Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Racal Report(s)
In view of some of the comments made last week about Waypoint changes over land etc, I decided to read the RACAL report(s) again to see if there was anything to support this claim. I got as far as:
1.1.5 The data extracted is that pertaining to the time of last powerdown of the system. The equipment is not designed to provide "historic" data, but attention has been paid to analysis of data which may indicate the situation at a time earlier in flight.
Just what part of "not" and "may", did Wratten and Day not understand.
By presenting this simulation to the HOL as established fact they were telling blatant lies. The only other explanation is that they gave their evidence without ever reading these reports.
The report shows the TANS to be working to a very high spec approaching the Mull. Seven satellites in solution and a doppler within 330 m of the GPS position. Overall accuracy would have been around 10 m, maybe even better.
So the crew approached the Mull in VMC, visibility one mile or more with equipment giving them precise ranging information. A Chinook contributor I have recently pm'd thinks Holbrooks initial estimate of speed was wrong but one of 120 - 130 IAS was more likely. This ties in with the RACAL estimate of 127.5 TAS 151 GS at impact. So just where was negligence at this point?
If Wratten accepts VMC, sensible speed at WP change, and bases negligence on poor low level abort proceedure, the simulation throws up other anomalies.
If the crew have over a mile visibility and the coastline is clearly visible, they have well over 20 secs to do something. Their TANS is giving them precise ranging. Even if the visibility to the left is poor, why not slow down and come right about? With the icing limitations, an abort is not the best option.
If the simulation is to be believed the crew made a manual change of Waypoint. I never did that until I had identified the Waypoint before. I expect this crew did the same. Having done this, one of the crew switched the display off and if the crew were still in full control of the aircraft, they elected to coast in using DR navigation??
I could go on. This simulation poses more questions than it gives answers.
Final point: Cable gives impact speeds of IAS 150 GS of 174. He bases this, I believe, on debris pattern. The simulation gives TAS 127.5 GS 151. That is a big discrepancy.
If Cable is close to correct then a anaysis worked back from false data at impact is clearly bo**ocks.
1.1.5 The data extracted is that pertaining to the time of last powerdown of the system. The equipment is not designed to provide "historic" data, but attention has been paid to analysis of data which may indicate the situation at a time earlier in flight.
Just what part of "not" and "may", did Wratten and Day not understand.
By presenting this simulation to the HOL as established fact they were telling blatant lies. The only other explanation is that they gave their evidence without ever reading these reports.
The report shows the TANS to be working to a very high spec approaching the Mull. Seven satellites in solution and a doppler within 330 m of the GPS position. Overall accuracy would have been around 10 m, maybe even better.
So the crew approached the Mull in VMC, visibility one mile or more with equipment giving them precise ranging information. A Chinook contributor I have recently pm'd thinks Holbrooks initial estimate of speed was wrong but one of 120 - 130 IAS was more likely. This ties in with the RACAL estimate of 127.5 TAS 151 GS at impact. So just where was negligence at this point?
If Wratten accepts VMC, sensible speed at WP change, and bases negligence on poor low level abort proceedure, the simulation throws up other anomalies.
If the crew have over a mile visibility and the coastline is clearly visible, they have well over 20 secs to do something. Their TANS is giving them precise ranging. Even if the visibility to the left is poor, why not slow down and come right about? With the icing limitations, an abort is not the best option.
If the simulation is to be believed the crew made a manual change of Waypoint. I never did that until I had identified the Waypoint before. I expect this crew did the same. Having done this, one of the crew switched the display off and if the crew were still in full control of the aircraft, they elected to coast in using DR navigation??
I could go on. This simulation poses more questions than it gives answers.
Final point: Cable gives impact speeds of IAS 150 GS of 174. He bases this, I believe, on debris pattern. The simulation gives TAS 127.5 GS 151. That is a big discrepancy.
If Cable is close to correct then a anaysis worked back from false data at impact is clearly bo**ocks.
Flipster
The question mark you place against MoD(PE) is interesting in this case.
