Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Twinact,
I concur with your view.
If Ark Royal is correct then, given the Wx forecast provided for the flight (in particular the possibility of localised low cloud around the Mull); one has to question whether the decision to conduct the flight in that way was a sound decision.
Given the forecast, there was a distinct possibility of a low level Wx abort and an enforced climb to Safety Altitude. If the icing clearance precluded this then the decision to fly that route was clearly flawed.
It is ironic that the failure to conduct the required "outbrief" precluded the possibility of this being reviewed. Moreover, it also precluded any review of the crew duty considerations and its potential effect on aircraft availability should the aircraft be forced to nightstop outside the Province.
I concur with your view.
If Ark Royal is correct then, given the Wx forecast provided for the flight (in particular the possibility of localised low cloud around the Mull); one has to question whether the decision to conduct the flight in that way was a sound decision.
Given the forecast, there was a distinct possibility of a low level Wx abort and an enforced climb to Safety Altitude. If the icing clearance precluded this then the decision to fly that route was clearly flawed.
It is ironic that the failure to conduct the required "outbrief" precluded the possibility of this being reviewed. Moreover, it also precluded any review of the crew duty considerations and its potential effect on aircraft availability should the aircraft be forced to nightstop outside the Province.
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Old Ground
Catazou,
I see that the thread has started once again to go back over old ground.
Can I remind you what the Board actually said about the weather, crew duty time and the lack of an outbrief.
Weather
At para 42 the BoI commented:
42. Weather - The Board considered that the weather information available to the crew at RAF Aldergrove prior to flight was comprehensive and adequate for the task, and the Board was content that the crew had considered the weather relevant to their flight. The Board then considered the suitability of the forecast and actual weather for the VFR flight planned by the crew. The weather documentation faxed to the crew indicated that conditions entirely suitable for helicopter low level VFR flight would prevail over the greater portion of their route, but that over coastal areas there would be an occasional risk of less favourable but acceptable conditions, and an isolated risk of conditions sufficiently poor to preclude VFR flight. These indications were reflected in the associated TAFs and METARs. Along the crews planned route, these occasional and isolated conditions would only have been expected in the area of the Mull of Kintyre, with a specific risk of a 30% probability of weather below VFR limits being forecast for Machrihanish. In the opinion of the Board, a forecast of a 30% probability of en-route weather below VFR limits was not sufficient to preclude an attempt at a VFR flight (my underlining). However, a suitable bad weather contingency plan would have been required. This might have been a VFR diversion around the bad weather, a VFR return to the point of departure, or a pre-planned climb and conversion to IFR flight (my underlining). The possibility of a lightning strike affecting the aircraft was also considered by the Board, but as there were no reports of lightning activity in the area, and no evidence of a lightning strike was found in the technical investigation, it was discounted. Similarly, the Board also considered the part that turbulence may have played in the accident and, as the aftercast indicates that the turbulence in the area was only moderate, the Board concluded that it could have provided no more than a distraction to the crew, particularly when flying in IMC. However, as the actual weather in the area of the crash site at the time of the accident was very poor, with very low cloud bases and low visibilities, the Board concluded that weather was a contributory factor in the accident.
The weather also gets discussed in Stn Cdr Odihams’ alternative view of the accident - part of the BOI, which was:
An Alternative View
2. In looking for alternative causes I have no new evidence to call upon, and all I can do is put a different emphasis on factors already considered by the Board. By working “forward” from the departure point, I conclude it is highly probable that rather than electing to climb over the Mull the crew saw the coast and decided to continue VFR to the west of the Mull Peninsular. The evidence of the yachtsman who saw the aircraft about 2 -3 nm SW of the Mull gives a good idea of the weather and the aircraft’s height and attitude just before the crash. At about 17-30, only 30 minutes before the crash, the yachtsman then about ¾ mile from the Mull reported that the lighthouse and the cloud covering the land behind the lighthouse were clearly visible. Just before the accident the same man, now 2 to 3 miles from the Mull, reported that the aircraft was straight and level at a height of between 2-400 ft well below cloud level. He assessed cloud cover as 80% and the visibility as about 1nm, limited by haze. He also reported the cloud as structured which, in aircrew terminology may mean layered. After the aircraft passed the yachtsman any deductions about what happened become more speculative but I believe that given the reported weather, the crew saw the Mull and it was this sighting that prompted the Waypoint (WP) change at 1.75 km.
3. This WP change is crucial in trying to understand what the crew intended to do. If they had intended to abort at this stage and climb over the Mull despite the difficulty, which would have been so obvious to them, of clearing the high ground they would not have selected the Corran WP. Firstly, it removed from them the only easily interpretable information about the location of the high ground. Secondly, it was of little practical value; the crew would not have been able to climb to SA on track to Corran, in the hope of reverting to low level VFR, because of the forecast level of the 4ºC isotherm. If they intended to climb over the Mull then only sensible option would have been to keep the lighthouse WP on until well clear of it and then to select the chosen diversion airfield. On the other hand, selection of the Corran WP was entirely appropriate if the intention was to follow the western coast of the Mull Peninsular and regain the planned track at the first convenient opportunity. In arriving at this alternative scenario I am now faced with the same problem that faced the Board - how did the aircraft get to around 500 ft, at 150 kts IAS with a ROC of approx 1000ft per minute, which are the computed starting parameters of the final 18 seconds of flight?
4. Whilst tackling this issue the Board were unable to totally discount the following factors:
a. Spatial disorientation or visual illusion.
b. An unregistered technical malfunction.
c. Human factors.
Any of these, or a combination of them, could, in my view, have sufficiently distracted the crew from the task of turning away from the Mull to cause them both to inadvertently enter cloud and then to fail to take the correct procedure for an emergency climb in a timely manner. The Board consider engine control system malfunctions and it is particularly relevant to note that at this stage of the Chinook Mk II's service spurious ENG FAIL captions, lasting on average 7-8 seconds, were an increasingly frequent occurrence. These are now well understood but at the time they were not. Had such an indication occurred it would have caused crew considerable concern particularly as they were over the water with no obvious area for an emergency landing. Such a warning would also have required an urgent and very careful check of engine instruments and FRCs.
