How is such a question relevant? What is important is that ACAS issued an RTS in November 1993 saying the aircraft was airworthy, despite A&AEE saying that it was not and providing valid and verifiable reasons. In making this declaration, ACAS withheld the A&AEE statements from aircrew, falsley misrepresenting the interim information supplied by A&AEE.
May I ask knowledgeable aircrew this. What would your reaction be if the RTS, FRCs, ACM or any other part of the Aircraft Data Set said "I (ACAS) declare the aircraft airworthy, but be aware A&AEE have declared that new thingy called FADEC "positively dangerous" and, in time, we may establish how it is meant to behave, fix it and then tell you the outcome. And don't worry about those UFCMs you're experiencing. The senior Test Pilot says with sufficient training and altitude you may escape. (Sorry, training comes later and the Icing Limitation denies you altitude; and anyway, it is our policy to ignore him). Oh, and don't forget that you are not cleared to use most of the avionics and the error messages they display are so meaningless we don't know where to begin". The RTS withheld most of this, but the crew knew something was very wrong. That knowledge created a significant Human Factors Hazard.
I'm sure ACAS will be asked to explain his (in)actions.