Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Walter, my head isn't in the sand. If you bother to read my particular line (rather than merely regurgitating your theory) you will find that I'm pretty open minded about the cause; I am of the view that there isn't enough evidence to support any of the arguments hence the need for a NPD.
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Beagle
I have been aware of that listing for years - equally, many years ago I posted on this thread that a source in EuroControl told me that, at the time, there was a shortage of codes available in the system back then and that for less common exercises it was the usual practice to use one of the domestic allocation where there was no room for ambiguity (Channel Isles x NW Scotland = no ambiguity) so the list does not rule out 7760 for an exercise - (coincidently?) it means "ground transponders tests/trials" in some ATC systems.
What would have been nice is if someone had noted what the SSR code had been before they got near the Mull - either by having been party to the planning of the sortie or by observing the SSR code on the recordings of the secondary radar returns from Lowther Hill.
Incredibly, it is accepted that no one will ever no what the SSR/squawk code was set to before getting to close proximity to the Mull.
One reliable source is adamant that radar recordings were available at the time, having seen the recording and made comment at the time about the track - but unfortunately not the SSR code. There was no technical reason why Prestwick could not have received such data for much of the way across the sea from NI - you have LOS from Lowther Hill right down to sea level for much of that crossing.
Further, the nature of the selectors for the SSR code are such that "you needed a sledgehammer to move them" (or words to that effect by a loadmaster who wrote a book on this crash) and it would not have been the practice to change codes in a sudden emergency - so the question remains, why the odd SSR code?
Cows
The sand bit was addressing the general crowd on this thread (you collectively).
I have been aware of that listing for years - equally, many years ago I posted on this thread that a source in EuroControl told me that, at the time, there was a shortage of codes available in the system back then and that for less common exercises it was the usual practice to use one of the domestic allocation where there was no room for ambiguity (Channel Isles x NW Scotland = no ambiguity) so the list does not rule out 7760 for an exercise - (coincidently?) it means "ground transponders tests/trials" in some ATC systems.
What would have been nice is if someone had noted what the SSR code had been before they got near the Mull - either by having been party to the planning of the sortie or by observing the SSR code on the recordings of the secondary radar returns from Lowther Hill.
Incredibly, it is accepted that no one will ever no what the SSR/squawk code was set to before getting to close proximity to the Mull.
One reliable source is adamant that radar recordings were available at the time, having seen the recording and made comment at the time about the track - but unfortunately not the SSR code. There was no technical reason why Prestwick could not have received such data for much of the way across the sea from NI - you have LOS from Lowther Hill right down to sea level for much of that crossing.
Further, the nature of the selectors for the SSR code are such that "you needed a sledgehammer to move them" (or words to that effect by a loadmaster who wrote a book on this crash) and it would not have been the practice to change codes in a sudden emergency - so the question remains, why the odd SSR code?
Cows
The sand bit was addressing the general crowd on this thread (you collectively).
Last edited by walter kennedy; 20th Aug 2009 at 09:08. Reason: additional text
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Walter Kennedy wrote:
I don't know the answer to Walter's first two questions but I think I can address the last and the answer is: there were nowhere near enough hours flown to make a positive judgement. Broadly speaking, the target for UK military aircraft is that they should have a catastrophic accident no more than once every million hours of flight (JSP 553, interpreted somewhat for simplicity but not so as to invalidate what I write). Consequently, the target for FADEC-caused catastrophic accidents should also be no more than once every million hours (in fact, rather less, since there are many other potential causes of catastrophic accidents and you wouldn't want the FADECs to use up the whole budget, as it were). Since it is very plausible that FADEC failure could lead directly to a catastrophic accident, we are asking for the FADEC to fail dangerously no more often than once every million hours (probably rather less). To have any confidence that this was being achieved through operational experience, you would need to fly the aircraft for (probably tens of) millions of hours. Our Chinook fleet hasn't managed anything like that and never will.
From time to time, on this thread, I see people apparently suggesting that because no other (dangerous?) FADEC software failures have been observed in the Chinook fleet (I don't know if this is a true claim, incidentally), it could not have been the FADECs that caused the Mull accident. Leaving aside the obvious weakness of this argument, when you're aiming for ultra-reliability you have to operate for a very very very very very long time to demonstrate that ultra-reliability. Nearly always, that's more time than you have in practice.