Certainly, their 4 Star, the Chief of Defence Procurement admitted to the Public Accounts Committee 5 years later that key airworthiness issues still existed.
The Directorate responsible for Chinook, and especially the Assistant Directorate, was staffed by some of MoD’s most experienced people in this field. Their boss, AD/HP1, is on record complaining to his bosses about the immature state of the Mk2, especially the Safety Critical Software and System Integration issues. Also, A&AEE was at the time part of MoD, with airworthiness delegation through CDP. We know their staff stated quite clearly, in Sept 1993 and again in June 1994, that the Mk2 was not yet airworthy. It would be an entirely fair assumption that those staffs (AD/HP1 and below) carried out their task to the best of their ability.
That ability was, however, largely compromised by the likes of AMSO – quite possibly the single most incompetent and wasteful part of MoD in the late 80s and early 90s. (Due to a reorganisation, I was forcibly posted to AMSO in 1992 and almost immediately threatened with the sack by their Director General Support Management, an Air Vice Marshall. My crime was to continue trying to implement the airworthiness, financial probity and technical regulations, which his organisation deemed a waste of money. I’ve always thought such an ethos must have been ingrained for many years for so many people to agree with it and, indeed, we know the seeds were sown in the mid-80s).
Understanding AMSO’s role at this time is key, because Aircraft Directorates in MoD(PE) (e.g. Chinook) no longer had influence, through Controller Aircraft, on the status/safety of the equipment fitted to their aircraft. No tech pubs. Modifications missing by the score. Unserviceable kit stacked in stores with no Flex-Ops or preventative maintenance being carried out. No repair contracts. War Reserves held unserviceable. Few spares; and what spares we had progressively scrapped with 18 month replacement lead times. Critical flight safety hazards simply accepted and aircrew told to get on with it (after they left sick bay). AMSO was castigated by a coruscating report by MoD’s EAC (Equipment Accounting Centre, Liverpool) for all of this in about 1991 (I’ll check the precise date if you like). This gross incompetence and negligence prompted me to seek a move back to MoD(PE), where at least you could find a job with a boss who thought aviation safety rather important.
Placing AMSO aside (the best place for them, a complete non-entity) and going back to PE, we now concentrate on Director level, his 2* boss (RAF AVM) and finally 3* Controller Aircraft. The important posts were CA and his DGA; the latter’s role was probably the linkman to ACAS, as PE had to seek ACAS’s approval of the Controller Aircraft Release (CAR) before it was signed. So, it was CA and DGA’s job to present to Bagnall (sorry!) a proposed CAR and a covering letter from A&AEE that said the aircraft was not airworthy, not least because the Safety Critical Software implementation was “positively dangerous”. Not surprisingly, this is where MoD claim documents are missing, despite being able to provide those immediately before and after in the same file. Funny that.
Any criticism of MoD(PE) in this case should, I suggest, concentrate on these two posts, neither of who have been interviewed yet. AD/HP1’s concerns were highlighted by the House of Lords, so his position is clear. I would like to hear the Director’s viewpoint though. (All four are now retired). I strongly suspect a picture of RAF coercion will emerge, a political imperative to get the already late Mk2 into service as soon as possible; and sod the airworthiness aspect. Especially now that the RAF have pointed the finger at CA, claiming ACAS had no role in the release of the Mk2. I’m sure CA would have something to say about this outrageous lie. The airworthiness issue has forced them to break ranks. I suspect this break can never be healed because the accusation against Sir Donald Spiers and, especially, the naming of him in a letter to the public, is so serious, so outrageous, it is unforgivable. If anyone knows him, please let him know. It will shape his evidence to Lord Philip.
negligence or dereliction of duty occured in late 1993, in the higher-level corridors of Main Bldg, High Wycombe and possibly MoD PE.
Certainly, their 4 Star, the Chief of Defence Procurement admitted to the Public Accounts Committee 5 years later that key airworthiness issues still existed.