I also quoted this last paragraph at thread item 1788 above
Crew Duty Time
The comments of the Station Commander at Aldergrove (and also as SRAFONI responsible for authorising any CDT extension to the maximum allowable) were:
"Crew Duty Considerations- The crew of ZD 576 had flown a task within NI earlier on the 2 Jun. I concur with the Board\'s statement (para 66a), that the decision for the crew to carry out the Inverness sortie "Whilst not ideal, was not unreasonable". It was detachment practise, because of the extended day time in early June at Aldergrove's latitude, to preserve where possible, a "day-on day-off " routine between the 2 crews. Given the routine nature of the day's earlier tasking, it was reasonable, as a one off for a single crew to plan to complete the full day's tasking by extending flying hours within the Crew Duty Time (CDT).
Turning to possible further extensions of CDT, I do not believe that, in the absence of any firm evidence one way or the other, we can usefully speculate on TAPPER's further intentions after arrival at Inverness. At the time of the accident, the crew was operating within CDT extension which had been properly sought and granted (para 30b of the BOI), and fatigue was unlikely to have contributed to the cause of the accident."
Not surprisingly, since it would have been a major criticism of flying supervision at RAF Aldergrove, neither of the Air Marshals disagrees with the Station Commander's statement. In his book “Chinook Crash” the author Steuart Campbell also picked up this point impling that Tapper was acting alone by failing properly to take account of CDT on some sort of renegade mission - in fact nothing would have been further from the truth - both 230 Sqn and Aldergrove Operations would have been aware of the tasking and CDT issues (and if they were not they were failing in their duty) as would the JATOC. If supervisors had been unhappy with Tapper's plans they could have stopped them at any time, even allowing for the fact that Tapper was "self-authorising" - itself a carefully supervised delegation of authority from above.
Outbrief
In his comments on the lack of a formal outbrief the Stn Cdr Aldergrove commented:
I agree with the Board that, although Flt Lt Tapper filed to outbrief iaw the orders that were in force at the time he made best efforts to make details of his planning available. The planning of the sortie was clearly meticulous and indeed this evidence was of great use to the Board. I agree the lack of an outbriefing had no relevance to the accident.
This position was even confirmed by AVM Day who wrote:
….like the Board , I conclude that the crew’s outbriefing procedure at RAF Aldergrove had no relevance to the accident.
As I have said so many times before I believe that there are far more facts supporting an airworthiness or engineering dimension to this accident than there are hypotheses supporting aircrew error. I wish that PPRuNe contributors would look to, and hopefully support, these aspects – for which there is a lot of information now on this thread than going over old ground.
I see that the thread has started once again to go back over old ground.
Can I remind you what the Board actually said about the weather, crew duty time and the lack of an outbrief.
Weather
At para 42 the BoI commented:
42. Weather - The Board considered that the weather information available to the crew at RAF Aldergrove prior to flight was comprehensive and adequate for the task, and the Board was content that the crew had considered the weather relevant to their flight. The Board then considered the suitability of the forecast and actual weather for the VFR flight planned by the crew. The weather documentation faxed to the crew indicated that conditions entirely suitable for helicopter low level VFR flight would prevail over the greater portion of their route, but that over coastal areas there would be an occasional risk of less favourable but acceptable conditions, and an isolated risk of conditions sufficiently poor to preclude VFR flight. These indications were reflected in the associated TAFs and METARs. Along the crews planned route, these occasional and isolated conditions would only have been expected in the area of the Mull of Kintyre, with a specific risk of a 30% probability of weather below VFR limits being forecast for Machrihanish. In the opinion of the Board, a forecast of a 30% probability of en-route weather below VFR limits was not sufficient to preclude an attempt at a VFR flight (my underlining). However, a suitable bad weather contingency plan would have been required. This might have been a VFR diversion around the bad weather, a VFR return to the point of departure, or a pre-planned climb and conversion to IFR flight (my underlining). The possibility of a lightning strike affecting the aircraft was also considered by the Board, but as there were no reports of lightning activity in the area, and no evidence of a lightning strike was found in the technical investigation, it was discounted. Similarly, the Board also considered the part that turbulence may have played in the accident and, as the aftercast indicates that the turbulence in the area was only moderate, the Board concluded that it could have provided no more than a distraction to the crew, particularly when flying in IMC. However, as the actual weather in the area of the crash site at the time of the accident was very poor, with very low cloud bases and low visibilities, the Board concluded that weather was a contributory factor in the accident.
The weather also gets discussed in Stn Cdr Odihams’ alternative view of the accident - part of the BOI, which was:
An Alternative View
2. In looking for alternative causes I have no new evidence to call upon, and all I can do is put a different emphasis on factors already considered by the Board. By working “forward” from the departure point, I conclude it is highly probable that rather than electing to climb over the Mull the crew saw the coast and decided to continue VFR to the west of the Mull Peninsular. The evidence of the yachtsman who saw the aircraft about 2 -3 nm SW of the Mull gives a good idea of the weather and the aircraft’s height and attitude just before the crash. At about 17-30, only 30 minutes before the crash, the yachtsman then about ¾ mile from the Mull reported that the lighthouse and the cloud covering the land behind the lighthouse were clearly visible. Just before the accident the same man, now 2 to 3 miles from the Mull, reported that the aircraft was straight and level at a height of between 2-400 ft well below cloud level. He assessed cloud cover as 80% and the visibility as about 1nm, limited by haze. He also reported the cloud as structured which, in aircrew terminology may mean layered. After the aircraft passed the yachtsman any deductions about what happened become more speculative but I believe that given the reported weather, the crew saw the Mull and it was this sighting that prompted the Waypoint (WP) change at 1.75 km.