As far as I'm aware, there is no significant evidence that the FADECs caused the Mull accident. But I'm also not aware of any conclusive evidence that they didn't.
Tony Collins
<<There were important changes to the FADEC code after the Mull crash, and a different CPU used. From NAO report Feb 2000:
"… In September 1998 the Department, with the Royal Air Force’s consent, issued full Controller Aircraft Release for the Chinook Mk2 ...>>
Could you please give us an estimate of how many hours were flown in HC2 Chinooks between the accident date and the first implementation of any of these changes? In other words, how much flying was done subsequent to the crash without any changes to the FADEC system? And, if the amount is sufficient to pass judgement on, how does this compare with expected/satisfactory reliability for a military aircraft?
<<There were important changes to the FADEC code after the Mull crash, and a different CPU used. From NAO report Feb 2000:
"… In September 1998 the Department, with the Royal Air Force’s consent, issued full Controller Aircraft Release for the Chinook Mk2 ...>>
Could you please give us an estimate of how many hours were flown in HC2 Chinooks between the accident date and the first implementation of any of these changes? In other words, how much flying was done subsequent to the crash without any changes to the FADEC system? And, if the amount is sufficient to pass judgement on, how does this compare with expected/satisfactory reliability for a military aircraft?
From time to time, on this thread, I see people apparently suggesting that because no other (dangerous?) FADEC software failures have been observed in the Chinook fleet (I don't know if this is a true claim, incidentally), it could not have been the FADECs that caused the Mull accident. Leaving aside the obvious weakness of this argument, when you're aiming for ultra-reliability you have to operate for a very very very very very long time to demonstrate that ultra-reliability. Nearly always, that's more time than you have in practice.
As far as I'm aware, there is no significant evidence that the FADECs caused the Mull accident. But I'm also not aware of any conclusive evidence that they didn't.
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Squidlord
I think you are missing the point of the recent exchanges on this topic – starting with Cazatou's post which put the “grounding” into perspective in that it was lifted after some fairly minor further checks, trying to counter the spin that the aircraft was somehow not safe for test pilots, even;
Tony Collins countered this by saying that significant changes had been done after the crash – however, the end date he gave was several years later;
so I asked him to quantify this, as the amount of flying done before any such mods were incorporated could either support Cazatou's point or rebut it – and perhaps get this FADEC hysteria into perspective.
<<As far as I'm aware, there is no significant evidence that the FADECs caused the Mull accident.>>
Never mind “significant”, there's none whatsover.
<< But I'm also not aware of any conclusive evidence that they didn't. >>
The data recovered from one of the DECUS (or whatever it was) and the power levels and that dist/time analysis had it that they were slowing down all suggest that FADEC had not caused a problem.
I think you are missing the point of the recent exchanges on this topic – starting with Cazatou's post which put the “grounding” into perspective in that it was lifted after some fairly minor further checks, trying to counter the spin that the aircraft was somehow not safe for test pilots, even;
Tony Collins countered this by saying that significant changes had been done after the crash – however, the end date he gave was several years later;
so I asked him to quantify this, as the amount of flying done before any such mods were incorporated could either support Cazatou's point or rebut it – and perhaps get this FADEC hysteria into perspective.
<<As far as I'm aware, there is no significant evidence that the FADECs caused the Mull accident.>>
Never mind “significant”, there's none whatsover.
<< But I'm also not aware of any conclusive evidence that they didn't. >>
The data recovered from one of the DECUS (or whatever it was) and the power levels and that dist/time analysis had it that they were slowing down all suggest that FADEC had not caused a problem.
and perhaps get this FADEC hysteria into perspective.
Generally, the likes of tucumseh refer to it as one of several examples which demonstrate that the Chinook Mk2 was not airworthy at the time. As far as I can see no-one is claiming more than a possibility that a FADEC failure could have had any influence on the accident.
The clear evidence that the aircraft was not airworthy should have eliminated those responsible for that sad state of affairs from any say in the outcome of the BOI, other than to give evidence as to why they allowed it to be used for this mission against the wishes of the crew.
It is interesting that we see little from JP, caz et al defending their masters on this issue.
Walter
You asked about reliability.
To be able to produce the information you seek MoD would have had to robustly implement their own regulations for investigating faults.
They didn’t.
