Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[southside]

Interesting that the Secretary of State for Defence at the time of the accident - Malcolm Rifkind has signed both!

Thats the problem with EDM's though. At the end of the day an EDM is just a chit of paper on the wall in the toilets at the HofC's. They are rarely considered and because there are so many of them the point of Anyones argument gets lost. I.E The Chinook crash lies between the Sunderland Ech christmas campaign and a campaign for the safety of Grizzly bears !!!!

EDM's have their place for highlighting short lived campaigns but only if they are fully supported. In the case of EDM 1111 there are just 51 supporters which means over 600 MP's don't agree with it. In this case maybe we should be doing more to highlight the injustice.

[John Blakeley]

RAFA

An Teallach

Re your post at 1731 I am afraid that the RAFA did not publish the letter and is clearly not interested in anything that smacks of controversy. Pity - given its wide membership one would have hoped that the RAFA would have wished to support such a gross miscarriage of justice being put right!

[John Purdey]

Chinook

John. Of course they will wish to avoid controversy, and the editors probably realise that not everyone shares your view that it was a technical failure of some sort rather than professional airmanship that ultimately caused the tragedy. JP.

[John Blakeley]

RAFA

John Purdey

Funnily enough RAFA was quite happy to publish the review of Campbell's book with the comment that “Campbell’s closely argued conclusion shows how the accident occurred.” Given that none of us can ever know what caused the accident I would suggest that this is a pretty controversial statement! Still as I recall you were a strong supporter of the book and its conclusions, and given that a navigation error is just that, an error, and cannot be classed as Gross Negligence I am happy to listen to your opinion even though I do not support it.

We do not have to justify a technical argument for the verdict to be a gross miscarriage of justice - I do not have to go through the list of better men than me who have argued this case, and even those who would see this as an aircrew initiated accident for the most part do not agree with the GN finding. What is becoming clearer though, as we obtain more and more information under the FOIA, is just how flawed and incomplete the engineering aspects of the BOI were. I do not know whether an engineering or underlying airwothiness problem caused the accident, but what I would still claim, as I have before, is that there is no shortage of facts pointing to these areas being a possible cause (and see post 1824 for the latest FOIA information if you have not read it) - unlike the Reviewing Officers I am not, as pointed out by the House of Lords Select Committee, relying for my arguments on hypotheses turned into facts.

It seems to me that RAFA is ignoring what might be the widespread views of its membership - but we will never know if they are not prepared to allow the debate whilst, still publicising one persons views, written I assume for commercial purposes.

[ExGrunt]

Boeing Simulation

Could someone explain something to me please. The paragraph below, quoted from Boeing's overview of the major mathematical calculations and engineering physical equations used to represent the RAF HC MK2 (Available from the MoD web site as chinook_boeing1c.pdf), states the following on SHEET 62:

8. AIRFRAME TRIM LOOPS

...snip...

The three body axis angular accelerations (PDOT, QDOT, and RDOT) and the body axis vertical acceleration (WDOT) are fed from the airframe model to a series of gains and integrators, as shown in Figure 22. Each produces a trim command for the cockpit controllers (longitudinal and lateral cyclic stick, pedals and collective stick) that is sent to the control system. These signals then pass through the control system and are fed back into the airframe model as rotor commands to “fly” the model to a trimmed state. Additional feedback paths that operate on longitudinal acceleration (UDOT) to trim body pitch attitude (θ) and lateral acceleration (VDOT) to trim sideslip (β) are also included to complete the six-degree-of-freedom balance of forces and moments required for trim.

While I know little about aerodynamics, I do know about computer modelling. This says to me that the model is designed to keep returning to the straight and level upright configuration. The implication is that in any simulation run you will get a happily flying model which will need large inputs in the last moments of the simulation to correct it from trimmed to actual state.

Q: Am I correct in my interpretation of 'trimmed state'?

EG

[air pig]

Hi Brian

I have up to now not received a reply from either my MP Jane Kennedy or our esteemed Prime Minister, so I will have to be a little more irritating again !!!!!