3. This WP change is crucial in trying to understand what the crew intended to do. If they had intended to abort at this stage and climb over the Mull despite the difficulty, which would have been so obvious to them, of clearing the high ground they would not have selected the Corran WP. Firstly, it removed from them the only easily interpretable information about the location of the high ground. Secondly, it was of little practical value; the crew would not have been able to climb to SA on track to Corran, in the hope of reverting to low level VFR, because of the forecast level of the 4ºC isotherm. If they intended to climb over the Mull then only sensible option would have been to keep the lighthouse WP on until well clear of it and then to select the chosen diversion airfield. On the other hand, selection of the Corran WP was entirely appropriate if the intention was to follow the western coast of the Mull Peninsular and regain the planned track at the first convenient opportunity. In arriving at this alternative scenario I am now faced with the same problem that faced the Board - how did the aircraft get to around 500 ft, at 150 kts IAS with a ROC of approx 1000ft per minute, which are the computed starting parameters of the final 18 seconds of flight?
4. Whilst tackling this issue the Board were unable to totally discount the following factors:
a. Spatial disorientation or visual illusion.
b. An unregistered technical malfunction.
c. Human factors.
Any of these, or a combination of them, could, in my view, have sufficiently distracted the crew from the task of turning away from the Mull to cause them both to inadvertently enter cloud and then to fail to take the correct procedure for an emergency climb in a timely manner. The Board consider engine control system malfunctions and it is particularly relevant to note that at this stage of the Chinook Mk II's service spurious ENG FAIL captions, lasting on average 7-8 seconds, were an increasingly frequent occurrence. These are now well understood but at the time they were not. Had such an indication occurred it would have caused crew considerable concern particularly as they were over the water with no obvious area for an emergency landing. Such a warning would also have required an urgent and very careful check of engine instruments and FRCs.
I also quoted this last paragraph at thread item 1788 above
Crew Duty Time
The comments of the Station Commander at Aldergrove (and also as SRAFONI responsible for authorising any CDT extension to the maximum allowable) were:
"Crew Duty Considerations- The crew of ZD 576 had flown a task within NI earlier on the 2 Jun. I concur with the Board\'s statement (para 66a), that the decision for the crew to carry out the Inverness sortie "Whilst not ideal, was not unreasonable". It was detachment practise, because of the extended day time in early June at Aldergrove's latitude, to preserve where possible, a "day-on day-off " routine between the 2 crews. Given the routine nature of the day's earlier tasking, it was reasonable, as a one off for a single crew to plan to complete the full day's tasking by extending flying hours within the Crew Duty Time (CDT).
Turning to possible further extensions of CDT, I do not believe that, in the absence of any firm evidence one way or the other, we can usefully speculate on TAPPER's further intentions after arrival at Inverness. At the time of the accident, the crew was operating within CDT extension which had been properly sought and granted (para 30b of the BOI), and fatigue was unlikely to have contributed to the cause of the accident."
Not surprisingly, since it would have been a major criticism of flying supervision at RAF Aldergrove, neither of the Air Marshals disagrees with the Station Commander's statement. In his book “Chinook Crash” the author Steuart Campbell also picked up this point impling that Tapper was acting alone by failing properly to take account of CDT on some sort of renegade mission - in fact nothing would have been further from the truth - both 230 Sqn and Aldergrove Operations would have been aware of the tasking and CDT issues (and if they were not they were failing in their duty) as would the JATOC. If supervisors had been unhappy with Tapper's plans they could have stopped them at any time, even allowing for the fact that Tapper was "self-authorising" - itself a carefully supervised delegation of authority from above.
Outbrief
In his comments on the lack of a formal outbrief the Stn Cdr Aldergrove commented:
I agree with the Board that, although Flt Lt Tapper filed to outbrief iaw the orders that were in force at the time he made best efforts to make details of his planning available. The planning of the sortie was clearly meticulous and indeed this evidence was of great use to the Board. I agree the lack of an outbriefing had no relevance to the accident.
This position was even confirmed by AVM Day who wrote:
….like the Board , I conclude that the crew’s outbriefing procedure at RAF Aldergrove had no relevance to the accident.
As I have said so many times before I believe that there are far more facts supporting an airworthiness or engineering dimension to this accident than there are hypotheses supporting aircrew error. I wish that PPRuNe contributors would look to, and hopefully support, these aspects – for which there is a lot of information now on this thread than going over old ground.
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Walter Kennedy
Have you read my previous postings which referred to a radar recording at Prestwick?
I have read them and I have answered them
An article by a reputable journalist implied that the a/c was observed sufficiently close to the Mull to conclude that the last part of its flight was very much straight in.
As I previously wrote I made the video recording of the radar replay for the BOI and there was NO track showing.
The interesting thing is that the very existence of this recording has been denied by many on this thread and yet the journalist is adamant that his contact was in a position to know.
Who do you prefer to believe a journalist or a professional Air Traffic Controller? Perhaps your journo friend might care to identify his 'source'. I'd be keenly interested to discuss this with them on a professional level.
It is typical of the lack of positive feedback on this thread that no one mentioned that there had been a radar at Macrihanish – all the learned contributors mentioning only major sites nowhere near as being the only radars in the area.
As stated there was no radar at Mac at the time, the base was on a care and maintenance basis.
One would have thought that, with the sometimes intense air activity in the area (eg when exercises held) that there would be low level coverage.
Uuuumm, what intense air activity would this be then? The odd Hawk going low level at Gigha Island?
BD
Have you read my previous postings which referred to a radar recording at Prestwick?
I have read them and I have answered them
An article by a reputable journalist implied that the a/c was observed sufficiently close to the Mull to conclude that the last part of its flight was very much straight in.
As I previously wrote I made the video recording of the radar replay for the BOI and there was NO track showing.
The interesting thing is that the very existence of this recording has been denied by many on this thread and yet the journalist is adamant that his contact was in a position to know.
Who do you prefer to believe a journalist or a professional Air Traffic Controller? Perhaps your journo friend might care to identify his 'source'. I'd be keenly interested to discuss this with them on a professional level.
It is typical of the lack of positive feedback on this thread that no one mentioned that there had been a radar at Macrihanish – all the learned contributors mentioning only major sites nowhere near as being the only radars in the area.