But, importantly, what we do have is irrefutable evidence of many FADEC failures between CA Release and June 1994. So many that Odiham routinely robbed due to shortages. The sheer number of faults in this 8 month period has increased significance as they occurred;
(a)On a system hosting safety critical software, which was unvalidated and unverified, and hence did not meet the design maturity requirements for acceptance off contract, never mind introduction into Service.
(b)On a system for which MoD was the launch customer.
(c)During a conversion contract (Mk1 > Mk2), meaning there was little practical or historical experience to draw on (exacerbated by the FRCs being woefully inadequate).
Any of the above would require FADEC to be blacklisted (or whatever the RAF calls it). That is, ANY failure or suspected problem in the first xx months (usually 6) is the subject of a mandatory Fault Investigation. I’m sure MoD will be able to provide the MF761s if you ask them. Or perhaps not…………
As I have stated before, in 1991 the funding to maintain the build standard (a fundamental component of airworthiness) was cut, year on year; when the regulations actually demand an increase in funding when new equipment is being introduced. Investigating faults is one of 17 core components of this activity.
All components were affected, but the funding to identify and resolve trend failures was cut altogether, in 1991. (And the trend on FADEC was, of course, notified to PE by Boscombe Down and Users). Of course, this was handily rendered academic when Min(AF) ruled that, on Chinook/Mull, the rules on trend failures do not apply. That is, even if a fault existed on every other Chinook, if it could not be proved it existed on ZD576 then he has deemed it irrelevant to this accident. Only a complete moron would advise him to say this, but as we know……..
Engineering Authorities were instructed to save up fault reports (the MF760s) and only submit omnibus MF760As (requests for an investigation). The ensuing delay obviously created larger holes in that cheese slice. Even if they ignored the instruction the MoD(PE) / AMSO / AML Technical Agency was not given funding anyway. At first, in around 1991, what funding remained was allocated to safety tasks. In time, and no later than early 1993, even safety critical problems were denied funding, eliminating that important slice altogether. The actions of those responsible at first constituted incompetence. But once the consequences were pointed out to them (in short, airworthiness was not being maintained), their response, to cut the funding even further (and initiate disciplinary action against those who complained), amounted to gross negligence, abrogation of duty of care and abuse of power. Pity that particular 2 Star wasn’t called to account for his actions.
You may be familiar with the role of MACE/MACD. When asked about the above, Min(AF) stated that they took over the role of conducting all engineering investigations (as Design Authorities were no longer funded to do so). Suffice to say, he lied. Only a complete fool would have briefed Minister to say this (in a letter to an MP) and, again, illustrates the lengths to which MoD go to hide the truth.
Again, I’ve noted lies MoD have told. The common denominator in most, if not all, their lies is their attempt to hide shortcomings in their implementation of the airworthiness regulations and the process by which the Mk2 entered Service.
Sorry if this doesn’t answer your question, but I don’t think anyone here could answer it accurately. But it would be interesting to see how MoD would reply. Ask them.
Caz - We may not agree on many matters, but sincere condolences.
You asked about reliability.
To be able to produce the information you seek MoD would have had to robustly implement their own regulations for investigating faults.
They didn’t.
But, importantly, what we do have is irrefutable evidence of many FADEC failures between CA Release and June 1994. So many that Odiham routinely robbed due to shortages. The sheer number of faults in this 8 month period has increased significance as they occurred;
(a)On a system hosting safety critical software, which was unvalidated and unverified, and hence did not meet the design maturity requirements for acceptance off contract, never mind introduction into Service.
(b)On a system for which MoD was the launch customer.
(c)During a conversion contract (Mk1 > Mk2), meaning there was little practical or historical experience to draw on (exacerbated by the FRCs being woefully inadequate).
Any of the above would require FADEC to be blacklisted (or whatever the RAF calls it). That is, ANY failure or suspected problem in the first xx months (usually 6) is the subject of a mandatory Fault Investigation. I’m sure MoD will be able to provide the MF761s if you ask them. Or perhaps not…………
As I have stated before, in 1991 the funding to maintain the build standard (a fundamental component of airworthiness) was cut, year on year; when the regulations actually demand an increase in funding when new equipment is being introduced. Investigating faults is one of 17 core components of this activity.
All components were affected, but the funding to identify and resolve trend failures was cut altogether, in 1991. (And the trend on FADEC was, of course, notified to PE by Boscombe Down and Users). Of course, this was handily rendered academic when Min(AF) ruled that, on Chinook/Mull, the rules on trend failures do not apply. That is, even if a fault existed on every other Chinook, if it could not be proved it existed on ZD576 then he has deemed it irrelevant to this accident. Only a complete moron would advise him to say this, but as we know……..
