Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Walter
Walter
Well done, your persistence on PRC112 has;
a. Finally received acknowledgement from the thread that the system exists.
b. Has highlighted that systems thinking is important to achieving understanding (in simple terms, because you have forced people to realise that there exist complementary ground and air components)
c. You have re-iterated the different methods by which these systems can be fitted/used by aircrew (DA Mod, SEM, Carry-on kit, unofficially, etc). And in doing so, reinforced the need to carefully phrase questions.
The above, especially b. and c., are well known weaknesses in the MoD. They simply do not want engineering issues, such as configuration control, safety and maintaining build standards, aired. They have proven time and again a willingness to lie through their back teeth on these matters, mainly because they cannot withstand scrutiny. Others, far more experienced that I on this subject (ZD576) have long sought to bring these engineering issues to the fore; without success. I sincerely hope they support this aspect of what you say. I certainly do.
But, my friend, I think that the other issues, such as references to sabotage, do little to further the aims of this thread. If it is merely theory, then it offers your detractors an excuse for not addressing the factual elements of what you say. For example, in engineering terms I can believe your hypothesis on the PRC112 issue, but unless there is proof it does not further the aims of this thread. If it was fitted to, or used by, ZD576, then in all probability there will be no safety audit trail, because of the above MoD deficiencies. But, it cannot be proven one way or another, so focus is lost.
However, you are right to inquire about engineering matters. The simple, easily proven fact, is that the MoD have serious weaknesses in the way they apply the processes and procedures which are designed to ensure the whole aircraft is safe. (And I know you understand that, just because an aircraft can take off and fly, does not mean it is safe or serviceable – which seems to be the thrust of the MoD’s latest argument. That they are resorting to such arrant nonsense indicates nervousness). You are 100% correct on other engineering matters. DECU. Inherent Nav errors after flying over water. Weighted algorithms. TANS. Bonding. It is a fact that the MoD acknowledge design defects in the Nav system (which cause faults and can give erroneous Nav information), but will not say what they did about them, or when they became apparent. A lawyer would call this weight of evidence, leading to reasonable doubt. Which is far more than the MoD rules require to overturn this verdict.
I am not a pilot so refrain from commenting on flying issues. I leave that to the experts. But, I implore you flyers, please listen to the experts when they say that there are serious engineering issues here which, unlike what happened in the final moments of ZD576, can be proven beyond any doubt; and collectively may serve to undermine the MoD’s position. I believe Walter is entitled to his view. If you don’t agree with it (or me) then fine; but go past the more sinister theories and you will find some very unpalatable facts beneath. The MoD’s failure to discuss or address them is far more sinister.
Oh, and Walter, thank you for not divulging the content of private corrspondence.
Well done, your persistence on PRC112 has;
a. Finally received acknowledgement from the thread that the system exists.
b. Has highlighted that systems thinking is important to achieving understanding (in simple terms, because you have forced people to realise that there exist complementary ground and air components)
c. You have re-iterated the different methods by which these systems can be fitted/used by aircrew (DA Mod, SEM, Carry-on kit, unofficially, etc). And in doing so, reinforced the need to carefully phrase questions.
The above, especially b. and c., are well known weaknesses in the MoD. They simply do not want engineering issues, such as configuration control, safety and maintaining build standards, aired. They have proven time and again a willingness to lie through their back teeth on these matters, mainly because they cannot withstand scrutiny. Others, far more experienced that I on this subject (ZD576) have long sought to bring these engineering issues to the fore; without success. I sincerely hope they support this aspect of what you say. I certainly do.
But, my friend, I think that the other issues, such as references to sabotage, do little to further the aims of this thread. If it is merely theory, then it offers your detractors an excuse for not addressing the factual elements of what you say. For example, in engineering terms I can believe your hypothesis on the PRC112 issue, but unless there is proof it does not further the aims of this thread. If it was fitted to, or used by, ZD576, then in all probability there will be no safety audit trail, because of the above MoD deficiencies. But, it cannot be proven one way or another, so focus is lost.