The Directorate responsible for Chinook, and especially the Assistant Directorate, was staffed by some of MoD’s most experienced people in this field. Their boss, AD/HP1, is on record complaining to his bosses about the immature state of the Mk2, especially the Safety Critical Software and System Integration issues. Also, A&AEE was at the time part of MoD, with airworthiness delegation through CDP. We know their staff stated quite clearly, in Sept 1993 and again in June 1994, that the Mk2 was not yet airworthy. It would be an entirely fair assumption that those staffs (AD/HP1 and below) carried out their task to the best of their ability.
That ability was, however, largely compromised by the likes of AMSO – quite possibly the single most incompetent and wasteful part of MoD in the late 80s and early 90s. (Due to a reorganisation, I was forcibly posted to AMSO in 1992 and almost immediately threatened with the sack by their Director General Support Management, an Air Vice Marshall. My crime was to continue trying to implement the airworthiness, financial probity and technical regulations, which his organisation deemed a waste of money. I’ve always thought such an ethos must have been ingrained for many years for so many people to agree with it and, indeed, we know the seeds were sown in the mid-80s).
Understanding AMSO’s role at this time is key, because Aircraft Directorates in MoD(PE) (e.g. Chinook) no longer had influence, through Controller Aircraft, on the status/safety of the equipment fitted to their aircraft. No tech pubs. Modifications missing by the score. Unserviceable kit stacked in stores with no Flex-Ops or preventative maintenance being carried out. No repair contracts. War Reserves held unserviceable. Few spares; and what spares we had progressively scrapped with 18 month replacement lead times. Critical flight safety hazards simply accepted and aircrew told to get on with it (after they left sick bay). AMSO was castigated by a coruscating report by MoD’s EAC (Equipment Accounting Centre, Liverpool) for all of this in about 1991 (I’ll check the precise date if you like). This gross incompetence and negligence prompted me to seek a move back to MoD(PE), where at least you could find a job with a boss who thought aviation safety rather important.
Placing AMSO aside (the best place for them, a complete non-entity) and going back to PE, we now concentrate on Director level, his 2* boss (RAF AVM) and finally 3* Controller Aircraft. The important posts were CA and his DGA; the latter’s role was probably the linkman to ACAS, as PE had to seek ACAS’s approval of the Controller Aircraft Release (CAR) before it was signed. So, it was CA and DGA’s job to present to Bagnall (sorry!) a proposed CAR and a covering letter from A&AEE that said the aircraft was not airworthy, not least because the Safety Critical Software implementation was “positively dangerous”. Not surprisingly, this is where MoD claim documents are missing, despite being able to provide those immediately before and after in the same file. Funny that.
Any criticism of MoD(PE) in this case should, I suggest, concentrate on these two posts, neither of who have been interviewed yet. AD/HP1’s concerns were highlighted by the House of Lords, so his position is clear. I would like to hear the Director’s viewpoint though. (All four are now retired). I strongly suspect a picture of RAF coercion will emerge, a political imperative to get the already late Mk2 into service as soon as possible; and sod the airworthiness aspect. Especially now that the RAF have pointed the finger at CA, claiming ACAS had no role in the release of the Mk2. I’m sure CA would have something to say about this outrageous lie. The airworthiness issue has forced them to break ranks. I suspect this break can never be healed because the accusation against Sir Donald Spiers and, especially, the naming of him in a letter to the public, is so serious, so outrageous, it is unforgivable. If anyone knows him, please let him know. It will shape his evidence to Lord Philip.
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baston
I agree that the accident could have been caused by human error but we cannot rule out any of several different possible failures that would have led to the aircraft flying into the granite-stuffed hill rather than in its intended direction. Therefore there is doubt regarding the cause of the accident and it would have been unreasonable to find the two dead pilots grossly negligent "beyond reasonable doubt" let alone "beyond any doubt whatsoever".
Although the MoD will say that the evidence is not new, much evidence regarding the less-than-airworthy state of the HCMk2 has come to light since Day & Wratten reached their now infamous unfounded conclusion and this travesty must be righted, then the circumstances surrounding the entry into service of this aircraft should be investigated.