As stated there was no radar at Mac at the time, the base was on a care and maintenance basis.
One would have thought that, with the sometimes intense air activity in the area (eg when exercises held) that there would be low level coverage.
Uuuumm, what intense air activity would this be then? The odd Hawk going low level at Gigha Island?
BD
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Originally Posted by chevvron
I'm still of the opinion that a contributory cause was the lack of radar cover at low level in the area.
Macrihanish radar had been withdrawn about 2 months previously; the crew would know this and rather than fly IMC without radar above safety altitude in an area where there might be other traffic doing the same thing, they elected to stay VMC below. Of course the official inquiry would cover up this fact to cover their superiors from any blame (as far as I can recall, RAF Macrihanish still operated, it was just the radar that had been terminated, probably to re-site it elsewhere).
Macrihanish radar had been withdrawn about 2 months previously; the crew would know this and rather than fly IMC without radar above safety altitude in an area where there might be other traffic doing the same thing, they elected to stay VMC below. Of course the official inquiry would cover up this fact to cover their superiors from any blame (as far as I can recall, RAF Macrihanish still operated, it was just the radar that had been terminated, probably to re-site it elsewhere).
I write as an ex Scottish Military controller of 7.5 years experience of the unit, including during the time of the accident and who's neighbour was the duty controller at the time of the incident.
BD
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cazatou
Please do comment on John Blakeley's excellent response, to your attempt to imply (with little basis in fact) criticisism of the crew.
- "In the opinion of the Board, a forecast of a 30% probability of en-route weather below VFR limits was not sufficient to preclude an attempt at a VFR flight (my underlining). However, a suitable bad weather contingency plan would have been required."
- "….like the Board , I conclude that the crew’s outbriefing procedure at RAF Aldergrove had no relevance to the accident.
etc. etc. etc.....
You may care to respond to my earlier posting also???
Please do comment on John Blakeley's excellent response, to your attempt to imply (with little basis in fact) criticisism of the crew.
one has to question whether the decision to conduct the flight in that way was a sound decision.
t is ironic that the failure to conduct the required "outbrief" precluded the possibility of this being reviewed. Moreover, it also precluded any review of the crew duty considerations and its potential effect on aircraft availability should the aircraft be forced to nightstop outside the Province.
Today 13:39
Today 13:39
etc. etc. etc.....
You may care to respond to my earlier posting also???
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Cazatou
I was illustrating the kind of cooperation that existed using a pertinent example (ie NI).
CIA were the obvious/only source for the trigger and it would have been impossible for the INLA to have got hold of one; it would have been obvious to the CIA what it had been used for after the event, but they did not protest – I have no idea of the extent of cooperation in that case beyond that they must have supplied the trigger.
I am aware of Mr Neave’s history in intelligence and his respect by many – including Mrs Thatcher. However, he was determined to shake up the intelligence depts because of his perception that they were doing a lousy job – he had the names for the replacement heads of both MI5 and MI6 ready – his death came so closely after choosing to do this and just before he could execute it that there had to be a connection – there are plenty of quotes from politicians suggesting that the establishment would like to wash its hands of NI and not reinforce it with strong new measures. Remember that the team on board ZD576 were not in favour of major concessions to the IRA and in fact were on their way to planning a more aggressive campaign – a very similar situation, I suggest.
Just for the record, the official version had it that the INLA did it which, in my opinion, is farcial:
The amateurish outfit was so thoroughly infiltrated at the time that, to quote one source, they could not have passed wind without the British army knowing; I cannot see how that mob could have gotten access to his car (the bomb was placed in it expertly) inside the parliaments secure underground car park. Think about it.
"A reputable journalist"? – see my reply to BDiONU following.
BDiONU
With your experience I wonder if you would like to comment on the (apparently) incomplete radio dialogue between ZD576 and Scottish Military – why was there no answer to its (first and last) call?
Radio hams have observed Scot Mil changing transmitters during dialogues – is it possible that there was a response recorded on a different channel that has been overlooked?
If such a test of a new system was planned, would it have been a big deal to arrange low level coverage with equipment other than the large fixed sites or bring the old one back on? I believe that even the aerospace industry can organise that for themselves.
Regarding the article about the radar track: this was written very soon after the crash and would be unlikely to have been in support of any deep conjecture, more like just an immediate witness statement. The journo’s other work is extensive and in major publications over a long period.Whereas you wrote <<, what intense air activity would this be then? The odd Hawk going low level at Gigha Island?>> - having gone through transcripts of a/a and a/g comms during American/NATO exercises including helos at low level in that very area, I am very surprised at your comment and, on the strength of this would believe the above mentioned journalist over this air traffic controller.
I was illustrating the kind of cooperation that existed using a pertinent example (ie NI).
CIA were the obvious/only source for the trigger and it would have been impossible for the INLA to have got hold of one; it would have been obvious to the CIA what it had been used for after the event, but they did not protest – I have no idea of the extent of cooperation in that case beyond that they must have supplied the trigger.
I am aware of Mr Neave’s history in intelligence and his respect by many – including Mrs Thatcher. However, he was determined to shake up the intelligence depts because of his perception that they were doing a lousy job – he had the names for the replacement heads of both MI5 and MI6 ready – his death came so closely after choosing to do this and just before he could execute it that there had to be a connection – there are plenty of quotes from politicians suggesting that the establishment would like to wash its hands of NI and not reinforce it with strong new measures. Remember that the team on board ZD576 were not in favour of major concessions to the IRA and in fact were on their way to planning a more aggressive campaign – a very similar situation, I suggest.
Just for the record, the official version had it that the INLA did it which, in my opinion, is farcial:
The amateurish outfit was so thoroughly infiltrated at the time that, to quote one source, they could not have passed wind without the British army knowing; I cannot see how that mob could have gotten access to his car (the bomb was placed in it expertly) inside the parliaments secure underground car park. Think about it.
"A reputable journalist"? – see my reply to BDiONU following.
