Haddon-Cave, Airworthiness, Sea King et al (merged)
"The point of Military Flight Safety is to preserve both aircrew and aircraft from avoidable accidents so that they remain available for unavoidable war. Nobly expending either in unnecessary and avoidable accidents is wasteful and helps no-one, other than our potential enemies. This isn't about wrapping up the little darlings in fluffy cotton wool, but of giving them aircraft that can be seen by others (unless at war), recognised by allies (when at war), able to withstand an AK47 round entering a fuel tank without exploding, able to conduct airborne refuelling without exploding, able to keep flying without a computer arbitrarily winding up the power, winding down the power, or cutting the power altogether, etc, etc."
And what happens because the mission doesn't take off, and we can't complete the mission, because all the aircraft have been grounded? Why do the MAA get to make that operational decision?
If we are made aware of the risk, then we get to make that decision, not an "independent MAA", which by definition will be civilian run. Moreover, what happens if mitigating that risk results in the entire fleet having been grounded, because we can't afford to embody that mitigation?
I appreciate that you are trying to reduce the mitigatable (made-up word!) risks, but in doing so you reduce operational capability. Simply look at the loss in MPA capability we've accepted simply due to the death of 14 personnel. Whilst I appreciate this may be an emotive topic for many on this board, MR2 and MRA4 provided a significant capability, yet the cost (both financial and presentational) of fixing the flaws was deemed to be too high. I have significant fears that the majority of our aircraft types will have "risks" associated with them, and as the MAA increases it's influence, we will be unable to remove all those risks at an affordable cost.
As I've said, perfect remains the enemy of good enough, and whilst "risk" must be made transparent, it's not up to the MAA to stop us from flying.
And what happens because the mission doesn't take off, and we can't complete the mission, because all the aircraft have been grounded? Why do the MAA get to make that operational decision?
If we are made aware of the risk, then we get to make that decision, not an "independent MAA", which by definition will be civilian run. Moreover, what happens if mitigating that risk results in the entire fleet having been grounded, because we can't afford to embody that mitigation?
I appreciate that you are trying to reduce the mitigatable (made-up word!) risks, but in doing so you reduce operational capability. Simply look at the loss in MPA capability we've accepted simply due to the death of 14 personnel. Whilst I appreciate this may be an emotive topic for many on this board, MR2 and MRA4 provided a significant capability, yet the cost (both financial and presentational) of fixing the flaws was deemed to be too high. I have significant fears that the majority of our aircraft types will have "risks" associated with them, and as the MAA increases it's influence, we will be unable to remove all those risks at an affordable cost.
As I've said, perfect remains the enemy of good enough, and whilst "risk" must be made transparent, it's not up to the MAA to stop us from flying.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 3,399
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"The point of Military Flight Safety is to preserve both aircrew and aircraft from avoidable accidents so that they remain available for unavoidable war. ."
NO it is not.
Get the definition correct.
Go look in the book.
The purpose of Military Flight Safety is to increase operational effectiveness by preserving the people and aircraft.
ie, anything that does not increase operational effectiveness is counter to the purpose of military flight seafety.
Sometimes it is in the best interest of the service to bring everybody home all the time, and sometimes it is not.
NO it is not.
Get the definition correct.
Go look in the book.
The purpose of Military Flight Safety is to increase operational effectiveness by preserving the people and aircraft.
ie, anything that does not increase operational effectiveness is counter to the purpose of military flight seafety.
Sometimes it is in the best interest of the service to bring everybody home all the time, and sometimes it is not.
Join Date: Nov 2003
Location: Next door
Posts: 74
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
On the other side of the coin, I'm intrigued as to statements that those making decisions are well aware of the airworthiness issues. I would bet that either through ignorance, turning a blind eye, or just plain incompetence, the state of every aircraft on the line is not fully available to the person making the decision.
The situation can be further exacerbated, by the variety of agencies involved in the maintenance, and the communication problems that arise.
The project management process outlines specific tasks to be completed, and whoever deviates from that, and delays an aircraft from being back on the line, or ready for crew-in, is open to pressure from all sorts of places. The little things get missed, and can add up to something altogether more serious.