However, you are right to inquire about engineering matters. The simple, easily proven fact, is that the MoD have serious weaknesses in the way they apply the processes and procedures which are designed to ensure the whole aircraft is safe. (And I know you understand that, just because an aircraft can take off and fly, does not mean it is safe or serviceable – which seems to be the thrust of the MoD’s latest argument. That they are resorting to such arrant nonsense indicates nervousness). You are 100% correct on other engineering matters. DECU. Inherent Nav errors after flying over water. Weighted algorithms. TANS. Bonding. It is a fact that the MoD acknowledge design defects in the Nav system (which cause faults and can give erroneous Nav information), but will not say what they did about them, or when they became apparent. A lawyer would call this weight of evidence, leading to reasonable doubt. Which is far more than the MoD rules require to overturn this verdict.
I am not a pilot so refrain from commenting on flying issues. I leave that to the experts. But, I implore you flyers, please listen to the experts when they say that there are serious engineering issues here which, unlike what happened in the final moments of ZD576, can be proven beyond any doubt; and collectively may serve to undermine the MoD’s position. I believe Walter is entitled to his view. If you don’t agree with it (or me) then fine; but go past the more sinister theories and you will find some very unpalatable facts beneath. The MoD’s failure to discuss or address them is far more sinister.
Oh, and Walter, thank you for not divulging the content of private corrspondence.
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Tucumseh,
You were lucky. I replied to walter's PM and just about everything I said was qouted out of context in his next posting.
I feel sorry for the poor Air Commodore who had to listen to him at MOD. Walter said he "Stonewalled"; I tend to the view that the poor chap was in a state of stunned disbelief.
You were lucky. I replied to walter's PM and just about everything I said was qouted out of context in his next posting.
I feel sorry for the poor Air Commodore who had to listen to him at MOD. Walter said he "Stonewalled"; I tend to the view that the poor chap was in a state of stunned disbelief.
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Tucumseh & others
Sorry, I should have realised W was fishing with the persistent uninformed references to PRC112.
Returning to business.
Given the Deepcut announcement today, and the line emerging from the Scottish F-15s BoI, is there any mileage in more general pressure on the military investigative processes?
Sven
Sorry, I should have realised W was fishing with the persistent uninformed references to PRC112.
Returning to business.
Given the Deepcut announcement today, and the line emerging from the Scottish F-15s BoI, is there any mileage in more general pressure on the military investigative processes?
Sven
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Hi
I have just been reading the Parliamentary Questions concerning Hercules Safety thread (page 7) and was reminded of some comments which have been posted on this thread regarding John and Rick; “if they thought they weren’t familiar/confident in the aircraft they had a duty not to fly it”.
Before I continue I must stress that I believe our AT fleet have no option other than to continue to operate with their aircraft as equipped, duty is duty. I also believe they will be trying to influence the system, however, and this will unintentionally sound cheap, they have to pay the mortgage.
I know John pushed the boundaries as far as could, without being removed from theatre, to delay the Mk II Chinook coming to Ireland. Why? Well we (4 pilots, 4 crewmen) were an isolated community. We had been at Odiham during the build up to the arrival of the Mk II and were party to all the doubts and fears of the time which were not relieved by our brief (3 hour?) conversion some six weeks earlier (no 'official'documents). This insecurity was compounded by the plethora of incident signals, rumours from Boscombe, calls to Sqn and finally Boscombes’ refusal/delay to fly.
One particularly poignant memory is sitting with John a couple of weeks prior to the crash, the pair of us planning out this very trip, so that we could use the fuel plot as an additional argument for a letter John was working on to delay introduction. If John ever sent that letter I will never know, it would appear the MOD are unsure of its existence.
The day the Mk II arrived in theatre John, Rick, mate and I literally crawled all over it with a set of GS screwdrivers following wires to see how it worked. 36 Hours later John and Rick where dead and I was at home having flown the MK I back.
Within 48 hours (possibly less, it was a long time ago) I was back in Ireland (possibly the next MK II sortie in theatre) and an engine ‘failed’ itself on start.
Black days, thank you all for your support.
W 5
Edited to change 'cooked' with 'failed'.
I have just been reading the Parliamentary Questions concerning Hercules Safety thread (page 7) and was reminded of some comments which have been posted on this thread regarding John and Rick; “if they thought they weren’t familiar/confident in the aircraft they had a duty not to fly it”.
Before I continue I must stress that I believe our AT fleet have no option other than to continue to operate with their aircraft as equipped, duty is duty. I also believe they will be trying to influence the system, however, and this will unintentionally sound cheap, they have to pay the mortgage.
