Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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<<I wonder why a pilot still less two pilots should be at low level, flying straight at said chunk of rock in typical Kintyre IMC? >>
Not to mention the third pair of eyes, the forward loadmaster, the extra navigator who would surely have been expected to have been in this position as they were approaching high ground in marginal conditions:
BUT accident investigators concluded that he was not positioned there – he was either seated on or positioned at the “jump seat” (immediately behind and between the two pilots).
Why was he not seated at his usual vantage point?
Perhaps in the first of the HC2s the RDU was not mounted on the left hand pilot's console (as was later the case) and readings from the CPLS (mounted on a pallette on the floor behind the left hand pilot's seat) had to be relayed to the pilots by a loadmaster.
What else could possible have been more important to the loadmaster than eyeballing their approach to the land? - his better view of the crossing of the shoreline could well have saved them. My main criticism of the captain is that if such an exercise was thrust upon him, he should have had the second loadmaster up front in that “window” position as they approached the land.
And if there was no such exercise, why was he not in that position well before the position of waypoint change (already so close in) when presumably there could not have been any control issues or other significant distractions?
Not that any honest answers are expected – remember the simple enough question as to how much distance was required to slow a Chinook down? - well, we didn't need an answer from this forum anyway as the agility of these beasts is regularly demonstrated at airshows (over a tight area) but I was surprised that no one disclosed just how short a distance was required to execute a “quick stop” - they can stop on a sixpence really, so so long as they think they know what lies ahead and exactly how far they have to go then they can be coasting in at a rate of knots, can't they?
I suppose the new bleatings on software will keep you all in your comfort zone again but there is no evidence of malfunction – the evidence points to a measured approach with a sudden realisation of proximity to the ground – regarding the extreme pedal position, perhaps Chinook pilots would be so kind as to explain what they would do to the “rudder” pedals when initiating a quick stop? You know, like when you are surprised at how too close you have got to a mist covered slope.
<<I wonder why a pilot still less two pilots should be at low level, flying straight at said chunk of rock in typical Kintyre IMC? >>
Not to mention the third pair of eyes, the forward loadmaster, the extra navigator who would surely have been expected to have been in this position as they were approaching high ground in marginal conditions:
BUT accident investigators concluded that he was not positioned there – he was either seated on or positioned at the “jump seat” (immediately behind and between the two pilots).
Why was he not seated at his usual vantage point?
Perhaps in the first of the HC2s the RDU was not mounted on the left hand pilot's console (as was later the case) and readings from the CPLS (mounted on a pallette on the floor behind the left hand pilot's seat) had to be relayed to the pilots by a loadmaster.
What else could possible have been more important to the loadmaster than eyeballing their approach to the land? - his better view of the crossing of the shoreline could well have saved them. My main criticism of the captain is that if such an exercise was thrust upon him, he should have had the second loadmaster up front in that “window” position as they approached the land.
And if there was no such exercise, why was he not in that position well before the position of waypoint change (already so close in) when presumably there could not have been any control issues or other significant distractions?
Not that any honest answers are expected – remember the simple enough question as to how much distance was required to slow a Chinook down? - well, we didn't need an answer from this forum anyway as the agility of these beasts is regularly demonstrated at airshows (over a tight area) but I was surprised that no one disclosed just how short a distance was required to execute a “quick stop” - they can stop on a sixpence really, so so long as they think they know what lies ahead and exactly how far they have to go then they can be coasting in at a rate of knots, can't they?
I suppose the new bleatings on software will keep you all in your comfort zone again but there is no evidence of malfunction – the evidence points to a measured approach with a sudden realisation of proximity to the ground – regarding the extreme pedal position, perhaps Chinook pilots would be so kind as to explain what they would do to the “rudder” pedals when initiating a quick stop? You know, like when you are surprised at how too close you have got to a mist covered slope.
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Interesting perspective here:
Please shut up about the Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash ? The Register
Please shut up about the Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash ? The Register
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There is an item on the BBC News at the moment saying that the BBC has discovered that it may well have not been the fault of the pilots as there was a known serious fault. Just found a link to the news item.
Wally, the 'new bleatings on software' (as you term them) cast yet further doubt - as if any were needed - both on the airworthiness of the aircraft and on the conclusions drawn by Wratten and Day.
Your bizarre speculations about little green men with weird and wonderful wirelesses luring experienced SF pilots into a granite-filled cloud are helping no-one. So please stop.
Your bizarre speculations about little green men with weird and wonderful wirelesses luring experienced SF pilots into a granite-filled cloud are helping no-one. So please stop.
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Please shut up about the Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash
Blimey....... I was reading that article when I suddenly noticed who had written it..... Ah, Never mind.
It did make me laugh though when he started discussing "Low Flying Techniques"
It did make me laugh though when he started discussing "Low Flying Techniques"
I hope that todays media interest brings some belated comfort to TappersDad and all the family members of all the crew-members and pax alike. John was a thoroughly professional pilot and the reputation and memory of those lost should not be subject to besmirching in the absence of evidence.
I’m afraid a few posts, along with MoD, have missed the point entirely; probably deliberately so.
I haven’t read anything today which says FADEC was to blame for the crash. We don’t need to know what caused it; although we’d all like to.
What we have heard today is further evidence that senior officers were grossly negligent in releasing the aircraft to service in the first place. The issue over FADEC software implementation being “positively dangerous” merely casts further doubt on this unsustainable verdict. It also focuses attention on a group of people who have, to my knowledge, never been interviewed on this subject. Why are these people being protected?
Boscombe didn’t just refuse to recommend CA Release in late 1993. They did so consistently and in the strongest imaginable terms over an extraordinarily long period. The signatories to the CAR and RTS (CA and ACAS) should be asked why, given the mandated requirement to record decisions for the audit trail, the advice of Boscombe Down was ignored. And, given this rejection, whose independent advice did they seek and accept? There has to be such an audit trail.
