Flipster
negligence or dereliction of duty occured in late 1993, in the higher-level corridors of Main Bldg, High Wycombe and possibly MoD PE.
The question mark you place against MoD(PE) is interesting
in this case.
Certainly, their 4 Star, the Chief of Defence Procurement admitted to the Public Accounts Committee 5 years later that key airworthiness issues still existed.
The Directorate responsible for Chinook, and especially the Assistant Directorate, was staffed by some of MoD’s most experienced people in this field. Their boss, AD/HP1, is on record complaining to his bosses about the immature state of the Mk2, especially the Safety Critical Software and System Integration issues. Also, A&AEE was at the time part of MoD, with airworthiness delegation through CDP. We know their staff stated quite clearly, in Sept 1993 and again in June 1994, that the Mk2 was not yet airworthy. It would be an entirely fair assumption that those staffs (AD/HP1 and below) carried out their task to the best of their ability.
That ability was, however, largely compromised by the likes of AMSO – quite possibly the single most incompetent and wasteful part of MoD in the late 80s and early 90s. (Due to a reorganisation, I was forcibly posted to AMSO in 1992 and almost immediately threatened with the sack by their Director General Support Management, an Air Vice Marshall. My crime was to continue trying to implement the airworthiness, financial probity and technical regulations, which his organisation deemed a waste of money. I’ve always thought such an ethos must have been ingrained for many years for so many people to agree with it and, indeed, we know the seeds were sown in the mid-80s).
Understanding AMSO’s role at this time is key, because Aircraft Directorates in MoD(PE) (e.g. Chinook) no longer had influence, through Controller Aircraft, on the status/safety of the equipment fitted to their aircraft. No tech pubs. Modifications missing by the score. Unserviceable kit stacked in stores with no Flex-Ops or preventative maintenance being carried out. No repair contracts. War Reserves held unserviceable. Few spares; and what spares we had progressively scrapped with 18 month replacement lead times. Critical flight safety hazards simply accepted and aircrew told to get on with it (after they left sick bay). AMSO was castigated by a coruscating report by MoD’s EAC (Equipment Accounting Centre, Liverpool) for all of this in about 1991 (I’ll check the precise date if you like). This gross incompetence and negligence prompted me to seek a move back to MoD(PE), where at least you could find a job with a boss who thought aviation safety rather important.
Placing AMSO aside (the best place for them, a complete non-entity) and going back to PE, we now concentrate on Director level, his 2* boss (RAF AVM) and finally 3* Controller Aircraft. The important posts were CA and his DGA; the latter’s role was probably the linkman to ACAS, as PE had to seek ACAS’s approval of the Controller Aircraft Release (CAR) before it was signed. So, it was CA and DGA’s job to present to Bagnall (sorry!) a proposed CAR and a covering letter from A&AEE that said the aircraft was not airworthy, not least because the Safety Critical Software implementation was “positively dangerous”. Not surprisingly, this is where MoD claim documents are missing, despite being able to provide those immediately before and after in the same file. Funny that.
Any criticism of MoD(PE) in this case should, I suggest, concentrate on these two posts, neither of who have been interviewed yet. AD/HP1’s concerns were highlighted by the House of Lords, so his position is clear. I would like to hear the Director’s viewpoint though. (All four are now retired). I strongly suspect a picture of RAF coercion will emerge, a political imperative to get the already late Mk2 into service as soon as possible; and sod the airworthiness aspect. Especially now that the RAF have pointed the finger at CA, claiming ACAS had no role in the release of the Mk2. I’m sure CA would have something to say about this outrageous lie. The airworthiness issue has forced them to break ranks. I suspect this break can never be healed because the accusation against Sir Donald Spiers and, especially, the naming of him in a letter to the public, is so serious, so outrageous, it is unforgivable. If anyone knows him, please let him know. It will shape his evidence to Lord Philip.