I know John pushed the boundaries as far as could, without being removed from theatre, to delay the Mk II Chinook coming to Ireland. Why? Well we (4 pilots, 4 crewmen) were an isolated community. We had been at Odiham during the build up to the arrival of the Mk II and were party to all the doubts and fears of the time which were not relieved by our brief (3 hour?) conversion some six weeks earlier (no 'official'documents). This insecurity was compounded by the plethora of incident signals, rumours from Boscombe, calls to Sqn and finally Boscombes’ refusal/delay to fly.
One particularly poignant memory is sitting with John a couple of weeks prior to the crash, the pair of us planning out this very trip, so that we could use the fuel plot as an additional argument for a letter John was working on to delay introduction. If John ever sent that letter I will never know, it would appear the MOD are unsure of its existence.
The day the Mk II arrived in theatre John, Rick, mate and I literally crawled all over it with a set of GS screwdrivers following wires to see how it worked. 36 Hours later John and Rick where dead and I was at home having flown the MK I back.
Within 48 hours (possibly less, it was a long time ago) I was back in Ireland (possibly the next MK II sortie in theatre) and an engine ‘failed’ itself on start.
Black days, thank you all for your support.
W 5
Edited to change 'cooked' with 'failed'.
Last edited by Whooper5; 2nd Apr 2006 at 08:57.
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Cazatou,
I was not interviewed or involved with the BOI. Please don’t think I would have had anything to add over and above those that were. I have nothing new to bring to this; other than to put across the atmosphere that was prevalent during the introduction of the Mk II.
There was no need to tell the Board about it, it impacted the whole force; although it was possibly worse in our isolation. I have thought about whether I should have asked to be interviewed by the Board for years and now realise that any feelings of guilt are fuelled by a hefty dose of hindsight. Nobody expected the reviewing officers’ comments. I believe we all expected the findings to be as they were; and for those findings to be endorsed by the reviewers.
You post well with balance and manners; I hope I have answered in kind
Regards
W 5
I was not interviewed or involved with the BOI. Please don’t think I would have had anything to add over and above those that were. I have nothing new to bring to this; other than to put across the atmosphere that was prevalent during the introduction of the Mk II.
There was no need to tell the Board about it, it impacted the whole force; although it was possibly worse in our isolation. I have thought about whether I should have asked to be interviewed by the Board for years and now realise that any feelings of guilt are fuelled by a hefty dose of hindsight. Nobody expected the reviewing officers’ comments. I believe we all expected the findings to be as they were; and for those findings to be endorsed by the reviewers.
You post well with balance and manners; I hope I have answered in kind
Regards
W 5
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Whooper5
Thankyou for your most gracious comments.
I must confess that I am surprised that you were not interviewed by the BOI. I would have expected that all Chinook Aircrew who were in Theatre at that period would have been interviewed, as a matter of course, to ascertain their recollections of events surrounding the fatal sortie; even if this just involved confirmation of the testimony of others.
Thankyou for your most gracious comments.
I must confess that I am surprised that you were not interviewed by the BOI. I would have expected that all Chinook Aircrew who were in Theatre at that period would have been interviewed, as a matter of course, to ascertain their recollections of events surrounding the fatal sortie; even if this just involved confirmation of the testimony of others.
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I think Whooper5 raises an excellent point, nobody really pushed the views about the aircraft because they didn't think this outcome would happen. In the earliest pages of this thread, I talked about how unhappy Jon was in accepting the Mk2 for the flight. All these years later, the important facts get diluted by the crazy conspiracy theories of sad deluded idiots from the other side of the planet. I just wish that contributors would consider the impact of their posts sometimes.
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jayteeto and Whooper5,
You were clearly around at the time of the unfortunate accident. Clearly no-one expected the reviewing officers' conclusions.
However, can you recall whether there was a huge groundswell of opinion to ground the fleet as a result of the accident? Were people refusing to fly the aircraft?
You were clearly around at the time of the unfortunate accident. Clearly no-one expected the reviewing officers' conclusions.
However, can you recall whether there was a huge groundswell of opinion to ground the fleet as a result of the accident? Were people refusing to fly the aircraft?
