was the author). He didn't reply. This paper formed the basis of two submissions to Haddon-Cave.
I'm afraid this is the bit that makes me angry; the fact that many people have died since this negligence was first reported. Haddon-Cave wasn't a revelation - it was a simple collation of known and reported facts.
Just for the record, my reasonably extensive experience is very different to tucumseh's For the aircraft I am familiar with, very large amounts of work are done (quite properly) to assess the impact of and, if necessary, update the Safety Case in response to every change in design. It's also done in response to every "abrupt" change in use. However, it's not always done as coherently as it should be and I do have a concern over "slow" changes in use. I think the latter ought to be captured by regular review of the SOIU but those regular reviews don't happen as often as they should.
Fully agree. Excellent. This variation in the application of the regulations started when the necessary funding and the posts whose sole role was maintaning airworthiness were cut, in 1990/91. We were posted to various sections in MoD(PE) and AMSO and, depending on the ethos of our new bosses, our experience/expertise (such as it was!) was either used or abused. Overnight, some aircraft and equipment stopped the work altogether, but others continue to do it properly to this day (but often with a fight and by underhand means to hide what we're spending the money on). This fragmentation, the underlying reason and the solution was reported to DPA's Deputy Chief Executive (3 Star) in 2000 (at least - I only mention this example because I was the author). He didn't reply. This paper formed the basis of two submissions to Haddon-Cave.
I'm afraid this is the bit that makes me angry; the fact that many people have died since this negligence was first reported. Haddon-Cave wasn't a revelation - it was a simple collation of known and reported facts.
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Tuc/SL
I would be suprised if many front-line crews had ever seen the SOUI and appreciated its worth. However, on both of my last ac, the SOUI was so out of date to be worthless, thereby proving your point. I remember asking an engineer about the overwieght landings of the Herc in AFG/IRQ and being told it was being noted and taken care of. Subsequently, I think the engineers reaslised that the crews had been beating the sh!t out of the frame on altar of operational necessity. I wonder if that's why we have so few left??
Tallsar,
Quite right! Please could you just clarify this last bit of your post.
What was the improvement in the 1970s and did the RAF ac get it?
Or are you saying that the improvement was available in the 1970s but that the RAF ac are only getting it now (or at least soon)? I suspect the latter?
I would be suprised if many front-line crews had ever seen the SOUI and appreciated its worth. However, on both of my last ac, the SOUI was so out of date to be worthless, thereby proving your point. I remember asking an engineer about the overwieght landings of the Herc in AFG/IRQ and being told it was being noted and taken care of. Subsequently, I think the engineers reaslised that the crews had been beating the sh!t out of the frame on altar of operational necessity. I wonder if that's why we have so few left??
Tallsar,
Quite right! Please could you just clarify this last bit of your post.
Goodness knows thats why even the next variant of the Puma made in the mid 1970s had better rotor governing fitted and its been there for over 30 years in many other operators cabs!!! it will appear at last in the Puma Mk2 upgrade programme emerging now (40 years on!!!!!)
Or are you saying that the improvement was available in the 1970s but that the RAF ac are only getting it now (or at least soon)? I suspect the latter?
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One wonders what the recent court ruling that British Service men and women have no human rights once they have left their base will have on the MAA. It could be argued that basically once you have taken off the RAF has no "Duty of Care". So if things drop off or stop working on the aircraft whilst in flight rendering it "Un-airworthy"the RAF can turn round and say "Tough" get on with it.
Am I wrong in this?
Am I wrong in this?
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Hi Flip
The improvement in the Puma design resulted from upgrades to the engines and later re-engining. Although similar variants to the RAF one continued to be sold in that decade, once the North Sea got hold of it for use out there, the re-engined version had a much changed/improved engine rotor governing system. Such "Super Puma" variants included the new Makila engines and associated rotor governing system. The RAF has seen none of this, despite several aborted attempts over the decades to fund either upgraded engines or replace the fleet with the latest "super puma" variants. The Mk2 upgrade programme is on-going as we speak, and includes the new engines and associated rotor governing system - so at last the system will be where it should have been circa 1980.
Cheers
The improvement in the Puma design resulted from upgrades to the engines and later re-engining. Although similar variants to the RAF one continued to be sold in that decade, once the North Sea got hold of it for use out there, the re-engined version had a much changed/improved engine rotor governing system. Such "Super Puma" variants included the new Makila engines and associated rotor governing system. The RAF has seen none of this, despite several aborted attempts over the decades to fund either upgraded engines or replace the fleet with the latest "super puma" variants. The Mk2 upgrade programme is on-going as we speak, and includes the new engines and associated rotor governing system - so at last the system will be where it should have been circa 1980.