Add to that a PTs/CAMOs who are old school, with perhaps a lack of knowledge of the regulations, who trade off seemingly innocuous things to save time and money etc. and it amounts to a Human Factors maelstrom. The examples are out there!
The situation can be further exacerbated, by the variety of agencies involved in the maintenance, and the communication problems that arise.
The project management process outlines specific tasks to be completed, and whoever deviates from that, and delays an aircraft from being back on the line, or ready for crew-in, is open to pressure from all sorts of places. The little things get missed, and can add up to something altogether more serious.
Add to that a PTs/CAMOs who are old school, with perhaps a lack of knowledge of the regulations, who trade off seemingly innocuous things to save time and money etc. and it amounts to a Human Factors maelstrom. The examples are out there!
ATG
They don't, the local commander does, but has to justify it later. That holds true whether the MAA is inside or outside of the MOD, ie it holds true now! The point about airworthiness provision is that it is done before you get the aircraft in the first place, let alone go to war in. It is that first phase that has been so neglected and led to fiascos like the Nimrod saga. It wasn't grounded because 14 people died in it, it was grounded because it was going to cost a fortune to get it put right. If it had been done properly in the first place, 14 people live and MRA4 would be in service. That is what an independent MAA would ensure, that it gets done properly from the start. Legacy aircraft are of course a problem, part of the mountain of problems that the MAA have to deal with. They can't begin to do that if the same pressures that got us compromised Nimrods, Chinooks, Hercules etc can do so again and again.
As to it being all civilian, I don't see why it should be. If RAF Air Traffickers can serve alongside civilian ones, I don't see why the same thing can't happen in the MAA and MAAIB. The organisations might be civilian, it doesn't mean all their staff have to be!
Tourist, whatever definitions you quote (and believe me they will change as quickly as the title does of the issuing authority), Military Flight Safety is a Force Preserver. Of course going to War isn't, and is the ultimate purpose of the Armed Forces. Who is saying otherwise? Certainly not me!
Why do the MAA get to make that operational decision?
As to it being all civilian, I don't see why it should be. If RAF Air Traffickers can serve alongside civilian ones, I don't see why the same thing can't happen in the MAA and MAAIB. The organisations might be civilian, it doesn't mean all their staff have to be!
Tourist, whatever definitions you quote (and believe me they will change as quickly as the title does of the issuing authority), Military Flight Safety is a Force Preserver. Of course going to War isn't, and is the ultimate purpose of the Armed Forces. Who is saying otherwise? Certainly not me!
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: UK
Posts: 1,515
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If it had been done properly in the first place, 14 people live and MRA4 would be in service.
If the Nimrod had been better designed, better built or better modified, the crash of XV230 and loss of 14 lives might not have happened.
The link between HC and the MRA4 demise is pure speculation.
ATG,
"Close enough" is far too close to "Not close enough"
The losses of front line troops, on the ground and in the air, to needless risk is one reason to not sign up to unlimited fallibility.
In any fire-fight, re-enforcements are not the ones to eagerly run into the line of enemy fire with guns that dont work. Why do you expect any aircraft to do the same?
The point of this debate is to ensure that the asset of serviceable aircraft and death delivery systems is preserved as long as possible to ensure their prolonged use as a guaranteed support or assault weapon. To cheat on their maintenance is the same as not cleaning a gun - made worse because an aircraft can carry other crew or/and passengers.
...And WHO makes you aware of the risks you are about to take, when the airworthiness issues are not published for your delectation and assessment?
"Close enough" is far too close to "Not close enough"
The losses of front line troops, on the ground and in the air, to needless risk is one reason to not sign up to unlimited fallibility.
In any fire-fight, re-enforcements are not the ones to eagerly run into the line of enemy fire with guns that dont work. Why do you expect any aircraft to do the same?
The point of this debate is to ensure that the asset of serviceable aircraft and death delivery systems is preserved as long as possible to ensure their prolonged use as a guaranteed support or assault weapon. To cheat on their maintenance is the same as not cleaning a gun - made worse because an aircraft can carry other crew or/and passengers.
...And WHO makes you aware of the risks you are about to take, when the airworthiness issues are not published for your delectation and assessment?