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It was a long time ago, but I think that the aircraft was recommended not to be flown unless operationally necessary (before the accident). Read back, TPs were not flying it. I will state with 100% certainty that Jon was unhappy to take this aircraft and felt their was no choice. Why 100%? He said so in plain language.
This is why the Seal theory breaks down, even if the Mk2 had walters kit fitted (it didnt), they would have used the Mk1 if it had become serviceable. Those poor seals would have had a wasted journey in their nuclear powered hover cars. Luckily the Starship Enterprise would have beamed them and their cars back to base and they could have continued plotting to rule the universe with Darth Vader.
This is why the Seal theory breaks down, even if the Mk2 had walters kit fitted (it didnt), they would have used the Mk1 if it had become serviceable. Those poor seals would have had a wasted journey in their nuclear powered hover cars. Luckily the Starship Enterprise would have beamed them and their cars back to base and they could have continued plotting to rule the universe with Darth Vader.
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Twinact
It is difficult to accurately describe the atmosphere within the Chinook force at the time.
My personal assessment:
There was an enormous amount of pressure from ‘on high’ to get the MkII introduced, I have no idea why. The problem comes when you make personnel of the highest calibre, in all corners of the force, introduce a new aircraft type with scant information, no documentation, no UK military evidence of airworthiness and a confusing array of seemingly unrelated systems failures. If you are told “I hear what your saying but get on with it” no matter how hard you protest, you simply end up doing your best to help with the introduction.
This is not a failing of anyone who did their job, it is a failing of the system. What I believe then happened is a feeling of the system having prostituted peoples credibility through making them aid the introduction of an aircraft which was not ready for service. People were not about to go to the board and state they considered the aircraft they got into each day was unsafe, it would be one demeaning situation to far.
I say again; this is strictly my personal view and it must also be said that the MkII has turned out to be an amazing aircraft.
W 5
It is difficult to accurately describe the atmosphere within the Chinook force at the time.
My personal assessment:
There was an enormous amount of pressure from ‘on high’ to get the MkII introduced, I have no idea why. The problem comes when you make personnel of the highest calibre, in all corners of the force, introduce a new aircraft type with scant information, no documentation, no UK military evidence of airworthiness and a confusing array of seemingly unrelated systems failures. If you are told “I hear what your saying but get on with it” no matter how hard you protest, you simply end up doing your best to help with the introduction.
This is not a failing of anyone who did their job, it is a failing of the system. What I believe then happened is a feeling of the system having prostituted peoples credibility through making them aid the introduction of an aircraft which was not ready for service. People were not about to go to the board and state they considered the aircraft they got into each day was unsafe, it would be one demeaning situation to far.
I say again; this is strictly my personal view and it must also be said that the MkII has turned out to be an amazing aircraft.
W 5
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Twinact,
Purely curious.
You wouldn't be a Reporter after a story; would you?
I just asked because I assumed that any RAF Officer would realise that refusing a lawful command on active service was a Court Martial offence. In fact, in the past 2 World Wars, it was a Capital Offence.
Purely curious.
You wouldn't be a Reporter after a story; would you?
I just asked because I assumed that any RAF Officer would realise that refusing a lawful command on active service was a Court Martial offence. In fact, in the past 2 World Wars, it was a Capital Offence.
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Chinook
Twinact and others.
This is all rather strange. If there were such technical problems with the MkII, how come the aircraft were not all grounded, either as a result of this tragedy or as the result of other doubts about the aircraft?
Also, I understand that the supervisory chain held several very experienced helo people including the CinC. Are we saying that they forced the crews to press on with potentially dangerous machines? Why should they; it was not a wartime scenario?
And what was this about aircrews crawling over the Mk II with GS screwdrivers to see how it worked? Were there not engineers on the unit, and what did aircrew hope the uncover that the engineers had not?
I ask only because I am very curious about the engineering regime that it is alleged played so important a part in this very sad business.
Regards and best wishes to all others with an inquiring mind on this thread,
John Purdey.
This is all rather strange. If there were such technical problems with the MkII, how come the aircraft were not all grounded, either as a result of this tragedy or as the result of other doubts about the aircraft?
Also, I understand that the supervisory chain held several very experienced helo people including the CinC. Are we saying that they forced the crews to press on with potentially dangerous machines? Why should they; it was not a wartime scenario?