And what of Boscombe? The implication is that MoD(PE) thought them somehow incompetent, that their advice was nonsense. Yet, they continued to be contracted/tasked to conduct their core work and to this day retain their status as world leading experts on the subject. There is something very wrong here, and the rulings of Wratten and Day are merely the tip of a very dirty iceberg. So, CA and ACAS, please explain.
From Hansard;
Lord Jacobs asked Her Majesty's Government:
Who was the Controller Aircraft who granted an Initial CA Release for the Chinook Mk2; and who was the then Assistant Chief of the Air Staff.[HL3391]
24 Jul 2000 : Column WA28
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: The Controller Aircraft who granted an Initial CA Release for the Chinook Mk2 was Sir Donald Spiers CB, TD; the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff at this time was Air Vice-Marshal A J C Bagnall OBE.
Note: the question and reply don't say ".....who signed the RTS" - an interesting omission, given the RTS is the Master document. It makes one wonder if a valid RTS was actually signed in November 1993, as stated by Adam Ingram (another Minister who has been fed a hatful of lies on this subject).
I haven’t read anything today which says FADEC was to blame for the crash. We don’t need to know what caused it; although we’d all like to.
What we have heard today is further evidence that senior officers were grossly negligent in releasing the aircraft to service in the first place. The issue over FADEC software implementation being “positively dangerous” merely casts further doubt on this unsustainable verdict. It also focuses attention on a group of people who have, to my knowledge, never been interviewed on this subject. Why are these people being protected?
Boscombe didn’t just refuse to recommend CA Release in late 1993. They did so consistently and in the strongest imaginable terms over an extraordinarily long period. The signatories to the CAR and RTS (CA and ACAS) should be asked why, given the mandated requirement to record decisions for the audit trail, the advice of Boscombe Down was ignored. And, given this rejection, whose independent advice did they seek and accept? There has to be such an audit trail.
And what of Boscombe? The implication is that MoD(PE) thought them somehow incompetent, that their advice was nonsense. Yet, they continued to be contracted/tasked to conduct their core work and to this day retain their status as world leading experts on the subject. There is something very wrong here, and the rulings of Wratten and Day are merely the tip of a very dirty iceberg. So, CA and ACAS, please explain.
From Hansard;
Lord Jacobs asked Her Majesty's Government:
Who was the Controller Aircraft who granted an Initial CA Release for the Chinook Mk2; and who was the then Assistant Chief of the Air Staff.[HL3391]
24 Jul 2000 : Column WA28
Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: The Controller Aircraft who granted an Initial CA Release for the Chinook Mk2 was Sir Donald Spiers CB, TD; the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff at this time was Air Vice-Marshal A J C Bagnall OBE.
Note: the question and reply don't say ".....who signed the RTS" - an interesting omission, given the RTS is the Master document. It makes one wonder if a valid RTS was actually signed in November 1993, as stated by Adam Ingram (another Minister who has been fed a hatful of lies on this subject).
Last edited by tucumseh; 4th Jan 2010 at 18:02.
tucumseh:
It would be pertinent perhaps for the Provost Branch investigation of evidence revealed by the Nimrod Review into the Airworthiness of the Nimrod Mk2 to broaden their enquiries into the RTS of the Chinook Mk2 in a Grossly Unairworthy condition. Perhaps the above gentlemen could assist them in their enquiries.
DHP was a civilian 1 Star. DGA2 an RAF 2 Star. CA a civilian 3 Star. ACAS an RAF 3 Star.
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Walter,
I'm going to try one last time to explain a few things that you seem to have misunderstood. What you have probably seen at airshows is a demonstration of the limits of helicopter physical manoeuvrability, not much more than that.
You should understand that this is very different to how a helicopter is flown on an operation, especially in bad weather, more especially when at relatively high weights and on a passenger carrying flight. Passengers are often apprehensive, even in straight and level flight and crews are trained to fly accordingly, sympathetic to the operational situation and most definitely not merely trying to make a lot of noise and please the crowd, such as is allowed at airshows, by specially trained display crews.
An approach to a landing site begins some way back when the aircraft is flown at cruise speed towards an initial point, somewhere obvious to find, and from where the gradually decelerating landing approach can begin (this is done by eyeball, not by using a DME. DME is not accurate enough). The helicopter is slowed down from cruise speed to something like 60 to 90 kts, to give the crew time to assimilate local features and to allow themselves sufficient orientation, and they would then probably follow a lead-in feature, flying from a 50,000 map, using what is known as the "map to ground" technique. Crew are trained to use something like a tree line, a ridge line, a valley, a track, railway line or any other useful feature; each locality having it's own unique scenario. In bad weather such as was apparent in this case, the aircraft would be flown more slowly, just as if you were driving your car in poor weather and were looking for a house address.
However, this helicopter, after a reported time at quite a low speed, (yachtsman's evidence) subsequently accelerated under high power, to a speed equal or higher than the normal cruise speed, then hit the ground in a slight climb, with the yaw pedals (helicopters don't have "rudders") deflected to almost full travel.
During any emergency abort/climb, (I've done quite a few in my time) a helicopter's yaw pedals would normally be deflected only enough to keep the aircraft in balanced flight; i.e. with the balance ball in the middle, as speed was traded for climb performance, in addition to use of full power. This would not be anywhere near full deflection, such as was strangely apparent in this accident.
It was the very high impact speed, coupled with the very large deflection of the yaw pedals, that led the station commander RAF Odiham to make a statement to the effect of (I don't now have access to his written report) that the aircraft hit the ground in a configuration that he couldn't understand.
I agree with him, so does any experienced SH pilot. Why it was suddenly in this high speed, cross-controlled configuration, in that location, after slowing down approaching the coastline, is where the trail goes completely cold. Everything else is conjecture or opinion.