Engineering Authorities were instructed to save up fault reports (the MF760s) and only submit omnibus MF760As (requests for an investigation). The ensuing delay obviously created larger holes in that cheese slice. Even if they ignored the instruction the MoD(PE) / AMSO / AML Technical Agency was not given funding anyway. At first, in around 1991, what funding remained was allocated to safety tasks. In time, and no later than early 1993, even safety critical problems were denied funding, eliminating that important slice altogether. The actions of those responsible at first constituted incompetence. But once the consequences were pointed out to them (in short, airworthiness was not being maintained), their response, to cut the funding even further (and initiate disciplinary action against those who complained), amounted to gross negligence, abrogation of duty of care and abuse of power. Pity that particular 2 Star wasn’t called to account for his actions.
You may be familiar with the role of MACE/MACD. When asked about the above, Min(AF) stated that they took over the role of conducting all engineering investigations (as Design Authorities were no longer funded to do so). Suffice to say, he lied. Only a complete fool would have briefed Minister to say this (in a letter to an MP) and, again, illustrates the lengths to which MoD go to hide the truth.
Again, I’ve noted lies MoD have told. The common denominator in most, if not all, their lies is their attempt to hide shortcomings in their implementation of the airworthiness regulations and the process by which the Mk2 entered Service.
Sorry if this doesn’t answer your question, but I don’t think anyone here could answer it accurately. But it would be interesting to see how MoD would reply. Ask them.
Caz - We may not agree on many matters, but sincere condolences.
Walter
Referring to…..
I think it is you who has missed the point. Caz was of the mistaken opinion there had been no airborne malfunctions. MoD correspondence was quoted which admitted numerous airborne events in the 2 months period before the accident; which I assume no-one is disputing now.
But your post to Squidlord (and now myself) seemingly still supports the original assertion, despite all the evidence.
That changes in the FADEC design took place is not in doubt. MoD sought to deny the problems which led to these and other changes, but were caught lying when the evidence was “discovered” two weeks after its existence was denied in Committee. On other occasions MoD have not been truthful when discussing Chinook problems, notably Dr Reid’s evidence to the HCDC when he said there had only been one accident before Mull, knowing there had been at least seven – some leading to loss of life and serious injury. At the time he was accompanied by an AVM, who knew the truth but failed to correct him.
In his evidence to the BoI, the Chinook OCU Flight Commander stated these “unforeseen” FADEC malfunctions were of a “Flight Critical Nature”, resulting in “undemanded engine shutdown, engine run up, spurious engine failure captions and misleading and confusing cockpit engine indications”.
I think you also miss the point that, while some problems may have turned out to be “minor” (the RAF’s most experienced Chinook test pilot of the day disputes this, but I’m in no position to comment), the important thing is that AT THE TIME there was a dearth of information available to pilots, mainly because;
(a)The Mk2 had entered Service too early, before the problems were fully understood, and,
(b)What little knowledge existed on the problems and how to cope with them was omitted from the FRCs and, I believe, aircrew training.
To repeat, I am not saying this was what caused the accident. But MoD have stated the sole cause was the pilots’ gross negligence. Even if such negligence could be proven (and it can’t) there would clearly be a degree of shared blame because of the failure to implement the airworthiness regulations. That failure is demonstrable, and constitutes gross negligence and abrogation of duty of care. The most insidious element of this whole case is that the latter staffs are those who have been allowed to judge this case. But whenever there has been an independent inquiry, the pilots have not been blamed to this degree. All I seek is natural justice.
The first half of my post to "Squidlord" applies to your post.
Referring to…..
I think you are missing the point of the recent exchanges on this topic – starting with Cazatou's post which put the “grounding” into perspective in that it was lifted after some fairly minor further checks, trying to counter the spin that the aircraft was somehow not safe for test pilots
I think it is you who has missed the point. Caz was of the mistaken opinion there had been no airborne malfunctions. MoD correspondence was quoted which admitted numerous airborne events in the 2 months period before the accident; which I assume no-one is disputing now.
But your post to Squidlord (and now myself) seemingly still supports the original assertion, despite all the evidence.