I agree that the accident could have been caused by human error but we cannot rule out any of several different possible failures that would have led to the aircraft flying into the granite-stuffed hill rather than in its intended direction. Therefore there is doubt regarding the cause of the accident and it would have been unreasonable to find the two dead pilots grossly negligent "beyond reasonable doubt" let alone "beyond any doubt whatsoever".
Although the MoD will say that the evidence is not new, much evidence regarding the less-than-airworthy state of the HCMk2 has come to light since Day & Wratten reached their now infamous unfounded conclusion and this travesty must be righted, then the circumstances surrounding the entry into service of this aircraft should be investigated.
I suspect that part of your post and the subsequent excellent post from tuc is what is causing most angst among some folk
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Dalek
I believe you are getting mixed up between “analysis” and “simulation” - there were points at which certain data were stored (recovered later from the actual equipment): waypoint change, last steering calculation and power down being most relevant to near the Mull; interpolation between these points is analysis rather than simulation.
When it comes to altitude, I believe simulation was used to suggest what their elevation profile could have been and I agree that this was contentious – I favour the Boeing analysis of the available data (by Mitchel - not the simulation) which, within the bounds of accuracy of the systems, includes in the possibilities that they had not increased in altitude significantly at all on that final leg from waypoint change to impact.
When you wrote <<The report shows the TANS to be working to a very high spec approaching the Mull. Seven satellites in solution and a doppler within 330 m of the GPS position. Overall accuracy would have been around 10 m, maybe even better.>>, this reinforces the point I made on this forum recently that there is a widespread misunderstanding of the way the navigation data is presented to the pilots – I will not elaborate just now as I had prompted a discussion on this and am waiting for someone to kick it off (although realistically I will probably have to do so) – for now I will just reiterate that the way the Doppler and GPS system data is combined to drive the Horizontal Situation Indicators (HoSIs) makes the system effectively unreliable to any useful degree of accuracy when approaching a landmark as they were, especially after a sea crossing, and that Flt Lt Tapper had expressed misgivings about this system's accuracy and would surely not have trusted it to have got in as close as they did, approaching high ground, by the time he changed the waypoint in that system (demonstrating that it was not of any use to them at that point).
It is one thing for the non-handling pilot (acting as the navigator, if you like) to be able to read accurate GPS data from the CDU, work out with reference to his maps and with his and the load master's eyes out where they need to go and relay this to the handling pilot while he flies the a/c visual say along a valley low level;
but it is quite another thing for the handling pilot to be able to keep on track by reference to his HoSI when cruising at speed on a long leg with no clear visual landmark to aim for nor any ground feature beneath him (road, river, etc as they were over sea) for him to correct for drift – he needs his HoSI over sea with a fuzzy mass ahead of him.
I believe you are getting mixed up between “analysis” and “simulation” - there were points at which certain data were stored (recovered later from the actual equipment): waypoint change, last steering calculation and power down being most relevant to near the Mull; interpolation between these points is analysis rather than simulation.
When it comes to altitude, I believe simulation was used to suggest what their elevation profile could have been and I agree that this was contentious – I favour the Boeing analysis of the available data (by Mitchel - not the simulation) which, within the bounds of accuracy of the systems, includes in the possibilities that they had not increased in altitude significantly at all on that final leg from waypoint change to impact.
When you wrote <<The report shows the TANS to be working to a very high spec approaching the Mull. Seven satellites in solution and a doppler within 330 m of the GPS position. Overall accuracy would have been around 10 m, maybe even better.>>, this reinforces the point I made on this forum recently that there is a widespread misunderstanding of the way the navigation data is presented to the pilots – I will not elaborate just now as I had prompted a discussion on this and am waiting for someone to kick it off (although realistically I will probably have to do so) – for now I will just reiterate that the way the Doppler and GPS system data is combined to drive the Horizontal Situation Indicators (HoSIs) makes the system effectively unreliable to any useful degree of accuracy when approaching a landmark as they were, especially after a sea crossing, and that Flt Lt Tapper had expressed misgivings about this system's accuracy and would surely not have trusted it to have got in as close as they did, approaching high ground, by the time he changed the waypoint in that system (demonstrating that it was not of any use to them at that point).