However, if the aircraft had developed an emergency of any sort, the crewman would leave his vulnerable position by the door (where he would be restrained only by a belt harness) and move forward to assist the pilots and to get himself into a more secure personal position on the jumpseat. There would be every reason for him not to remain by the door. Bearing in mind the BOI found evidence of the co-pilot's comms box selected to its "emergency" position (i.e. some sort of comms failure, possibly nothing more, but maybe also something more serious, such as an electrical problem). Also, only one "row" selection of the transponder was just one digit away from 7, which would have completed a selection of 7700, the full emergency code to alert ATC units, it is possible they had a further emergency.
We will never know.
I'm going to try one last time to explain a few things that you seem to have misunderstood. What you have probably seen at airshows is a demonstration of the limits of helicopter physical manoeuvrability, not much more than that.
You should understand that this is very different to how a helicopter is flown on an operation, especially in bad weather, more especially when at relatively high weights and on a passenger carrying flight. Passengers are often apprehensive, even in straight and level flight and crews are trained to fly accordingly, sympathetic to the operational situation and most definitely not merely trying to make a lot of noise and please the crowd, such as is allowed at airshows, by specially trained display crews.
An approach to a landing site begins some way back when the aircraft is flown at cruise speed towards an initial point, somewhere obvious to find, and from where the gradually decelerating landing approach can begin (this is done by eyeball, not by using a DME. DME is not accurate enough). The helicopter is slowed down from cruise speed to something like 60 to 90 kts, to give the crew time to assimilate local features and to allow themselves sufficient orientation, and they would then probably follow a lead-in feature, flying from a 50,000 map, using what is known as the "map to ground" technique. Crew are trained to use something like a tree line, a ridge line, a valley, a track, railway line or any other useful feature; each locality having it's own unique scenario. In bad weather such as was apparent in this case, the aircraft would be flown more slowly, just as if you were driving your car in poor weather and were looking for a house address.
However, this helicopter, after a reported time at quite a low speed, (yachtsman's evidence) subsequently accelerated under high power, to a speed equal or higher than the normal cruise speed, then hit the ground in a slight climb, with the yaw pedals (helicopters don't have "rudders") deflected to almost full travel.
During any emergency abort/climb, (I've done quite a few in my time) a helicopter's yaw pedals would normally be deflected only enough to keep the aircraft in balanced flight; i.e. with the balance ball in the middle, as speed was traded for climb performance, in addition to use of full power. This would not be anywhere near full deflection, such as was strangely apparent in this accident.
It was the very high impact speed, coupled with the very large deflection of the yaw pedals, that led the station commander RAF Odiham to make a statement to the effect of (I don't now have access to his written report) that the aircraft hit the ground in a configuration that he couldn't understand.
I agree with him, so does any experienced SH pilot. Why it was suddenly in this high speed, cross-controlled configuration, in that location, after slowing down approaching the coastline, is where the trail goes completely cold. Everything else is conjecture or opinion.
However, if the aircraft had developed an emergency of any sort, the crewman would leave his vulnerable position by the door (where he would be restrained only by a belt harness) and move forward to assist the pilots and to get himself into a more secure personal position on the jumpseat. There would be every reason for him not to remain by the door. Bearing in mind the BOI found evidence of the co-pilot's comms box selected to its "emergency" position (i.e. some sort of comms failure, possibly nothing more, but maybe also something more serious, such as an electrical problem). Also, only one "row" selection of the transponder was just one digit away from 7, which would have completed a selection of 7700, the full emergency code to alert ATC units, it is possible they had a further emergency.
We will never know.
Last edited by ShyTorque; 4th Jan 2010 at 19:52. Reason: A couple of typos/grammatical errors corrected.
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ShyT
Well put but Tuc has the right idea. The paper audit trail documenting airworthiness of the HC2 in 1993-4 is hull of holes. Furthermore and as a result, the MoD can no longer state the ac was 'airworthy' at the time of the crash - in a similar vein to the losses of XVs 230, 179 and 705 and 640!
Well put but Tuc has the right idea. The paper audit trail documenting airworthiness of the HC2 in 1993-4 is hull of holes. Furthermore and as a result, the MoD can no longer state the ac was 'airworthy' at the time of the crash - in a similar vein to the losses of XVs 230, 179 and 705 and 640!
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Sqn Ldr Burke says something interesting
It's nice when someone says something that clears up a lot of speculation.
Remember the discussions about why they all were put in one helicopter and whether this was a local detachment decision?
And the derision of the idea that such VIPs could be on a flight that had a training element?
Well in that recent BBC interview, Sqn Ldr Burke described it as a "Showcase Flight", intended to demonstrate to the army that it was fit for operational service, and implied that the decision to put all the top security VIPs on it was made at a level much higher than the detachment.
So it wasn't really about saving the use of one in theatre helicopter, was it?
And it wouldn't have been much of a demo doing the easy ferry run Curran to Corran, would it? Why wouldn't they demonstrate the new kit for fast insertion/extraction, etc in bad conditions by setting something up using a CPLS in that useful area of fixed/localised predictable weather on the Mull?
It's nice when someone says something that clears up a lot of speculation.
Remember the discussions about why they all were put in one helicopter and whether this was a local detachment decision?
And the derision of the idea that such VIPs could be on a flight that had a training element?
Well in that recent BBC interview, Sqn Ldr Burke described it as a "Showcase Flight", intended to demonstrate to the army that it was fit for operational service, and implied that the decision to put all the top security VIPs on it was made at a level much higher than the detachment.
So it wasn't really about saving the use of one in theatre helicopter, was it?
And it wouldn't have been much of a demo doing the easy ferry run Curran to Corran, would it? Why wouldn't they demonstrate the new kit for fast insertion/extraction, etc in bad conditions by setting something up using a CPLS in that useful area of fixed/localised predictable weather on the Mull?
