Squidlord
Just for the record, my reasonably extensive experience is very different to tucumseh's For the aircraft I am familiar with, very large amounts of work are done (quite properly) to assess the impact of and, if necessary, update the Safety Case in response to every change in design. It's also done in response to every "abrupt" change in use. However, it's not always done as coherently as it should be and I do have a concern over "slow" changes in use. I think the latter ought to be captured by regular review of the SOIU but those regular reviews don't happen as often as they should.
Fully agree. Excellent. This variation in the application of the regulations started when the necessary funding and the posts whose sole role was maintaning airworthiness were cut, in 1990/91. We were posted to various sections in MoD(PE) and AMSO and, depending on the ethos of our new bosses, our experience/expertise (such as it was!) was either used or abused. Overnight, some aircraft and equipment stopped the work altogether, but others continue to do it properly to this day (but often with a fight and by underhand means to hide what we're spending the money on). This fragmentation, the underlying reason and the solution was reported to DPA's Deputy Chief Executive (3 Star) in 2000 (at least - I only mention this example because I was the author). He didn't reply. This paper formed the basis of two submissions to Haddon-Cave.
I'm afraid this is the bit that makes me angry; the fact that many people have died since this negligence was first reported. Haddon-Cave wasn't a revelation - it was a simple collation of known and reported facts.