Cheers
The Puma may have its governing faults but all the RAF Puma aircraft crashes in the last 10 years have been as a result of pilot error!
Had a brief on MAA the other day and despite all their best laid plans, they will still be hamstrung by the fact that the senior officers in charge will move jobs every 2 years and never face the repercussions of their decisions.
Had a brief on MAA the other day and despite all their best laid plans, they will still be hamstrung by the fact that the senior officers in charge will move jobs every 2 years and never face the repercussions of their decisions.
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A reasonable point SM ....although EC would no doubt argue that the 322 has much to commend it beyond the old SP design and seems to be finding favour with all the main NS operators and others still.
More to the point ...as others have said...its is diffcult to accept that taking 40 year old airframes and spending hundreds of millions of squids on them is a cost-effective way forward for the UK's LSH fleet (and perhaps creating other airworthiness management problems that are not mainstream 322 or SP)....I suspect the new goverment will agree...but will they spend the cash on something more modern....Mmmm sadly don't think so.
Cheers
More to the point ...as others have said...its is diffcult to accept that taking 40 year old airframes and spending hundreds of millions of squids on them is a cost-effective way forward for the UK's LSH fleet (and perhaps creating other airworthiness management problems that are not mainstream 322 or SP)....I suspect the new goverment will agree...but will they spend the cash on something more modern....Mmmm sadly don't think so.
Cheers
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Unfortunatley we (the UK Mod) are not good at doing "second hand" either.....look at the joke of a programme to bring into service some ex SAAF Pumas. To be fairer, any purchase like that would entail further modification to ensure some key systems compatibilty for UK tac ops at the very least, and no doubt some refurbishment work to establish their basic lifeing and airworthiness baselines under mil registration. Probably meaning it wouldn't be cost-effective. No a better way forward has to be new, to the right spec but with a cost-effective procurement process .....mmm tricky!!
Cheers
Cheers
Last edited by Tallsar; 14th Jul 2010 at 06:27.
No a better way forward has to be new, to the right spec but with a cost-effective procurment process .....mmm tricky!!
tuc:
"
Seems to me that many pilots who find all this airworthiness stuff boring and best left to the engineers should at least relate to tuc's old saws as above. Imagine if CFS were denuded of all those expensive and fussy pilots how much money could then be saved in replacing them with scribblies and blanket stackers as happened with the airworthiness engineers. Only problem is that much of ever that we learned about flying was from similar old saws from similar wise heads. No wise heads = no wise words = much reduced pilot life expectancy. Same result as the removal of the airworthiness engineers of course.
"
Never modify a modification"
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Tappers Dad:
I guess you'd have to ask a lawyer but my understanding is that this is only about the scope of one piece of legislation - the Human Rights Act. I think the Supreme Court have decided it does not apply abroad outside of UK bases. But I see no reason why other relevant legislation wouldn't apply (in general).
One wonders what the recent court ruling that British Service men and women have no human rights once they have left their base will have on the MAA. It could be argued that basically once you have taken off the RAF has no "Duty of Care". So if things drop off or stop working on the aircraft whilst in flight rendering it "Un-airworthy"the RAF can turn round and say "Tough" get on with it.
Tappers Dad said:
"One wonders what the recent court ruling that British Service men and women have no human rights once they have left their base will have on the MAA. It could be argued that basically once you have taken off the RAF has no "Duty of Care". So if things drop off or stop working on the aircraft whilst in flight rendering it "Un-airworthy"the RAF can turn round and say "Tough" get on with it.
Am I wrong in this?"
TD,
No, You're not wrong - but only for personnel and aircraft in a war zone.
My understanding of the ruling is that Human Rights would apply in a (my phrase) "non-combat zone".
Now, the next interesting point is what constitutes a "Non-combat zone"?
"One wonders what the recent court ruling that British Service men and women have no human rights once they have left their base will have on the MAA. It could be argued that basically once you have taken off the RAF has no "Duty of Care". So if things drop off or stop working on the aircraft whilst in flight rendering it "Un-airworthy"the RAF can turn round and say "Tough" get on with it.
Am I wrong in this?"
TD,
No, You're not wrong - but only for personnel and aircraft in a war zone.
My understanding of the ruling is that Human Rights would apply in a (my phrase) "non-combat zone".
Now, the next interesting point is what constitutes a "Non-combat zone"?