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For me all the evidence points to a navigation error...........if the crew thought they had open sea ahead of them when they entered cloud , they would have initiated a gentle climb to break through on top . the cloud/fog was localised and they could continue at low level after resuming vmc .
..there are references to errors on the Racal nav box , including a possible erroneous entry....and I am sure they did not realise that their first checkpoint was 300 feet up a cliff ......
Does anyone know if any of the flight planning documents survived..?????...
On a clear day any error would have been obvious , but in the localised greyout conditions they had no chance........
..there are references to errors on the Racal nav box , including a possible erroneous entry....and I am sure they did not realise that their first checkpoint was 300 feet up a cliff ......
Does anyone know if any of the flight planning documents survived..?????...
On a clear day any error would have been obvious , but in the localised greyout conditions they had no chance........
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BOAC
Thanks for the pointer and, I assume, the gentle dig. The C4 link you directed me to explains my query, but leaves one which we will never know the answer to.
The captain of an aircraft has the ultimate sanction on whether to fly a sortie. If a captain thought that safety concerns over an aircraft were so grave that he was reported to have considered life insurance, the weather for the route poor and the aircraft unable to cope with it, why fly?
Refusing to fly a sortie would potentially have had career changing implications of course, and the decision would never have been taken without the most serious consideration, but he would not have been the first to do.
With hindsight and the wisdom experience brings, there may be many pilots from years gone by that could have taken such a decision themselves, but were lucky and skilful enough to have survived their own set of circumstances to be able to talk about it.
I suspect this will not be a popular post, but it's a point of view.
Thanks for the pointer and, I assume, the gentle dig. The C4 link you directed me to explains my query, but leaves one which we will never know the answer to.
The captain of an aircraft has the ultimate sanction on whether to fly a sortie. If a captain thought that safety concerns over an aircraft were so grave that he was reported to have considered life insurance, the weather for the route poor and the aircraft unable to cope with it, why fly?
Refusing to fly a sortie would potentially have had career changing implications of course, and the decision would never have been taken without the most serious consideration, but he would not have been the first to do.
With hindsight and the wisdom experience brings, there may be many pilots from years gone by that could have taken such a decision themselves, but were lucky and skilful enough to have survived their own set of circumstances to be able to talk about it.
I suspect this will not be a popular post, but it's a point of view.
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Robin, all this has been discussed in some detail.
You would do well to find the start of these threads, which goes back over eight years, using the search engine, and read through. There is an awful lot to read and a lot of previous repetition. I'm sure you will find the answer you are looking for.
P6 driver, had this crew, or part of it, refused to fly, it is entirely possible that this campaign might be still here, with only the names of the crew changed. It was an operational theatre and there was obviously a huge amount of pressure from above for the flight to proceed. Having served in the same theatre it might even have been my name, or others here, in slightly different circumstances (I left the RAF only a very short time before the accident).
You would do well to find the start of these threads, which goes back over eight years, using the search engine, and read through. There is an awful lot to read and a lot of previous repetition. I'm sure you will find the answer you are looking for.
P6 driver, had this crew, or part of it, refused to fly, it is entirely possible that this campaign might be still here, with only the names of the crew changed. It was an operational theatre and there was obviously a huge amount of pressure from above for the flight to proceed. Having served in the same theatre it might even have been my name, or others here, in slightly different circumstances (I left the RAF only a very short time before the accident).
Last edited by ShyTorque; 4th Jan 2010 at 20:00.
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Why wouldn't they demonstrate the new kit for fast insertion/extraction, etc in bad conditions by setting something up using a CPLS in that useful area of fixed/localised predictable weather on the Mull?
Again, I say to you (this must be at least the third time) if the purpose of the flight was to demonstrate a homing device fitted to this particular Mk2 airframe, how on earth does this possibly fit in with the captain's request for a completely different airframe, a Mk1?
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ShyT
I take it that your post is aimed at recent readers as so many of your points have been addressed over a long period of time - regretfully, I feel I have to waste time briefly putting you straight on them:
<<What you have probably seen at air shows is a demonstration of the limits of helicopter physical manoeuvrability, not much more than that.
You should understand that this is very different to how a helicopter is flown on an operation, especially in bad weather, more especially when at relatively high weights and on a passenger carrying flight. >>
The bad weather was localised on the Mull and would have affected their ability to recognise local features (such as there are on that ground);
the weight was within limits for single engine flight, was it not? and so not anywhere near "high" for a Chinook; the passengers were not grannies on a church outing, either; the reference to air shows was merely to point out that no info on distances to slow down were volunteered on this site (and I note that you still do not use this opportunity to quantify "where the gradually decelerating landing approach can begin from") but from air shows the observer can get an idea - my original question on this was to substantiate the view that being 1/2 a mile or so out in judgement of distance to go would have explained that they were still at such a high speed despite having started to coast (letting drag wash off the speed) after their turn onto 035 (Boeings calcs).
<<Crew are trained to use something like a tree line, a ridge line, a valley, a track, railway line or any other useful feature; each locality having it's own unique scenario. >> If you can't consistently see the lighthouse clearly, there is naff all else to spot in that area - I suggest that you ask crew familiar with CPLS how it can be used in such conditions.
<<DME is not accurate enough>> What else is more accurate? I think I posted some time back the accident on an Aussie vessel where the eyeball was used but the TACAN would have been the safe option; ZD576 did not have radar; the UHF DME function of a PRC112 with CPLS is intrinsically very accurate and reliable - just needs to have been where it was meant to be.
<< Bearing in mind the BOI found evidence of the co-pilot's comms box selected to its "emergency" position ...>> You talk to an operator on the ground with a PRC112 on the UHF guard channel - other than someone very local, UHF would not have done them any good at their height, would it? We know their VHF was working when they called ScotMil.