It is one thing for the non-handling pilot (acting as the navigator, if you like) to be able to read accurate GPS data from the CDU, work out with reference to his maps and with his and the load master's eyes out where they need to go and relay this to the handling pilot while he flies the a/c visual say along a valley low level;
but it is quite another thing for the handling pilot to be able to keep on track by reference to his HoSI when cruising at speed on a long leg with no clear visual landmark to aim for nor any ground feature beneath him (road, river, etc as they were over sea) for him to correct for drift – he needs his HoSI over sea with a fuzzy mass ahead of him.
I said;
Apologies. The report was dated February 1989, which merely pushes back AMSO's known incompetence! It was Jan/Feb 1991 when EAC sought our advice on how to prevent the waste of the £hundreds of millions which AMSO was insisting on, as they noticed we'd taken successful action and kept the C130, VC10, Jetstream, Nimrod and Dominie fleets flying, when AMSO 's actions were about to ground them. It was that date which stuck in my addled memory.
AMSO was castigated by a coruscating report by MoD’s EAC (Equipment Accounting Centre, Liverpool) for all of this in about 1991 (I’ll check the precise date if you like).
Apologies. The report was dated February 1989, which merely pushes back AMSO's known incompetence! It was Jan/Feb 1991 when EAC sought our advice on how to prevent the waste of the £hundreds of millions which AMSO was insisting on, as they noticed we'd taken successful action and kept the C130, VC10, Jetstream, Nimrod and Dominie fleets flying, when AMSO 's actions were about to ground them. It was that date which stuck in my addled memory.
for now I will just reiterate that the way the Doppler and GPS system data is combined to drive the Horizontal Situation Indicators (HoSIs)
but it is quite another thing for the handling pilot to be able to keep on track by reference to his HoSI when cruising at speed on a long leg with no clear visual landmark to aim for nor any ground feature beneath him (road, river, etc as they were over sea) for him to correct for drift – he needs his HoSI over sea with a fuzzy mass ahead of him
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John Purdey
Some information was published on this thread previously in response to your question, though I did notice at the time that you didn't respond - perhaps you missed it?
Perhaps someone can point us back to it (regrettably I don't have time alongside my current itinerary). Failing that, can anyone give an example of mods (software or hardware) that have been made to the HCMk2 since June 94?
Of course, even if NO mods have occurred, the fact that no further aircraft has suffered a mysterious accident does not provide a basis for ruling out mechanical/software malfunction on 2 June 1994. Now if the aircraft specification had included an ADR and CVR.........
perhaps someone out there could tell us whether or not the Mk2s are now airworthy. If they are not, then why are they flying? And if they are now airworthy then just what steps were taken, by whom, and on what date, directly post the Mull crash, to raise their status?
Perhaps someone can point us back to it (regrettably I don't have time alongside my current itinerary). Failing that, can anyone give an example of mods (software or hardware) that have been made to the HCMk2 since June 94?
Of course, even if NO mods have occurred, the fact that no further aircraft has suffered a mysterious accident does not provide a basis for ruling out mechanical/software malfunction on 2 June 1994. Now if the aircraft specification had included an ADR and CVR.........
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Tuc,
Oh yes, I was not casting any aspertions at A&AEE or PMs at MoD PE - defintitely something happened above AD/HP1 (who had nigh on 'implored' his superiors to heed the concerns of Boscombe). I wonder if those bosses are regretting their decision now? It would interesting to read their reasoning but, as you say, the MoD can't find the missing pages at either PE or RTSA/ACAS/DAS...funny that!
Mr Purdey,
So bad has been the audit trail for the build standard of the HC2, that I sincerely doubt whether anyone can tell you all the individual changes that have been made to the HC2 over the years. This is especially true for software that was 'UCC' for so long and who's contracts were poorly written and their perormance monitored by under-funded and under-staffed engineers who were mechanical engine experts - not software experts. That's not to mention the fact that these sub-sub-contractors have changed name, owners and offices a number of times - so effective audit is impossible. QED I would think?