I thank you for you suggestion that I contact both David Cameron and the leadership contenders of the Lib Dems. Simon Hughes will be the first as he has not signed either EDM.

Have you followed the thread on the BoI of the F15 crash in Scotland. Too many similarities.

I have just been looking at the Parliament website and have noted that Peter Bottomley has added an ammendment to EDM 651 to be EDM 651A1, and it reads quote " leave out from goverment to the end and add: while understanding the feeling of the families of all those who lost their lives in the helicopter that hit the Mull of Kintyre, to recognise that the RAF Board of Inquirey fulfilled its responsiblity properely"
This is I believe an attempt to skew the original intent of EDM 651, and he must not be allowed to get away with it !!!! This was posted on 21:10:05. Unsurprisingly it only has one signature.

I have as you suggested e-mailed David Cameron and yet again my MP, who will no doubt continue to ignore one of her constituants.

Regards
Air Pig.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi Air Pig,
Keep irritating!! If you don't get a reply, and you can spare the time, why not pop along to one of her surgeries? Go and say "Hi" in person. Much more fun! Remind her that she worked in the Northern Ireland Office from 2001 to 2004, and the accident is closely linked to the Province.

I have, indeed, been following the thread on the F15 crash and agree that there are certain similarities. I wish those involved in that issue every success in their aims.

With regards Peter Bottomley's EDM. I think it speaks volumes that he is the only signatory and has no support for his views.

As always, I am grateful for your support.

ExGrunt,
I'm sorry, but computer modelling isnt my chosen speciality. I have, however, made contact with a pal who may be able to assist. I'll keep you updated as to any reply I get.

My best to you all, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[air pig]

Hi Brian

Trying to find out where she holds her local surgeries is a problem, seems to be an offshoot of the secret squirels. I may ring one of the local radio talk shows and ask how they find this apparition.

That MPs that do not reply to legitimate concerns of their constituants is disturbing.

Will keep irritating.

Regards

Air Pig.

[Brian Dixon]

Thanks Air Pig.

This will probably help:
Office: 108 Prescott Road, Liverpool L7 0JA. Tel - 0151 261 0332

Surgeries held at:
- St Anne's Primary School, Prescot Road, Old Swan L13 3BT
- Dovecot Primary School, Grant Road L14 0LH
- H.A.N.D.S. 32 Lawrence Road, Picton L15 0EG
- Fairfield Special Education Centre, Sheil Road, Kensington L6 3AA
All Surgeries From 5.00pm No Appointment is Necessary

Enjoy

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[CarltonBrowne the FO]

Ex-Grunt: a "trimmed state" need not be straight and level. For any attitude which the pilot wishes to hold for more than a few seconds (for example a climb) the controls can be trimmed so that the aircraft will hold that attitude "hands off" without engaging the autopliot (assuming an autopilot is fitted).
The trims are not used instead of the autopilot- the pilot will not actually let go of the controls. However, in a trimmed state, small adjustments can be made without requiring large control forces, and the pilot does not have to continually exert pressure against the controls to hold an attitude.

[John Blakeley]

PM for John Purdey

John,

I have tried a couple of times to PM you a response to your mail to me of last week, but the system dumps me off line as I hit "Submit Reply" - perhaps a measure of the quaility of my input!

Have you received either of my replies - please PM me again.


Thanks

[John Purdey]

Chinook

John Blakely. Negative; no reply seen here. JP

[BEagle]

Another response from the always-helpful David Cameron's team to my e-mail rebuffing Reid's last effort:

"Please accept my apologies for my delayed reply. David has passed on your letter to John Reid MP, Secretary of State for Defence, asking him to respond to your questions. As soon as we are in receipt of his response, David will write to you immediately.

Thank you for taking the time to write to David about this issue."

[Brian Dixon]

That's still OK BEags.

It keeps reminding Dr Reid that the Campaign is still here and active. I would guess that he will have about half a dozen letters to write at the moment .

The fact that the response will get to you via Mr Cameron's office also keeps the matter firmly within his office too!