<<...after a reported time at quite a low speed, (yachtsman's evidence) subsequently accelerated under high power, to a speed equal or higher than the normal cruise speed, then hit the ground in a slight climb, with the yaw pedals (helicopters don't have "rudders") deflected to almost full travel.>> I put "rudder" in quotes, didn't I? - just for simplicity - I have posted several times on Sqn Ldr Burke's misleading statement on those pedals, demonstrating, I think adequately, that I am understanding their application to tandem rotor craft so I think your sarcasm is a bit silly here; other than that the rest of this paragraph of yours shows a lack of willingness to go through the distance/time analysis that I have suggested you all do along the lines of Boeing's "Analysis of Available Data" - the most obvious scenario from the analysis is that it flew at a consistent cruising speed until the turn to 035 (at the position of waypoint change whereon it started to slow down in terms of TAS (this was masked by the increase in tail wind component near the landmass) which was consistent with the matched engine power levels - regarding the yachtsman's judgement, I challenge any of you to judge the speed of an unfamiliar a/c with any accuracy at the distance involved - a big Chinook would look very slow without a nearby familiar object to someone who had previously only seen other types.
<<During any emergency abort/climb, (I've done quite a few in my time) a helicopter's yaw pedals would normally be deflected only enough to keep the aircraft in balanced flight; i.e. with the balance ball in the middle, as speed was traded for climb performance, in addition to use of full power. This would not be anywhere near full deflection, such as was strangely apparent in this accident.>> A bit like Sqn Ldr Burke's view - why not leave this answer to those who I put the question to? That is to Chinook pilots, what do you do with these pedals when initiating a "quick stop"? Or was all this smoke of yours aimed at hiding the lack of response to this basic, relevant question?
<<Also, only one "row" selection of the transponder was just one digit away from 7, which would have completed a selection of 7700, the full emergency code to alert ATC units>> The code selected was found to be 7760 - from the expected 7000 that is one wheel switch two positions out and another one - they are hard to move - it is not the practice to change this in a sudden emergency, is it? - the SSR recordings (which would have cleared this up) are said to have shown nothing despite a reliable report from someone who had seen them - a code from the domestic allocation (at that time there was a shortage of available codes for special usage) where no ambiguity was likely could be used for special exercises (not forgetting the callsign was likewise suggestive of an exercise).
<<We will never know>> This mantra is often repeated by many - especially media and politicians - enough data has been retrieved, instrument settings preserved, etc to further our understanding considerably beyond the "official" version, to establish that the approach to the Mull was an excursion from a safer planned route, to which it is evident that they were to rejoin, and that they were set up for a close pass or landing at an LZ that had been used prior to this crash on numerous occasions by mil helos including Chinooks, close to which the crash happened. This is enough to justify quashing the verdicts, that such has been so far withheld from inquiries. It would require consensus support from interested parties to get anything done.
I will be in the UK for a couple of months from next week, and will PM contact details for anybody genuinely interested in going through the detailed chart work, etc in a group meeting where perhaps a bit of open discussion can take our understanding a bit further.
OhOh - another from ShyT
<<...these passengers would have no operational or technical interest in a homing system.>> A Covert Personnel Locator System - "just the thing when your men are in an OP from which they need to be extracted in a hurry - whatever the conditions - understanding our new capability will aid you in tactical decisions - besides, it is new kit for us and we are short of time to train with it and this location is ideal and it will not delay your itinery a bit ..." an easy sell.
<< ...if the purpose of the flight was to demonstrate a homing device fitted to this particular Mk2 airframe, how on earth does this possibly fit in with the captain's request for a completely different airframe, a Mk1?>> while ultimately the CPLS was intended to be fitted to HC2s with the Remote Display Unit fitted to the left hand pilot's console, the connections for power and to the intercom system for the palletised kit were simplicity itself and so perhaps Flt Lt Tapper thought the trial set could just as easily have been screwed to the floor of a Mk1 and the readings relayed by a loadmaster - I dunno, just a thought - perhaps he had a bad feeling and was looking for an excuse not to do the Mull demo - otherwise, preferring a Mk1??!! - I would have thought the advantages of FADEC in the power management of such a beast would have more than compensated for any anticipated glitches - it was the future, after all, akin in terms of workload to the transition from steam to Diesel/Electric for loco drivers.
I think you should use your connections with the RAF to satisfy yourself of the initial use of the CPLS and just let us in the public domain know if you are happy with the explanation or not - if you are willing, I am sure many of us would be interested to know of its initial fitting and evaluation - if you don't know and are unwilling to find out, please stop filling up the pages with your less than constructive spin.
And as I have said, so many times before, don't get hung up on this specific piece of equipment - it is only a candidate that I have suggested - what is needed is an objective discussion on the parameters that I have pointed to that indicate their intentions in terms of track and set up for a close approach or landing at a known LZ - that gets the ball rolling. That, to date, so many of you who should have been qualified to do so have not recognised at least as a possibility that such parameters had a significance is very disappointing to say the least - they really do go together to make a very obvious picture - please make an effort.
I take it that your post is aimed at recent readers as so many of your points have been addressed over a long period of time - regretfully, I feel I have to waste time briefly putting you straight on them:
<<What you have probably seen at air shows is a demonstration of the limits of helicopter physical manoeuvrability, not much more than that.
You should understand that this is very different to how a helicopter is flown on an operation, especially in bad weather, more especially when at relatively high weights and on a passenger carrying flight. >>
The bad weather was localised on the Mull and would have affected their ability to recognise local features (such as there are on that ground);
the weight was within limits for single engine flight, was it not? and so not anywhere near "high" for a Chinook; the passengers were not grannies on a church outing, either; the reference to air shows was merely to point out that no info on distances to slow down were volunteered on this site (and I note that you still do not use this opportunity to quantify "where the gradually decelerating landing approach can begin from") but from air shows the observer can get an idea - my original question on this was to substantiate the view that being 1/2 a mile or so out in judgement of distance to go would have explained that they were still at such a high speed despite having started to coast (letting drag wash off the speed) after their turn onto 035 (Boeings calcs).