Oh yes, I was not casting any aspertions at A&AEE or PMs at MoD PE - defintitely something happened above AD/HP1 (who had nigh on 'implored' his superiors to heed the concerns of Boscombe). I wonder if those bosses are regretting their decision now? It would interesting to read their reasoning but, as you say, the MoD can't find the missing pages at either PE or RTSA/ACAS/DAS...funny that!
Mr Purdey,
So bad has been the audit trail for the build standard of the HC2, that I sincerely doubt whether anyone can tell you all the individual changes that have been made to the HC2 over the years. This is especially true for software that was 'UCC' for so long and who's contracts were poorly written and their perormance monitored by under-funded and under-staffed engineers who were mechanical engine experts - not software experts. That's not to mention the fact that these sub-sub-contractors have changed name, owners and offices a number of times - so effective audit is impossible. QED I would think?
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Hi Walter,
I stand corrected RACAL produced an analysis, not a simulation. Still does not produce any "facts" though. Same goes for the Boeing analysis.
I do know that the TANS fed the HSI but have never seen it in action on the Chinook and can no longer remember how it worked on my own types.
The TANS display unit, whether in Along / Across or Bearing / Distance would have been giving precise ranging information.
The numbers on the TANS are large and clear. If the crew had any doubts about HSI interpretation, they could / would simply look at these figures.
I stand corrected RACAL produced an analysis, not a simulation. Still does not produce any "facts" though. Same goes for the Boeing analysis.
I do know that the TANS fed the HSI but have never seen it in action on the Chinook and can no longer remember how it worked on my own types.
The TANS display unit, whether in Along / Across or Bearing / Distance would have been giving precise ranging information.
The numbers on the TANS are large and clear. If the crew had any doubts about HSI interpretation, they could / would simply look at these figures.
Last edited by dalek; 24th Aug 2010 at 07:23.
The suggestion or implication that an engineering modification would alleviate all airworthiness problems is disingenious in the extreme. But I accept that someone with little understanding of airworthiness matters may not fully appreciate that.
If one did appreciate that, yet still asked the question, their motive could only be to divert attention from the real issue and those responsible. That is, the premature Release of a grossly immature aircraft, despite advice from world leading experts that it was not airworthy. A Release that knowingly withheld vital safety information from aircrew. In my opinion, that is not only Gross Negligence, it is a criminal act of omission. Supporters of these people would be wise to review their position lest they be implicated.
If one did appreciate that, yet still asked the question, their motive could only be to divert attention from the real issue and those responsible. That is, the premature Release of a grossly immature aircraft, despite advice from world leading experts that it was not airworthy. A Release that knowingly withheld vital safety information from aircrew. In my opinion, that is not only Gross Negligence, it is a criminal act of omission. Supporters of these people would be wise to review their position lest they be implicated.
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Chinook
Tuc. Thankyou. Let me put it in another way; at just what point was the Mk2 declared airworthy post-crash, and by whon? Regards JP
Last edited by John Purdey; 24th Aug 2010 at 09:04. Reason: spelling
How is such a question relevant? What is important is that ACAS issued an RTS in November 1993 saying the aircraft was airworthy, despite A&AEE saying that it was not and providing valid and verifiable reasons. In making this declaration, ACAS withheld the A&AEE statements from aircrew, falsley misrepresenting the interim information supplied by A&AEE.
May I ask knowledgeable aircrew this. What would your reaction be if the RTS, FRCs, ACM or any other part of the Aircraft Data Set said "I (ACAS) declare the aircraft airworthy, but be aware A&AEE have declared that new thingy called FADEC "positively dangerous" and, in time, we may establish how it is meant to behave, fix it and then tell you the outcome. And don't worry about those UFCMs you're experiencing. The senior Test Pilot says with sufficient training and altitude you may escape. (Sorry, training comes later and the Icing Limitation denies you altitude; and anyway, it is our policy to ignore him). Oh, and don't forget that you are not cleared to use most of the avionics and the error messages they display are so meaningless we don't know where to begin". The RTS withheld most of this, but the crew knew something was very wrong. That knowledge created a significant Human Factors Hazard.