Don't expect anything other than the usual cut and paste response from Dr Reid, but take comfort in the fact that he has, yet again, got to put pen to paper to defend the indefensible.

Thanks, as always, for your continued support.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[walter kennedy]

CarltonBrowne the FO
Regarding the trim: if they were indeed in cruise climb, they may have trimmed for that attitude – I wonder if any of the control positions (as found) could support this? They would hardly have altered trim in the final manouvre so perhaps there is a slight chance of clearing the matter of cruise climb up (instead of just relying on reconstruction and the simulation).

[walter kennedy]

John Blakeley
I believe that any control problem had such a short time to manifest itself and then disappear that it would have been extremely unlikely: they were already so very close in (about 1 nm) when they apparently had control (changing waypoints, the corrective steer demand to the right …) and the final rudder position in particular was indicative of a sudden realization of their predicament and appropriate use of control.
If you plot their path on a map, you will see that they were approaching at a rather oblique angle – not at all straight on – and only a moderate steer to the left somewhere in that last 20 seconds would have seen them safe. Whatever technical problem that they may have encountered would had had to have prevented them from this – surely no mere distraction whatsoever could have prevented the steer to safety. Surely it is clear that they did not realize how close they actually were.
That mist is common there and starts right on the shoreline – not often out at sea – and so if they entered the mist they would have known that they were in real trouble as the granite would follow closely – there would have been no case of entering IMC and taking the usual action, in that location if they entered it they were in the poop. They were already too close in at their speed in those conditions at the time when they still had control – the only sensible conclusion is that they misjudged their distance to go – the question is why?
While they could see the Mull from the NI coast, the ground detail would have been obscured and as the top blended with the cloud base there would not have been any topographical shapes for parallax – conditions very difficult for estimating range. If they had had a clear feature or, say, building in view then they would not have come that close anyway (ie closer than where they apparently last had control) – it is important to remember how close all this was. So assuming they did not have a good visual reference, they could have approached at an increasingly oblique angle (as an experienced pilot said on this thread some time ago) playing it safe without having to reduce speed – why didn’t they? – in fact, after changing waypoints, they made a small steering demand TO THE RIGHT (into danger).
A small judgment error would have had no bearing on their going over the Mull – they were miles out for that – so, together with all the other arguments, let’s forget about going over (don’t worry, there is a possible reason for cruise climb), they were going to turn left, simple – and a small error would cause problems if you were turning close in – so you would want to be sure how far you were to be turning so close and so fast – you can see they grey amorphous mass but it’s hard to judge the distance – the steer to the right (just after waypoint change) and coming in so close in those conditions are clues – they must have been heading for a specific point for some reason.

[air pig]

Hi Brian.

Just had a response from David Cameron the new Conservative leader, stating that he had signed EDM 651, AND THAt I should contact Liam Fox their defence spokesman. Certainly will !!!

Regards

Air pig

[Brian Dixon]

Great news Air Pig. Congratulations on your persistence. Let us know how you get on with Dr Fox. Don't forget to point him in the direction of James Arbuthnot.

I'm off to write to Sir Ming Campbell to offer congratulations on his leadership election. He too is a staunch Campaign supporter so we now have support from the top of the Tory party and the Lib Dem party.

All we need now is for the current lot to see that the negligence verdict is unsustainable and remove it forthwith!

Ah, if it were only that simple.

Thanks, as always for your support.

Regards all.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[cazatou]

walter kennedy

It seems to me that you are just about 100% in agreement with the rationale of the then AOC 1 Gp in regards to the finding of negligence.

[walter kennedy]

CAZATOU

<<… in agreement with the rationale …>>

How’s that? – wasn’t the official line something like in adverse/ variable/ deteriorating weather conditions they selected an inappropriate rate of climb to pass over the Mull? – have I not made the case that on that day the weather conditions were typical and common in that area with the mist localized on the Mull such that the low level passage from NI to the Mull was in good VFR conditions? – have I not argued that they were no where near (miles out) a safe passage over the Mull, way beyond a small error in judgment because (in addition to the technical limitations that others have described)
it was never the intention to go over?
I have argued that they were intending to turn to go up the shoreline as I believe was the common practice on that route.