That changes in the FADEC design took place is not in doubt. MoD sought to deny the problems which led to these and other changes, but were caught lying when the evidence was “discovered” two weeks after its existence was denied in Committee. On other occasions MoD have not been truthful when discussing Chinook problems, notably Dr Reid’s evidence to the HCDC when he said there had only been one accident before Mull, knowing there had been at least seven – some leading to loss of life and serious injury. At the time he was accompanied by an AVM, who knew the truth but failed to correct him.
In his evidence to the BoI, the Chinook OCU Flight Commander stated these “unforeseen” FADEC malfunctions were of a “Flight Critical Nature”, resulting in “undemanded engine shutdown, engine run up, spurious engine failure captions and misleading and confusing cockpit engine indications”.
I think you also miss the point that, while some problems may have turned out to be “minor” (the RAF’s most experienced Chinook test pilot of the day disputes this, but I’m in no position to comment), the important thing is that AT THE TIME there was a dearth of information available to pilots, mainly because;
(a)The Mk2 had entered Service too early, before the problems were fully understood, and,
(b)What little knowledge existed on the problems and how to cope with them was omitted from the FRCs and, I believe, aircrew training.
To repeat, I am not saying this was what caused the accident. But MoD have stated the sole cause was the pilots’ gross negligence. Even if such negligence could be proven (and it can’t) there would clearly be a degree of shared blame because of the failure to implement the airworthiness regulations. That failure is demonstrable, and constitutes gross negligence and abrogation of duty of care. The most insidious element of this whole case is that the latter staffs are those who have been allowed to judge this case. But whenever there has been an independent inquiry, the pilots have not been blamed to this degree. All I seek is natural justice.
Having been absent for a week or so (due to youngest son getting married), some interesting posts have appeared, and in some cases disappeared as well it would seem! It is notable that at last there is testimony that the FADEC code was indeed revised following this accident, along with other known deficiencies such as the DECU connector and the Control Pallet no doubt. The one known in an accident strewn with both known and unknown unknowns is that this aircraft was unairworthy, and grossly so at that given that it badly affected engine and flight controls. That indeed was known by RAF Higher Command even as the original and restricted RTS was granted. That such an irresponsible and reckless decision could be taken is breathtaking enough, but then attempting to cover that up by conducting such a partisan and biased accident investigation resulting in the infamous finding of Gross Negligence on the two deceased pilots is shameful and unforgivable. I cannot see any way that the Royal Air Force can ever look back on this affair without shame. That the finding should be reversed and the pilots reputations be restored is clear. That UK Military Airworthiness be removed from the indifferent hands of the MOD into the hands of those who care about such things is urgent. But neither act will expunge this dishonourable act that has besmirched the proud name of the Royal Air Force. For shame!
caz, I know that you will not receive this post gladly and that we are fated for ever to disagree on how we view this accident and its investigation, but may I sincerely add my condolences to those that have already been expressed for your bereavement?
caz, I know that you will not receive this post gladly and that we are fated for ever to disagree on how we view this accident and its investigation, but may I sincerely add my condolences to those that have already been expressed for your bereavement?
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Apologies if this has been posted before (although I appreciate it's quite well known).
MoD denial over helicopter software - Yahoo! News UK
MoD denial over helicopter software - Yahoo! News UK
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Frostbite
These were the later HC3s (ZD576 was HC2) and the s/ware was just the avionics stuff (a la glass cockpit sort of thing).
BUT your post was important for highlighting the MOD's capability with such software - would their evaluation of code as per FADECS etc be any better than accepting the manufacturers stuff as a turn key system anyway and judging on actual performance (as was the case in effect with the first HC2s)?
Back to this HC2 FADEC s/ware - we of course still have no idea of how much flying was done between the crash and significant changes to that code on other HC2s.
These were the later HC3s (ZD576 was HC2) and the s/ware was just the avionics stuff (a la glass cockpit sort of thing).
BUT your post was important for highlighting the MOD's capability with such software - would their evaluation of code as per FADECS etc be any better than accepting the manufacturers stuff as a turn key system anyway and judging on actual performance (as was the case in effect with the first HC2s)?
Back to this HC2 FADEC s/ware - we of course still have no idea of how much flying was done between the crash and significant changes to that code on other HC2s.
Walter
Judging by the fact Boscombe’s validation and verification task (ongoing in June 94, and part of the task which, if successful, would eventually permit Release to Service….. Ooops) had already discovered hundreds of errors in the software, I’d tend to give them the benefit of any doubt.