BDiONU
With your experience I wonder if you would like to comment on the (apparently) incomplete radio dialogue between ZD576 and Scottish Military – why was there no answer to its (first and last) call?
Radio hams have observed Scot Mil changing transmitters during dialogues – is it possible that there was a response recorded on a different channel that has been overlooked?
If such a test of a new system was planned, would it have been a big deal to arrange low level coverage with equipment other than the large fixed sites or bring the old one back on? I believe that even the aerospace industry can organise that for themselves.
Regarding the article about the radar track: this was written very soon after the crash and would be unlikely to have been in support of any deep conjecture, more like just an immediate witness statement. The journo’s other work is extensive and in major publications over a long period.Whereas you wrote <<, what intense air activity would this be then? The odd Hawk going low level at Gigha Island?>> - having gone through transcripts of a/a and a/g comms during American/NATO exercises including helos at low level in that very area, I am very surprised at your comment and, on the strength of this would believe the above mentioned journalist over this air traffic controller.
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John Blakeley
Crew Duty Time
You quoted
<<The comments of the Station Commander at Aldergrove (and also as SRAFONI responsible for authorising any CDT extension to the maximum allowable) were:
"Crew Duty Considerations- … At the time of the accident, the crew was operating within CDT extension which had been properly sought and granted (para 30b of the BOI …">>
Just to clarify this, the CDT extension granted here was only from 7 hrs to 8 hrs – to quote from one of the inquiries (AVM Day?)
<<… . So when they set out from Aldergrove to fly to Inverness, they had flown 5 hours 40 minutes and they had to finish flying by the 8 hour point or they had to get the Senior Royal Air Force Officer, Northern Ireland, Group Captain Wedge's authority to extend to 10 hours. There is no doubt the 10 hours would have allowed them to get to Inverness and back but the 8 hours did not …>>
I was present at the FAI when the Station Commander was replying to questions on this issue – he seemed to be making it very clear that no such extension had been asked for.
Crew Duty Time
You quoted
<<The comments of the Station Commander at Aldergrove (and also as SRAFONI responsible for authorising any CDT extension to the maximum allowable) were:
"Crew Duty Considerations- … At the time of the accident, the crew was operating within CDT extension which had been properly sought and granted (para 30b of the BOI …">>
Just to clarify this, the CDT extension granted here was only from 7 hrs to 8 hrs – to quote from one of the inquiries (AVM Day?)
<<… . So when they set out from Aldergrove to fly to Inverness, they had flown 5 hours 40 minutes and they had to finish flying by the 8 hour point or they had to get the Senior Royal Air Force Officer, Northern Ireland, Group Captain Wedge's authority to extend to 10 hours. There is no doubt the 10 hours would have allowed them to get to Inverness and back but the 8 hours did not …>>
I was present at the FAI when the Station Commander was replying to questions on this issue – he seemed to be making it very clear that no such extension had been asked for.
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Walter Kennedy
"With your experience I wonder if you would like to comment on the (apparently) incomplete radio dialogue between ZD576 and Scottish Military – why was there no answer to its (first and last) call?"
My colleague and next door neighbour was the duty controller. He did not hear the single call made by the aircraft. No reason could be determined, he just didn't hear it, it was only discovered when the radio tapes were replayed. The rules are that aircraft should make 3 transmissions before assuming that there is no RT contact.
"Radio hams have observed Scot Mil changing transmitters during dialogues"
Hhhhmmmm, Due to the large area of coverage Scot Mil transmitters and receivers are generally on two legs (two geographically distant places to give good coverage of the frequency). To give redundancy there is always an A and a back up B tx/rx and in the event of failure they're switched. The ATC controller has no method of selecting an individual leg nor of changing over the A and B tx/rx. It is conceivable that they could switch from A to B due to a failure but this would be transparent to the controller. Irrespective it is the frequency itself which is recorded.
"is it possible that there was a response recorded on a different channel that has been overlooked?"
No, all channels were examined.
"Regarding the article about the radar track: this was written very soon after the crash and would be unlikely to have been in support of any deep conjecture, more like just an immediate witness statement."
By whom? The only people who would have been able order a viewing of the replay immediately in the aftermath would have been the Distress and Diversion controller or the civil watch supervisor. Obviously whichever engineers set that up would have been able to watch as well. I videoed the replay for the BOI about a month afterwards (as far as I recall).
"The journo’s other work is extensive and in major publications over a long period.Whereas you wrote <<, what intense air activity would this be then? The odd Hawk going low level at Gigha Island?>> - having gone through transcripts of a/a and a/g comms during American/NATO exercises including helos at low level in that very area, I am very surprised at your comment"
Why are you surprised at my comment? I write as a highly experienced ATC who controlled in that area for 7.5 years and I am telling you that there was no requirement for a low level ATC service in the area of Mac. There were very few aircraft requesting descent to low level there.
I am curious about how you are able, through reading voice transcripts, to determine the position of the aircraft you write about? Yes there were many large scale JMC exercises at the time (about 3 a year) but they worked their way around Scotland, generally out of Rosyth and ending up in the Clyde.
On a final note about providing low level radar coverage in Scotland. There are vast tracts of Scotland which have no radar coverage, are you seriously suggesting that radar should be installed everywhere, on the off chance that there might just be an aircraft requiring ATC to give a low level descent once or twice a year?
"and, on the strength of this would believe the above mentioned journalist over this air traffic controller."
Oh I see, so I'm a liar. Well this ends my cooperation in trying to give you rational explanations from my professional experience to your delusional scribblings.
BD
"With your experience I wonder if you would like to comment on the (apparently) incomplete radio dialogue between ZD576 and Scottish Military – why was there no answer to its (first and last) call?"
My colleague and next door neighbour was the duty controller. He did not hear the single call made by the aircraft. No reason could be determined, he just didn't hear it, it was only discovered when the radio tapes were replayed. The rules are that aircraft should make 3 transmissions before assuming that there is no RT contact.