TOFO, point taken and I'm certainly not a Time Lord! Would Mk2 be a more acceptable substitution for MRA4? As to probable cause, that is the best one can ever hope for in most cases, and I accept your blue pencil correction. I was commenting on the airworthiness shortcomings of the fuel system that are thought to be responsible for the probable cause. If the Regulations had been adhered to then they would not have existed, and 14 lives would probably have been saved. Yes?
Tourist
As it was written and published in an RN BoI report, I assume you disagree with Bismark’s assertions about the RN’s approach to the subject!
If there is such disagreement, do the regulations not allow for the BoI to be reconvened so they can get it right? Or at least for some clarification statement to be made? I recall both DEC and the IPT took this statement very seriously, initiating the investigation mentioned above; the latter making complete fools of themselves by denying any knowledge of HISL in Sea Kings. Panic, one assumes. The retraction, in a Ministerial reply, was even more embarrassing.
I happen to agree with you, up to a point, because the limited real estate on a helicopter makes the design of such things very difficult. There have to be many compromises; but those compromises mean one has to be doubly sure about the installation design, the method/quality of embodiment and its installed performance. (Your mention of trialling only addresses the last). That means you make sure all are right through examination, testing and trialling. There is more to such an installation than the lights themselves. High Voltage Power Supplies to be located properly and lengthy cable runs that must carefully avoid (certain) other wiring. Part of the airworthiness process, before any flying takes place, is to ensure this is done correctly – one such device is the Critical Design Review, which was waived.
Was all this done on the Mk6? Are you saying the installation design is exactly the same on Mk7? I very much doubt it. No-one in their right mind would read across such an installation given the EMC and TEMPEST implications. You say it was trialled in a Mk6, but could the IPT (who denied knowledge of HISL) provide evidence of the complete audit trail to satisfy any claim of read across? There is a basic contradiction there.
While of course I’m not a pilot and cannot put myself in their position, instinct tells me there is more to this. See and be seen someone said. You also see with your radar. Is the Mk6 and Mk7 (and Mk2) the same? That is, do both have full radar capability from deck to deck? (The BoI report says not). If not, there is a major interoperability disconnect (between aircraft and ship) which cannot be read across from an aircraft that does have full coverage. The BoI report also mentions NVG, or lack of it. To me, these 3 factors are all connected. If they did not have full radar coverage and NVG, then at night what aid to visibility did they have? HISL. The forward one was off and the upper one was being viewed by the incoming aircraft through both rotor discs; which the BoI noted produced a “wooded” effect causing poor situational awareness. A Critical Design Review plus trials would have revealed all these issues.
I fully accept that you, aircrew, accept these compromises and “work around” them. But others, like me, are employed to make sure these limitations are minimised, and what limitations remain are within the acceptable airworthiness boundaries – and that you are informed of them through the RTS, FRCs etc and they are covered in training. Avoid the avoidable and manage the unavoidable. Are you sure all the avoidables were avoided in this case? As the CDR was waived, you can never be sure. THAT act was the major airworthiness failure, closely followed by the IPT apparently not knowing what was fitted to their aircraft. It follows that the Safety Case could not be validated.
"Para 101 - It is considered by the Board that the HISL is not fit for purpose and non-compliant with the requirement in DEF STAN 00970 Vol 2 para 2.1 (Enc. 42), in that the it should be located so that the emitted light shall not be detrimental to the crew's vision."
That is a statement written by an imbecile.
That is a statement written by an imbecile.
As it was written and published in an RN BoI report, I assume you disagree with Bismark’s assertions about the RN’s approach to the subject!
If there is such disagreement, do the regulations not allow for the BoI to be reconvened so they can get it right? Or at least for some clarification statement to be made? I recall both DEC and the IPT took this statement very seriously, initiating the investigation mentioned above; the latter making complete fools of themselves by denying any knowledge of HISL in Sea Kings. Panic, one assumes. The retraction, in a Ministerial reply, was even more embarrassing.
I happen to agree with you, up to a point, because the limited real estate on a helicopter makes the design of such things very difficult. There have to be many compromises; but those compromises mean one has to be doubly sure about the installation design, the method/quality of embodiment and its installed performance. (Your mention of trialling only addresses the last). That means you make sure all are right through examination, testing and trialling. There is more to such an installation than the lights themselves. High Voltage Power Supplies to be located properly and lengthy cable runs that must carefully avoid (certain) other wiring. Part of the airworthiness process, before any flying takes place, is to ensure this is done correctly – one such device is the Critical Design Review, which was waived.
