Chinook 240
It may not be relevant to you, but those of us whose put our trust in the Chinook on a daily basis would like to know.
I think you know what I meant. It is not relevant to the question why ACAS issued a Release to Service in November 1993 and an Amendment in March 1994; neither of which came remotely near complying with the mandated regulations.
When did we stop flying an unairworthy ac?
Don’t know. As I said, The Chief of Defence Procurement openly admitted to the Public Accounts Committee in 1998 there were serious airworthiness problems still outstanding. (So fundamental that the validity of the Safety Case and hence, RTS, was immediately placed in doubt – although it was not pursued). He, and various Ministers have admitted many times since that the general problem exists, without being specific about Chinook; and the Haddon-Cave report simply confirms it. However, when pressed a few years ago, Adam Ingram contradicted CDP, stating there were no such problems and implying the Chinook HC Mk2 was a brand new aircraft in November 1993, not a modification to the Mk1. (Even if that were true, his reasoning was flawed). As I always say, such dissembling simply reveals where MoD are nervous.
Is it still unairworthy?
Don’t know. My impression is (a) the fallout from the Chinook Mk3 fiasco and (b) the sheer number of safety related modifications in the years following Mull, concentrated their minds. I know for a fact that the project director, as of 1999, was concerned on a daily basis that he could not demonstrate the airworthiness regulations had been complied with. He was aggravated that some staff didn’t implement the regs, but staffs on other helicopters sitting next to them did. What agitated him even more was the 1 and 2 Stars thought the former right, while constantly seeking assurance from other staffs that they weren’t wasting time and money on the Secretary of State’s and PUS’s mandated regulations. This period and what I talk of is directly related to CDP’s evidence to the PAC (above) when every effort was made to ensure he wasn’t exposed to the truth, so he would not be seen to knowingly give wrong answers.
Have A&AEE (RWTS) changed their views on FADEC and given it an unconditional release?
Don’t know, but it is reported that the CPU was changed (which was part of the problem A&AEE had with validation and verification). We also know a new variant DECU was introduced. You may recall A&AEE first registered their concern about FADEC in the 80s. They also stated that they considered ESSENTIAL a number of modifications before either the Mk1 or Mk2 could be considered airworthy. No RTS up to 1998 records those mods having been embodied. In their exchange of letters with MoD(PE) in September 1993, they reminded PE that the ESSENTIAL modification to the DASH was still outstanding – indeed, MoD had not bothered replying to their correspondence for years.
Do we still get UFCMs? Does a -6 deg icing clearance make it safer than the Puma with a 0 deg?
Don’t know. Perhaps someone else could answer. The point the test pilot (Sqn Ldr Burke) and A&AEE made (in doing so merely quoting the regs) was that one must fully understand what the aircraft and its systems are meant to do before one can establish the installed performance, state any limitations and recommend clearance of the equipment. The correspondence from 1993 clearly shows how immature this understanding was. In time, as understanding matures and, if that were the only problem, then A&AEE would reconsider and perhaps agree they were now understood and were explained properly in the RTS and FRCs, and the aircraft was now compliant. MoD have freely provided written evidence the Mk2 was not compliant on 2nd June 1994, which is the immediate concern of this thread.
I understand that this is an impossible question for you or anyone to answer, but confidence in the aircraft is an important factor for those who fly it. If you have the confidence to declare an aircraft unairworthy then the decision to clear it must also be taken by you.
Know what you mean but don’t wholly agree if, by “you”, you mean A&AEE. It is their job to advise if the aircraft is unworthy, the test being a raft of easily understood regulations.
In September and October 1993 they said it wasn’t, and repeated this in June 1994, before the crash. But, A&AEE do not take the decision to clear it. CA and ACAS decided to ignore A&AEE, and it is for them to say why (information that MoD refuse to provide). I have always agreed that, in a sense, the aircraft was airworthy because ACAS issued an RTS saying it was.
The record shows that in the years following the crash, A&AEE continued with their task of clearing the aircraft, which would lead to a recommendation that CAR be signed. Of course, this task continued even though it had been signed. The very fact that it did continue, under DHP tasking, is a clear indication that staff in DHP knew it was barking to have signed the CAR and RTS in November 1993. They were probably hoping that nothing untoward would happen before the trials were completed. Unfortunately, that known risk materialised. I would support that opinion by pointing to the correspondence from AD/HP1 to his superiors in 1994/95, and the 1996 statement from his successor that Boscombe’s concerns about FADEC still stood.
Hope this helps but I’m afraid I can’t answer all your questions.