And what was this about aircrews crawling over the Mk II with GS screwdrivers to see how it worked? Were there not engineers on the unit, and what did aircrew hope the uncover that the engineers had not?
I ask only because I am very curious about the engineering regime that it is alleged played so important a part in this very sad business.
Regards and best wishes to all others with an inquiring mind on this thread,
John Purdey.
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John Purdey,
You are quite correct that there were many experienced SH operators in the chain of command.
At 1 Gp level there were Sqn Ldr Staff Officers for each aircraft type; there was also a Wg Cdr and a Gp Capt SH. The AOC himself had some 30+ years experience of helicopter operations.
These posts were replicated at HQ STC and, also, at MOD level. Let us not forget that the BOI was reviewed by CAS and his staff before its release.
The furore that erupted after release of the BOI owes much to a common misconception regarding the BOI system. Many believe that the panel assembled to investigate an accident is the ultimate authority on that accident. This simply is not true.
The authority for convening a BOI resides with the AOC in C who delegates that responsibility to the appropriate Group Commander; this Air Officer, in turn, nominates a President of the BOI and such other members as may be required by the circumstances of the "Accident". It is not unknown for a "President", or other Board members, to be replaced during an investigation if circumstances warrent such a move.
It is my belief that, due to the inordinate length of time that the BOI had taken (itself mainly due to the meticulous AAIB investigation), changes to the BOI were not an option. This despite the finding of the BOI that the cause of the accident was that the Pilots, whilst approaching high ground at a relatively high speed in poor weather, "selected an inappropriate rate of climb" to clear the Mull.
This is arrant nonsense. If you are approaching,at low level, high ground covered by poor weather in ANY type of aircraft the only appropriate rate of climb is the maximum attainable coupled with, if possible, a turn away from the obstacle. In a helicopter you have another option which is to slow down, stop, turn around and retrace your track. It is, of course, possible that the disparate altimeter sub-scale settings in the Chinook cockpit may have caused some confusion as to when it was safe to level out.
The laisser-faire attitude towards the regulations regarding the requirement to have breakfast before commencing flying operations, the maximum times between meals and permissable crew duty extensions (let alone the option of exceeding crew duty hours or nightstopping out of Theatre without approval):coupled with the disparate altimeter settings and navigation equipment tuned to a commercial radio station; do not, in my view, show a totally "professional" approach to the "job in hand".
Perhaps the proponants of the "FADEC runaway" theory could give us some idea of how many recorded occurrences there were before the accident and how many there have been since? It would also be useful to know how many of these occurrences resulted in accidents.
You are quite correct that there were many experienced SH operators in the chain of command.
At 1 Gp level there were Sqn Ldr Staff Officers for each aircraft type; there was also a Wg Cdr and a Gp Capt SH. The AOC himself had some 30+ years experience of helicopter operations.
These posts were replicated at HQ STC and, also, at MOD level. Let us not forget that the BOI was reviewed by CAS and his staff before its release.
The furore that erupted after release of the BOI owes much to a common misconception regarding the BOI system. Many believe that the panel assembled to investigate an accident is the ultimate authority on that accident. This simply is not true.
The authority for convening a BOI resides with the AOC in C who delegates that responsibility to the appropriate Group Commander; this Air Officer, in turn, nominates a President of the BOI and such other members as may be required by the circumstances of the "Accident". It is not unknown for a "President", or other Board members, to be replaced during an investigation if circumstances warrent such a move.
It is my belief that, due to the inordinate length of time that the BOI had taken (itself mainly due to the meticulous AAIB investigation), changes to the BOI were not an option. This despite the finding of the BOI that the cause of the accident was that the Pilots, whilst approaching high ground at a relatively high speed in poor weather, "selected an inappropriate rate of climb" to clear the Mull.
This is arrant nonsense. If you are approaching,at low level, high ground covered by poor weather in ANY type of aircraft the only appropriate rate of climb is the maximum attainable coupled with, if possible, a turn away from the obstacle. In a helicopter you have another option which is to slow down, stop, turn around and retrace your track. It is, of course, possible that the disparate altimeter sub-scale settings in the Chinook cockpit may have caused some confusion as to when it was safe to level out.