Was all this done on the Mk6? Are you saying the installation design is exactly the same on Mk7? I very much doubt it. No-one in their right mind would read across such an installation given the EMC and TEMPEST implications. You say it was trialled in a Mk6, but could the IPT (who denied knowledge of HISL) provide evidence of the complete audit trail to satisfy any claim of read across? There is a basic contradiction there.
While of course I’m not a pilot and cannot put myself in their position, instinct tells me there is more to this. See and be seen someone said. You also see with your radar. Is the Mk6 and Mk7 (and Mk2) the same? That is, do both have full radar capability from deck to deck? (The BoI report says not). If not, there is a major interoperability disconnect (between aircraft and ship) which cannot be read across from an aircraft that does have full coverage. The BoI report also mentions NVG, or lack of it. To me, these 3 factors are all connected. If they did not have full radar coverage and NVG, then at night what aid to visibility did they have? HISL. The forward one was off and the upper one was being viewed by the incoming aircraft through both rotor discs; which the BoI noted produced a “wooded” effect causing poor situational awareness. A Critical Design Review plus trials would have revealed all these issues.
I fully accept that you, aircrew, accept these compromises and “work around” them. But others, like me, are employed to make sure these limitations are minimised, and what limitations remain are within the acceptable airworthiness boundaries – and that you are informed of them through the RTS, FRCs etc and they are covered in training. Avoid the avoidable and manage the unavoidable. Are you sure all the avoidables were avoided in this case? As the CDR was waived, you can never be sure. THAT act was the major airworthiness failure, closely followed by the IPT apparently not knowing what was fitted to their aircraft. It follows that the Safety Case could not be validated.
Chug - how can you have an independent MAA if the person criticising the RAF is dependent on the RAF for his future employment and/or promotion, if not in this job then the next (or the one after that).
I would counter it's not about sending blokes into Op Certain Death, but how many flights of the MR2 (or SK M7 or whatever) took place with no incident? If the risk was 1 in xx,000 flights, then that's acceptable. Indeed, at some points in operational (which isn't the same as being "at war") flying (or any kind of operation), then we should be willing to take risks all the way down to 1 in x00. That decision is for the front line to make, with information provided by the MAA (or whoever).
As for designing in proper safety, yes, absolutely, but lets be honest, ALARP does include cost issues.
Let me be clear here, I have no issue with the MAA (or whoever) exposing risk, but that, to my mind, is the limit of their purview. In concert with that are properly informed Officers who can make front line decisions, which may result in deaths for which they should not be unduly criticised.
I would counter it's not about sending blokes into Op Certain Death, but how many flights of the MR2 (or SK M7 or whatever) took place with no incident? If the risk was 1 in xx,000 flights, then that's acceptable. Indeed, at some points in operational (which isn't the same as being "at war") flying (or any kind of operation), then we should be willing to take risks all the way down to 1 in x00. That decision is for the front line to make, with information provided by the MAA (or whoever).
As for designing in proper safety, yes, absolutely, but lets be honest, ALARP does include cost issues.
Let me be clear here, I have no issue with the MAA (or whoever) exposing risk, but that, to my mind, is the limit of their purview. In concert with that are properly informed Officers who can make front line decisions, which may result in deaths for which they should not be unduly criticised.
Alfred
Absolutely right.
But what if the money to achieve ALARP is bid for, approved and committed in the contract; and then at the last minute the contractual requirement is waived (e.g. as described above) yet the monies paid in full?
The (engineering) programme manager has a choice. Go with the flow, follow orders and sign off on safety knowing that it has not been demonstrated. (And take a chance that the holes don't line up and result in a crash). Or refuse that order and meet his legal obligation to Secy of State.
If he goes with the latter, and actually achieves anything before the disciplinary might of MoD descends on him, where does he get the money? It has already been spent (on nothing) so the normal "solution" is to chop some capability from the programme. pprune is full of such examples - typically in support. Insufficient spares, poor tech pubs, inadequate training etc. These are the avoidables I talk of.