They would not have been breaking any regulations for a helo in those conditions provided that they did not enter the mist; nothing could have been coming out of the mist (because of the hills therein and in any case any other hypothetical a/c coming from that direction would have had to have been IMC and so way higher) so they could get as close as they liked without entering it.
The point has been made by others that it would still be bad airmanship to head towards that headland in those conditions at their speed; I would like to clear up that aspect:
on several occasions in the inquiries, it seems to be suggested that their speed was excessive or on the high end – but was not its airspeed (135kts?) the optimum cruise for the job? Why would you do a ferry trip slower? There seemed to be a willingness to confuse the public by including the tailwind component without making this clear on all occasions where the speed was mentioned with the spin that it was excessive;
they were no where near heading straight in – their approach angle to the coast was quite oblique and a comfortable turn (at or about the actual geographical position of waypoint A) was all that was required while maintaining their speed;
the visibility was excellent on their approach to the Mull – they would have been able to see it the whole way across – it was where the mist was (and vice versa) – they could probably see the shoreline as they got closer (but not far up from that as the mist forms rapidly as the air moves up the slope) – but it would have been a problem in judging their distance to go at that speed (ground detail and prominent features obscured) – bearing in mind that this crew would not have been unduly perturbed by the SuperTANS differing by up to a mile from their estimated position after a sea crossing, nevertheless after making the waypoint change (and thus discounting thereafter the SuperTANS for immediate fine navigation) prudence would have had them concentrating on the distance to go to the landmass, but they made a small steering demand to the right at about this point – and on this occasion the SuperTANS had actually been accurate and they were already very close in.
In my humble opinion, the above summary is not so much speculation but rather a reasonable summary of the conditions in the approach to the Mull - how does this compare to that official line of confused conditions and intentions?
Was this deliberate obfuscation … to hide an extra task? – or their embarrassment at losing the team?

So if the “rationale” is completely different, it must be the path I am taking that you object to – I have made the point before that I think there is a culture amongst the interested parties of not wanting to delve deeper in case something adverse to the cause comes up – surely after 11 years there is nothing to lose?

Now, here’s a bit of really wild speculation for you all to chew on:
Assuming the MIL-STD-1553 bus (and I could well be wrong, just trying to get you all into sorting out all the possibilities) was in the HC2 avionics set up and when the techs were doing things (without raising the paperwork) with the nav racks just before that final sortie they popped in an ARS6 module (remember, public knowledge of this activity only came about as a result of anomalies in those racks found in the crash investigation – anomalies I suggest that may have been consistent with the inexpert/hurried removal of such a module); apparently (according to the manufacturer’s published information) if a PRC112 is activated within range, range and steering data (to that PRC112 on the ground) can be AUTOMATICALLY transferred to the onboard navigation system (ie on the nav DCU) … as a way-point.
Whether they were knowingly part of such an evaluation or not, if someone had been on the Mull a bit further inland of waypoint A (on the STANS) with an active PRC112 then as they selected the next waypoint this temporary (external to the STANS) one may have popped up on their display – now there’s a distraction!
Even with the known inaccuracies of the SuperTANS, waypoint A would have been a safe point to start their turn remaining clear of the mist; what if, when they selected the next waypoint, they had steering and range data to carry on (albeit with a slight steer to the right) a bit further? Who knows? Without being open about these systems and whether there was an evaluation prior to 1995 we shall never know.
Surely, regardless of their obligation of safety, if any such extra navigational information had been available to them, whether it was accurate or not, but this had not been brought to the attention of any of the inquiries, then the verdict of these inquiries is invalid.
And of course, if they had been set up in any way (an evaluation task where the ground equipment was erroneously or maliciously in the wrong place), the question of whether the pilots had acted properly surely becomes a mute point, or at least secondary to the question of who was really responsible for this almighty stuff up.