Hi Flip. There are so many good messages running here now its difficult to know which to respond to. That said, you have by accident or design rasied the one of the other major issues (in talking of the Puma training/awareness issue) that has undermined our RTS process in my time.
One of the significant tensions in the RTS process has been the perception that tps at Boscombe are bereft of operational understanding and really don't get the operational "get arounds" associated with front line ops. Of course they did, having been chosen as above average operators in the first place! - but it was their job as part of the RTS process to provide impartial advice to underpin the operational spectrum and ensure it was safe - not to make amends for poor specification (by MoD) or inadequate design by the maker. Thus MoD air staff have long had the tendency to countermand what they see as very clinical and scientific assessments on such issues as the acceptability or otherwise of poor rotor governing in the Puma etc. IMO this is often driven by the very financial pressures I spoke of earlier - no one likes to be caught out as a desk officer with a problem to be sorted and no budget with which to do it! While there is no doubt that many issues can have their risk impact reduced by good training, awareness and smaller modifications (such as low RRPM audio warning), there comes a point when a qualitative and quantative assessment has to be made (often through trials) of whether there are times when the problem becomes unavoidable, or indeed cannot be recovered from, once enterred (the cliff-edge effect). Professional pride has to be put in the box if risk is to be minimised for a real problem. Of course this also involves understanding the role the ac is used in (often very customer specific) and then being able to relate it to the problem. This was what tps and their boffins used to do at Boscombe - often to the professional atagonism of well worn "operational experts" occupying MoD staff positions - particularly CFS qualified aircrew who believed there was always a training solution for every problem. Puma rotor governing is indeed a case in point..when the Puma was enterring service in 1971, its major deficiency could not be put in the right context by those senior staff officers used to (what was then world class very high tech) accurate analogue computer rotor governing available on the Wessex and Whirlwind, and for an ac type that already had design freeze due to the "anglo-french" helo deal politics of the time. Despite the accidents, the extra training and the incorporation of audio rotor warning, there have still been accidents associated with the rotor governing problem. Why, because in the heat of the operational/tactical moment where situational awareness is at the limit, the very training is (in some cases) of insufficent value to overide the getting into the flight envelope red area(in a single pilot ac in particular), and the rotor warning is too late, close to the ground, to prevent the inevitable accident. Goodness knows thats why even the next variant of the Puma made in the mid 1970s had better rotor governing fitted and its been there for over 30 years in many other operators cabs!!! it will appear at last in the Puma Mk2 upgrade programme emerging now (40 years on!!!!!
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My apologies - I have pontificated for too long
Cheers