The laisser-faire attitude towards the regulations regarding the requirement to have breakfast before commencing flying operations, the maximum times between meals and permissable crew duty extensions (let alone the option of exceeding crew duty hours or nightstopping out of Theatre without approval):coupled with the disparate altimeter settings and navigation equipment tuned to a commercial radio station; do not, in my view, show a totally "professional" approach to the "job in hand".
Perhaps the proponants of the "FADEC runaway" theory could give us some idea of how many recorded occurrences there were before the accident and how many there have been since? It would also be useful to know how many of these occurrences resulted in accidents.
Whilst what you say might be true, cazatou, neither you nor Wratten, Day nor anyone else bar the deceased crew can be certain beyond any doubt whatsoever.
And that is the crux of the whole issue.
And that is the crux of the whole issue.
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BEagle,
Much as I dislike the idea, I regret that I must disagree with you.
IF everything had happened in exactly the same way and the helicopter had forced landed without any casualties then; given the discrepancies in procedures, compliance with ASI's, basic Airmanship such as altimeter settings; the usage of nav aids and the total disregard of crew duty limitations; crew meal requirements, outbriefing etc - then what would have been the finding of the BOI?
I would respectfully suggest that it would have been "Negligence"
and that if the BOI had not so found; then the AOC would have!!
Much as I dislike the idea, I regret that I must disagree with you.
IF everything had happened in exactly the same way and the helicopter had forced landed without any casualties then; given the discrepancies in procedures, compliance with ASI's, basic Airmanship such as altimeter settings; the usage of nav aids and the total disregard of crew duty limitations; crew meal requirements, outbriefing etc - then what would have been the finding of the BOI?
I would respectfully suggest that it would have been "Negligence"
and that if the BOI had not so found; then the AOC would have!!
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John Purdey
<< … to see how it worked? Were there not engineers on the unit, and what did aircrew hope the uncover that the engineers had not? >>
But there were changes from the Mk1 and would it not be expected for aircrew to be as knowledgeable as possible about their a/c, especially systems (eg nav) that directly affect their job?
That said, I agree that the emphasis on the a/c’s airworthiness is strange given that it got them there (past where they changed from waypoint A which, if anyone can be bothered plotting it on a map, was already dangerously close in those conditions).
That is to say, they were already so close in (in those conditions) that their navigation and intentions would already be of concern before the narrow window of opportunity occurred for control problems to manifest themselves – and the final control positions and a/c attitude were consistent with an evasive manouvre which was being responded to appropriately by the a/c.
And 47Ds hadn’t exactly been dropping out of the sky before this tragic event nor have HC2s since.
Perhaps the misgivings expressed by aircrew involved were more to do with pressure and arrangements to use a Mk2 for this trip? Perhaps there was a real desire to give this team a demonstration of the Mk2’s capabilities beyond just ferrying them around? Perhaps it just had to be a Mk2 for whatever reason, eh jayteeto?
Then again, pointing at hypothetical transient technical problems in such a complex machine without clear evidence would no doubt keep interested parties running around harmlessly in ever decreasing circles for decades, would it not?
<< … to see how it worked? Were there not engineers on the unit, and what did aircrew hope the uncover that the engineers had not? >>
But there were changes from the Mk1 and would it not be expected for aircrew to be as knowledgeable as possible about their a/c, especially systems (eg nav) that directly affect their job?
That said, I agree that the emphasis on the a/c’s airworthiness is strange given that it got them there (past where they changed from waypoint A which, if anyone can be bothered plotting it on a map, was already dangerously close in those conditions).
That is to say, they were already so close in (in those conditions) that their navigation and intentions would already be of concern before the narrow window of opportunity occurred for control problems to manifest themselves – and the final control positions and a/c attitude were consistent with an evasive manouvre which was being responded to appropriately by the a/c.
And 47Ds hadn’t exactly been dropping out of the sky before this tragic event nor have HC2s since.
Perhaps the misgivings expressed by aircrew involved were more to do with pressure and arrangements to use a Mk2 for this trip? Perhaps there was a real desire to give this team a demonstration of the Mk2’s capabilities beyond just ferrying them around? Perhaps it just had to be a Mk2 for whatever reason, eh jayteeto?
Then again, pointing at hypothetical transient technical problems in such a complex machine without clear evidence would no doubt keep interested parties running around harmlessly in ever decreasing circles for decades, would it not?