Instead of asking about how many flights without accident (the MoD's own rules prevent one using such an argument to justify safety anyway) I prefer to look at all the BoI reports we discuss here. I read the recommendations and ask - Are these recommendations mandated anyway? Invariably the answer is a resounding YES. Nimrod. Hercules. Sea King. Chinook. Tornado/Patriot. (4 didn't involve enemy action, which is all the more galling). All the reports include recommendations in this category - the common denominator being "implement mandated airworthiness regs". If that simple, legal obligation had been satisfied, how many deaths would have been avoided? Avoiding that obligation seldom saves time or, in the long term, money; and by definition compromises performance.
lets be honest, ALARP does include cost issues
Absolutely right.
But what if the money to achieve ALARP is bid for, approved and committed in the contract; and then at the last minute the contractual requirement is waived (e.g. as described above) yet the monies paid in full?
The (engineering) programme manager has a choice. Go with the flow, follow orders and sign off on safety knowing that it has not been demonstrated. (And take a chance that the holes don't line up and result in a crash). Or refuse that order and meet his legal obligation to Secy of State.
If he goes with the latter, and actually achieves anything before the disciplinary might of MoD descends on him, where does he get the money? It has already been spent (on nothing) so the normal "solution" is to chop some capability from the programme. pprune is full of such examples - typically in support. Insufficient spares, poor tech pubs, inadequate training etc. These are the avoidables I talk of.
Instead of asking about how many flights without accident (the MoD's own rules prevent one using such an argument to justify safety anyway) I prefer to look at all the BoI reports we discuss here. I read the recommendations and ask - Are these recommendations mandated anyway? Invariably the answer is a resounding YES. Nimrod. Hercules. Sea King. Chinook. Tornado/Patriot. (4 didn't involve enemy action, which is all the more galling). All the reports include recommendations in this category - the common denominator being "implement mandated airworthiness regs". If that simple, legal obligation had been satisfied, how many deaths would have been avoided? Avoiding that obligation seldom saves time or, in the long term, money; and by definition compromises performance.
ATG, the old chestnut that if there has been only one airworthiness related fatal accident in n years/hours of operating then that is an acceptable risk is patent nonsense if you think about it. As tuc says the regulations do not allow for that anyway, and for the obvious reason that the risk is incalculable except after the type is withdrawn from service. You cannot calculate the failure rate of a FADEC controlled with bad code, it will arbitrarily misbehave as and when it wishes. Admittedly you can calculate the failure rate of a dysfunctional HISL system if it is the custom of, say, half the operators to switch it off in poor/hazy conditions, as for them in those conditions it is 100%! Brilliant, indeed too brilliant! Known failure rates do indeed play their part in airworthiness, playing Random Russian Roulette with other peoples lives does not.
As to an independent MAA to which serving personnel are attached, the problem for those people to remain objective when faced with pressure from their parent Service is clear, and my advice would be the same as it is now for everyone who serves in the MOD's MAA: have a letter of resignation permanently to hand. The difference of course is that an independent MAA would still be independent, whereas now it is not!
As to an independent MAA to which serving personnel are attached, the problem for those people to remain objective when faced with pressure from their parent Service is clear, and my advice would be the same as it is now for everyone who serves in the MOD's MAA: have a letter of resignation permanently to hand. The difference of course is that an independent MAA would still be independent, whereas now it is not!
Examples of the trouble with using stats and opinion to prove the safety of any item:
1. An operator states that one of its recently acquired electronic systems is presenting a near 100% serviceability rate and proposes to hold it's new maintenance regime as the model for other systems to aspire to - until the revelation that most crews don't use it, or even switch it on, and the only reason it's so trouble free is that no-one is actually using it. In fact, the few times it is used - it doesn't work! Overnight, the system becomes the worst performing in the fleet.
2. After 25 years of "fault-free" flights an operator of fifteen jets congratulates itself with a big party - just before which, it finds that it has 14 component overruns - over their Life Limits - and has to ground the fleet for two weeks, almost losing its AOC/M/145 approvals.
Complacency and confidence is what makes most accidents happen.
ATG,
You display that generic aircrew confidence in an ability to judge what is right - without, I rudely assume, either qualification or experience in this particular field.