<<Crew are trained to use something like a tree line, a ridge line, a valley, a track, railway line or any other useful feature; each locality having it's own unique scenario. >> If you can't consistently see the lighthouse clearly, there is naff all else to spot in that area - I suggest that you ask crew familiar with CPLS how it can be used in such conditions.
<<DME is not accurate enough>> What else is more accurate? I think I posted some time back the accident on an Aussie vessel where the eyeball was used but the TACAN would have been the safe option; ZD576 did not have radar; the UHF DME function of a PRC112 with CPLS is intrinsically very accurate and reliable - just needs to have been where it was meant to be.
<< Bearing in mind the BOI found evidence of the co-pilot's comms box selected to its "emergency" position ...>> You talk to an operator on the ground with a PRC112 on the UHF guard channel - other than someone very local, UHF would not have done them any good at their height, would it? We know their VHF was working when they called ScotMil.
<<...after a reported time at quite a low speed, (yachtsman's evidence) subsequently accelerated under high power, to a speed equal or higher than the normal cruise speed, then hit the ground in a slight climb, with the yaw pedals (helicopters don't have "rudders") deflected to almost full travel.>> I put "rudder" in quotes, didn't I? - just for simplicity - I have posted several times on Sqn Ldr Burke's misleading statement on those pedals, demonstrating, I think adequately, that I am understanding their application to tandem rotor craft so I think your sarcasm is a bit silly here; other than that the rest of this paragraph of yours shows a lack of willingness to go through the distance/time analysis that I have suggested you all do along the lines of Boeing's "Analysis of Available Data" - the most obvious scenario from the analysis is that it flew at a consistent cruising speed until the turn to 035 (at the position of waypoint change whereon it started to slow down in terms of TAS (this was masked by the increase in tail wind component near the landmass) which was consistent with the matched engine power levels - regarding the yachtsman's judgement, I challenge any of you to judge the speed of an unfamiliar a/c with any accuracy at the distance involved - a big Chinook would look very slow without a nearby familiar object to someone who had previously only seen other types.
<<During any emergency abort/climb, (I've done quite a few in my time) a helicopter's yaw pedals would normally be deflected only enough to keep the aircraft in balanced flight; i.e. with the balance ball in the middle, as speed was traded for climb performance, in addition to use of full power. This would not be anywhere near full deflection, such as was strangely apparent in this accident.>> A bit like Sqn Ldr Burke's view - why not leave this answer to those who I put the question to? That is to Chinook pilots, what do you do with these pedals when initiating a "quick stop"? Or was all this smoke of yours aimed at hiding the lack of response to this basic, relevant question?
<<Also, only one "row" selection of the transponder was just one digit away from 7, which would have completed a selection of 7700, the full emergency code to alert ATC units>> The code selected was found to be 7760 - from the expected 7000 that is one wheel switch two positions out and another one - they are hard to move - it is not the practice to change this in a sudden emergency, is it? - the SSR recordings (which would have cleared this up) are said to have shown nothing despite a reliable report from someone who had seen them - a code from the domestic allocation (at that time there was a shortage of available codes for special usage) where no ambiguity was likely could be used for special exercises (not forgetting the callsign was likewise suggestive of an exercise).
<<We will never know>> This mantra is often repeated by many - especially media and politicians - enough data has been retrieved, instrument settings preserved, etc to further our understanding considerably beyond the "official" version, to establish that the approach to the Mull was an excursion from a safer planned route, to which it is evident that they were to rejoin, and that they were set up for a close pass or landing at an LZ that had been used prior to this crash on numerous occasions by mil helos including Chinooks, close to which the crash happened. This is enough to justify quashing the verdicts, that such has been so far withheld from inquiries. It would require consensus support from interested parties to get anything done.
I will be in the UK for a couple of months from next week, and will PM contact details for anybody genuinely interested in going through the detailed chart work, etc in a group meeting where perhaps a bit of open discussion can take our understanding a bit further.
OhOh - another from ShyT
<<...these passengers would have no operational or technical interest in a homing system.>> A Covert Personnel Locator System - "just the thing when your men are in an OP from which they need to be extracted in a hurry - whatever the conditions - understanding our new capability will aid you in tactical decisions - besides, it is new kit for us and we are short of time to train with it and this location is ideal and it will not delay your itinery a bit ..." an easy sell.
<< ...if the purpose of the flight was to demonstrate a homing device fitted to this particular Mk2 airframe, how on earth does this possibly fit in with the captain's request for a completely different airframe, a Mk1?>> while ultimately the CPLS was intended to be fitted to HC2s with the Remote Display Unit fitted to the left hand pilot's console, the connections for power and to the intercom system for the palletised kit were simplicity itself and so perhaps Flt Lt Tapper thought the trial set could just as easily have been screwed to the floor of a Mk1 and the readings relayed by a loadmaster - I dunno, just a thought - perhaps he had a bad feeling and was looking for an excuse not to do the Mull demo - otherwise, preferring a Mk1??!! - I would have thought the advantages of FADEC in the power management of such a beast would have more than compensated for any anticipated glitches - it was the future, after all, akin in terms of workload to the transition from steam to Diesel/Electric for loco drivers.
I think you should use your connections with the RAF to satisfy yourself of the initial use of the CPLS and just let us in the public domain know if you are happy with the explanation or not - if you are willing, I am sure many of us would be interested to know of its initial fitting and evaluation - if you don't know and are unwilling to find out, please stop filling up the pages with your less than constructive spin.