I'm sure ACAS will be asked to explain his (in)actions.
May I ask knowledgeable aircrew this. What would your reaction be if the RTS, FRCs, ACM or any other part of the Aircraft Data Set said "I (ACAS) declare the aircraft airworthy, but be aware A&AEE have declared that new thingy called FADEC "positively dangerous" and, in time, we may establish how it is meant to behave, fix it and then tell you the outcome. And don't worry about those UFCMs you're experiencing. The senior Test Pilot says with sufficient training and altitude you may escape. (Sorry, training comes later and the Icing Limitation denies you altitude; and anyway, it is our policy to ignore him). Oh, and don't forget that you are not cleared to use most of the avionics and the error messages they display are so meaningless we don't know where to begin". The RTS withheld most of this, but the crew knew something was very wrong. That knowledge created a significant Human Factors Hazard.
I'm sure ACAS will be asked to explain his (in)actions.
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Tuc,
The Boscome report really does speak volumes.
I suspect we are going to see quite a bit of "smoke and mirrors" over the coming months from those whose reputations currently hang in the balance.
The Boscome report really does speak volumes.
I suspect we are going to see quite a bit of "smoke and mirrors" over the coming months from those whose reputations currently hang in the balance.
How is such a question relevant?
I understand that this is an impossible question for you or anyone to answer, but confidence in the aircraft is an important factor for those who fly it. If you have the confidence to declare an aircraft unairworthy then the decision to clear it must also be taken by you.
Flipster. Many thanks; I'm sure there have been numerous mods over the years, but I asked for those that were specifically post-crash and related to it. JP
Chinook 240
I think you know what I meant. It is not relevant to the question why ACAS issued a Release to Service in November 1993 and an Amendment in March 1994; neither of which came remotely near complying with the mandated regulations.
Don’t know. As I said, The Chief of Defence Procurement openly admitted to the Public Accounts Committee in 1998 there were serious airworthiness problems still outstanding. (So fundamental that the validity of the Safety Case and hence, RTS, was immediately placed in doubt – although it was not pursued). He, and various Ministers have admitted many times since that the general problem exists, without being specific about Chinook; and the Haddon-Cave report simply confirms it. However, when pressed a few years ago, Adam Ingram contradicted CDP, stating there were no such problems and implying the Chinook HC Mk2 was a brand new aircraft in November 1993, not a modification to the Mk1. (Even if that were true, his reasoning was flawed). As I always say, such dissembling simply reveals where MoD are nervous.
Don’t know. My impression is (a) the fallout from the Chinook Mk3 fiasco and (b) the sheer number of safety related modifications in the years following Mull, concentrated their minds. I know for a fact that the project director, as of 1999, was concerned on a daily basis that he could not demonstrate the airworthiness regulations had been complied with. He was aggravated that some staff didn’t implement the regs, but staffs on other helicopters sitting next to them did. What agitated him even more was the 1 and 2 Stars thought the former right, while constantly seeking assurance from other staffs that they weren’t wasting time and money on the Secretary of State’s and PUS’s mandated regulations. This period and what I talk of is directly related to CDP’s evidence to the PAC (above) when every effort was made to ensure he wasn’t exposed to the truth, so he would not be seen to knowingly give wrong answers.
Don’t know, but it is reported that the CPU was changed (which was part of the problem A&AEE had with validation and verification). We also know a new variant DECU was introduced. You may recall A&AEE first registered their concern about FADEC in the 80s. They also stated that they considered ESSENTIAL a number of modifications before either the Mk1 or Mk2 could be considered airworthy. No RTS up to 1998 records those mods having been embodied. In their exchange of letters with MoD(PE) in September 1993, they reminded PE that the ESSENTIAL modification to the DASH was still outstanding – indeed, MoD had not bothered replying to their correspondence for years.