I take it MoD have not responded to your request?
On the subject of software and obtaining source code, it is worth remembering that MoD’s own regulations at the time mandated that if there is to be independent or in-house V&V (in these cases, by Boscombe) then the contract must;
“secure adequate rights of access and use to design information and code for itself and its agents while protecting the rights of the originators"
This was enshrined in a policy directive issued by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Defence Procurement). The detailed instructions on how to implement the policy were issued by the Head of Comms and Computing Group, RSRE Malvern.
This was seemingly ignored.
BUT your post was important for highlighting the MOD's capability with such software - would their evaluation of code as per FADECS etc be any better than accepting the manufacturers stuff as a turn key system anyway and judging on actual performance (as was the case in effect with the first HC2s)?
Back to this HC2 FADEC s/ware - we of course still have no idea of how much flying was done between the crash and significant changes to that code on other HC2s.
On the subject of software and obtaining source code, it is worth remembering that MoD’s own regulations at the time mandated that if there is to be independent or in-house V&V (in these cases, by Boscombe) then the contract must;
“secure adequate rights of access and use to design information and code for itself and its agents while protecting the rights of the originators"
This was enshrined in a policy directive issued by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Defence Procurement). The detailed instructions on how to implement the policy were issued by the Head of Comms and Computing Group, RSRE Malvern.
This was seemingly ignored.
frostbite:
As Walter reminds us this story (actually a Times one) refers to the Chinook HC3:
Ministry of Defence's 'disastrous' decision over Chinooks - Times Online
nonetheless the similarities with this thread are worth noting. Incompetent decision making in the MOD, a 15 year cover up and the blame laid on an innocent party (in this case Boeing themselves, who know which side their bread is buttered).
What's that racket you ask? The bells, the bells!
Apologies if this has been posted before (although I appreciate it's quite well known).
Ministry of Defence's 'disastrous' decision over Chinooks - Times Online
nonetheless the similarities with this thread are worth noting. Incompetent decision making in the MOD, a 15 year cover up and the blame laid on an innocent party (in this case Boeing themselves, who know which side their bread is buttered).
What's that racket you ask? The bells, the bells!
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Chinook
Tucumseh. You have made many posts on the subject of airworthyness. Did you give evidence to the Haddon-Cave inquiry? JP
Last edited by John Purdey; 27th Aug 2009 at 14:25. Reason: spelling
JP
May I ask why you are interested, having apparently "retired" from the thread?
It's just that you either ignore or deride my posts, thereby showing complete disinterest in airworthiness; in fact, much like a few 2 Stars and above I have quoted, including various Mins(AF); the last of whom is now our esteemed Secretary of State.
If Mr Haddon-Cave expands his interest beyond Nimrod (on which aircraft the MoD acknowledged a lack of airworthiness, so evidence was only needed as to the extent of the problem, which MoD had tried to hide) he need look no further than CDP's statements on Chinook and the evidence placed before the BoI, House of Lords and House of Commons which revealed precisely the same abrogation of duty of care and gross negligence, through failing to implement the mandated airworthiness regulations.
Having said this, it would indeed be nice if your sudden interest is as a result of you now recognising the sheer weight of evidence against MoD, in which case I'd be happy to discuss the detail with you.
May I ask why you are interested, having apparently "retired" from the thread?
It's just that you either ignore or deride my posts, thereby showing complete disinterest in airworthiness; in fact, much like a few 2 Stars and above I have quoted, including various Mins(AF); the last of whom is now our esteemed Secretary of State.
If Mr Haddon-Cave expands his interest beyond Nimrod (on which aircraft the MoD acknowledged a lack of airworthiness, so evidence was only needed as to the extent of the problem, which MoD had tried to hide) he need look no further than CDP's statements on Chinook and the evidence placed before the BoI, House of Lords and House of Commons which revealed precisely the same abrogation of duty of care and gross negligence, through failing to implement the mandated airworthiness regulations.
Having said this, it would indeed be nice if your sudden interest is as a result of you now recognising the sheer weight of evidence against MoD, in which case I'd be happy to discuss the detail with you.
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Chinook
Tucumseh. I have indeed retired from the Chinook discussion, but mine was a simple question about your wider interest in airworthiness. Perhaps it was too much to expect a straighforward reply. Please forget it. Regards JP