1. An operator states that one of its recently acquired electronic systems is presenting a near 100% serviceability rate and proposes to hold it's new maintenance regime as the model for other systems to aspire to - until the revelation that most crews don't use it, or even switch it on, and the only reason it's so trouble free is that no-one is actually using it. In fact, the few times it is used - it doesn't work! Overnight, the system becomes the worst performing in the fleet.
2. After 25 years of "fault-free" flights an operator of fifteen jets congratulates itself with a big party - just before which, it finds that it has 14 component overruns - over their Life Limits - and has to ground the fleet for two weeks, almost losing its AOC/M/145 approvals.
Complacency and confidence is what makes most accidents happen.
ATG,
You display that generic aircrew confidence in an ability to judge what is right - without, I rudely assume, either qualification or experience in this particular field.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 3,399
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Rigga
And you demonstrate that generic engineer confidence in an ability to judge what is important in aviation - without, I rudely assume, either a clue what it is like to operate aircraft or what really matters in winning a war.
And you demonstrate that generic engineer confidence in an ability to judge what is important in aviation - without, I rudely assume, either a clue what it is like to operate aircraft or what really matters in winning a war.
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 737
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Tourist. Your bereaved wife & half-orphaned children's solicitor will be employing Rigga as an expert witness at the inquest. Your workmates will be on the other side, claiming you were expendable. (as I was)
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 3,399
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No, because I have given very strict instructions that however I die, they do not embarass my memory by doing any such thing.
I am a volunteer.
I can stop at any time.
I take the risks as a choice.
I love doing it and am perfectly willing to risk my life for the enjoyment the job gives me.
I take personal responsibility for my actions.
I will never fly if I do not believe the risks are outweighed by the reward.
To do otherwise paints me as a victim, and that is one thing I never, ever, am.
I am a volunteer.
I can stop at any time.
I take the risks as a choice.
I love doing it and am perfectly willing to risk my life for the enjoyment the job gives me.
I take personal responsibility for my actions.
I will never fly if I do not believe the risks are outweighed by the reward.
To do otherwise paints me as a victim, and that is one thing I never, ever, am.
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 737
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Fair cop, are you single seat?
(Lots of respect for what you have said above though)
'Tally-Ho, chaps, drink up your cocoa, let's give the Bosch a bit of what-for'
(Officer gets shot in the back of the head by his Sergeant)
(Lots of respect for what you have said above though)
'Tally-Ho, chaps, drink up your cocoa, let's give the Bosch a bit of what-for'
(Officer gets shot in the back of the head by his Sergeant)
Last edited by SirPeterHardingsLovechild; 17th Aug 2011 at 21:04.
Originally Posted by Tourist
I take the risks as a choice.
You believe that you fully understand the risks that you are exposed to, and how they are mitigated.
I believe that you are almost certainly mistaken in that view.
Why do I believe that? Because of your responses to some of the engineering and legislative issues that have been raised in these threads; it doesn't seem that you acknowledge the context that is being painted by others.
I may be wrong, but it's what I believe based on your posts.
Now, I'm NOT suggesting that the risks are inherently always unacceptable. Far from it, in fact.
Just that if they were, with your world-view you wouldn't be able to tell. Consequently, the risks you are in fact taking are not the risks that you think you are.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Home
Posts: 3,399
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"You believe that you fully understand the risks that you are exposed to, and how they are mitigated."
No, not at all.
I am, however, able to see lots of us flying every day, and how many of my mates have failed to come home over the years.
I do the maths, and decide that when you add up the known risks and the unknown risks that I am happy with my chances.
You do the same every day when you drive your car.
You know that it is a risk but you do it anyway.
More of my mates have died in car accidents than aircraft accidents.
No, not at all.
I am, however, able to see lots of us flying every day, and how many of my mates have failed to come home over the years.
I do the maths, and decide that when you add up the known risks and the unknown risks that I am happy with my chances.
You do the same every day when you drive your car.
You know that it is a risk but you do it anyway.
More of my mates have died in car accidents than aircraft accidents.
Fair enough. My opinion's static.
Regarding anecdotes, though:
Interestingly, and meaninglessly, my experience is the opposite. 
Regarding anecdotes, though:
Originally Posted by Tourist
More of my mates have died in car accidents than aircraft accidents.