"Radio hams have observed Scot Mil changing transmitters during dialogues"
Hhhhmmmm, Due to the large area of coverage Scot Mil transmitters and receivers are generally on two legs (two geographically distant places to give good coverage of the frequency). To give redundancy there is always an A and a back up B tx/rx and in the event of failure they're switched. The ATC controller has no method of selecting an individual leg nor of changing over the A and B tx/rx. It is conceivable that they could switch from A to B due to a failure but this would be transparent to the controller. Irrespective it is the frequency itself which is recorded.
"is it possible that there was a response recorded on a different channel that has been overlooked?"
No, all channels were examined.
"Regarding the article about the radar track: this was written very soon after the crash and would be unlikely to have been in support of any deep conjecture, more like just an immediate witness statement."
By whom? The only people who would have been able order a viewing of the replay immediately in the aftermath would have been the Distress and Diversion controller or the civil watch supervisor. Obviously whichever engineers set that up would have been able to watch as well. I videoed the replay for the BOI about a month afterwards (as far as I recall).
"The journo’s other work is extensive and in major publications over a long period.Whereas you wrote <<, what intense air activity would this be then? The odd Hawk going low level at Gigha Island?>> - having gone through transcripts of a/a and a/g comms during American/NATO exercises including helos at low level in that very area, I am very surprised at your comment"
Why are you surprised at my comment? I write as a highly experienced ATC who controlled in that area for 7.5 years and I am telling you that there was no requirement for a low level ATC service in the area of Mac. There were very few aircraft requesting descent to low level there.
I am curious about how you are able, through reading voice transcripts, to determine the position of the aircraft you write about? Yes there were many large scale JMC exercises at the time (about 3 a year) but they worked their way around Scotland, generally out of Rosyth and ending up in the Clyde.
On a final note about providing low level radar coverage in Scotland. There are vast tracts of Scotland which have no radar coverage, are you seriously suggesting that radar should be installed everywhere, on the off chance that there might just be an aircraft requiring ATC to give a low level descent once or twice a year?
"and, on the strength of this would believe the above mentioned journalist over this air traffic controller."
Oh I see, so I'm a liar. Well this ends my cooperation in trying to give you rational explanations from my professional experience to your delusional scribblings.
BD
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If, why, where, shoulda, coulda, woulda..........All this speculation is mind numbing. The fact remains that the reputation and good name of these two fine pilots has been sullied by a BOI acting totally inappropriately. Lets not cloud the overwhelming desire for justice with all these "smoke and mirror" theories, most of which are pure conjecture.
Use your energies to fight the wrong that has been done !!!
Use your energies to fight the wrong that has been done !!!
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Well said, KENNYR.
I, too am fed up with the endless waste of bandwidth on useless speculation, for that is what it is. Why don't the speculators put a sock in it and let the campaign try to get a review.
I, too am fed up with the endless waste of bandwidth on useless speculation, for that is what it is. Why don't the speculators put a sock in it and let the campaign try to get a review.
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FJJP
The campaign has had 11 years.
Its strategy appears rely on nothing being known sufficiently to justify the verdict in parallel with a fruitless effort to blame some technical malfunction (for which there was no evidence in this case) in a complex beast which would be hard to achieve even if it was the case. This strategy has the unfortunate effect on interested parties in that they fear any in depth analysis of other aspects of this flight (eg navigation) may spoil this strategy – self censorship, if you like.
All that could be hoped for is the benefit of the doubt being given to the pilots which, while achieving the prime objective of the campaign, would effectively end interest in the case after such a long period of time.
Don’t these pilots deserve better than this?
If they had been tasked to do anything extraordinary that could have had an impact, should this not be established so that they could be clearly exonerated?
If such happened, should not those responsible for this extra tasking be brought to account?
Contributors to this site have the opportunity to establish clearly some basic parameters of the flight that may help others not of an aviation background continue an investigation should this be warranted. To date, the most basic parameters have been left confused.
The campaign has had 11 years.
Its strategy appears rely on nothing being known sufficiently to justify the verdict in parallel with a fruitless effort to blame some technical malfunction (for which there was no evidence in this case) in a complex beast which would be hard to achieve even if it was the case. This strategy has the unfortunate effect on interested parties in that they fear any in depth analysis of other aspects of this flight (eg navigation) may spoil this strategy – self censorship, if you like.
All that could be hoped for is the benefit of the doubt being given to the pilots which, while achieving the prime objective of the campaign, would effectively end interest in the case after such a long period of time.
Don’t these pilots deserve better than this?
If they had been tasked to do anything extraordinary that could have had an impact, should this not be established so that they could be clearly exonerated?
If such happened, should not those responsible for this extra tasking be brought to account?
Contributors to this site have the opportunity to establish clearly some basic parameters of the flight that may help others not of an aviation background continue an investigation should this be warranted. To date, the most basic parameters have been left confused.
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They were not tasked to do anything extraordinary, when we walked out to the aircraft, Jon was not unhappy at the prospect of spending a night in scotland. He didn't mention trying to get a crewduty extension to get back to aldergrove!! The only complaint going was the order to use the HC2 aircraft. A round of golf was a distinct possibility.....
PS. Those who say the sortie should not have even started because of a lack of icing clearance should consider this. The Puma has no clearance, does this mean it should never fly in winter??? Get real, it wasn't just an icing clearance, I THINK, it was an IF clearance that was required. Memory fading a bit, can anyone back that up?
PS. Those who say the sortie should not have even started because of a lack of icing clearance should consider this. The Puma has no clearance, does this mean it should never fly in winter??? Get real, it wasn't just an icing clearance, I THINK, it was an IF clearance that was required. Memory fading a bit, can anyone back that up?
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Circles
Walter Kennedy,
You could not be further off the mark with your comments at post 1822. There is ample evidence that the Chinook fleet and this aircraft in particular was suffering a wide range of technical malfunctions – the cause of which was both transient in nature and of unknown explanation – see the comments from Stn Cdr Odiham I posted a few days ago if you want an example from an operator rather than an engineer. I also suggest, given your obvious interest and persistence, that you take the time to read my full engineering report from Oct 2003 – it is on the main web site.