Don’t know. Perhaps someone else could answer. The point the test pilot (Sqn Ldr Burke) and A&AEE made (in doing so merely quoting the regs) was that one must fully understand what the aircraft and its systems are meant to do before one can establish the installed performance, state any limitations and recommend clearance of the equipment. The correspondence from 1993 clearly shows how immature this understanding was. In time, as understanding matures and, if that were the only problem, then A&AEE would reconsider and perhaps agree they were now understood and were explained properly in the RTS and FRCs, and the aircraft was now compliant. MoD have freely provided written evidence the Mk2 was not compliant on 2nd June 1994, which is the immediate concern of this thread.
Know what you mean but don’t wholly agree if, by “you”, you mean A&AEE. It is their job to advise if the aircraft is unworthy, the test being a raft of easily understood regulations.
In September and October 1993 they said it wasn’t, and repeated this in June 1994, before the crash. But, A&AEE do not take the decision to clear it. CA and ACAS decided to ignore A&AEE, and it is for them to say why (information that MoD refuse to provide). I have always agreed that, in a sense, the aircraft was airworthy because ACAS issued an RTS saying it was.
The record shows that in the years following the crash, A&AEE continued with their task of clearing the aircraft, which would lead to a recommendation that CAR be signed. Of course, this task continued even though it had been signed. The very fact that it did continue, under DHP tasking, is a clear indication that staff in DHP knew it was barking to have signed the CAR and RTS in November 1993. They were probably hoping that nothing untoward would happen before the trials were completed. Unfortunately, that known risk materialised. I would support that opinion by pointing to the correspondence from AD/HP1 to his superiors in 1994/95, and the 1996 statement from his successor that Boscombe’s concerns about FADEC still stood.
Hope this helps but I’m afraid I can’t answer all your questions.
It may not be relevant to you, but those of us whose put our trust in the Chinook on a daily basis would like to know.
When did we stop flying an unairworthy ac?
Is it still unairworthy?
Have A&AEE (RWTS) changed their views on FADEC and given it an unconditional release?
Do we still get UFCMs? Does a -6 deg icing clearance make it safer than the Puma with a 0 deg?
I understand that this is an impossible question for you or anyone to answer, but confidence in the aircraft is an important factor for those who fly it. If you have the confidence to declare an aircraft unairworthy then the decision to clear it must also be taken by you.
In September and October 1993 they said it wasn’t, and repeated this in June 1994, before the crash. But, A&AEE do not take the decision to clear it. CA and ACAS decided to ignore A&AEE, and it is for them to say why (information that MoD refuse to provide). I have always agreed that, in a sense, the aircraft was airworthy because ACAS issued an RTS saying it was.
The record shows that in the years following the crash, A&AEE continued with their task of clearing the aircraft, which would lead to a recommendation that CAR be signed. Of course, this task continued even though it had been signed. The very fact that it did continue, under DHP tasking, is a clear indication that staff in DHP knew it was barking to have signed the CAR and RTS in November 1993. They were probably hoping that nothing untoward would happen before the trials were completed. Unfortunately, that known risk materialised. I would support that opinion by pointing to the correspondence from AD/HP1 to his superiors in 1994/95, and the 1996 statement from his successor that Boscombe’s concerns about FADEC still stood.
Hope this helps but I’m afraid I can’t answer all your questions.
If I could just add to my above comment about staffs being told not to comply with regs. You may or may not appreciate that the AD/HP1 post covered Lynx also. (A busy time, what with the MRH/tiebar problems of the day and Chinook Mk3).
So concerned were the Royal Navy over what was still happening in the mid-late 90s (the instructions being issued from on high), that a senior officer from OR wrote to AD/HP1 stating he would personally stand in support of staffs who were victimised for seeking to implement the regs on RN aircraft. The officer concerned was regarded as "very senior" by a full Colonel, to place this in context. Both were good men.
So concerned were the Royal Navy over what was still happening in the mid-late 90s (the instructions being issued from on high), that a senior officer from OR wrote to AD/HP1 stating he would personally stand in support of staffs who were victimised for seeking to implement the regs on RN aircraft. The officer concerned was regarded as "very senior" by a full Colonel, to place this in context. Both were good men.