And as I have said, so many times before, don't get hung up on this specific piece of equipment - it is only a candidate that I have suggested - what is needed is an objective discussion on the parameters that I have pointed to that indicate their intentions in terms of track and set up for a close approach or landing at a known LZ - that gets the ball rolling. That, to date, so many of you who should have been qualified to do so have not recognised at least as a possibility that such parameters had a significance is very disappointing to say the least - they really do go together to make a very obvious picture - please make an effort.
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Walter,
Your posts are becoming increasingly difficult to decipher, because of a lack of paragraphs and those strange parentheses you use. It would be useful if you could use the quote facility, or at least separate your quotes by using a new paragraph, or double space them. Thankyou.
I cannot use my "RAF contacts" to find answers to fit in with your theories, which is what you crave; again, I have told you why, before now. You can read back and remind yourself. The reasons are nothing sinister or filled with smoke, as you strangely put it, merely practical.
7000 is the transponder code for normal VFR ops, 7700 is the emergency squawk. With 7760 showing, the third digit / row needed to have the "0" selected to send the emergency code. It is entirely possible that the crewman, or the co-pilot had hurriedly only partly selected this code to indicate an onboard emergency before being tragically interrupted by the impact.
At low level any transponder code may or may not be picked up by a radar, but the crew would of course be unable to verify this unless in contact with a secondary radar equipped unit. Irrespective of this, in the case of a serious emergency, RAF training recommends that 7700 is selected, if no other code was given after making contact with an ATC agency.
The reason no-one has given you a precise "slowing down" distance, from an IP to a landing point, which is what you appear to demand, is that this distance varies markedly because it depends on many factors.
This has little to do with the maximum physical capability of the aircraft to slow down (something often demonstrated by display pilots at airshows; a point I made in my previous post but was obviously lost on you). Instead, it depends on other factors such as the terrain, the prevailing weather conditions, the difficulty of finding the actual landing point and tactical considerations. If it is a very obvious landing point, the weather is good, the crew identify it from a long way off in good time, and there are no tactical reasons, the crew might choose to maintain higher airspeed a little longer than in adverse conditions - but 160 kts? Never.
The distance planned on paper prior to the flight might be a couple of miles, sometimes considerably more, sometimes a little less. Make no mistake, in poor, marginal VFR weather, it certainly is totally impractical to rush in at 160 kts to a distance of half a mile, especially having slowed considerably below cruise speed before the coastline was reached, as the yachtsman's evidence indicated. I believe the crew slowed down approaching the coast (as per normal SH training and doctrine) merely because of deteriorating weather, not because they were taking part in a homing trial and trying to land on the Mull using a DME.
Regarding lecturing me on passenger comfort whilst flying helicopters - how many times have you flown a passenger carrying helicopter? Not once. I've made a career out of it.
The initial point / feature that this crew would undoubtedly have used was at sea level, i.e. some point on the coastline. Becoming visual with the coastline would have been their number one priority, not looking inside at a trial fit DME whilst approaching high ground at high speed in poor weather below cloud!
Regarding the significance of the "emergency" selection found on the co-pilot's intercom box. You appear to misinterpret what this does. On ALL the aircraft types I've flown, this facility is NOT designed to select an emergency radio or a frequency for external comms. What it does is to allow the user to restore his voice communications, on intercom, with the rest of the crew, if his own box fails. Usually the "emergency" selection "borrows" the amplifier of another intercom box, or simply connects the user to it; for example the co-pilot's headset becomes connected to the pilot's side box. What other facilities are available in these circumstances depends on the actual aircraft comms design. I can't help you with that, it's an aircraft specific issue. Someone else here may be able to help you further.
So, the major significance of the selection of emergency intercom on the co-pilot's side, is that it indicates that the co-pilot had lost his normal intercom. Not that he made the selection to speak to an outside local ground agency / mobile unit, while climbing towards a cloud covered hill at 160 kts in an effort to land on it.
I previously told you this some years ago, when you first began visiting this forum. I think it was actually the main content of the first PM you sent. Again, you have either forgotten my reply, completely misunderstood it, or have simply chosen to ignore it.
I also recall you were quite polite in those early days, until the answers I gave didn't fit in with your own theories. When I said I didn't know the answers to some of those questions you accused me of being part of an "old boys cover up"! If there is a cover up I'm certainly not part of it; in fact the very opposite.
Why do you so rudely and patronisingly make a point of rebuffing honest answers that don't fit in with your own theories? My answers cannot be, in the main, constructive to your own theories, because you base them on your incomplete understanding of how helicopters fly and how they are operated, especially in the SH role, and what the relevant role was.
As for my "less than constructive spin"... Walter have you ever read your own posts, let alone mine?
At least my answers ARE based on actual RAF SH experience as a pilot and SH instructor, some of it in NI, not stuff I have read in books or simply made up, based on partial understanding. If I don't know the answer to a question you have asked, I have simply told you so, and given the reason.
I have yet again attempted to give honest answers to the points you raise, but why I still bother is a moot point, as all you ever give is back is far less than constructive.
Good luck with your UK meeting.
Your posts are becoming increasingly difficult to decipher, because of a lack of paragraphs and those strange parentheses you use. It would be useful if you could use the quote facility, or at least separate your quotes by using a new paragraph, or double space them. Thankyou.
I cannot use my "RAF contacts" to find answers to fit in with your theories, which is what you crave; again, I have told you why, before now. You can read back and remind yourself. The reasons are nothing sinister or filled with smoke, as you strangely put it, merely practical.
7000 is the transponder code for normal VFR ops, 7700 is the emergency squawk. With 7760 showing, the third digit / row needed to have the "0" selected to send the emergency code. It is entirely possible that the crewman, or the co-pilot had hurriedly only partly selected this code to indicate an onboard emergency before being tragically interrupted by the impact.
