D246
I think you’ve found out the hard way that they are not at all tolerant here of looking into any aspects of navigation – they associate anything in that area with supporting the (rotten) verdict. I personally believe that all aspects should have been followed up some time ago and that there is nothing to lose as the strategy of arguing a legal technicality (“beyond any doubt…” etc) or pointing to a spurious technical fault/distraction in such a complex system (without clear evidence) has not borne fruit after 11 long years.
I personally do not believe that pilots of their calibre would have made an “unforced” error in those conditions – which brings me to address one of your statements
<<But these guys were flying at 135kts in mist / cloud in the vicinity of and towards a mountain. Why?>>
But they were not – they would have been in good VFR conditions until the actually entered the mist by which time, as it started just after the shoreline, they would have been in real trouble.
Is it not lamentable that, after 11 years, so many are confused as to the actual weather conditions on that approach to the Mull?
You say you flew SH in NI – did you ever do that route? – if so, are you not familiar with such local conditions that are so common at that time of year in the latter part of the day? The strong (prevailing) wind that formed the ground hugging mist as the ground rose also would have kept the air above the sea on the approach clear of sporadic patches – and that the air was clear between NI coast and the Mull (at low level below the cloud base) is confirmed by witnesses.
The required (timely) turn to the left was moderate (plot their approach on a chart and assume they were going up the coast) and there should have been no need to reduce their speed (which was a normal cruising speed optimum for a ferry flight) had they judged the start of their turn correctly.
The question is surely, what prevented them starting that moderate turn? – only two options are possible:
Tech probs with control or indicators (the politically correct option);
Judgment error as to the distance to go to their intended turning point (apparently taboo here).
I have argued (at length in previous posts) that the window of opportunity for the control/indicator problems was very short and in any case, if they knew where they actually were, distraction alone by spurious indications would not have stopped them avoiding what they would have known lay just ahead (eg if you were doing aeros and were pulling out of a loop with the ground coming up close, is there any indication whatsoever that would distract you from the task of pulling up?).
The judgment question has two aspects:
If they were purely visual and they did not have any clear reference on the (mist shrouded) Mull or any ground detail, then they could have made their approach angle to the shoreline a bit more oblique than it already was – again, this would not have necessarily required a decrease in speed;
The SuperTANS had already let them know that they were approximately (such is the nature of the SuperTANS after a sea crossing) at their turning point and so, if they were having trouble judging visually this would have been a good time to start a left turn – but at this point they made a small steer demand to the right.
If you have flown SH since that time, what can you tell the readers of this thread about Personnel Locator Systems? – how they work? – their initial introduction and evaluation? There’s no big secret about them in other NATO countries (esp in USA) but a big mystery in the UK. Did you realize that the section of US SEALS that were on the Mull at the time of the crash would have had the groundside equipment issued to just about every man? Did you realize that ZD576 would have been one of (if not) the first RAF Chinook (being an HC2 equivalent in this regard to 47D) that could have had the onboard module slotted easily into the Nav racks (via the 1553 bus) automatically displaying range and bearing to any PLS active in the area on the nav DCU as a waypoint? Some of the brown jobs on board would surely have been interested in such a demo and would hardly have objected. Provided the ground equipment was in the correct position, the system is intrinsically accurate and reliable using the principal of a UHF DME – something a helo pilot would perhaps trust above his own visual perception of range? – needed to be activated in the expected location though – ½ a mile up the hill and ….
Just a thought.
They could hardly have been guilty of gross negligence if they were tasked so and the responsibility should have rested with whoever set the test up.