Since I wrote that report, which has never been refuted or responded to by MOD, even more evidence is coming to light. Thanks to the FOIA we now have written proof that a “no fault found” engine over-temp incident on ZD 576 only two weeks before the accident was one of the reasons why Boscombe Down suspended the flight trials – indeed they quote 4 in-service incidents as having driven the decision, not anything that was happening on the trials themselves. The Director of Test and Evaluation writing to MOD just after the accident on 6 June, but with a letter whose origins went right back to the Issue 1 CA Release in Nov 1993, said:
"The unquantifiable risks identified at the Interim CA Release (Nov 93) stage may not in themselves have changed but some have become more clearly defined by events (and he lists 4 in-service incidents to back this up) to the extent that we now consider the consequences of the risks and probability of an occurrence to be UNACCEPTABLE. (my bold). This is not a comment relating to just BD test flying it is a general warning which is made absolutely clear in paragraph 5 of the BD letter where the author "strongly recommends" that the addressee (MOD Air) makes BD's concerns known to the RAF.”
Sadly these comments and any action taken by the RAF (if there was any) came too late to save ZD 576. Needless to say none of these issues came out at a BOI which by its own admission was only really looking for an aircrew cause for the accident!
I can only repeat what I said at post 1788, and I am sorry to have to do so:
There are only two indisputable facts:
The aircraft crashed into the Mull
Nobody knows why - and this includes MOD and even the Senior Reviewing Officers who found the pilots Grossly Negligent - something the Senior Reviewing Officer admits is the case.
MOD and the Reviewing Officers rely on conjecture and hypotheses to justify their verdict, but do not acknowledge the issues relating to the airworthiness of the aircraft and its fitness for purpose at all - yet these must have been well known to all involved. If there had been fuller TORs or even a cursory examination of all of the issues raised by the BoI the Reviewing Officers could not have come to a conclusion of pilot error let alone one breaking the rules of AP3207 of Gross Negligence. That it would not suit MOD to open Pandora's Box covering the introduction to service of the Mk2 is now clear - and if you want the next example just look at the Mk3.
Yes the campaign has gone on for 11 years, but every single independent look at the MOD decision has shown that both the unacceptability of their verdict and the serious flaws in the way in which they have used the evidence they are prepared to look at (bearing in mind that there is much that they have ignored). I am quite happy to “prove” the case for a potential technical malfunction, but I have not seen a single contributor to support your theory that they had an additional task – but even this, if true, would not invalidate any of my technical malfunction arguments.
However, despite what you might like to have happen the fight to clear the pilot’s name on the basis that there are other, more factually based, possible explanations for the accident is the only game in town. Given what we now know no form of aircrew error verdict stands up to close examination and Gross Negligence, with the “criminal” connotation that goes with such a verdict, is a verdict that has to be withdrawn by MOD if all of the families involved are to have "closure" – until we have time travel we will never know the truth of what happened on that fateful day so none of us could ever hope to achieve the ultimate aim of a full and true explanation of the cause, of this accident. If we could my money would not be on aircrew error!
PS: Apologies to Cazatou for incorrectly spelling his name last time.
You could not be further off the mark with your comments at post 1822. There is ample evidence that the Chinook fleet and this aircraft in particular was suffering a wide range of technical malfunctions – the cause of which was both transient in nature and of unknown explanation – see the comments from Stn Cdr Odiham I posted a few days ago if you want an example from an operator rather than an engineer. I also suggest, given your obvious interest and persistence, that you take the time to read my full engineering report from Oct 2003 – it is on the main web site.
Since I wrote that report, which has never been refuted or responded to by MOD, even more evidence is coming to light. Thanks to the FOIA we now have written proof that a “no fault found” engine over-temp incident on ZD 576 only two weeks before the accident was one of the reasons why Boscombe Down suspended the flight trials – indeed they quote 4 in-service incidents as having driven the decision, not anything that was happening on the trials themselves. The Director of Test and Evaluation writing to MOD just after the accident on 6 June, but with a letter whose origins went right back to the Issue 1 CA Release in Nov 1993, said:
"The unquantifiable risks identified at the Interim CA Release (Nov 93) stage may not in themselves have changed but some have become more clearly defined by events (and he lists 4 in-service incidents to back this up) to the extent that we now consider the consequences of the risks and probability of an occurrence to be UNACCEPTABLE. (my bold). This is not a comment relating to just BD test flying it is a general warning which is made absolutely clear in paragraph 5 of the BD letter where the author "strongly recommends" that the addressee (MOD Air) makes BD's concerns known to the RAF.”
Sadly these comments and any action taken by the RAF (if there was any) came too late to save ZD 576. Needless to say none of these issues came out at a BOI which by its own admission was only really looking for an aircrew cause for the accident!
I can only repeat what I said at post 1788, and I am sorry to have to do so:
There are only two indisputable facts:
The aircraft crashed into the Mull
Nobody knows why - and this includes MOD and even the Senior Reviewing Officers who found the pilots Grossly Negligent - something the Senior Reviewing Officer admits is the case.
MOD and the Reviewing Officers rely on conjecture and hypotheses to justify their verdict, but do not acknowledge the issues relating to the airworthiness of the aircraft and its fitness for purpose at all - yet these must have been well known to all involved. If there had been fuller TORs or even a cursory examination of all of the issues raised by the BoI the Reviewing Officers could not have come to a conclusion of pilot error let alone one breaking the rules of AP3207 of Gross Negligence. That it would not suit MOD to open Pandora's Box covering the introduction to service of the Mk2 is now clear - and if you want the next example just look at the Mk3.
Yes the campaign has gone on for 11 years, but every single independent look at the MOD decision has shown that both the unacceptability of their verdict and the serious flaws in the way in which they have used the evidence they are prepared to look at (bearing in mind that there is much that they have ignored). I am quite happy to “prove” the case for a potential technical malfunction, but I have not seen a single contributor to support your theory that they had an additional task – but even this, if true, would not invalidate any of my technical malfunction arguments.
However, despite what you might like to have happen the fight to clear the pilot’s name on the basis that there are other, more factually based, possible explanations for the accident is the only game in town. Given what we now know no form of aircrew error verdict stands up to close examination and Gross Negligence, with the “criminal” connotation that goes with such a verdict, is a verdict that has to be withdrawn by MOD if all of the families involved are to have "closure" – until we have time travel we will never know the truth of what happened on that fateful day so none of us could ever hope to achieve the ultimate aim of a full and true explanation of the cause, of this accident. If we could my money would not be on aircrew error!
PS: Apologies to Cazatou for incorrectly spelling his name last time.
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Tandemrotor,
"A suitable bad weather contingency plan would have been required"
As there was no outbrief we do not know what their "bad weather contingency plan" was.
"A suitable bad weather contingency plan would have been required"
As there was no outbrief we do not know what their "bad weather contingency plan" was.
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walter kennedy
The reason that people do not believe the journalists "evidence" of a radar track is quite simple; he did not see the recording himself - it is hearsay gleaned from someone who CLAIMED to have seen the tape.
The recordings were subjected to expert analysis and also reviewed by the BOI members. THERE WAS NO TRACK.
The reason that people do not believe the journalists "evidence" of a radar track is quite simple; he did not see the recording himself - it is hearsay gleaned from someone who CLAIMED to have seen the tape.
The recordings were subjected to expert analysis and also reviewed by the BOI members. THERE WAS NO TRACK.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Business as Usual
Hi everyone,
Just to keep you all up to date with Campaign matters. Regrettably, I have to inform you that our Chair, Mr James Arbuthnot has had to step down from the position. This is due to a perceived conflict to his role of Chair of the Defence Select Committee. With his permission, I give you sight of his E-mail to members of the Campaign:
I have decided, with great sadness and reluctance, that I must step down as Chairman of the Mull of Kintyre Group. This is because the House Authorities have said that my chairmanship of the Group was incompatible with Chairmanship of the Defence Select Committee.
I am delighted to say that Lord O'Neill of Clackmannan has agreed to take on the role, and there will be no gap. He was the first Parliamentarian to run with the issue, he was one of the all-party delegation to go to see the Prime Minister and it is entirely appropriate that he should be in the lead on this important campaign. He will have my complete support.
The campaign will, one day, succeed. There are two reasons for this. One is that, in the end, justice does come to the fore. All our human instincts cry out for injustice to be righted and, unlike other things, that never diminishes with time. And the other reason is that the people behind this campaign are outstanding in their quality and their determination. Already the opinion of the world is that we are right, and we only have to change the opinion of the Ministry of Defence. With perseverance, we will achieve even that.
With very best wishes,
James
I should like to publicly thank Mr Arbuthnot for his support, guidance and determination to succeed in having the disgraceful slur of negligence removed from the reputation of Flt Lts Jon Tapper and Rick Cook. It has been a great honour, privilege and pleasure to be a part of the Mull of Kintyre Group, under his leadership.
I look forward to working with Lord O’Neill of Clackmannan who, I know, has the same level of commitment to the Campaign. We remain in good hands, and will continue to strive for justice.
Updates, as and when.
My best, as always,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Just to keep you all up to date with Campaign matters. Regrettably, I have to inform you that our Chair, Mr James Arbuthnot has had to step down from the position. This is due to a perceived conflict to his role of Chair of the Defence Select Committee. With his permission, I give you sight of his E-mail to members of the Campaign:
I have decided, with great sadness and reluctance, that I must step down as Chairman of the Mull of Kintyre Group. This is because the House Authorities have said that my chairmanship of the Group was incompatible with Chairmanship of the Defence Select Committee.
I am delighted to say that Lord O'Neill of Clackmannan has agreed to take on the role, and there will be no gap. He was the first Parliamentarian to run with the issue, he was one of the all-party delegation to go to see the Prime Minister and it is entirely appropriate that he should be in the lead on this important campaign. He will have my complete support.
The campaign will, one day, succeed. There are two reasons for this. One is that, in the end, justice does come to the fore. All our human instincts cry out for injustice to be righted and, unlike other things, that never diminishes with time. And the other reason is that the people behind this campaign are outstanding in their quality and their determination. Already the opinion of the world is that we are right, and we only have to change the opinion of the Ministry of Defence. With perseverance, we will achieve even that.
With very best wishes,
James
I should like to publicly thank Mr Arbuthnot for his support, guidance and determination to succeed in having the disgraceful slur of negligence removed from the reputation of Flt Lts Jon Tapper and Rick Cook. It has been a great honour, privilege and pleasure to be a part of the Mull of Kintyre Group, under his leadership.
I look forward to working with Lord O’Neill of Clackmannan who, I know, has the same level of commitment to the Campaign. We remain in good hands, and will continue to strive for justice.
Updates, as and when.
My best, as always,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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cazatou
Despite the fact that the lack of outbrief was deemed to have had no relevance to the accident:
Please tell us, if you know, WHY there was no outbrief!
Or are you simply attempting, rather mischeviously perhaps, to suggest that the lack of an outbrief was somehow the fault of the crew??
Are you trying to imply it was indicative of something else??!
Despite the fact that the lack of outbrief was deemed to have had no relevance to the accident:
"….like the Board , I conclude that the crew’s outbriefing procedure at RAF Aldergrove had no relevance to the accident.
Or are you simply attempting, rather mischeviously perhaps, to suggest that the lack of an outbrief was somehow the fault of the crew??
Are you trying to imply it was indicative of something else??!
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Work has distracted me from replying to the MoD.
Anyway, having got around to it I was refreshing my mind of the facts, but it appears that the AAIB report has been removed from the Parliamentary web site ( where it was published as part of HL 25(i)).
Does anyone have a electronic version they could forward to me.
EG
Anyway, having got around to it I was refreshing my mind of the facts, but it appears that the AAIB report has been removed from the Parliamentary web site ( where it was published as part of HL 25(i)).
Does anyone have a electronic version they could forward to me.
EG