At low level any transponder code may or may not be picked up by a radar, but the crew would of course be unable to verify this unless in contact with a secondary radar equipped unit. Irrespective of this, in the case of a serious emergency, RAF training recommends that 7700 is selected, if no other code was given after making contact with an ATC agency.
The reason no-one has given you a precise "slowing down" distance, from an IP to a landing point, which is what you appear to demand, is that this distance varies markedly because it depends on many factors.
This has little to do with the maximum physical capability of the aircraft to slow down (something often demonstrated by display pilots at airshows; a point I made in my previous post but was obviously lost on you). Instead, it depends on other factors such as the terrain, the prevailing weather conditions, the difficulty of finding the actual landing point and tactical considerations. If it is a very obvious landing point, the weather is good, the crew identify it from a long way off in good time, and there are no tactical reasons, the crew might choose to maintain higher airspeed a little longer than in adverse conditions - but 160 kts? Never.
The distance planned on paper prior to the flight might be a couple of miles, sometimes considerably more, sometimes a little less. Make no mistake, in poor, marginal VFR weather, it certainly is totally impractical to rush in at 160 kts to a distance of half a mile, especially having slowed considerably below cruise speed before the coastline was reached, as the yachtsman's evidence indicated. I believe the crew slowed down approaching the coast (as per normal SH training and doctrine) merely because of deteriorating weather, not because they were taking part in a homing trial and trying to land on the Mull using a DME.
Regarding lecturing me on passenger comfort whilst flying helicopters - how many times have you flown a passenger carrying helicopter? Not once. I've made a career out of it.
The initial point / feature that this crew would undoubtedly have used was at sea level, i.e. some point on the coastline. Becoming visual with the coastline would have been their number one priority, not looking inside at a trial fit DME whilst approaching high ground at high speed in poor weather below cloud!
Regarding the significance of the "emergency" selection found on the co-pilot's intercom box. You appear to misinterpret what this does. On ALL the aircraft types I've flown, this facility is NOT designed to select an emergency radio or a frequency for external comms. What it does is to allow the user to restore his voice communications, on intercom, with the rest of the crew, if his own box fails. Usually the "emergency" selection "borrows" the amplifier of another intercom box, or simply connects the user to it; for example the co-pilot's headset becomes connected to the pilot's side box. What other facilities are available in these circumstances depends on the actual aircraft comms design. I can't help you with that, it's an aircraft specific issue. Someone else here may be able to help you further.
So, the major significance of the selection of emergency intercom on the co-pilot's side, is that it indicates that the co-pilot had lost his normal intercom. Not that he made the selection to speak to an outside local ground agency / mobile unit, while climbing towards a cloud covered hill at 160 kts in an effort to land on it.
I previously told you this some years ago, when you first began visiting this forum. I think it was actually the main content of the first PM you sent. Again, you have either forgotten my reply, completely misunderstood it, or have simply chosen to ignore it.
I also recall you were quite polite in those early days, until the answers I gave didn't fit in with your own theories. When I said I didn't know the answers to some of those questions you accused me of being part of an "old boys cover up"! If there is a cover up I'm certainly not part of it; in fact the very opposite.
Why do you so rudely and patronisingly make a point of rebuffing honest answers that don't fit in with your own theories? My answers cannot be, in the main, constructive to your own theories, because you base them on your incomplete understanding of how helicopters fly and how they are operated, especially in the SH role, and what the relevant role was.
As for my "less than constructive spin"... Walter have you ever read your own posts, let alone mine?
At least my answers ARE based on actual RAF SH experience as a pilot and SH instructor, some of it in NI, not stuff I have read in books or simply made up, based on partial understanding. If I don't know the answer to a question you have asked, I have simply told you so, and given the reason.
I have yet again attempted to give honest answers to the points you raise, but why I still bother is a moot point, as all you ever give is back is far less than constructive.
Good luck with your UK meeting.
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Finally looks like some progress
Software linked to Chinook tragedy - MSN News - MSN UK
Software linked to Chinook tragedy - MSN News - MSN UK
pa.press.net, Updated: 05/01/2010 00:09
Software linked to Chinook tragedy
Evidence has emerged suggesting a Chinook helicopter crash which wiped out much of Northern Ireland's intelligence community could have been caused by faulty computer software.
The scene of the Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre
Evidence has emerged suggesting a Chinook helicopter crash which wiped out much of Northern Ireland's intelligence community could have been caused by faulty computer software.
An internal Ministry of Defence document written nine months before the tragedy in 1994 said the engine control computer software was "positively dangerous".
Written by experts working for the MoD's aircraft testing centre at Boscombe Down, it points to serious concerns with the software, warning of "catastrophic effects".
The report, obtained by the BBC, said the 174 deficiencies found in the software meant the pilot's full control of the engines "could not be assured". The document has reignited the debate over the cause of the accident on June 2 1994, which killed 29 people including 25 senior military, police and intelligence officers.
The helicopter, which flew from Belfast, was transporting the group to a security conference at the Fort George military base in Inverness when it crashed in thick fog on the Mull of Kintyre. Their deaths were described at the time as a "catastrophic loss in the fight against terrorism".
An official RAF inquiry concluded the aircraft was airworthy and found the two pilots guilty of gross negligence, saying they were flying too low and too fast.
But three subsequent inquiries since have found the cause of the crash inconclusive. Inquiries in the House of Commons and the House of Lords found the verdicts of gross negligence were unsustainable and unjustified.
The document said that the release of the Chinook Mark 2 into service could not be recommended and called for a rewrite of the computer software.
"The hazard analysis of Chinook Mark 2 identifies the software in the engine Fadec (control system) as safety critical and states that any malfunctions or design errors could have catastrophic effects," it read.
"Twenty-one category 1 and 153 category 2 anomalies have been revealed. One of these is considered to be positively dangerous. The density of deficiencies is so high that the software is unintelligible. Pilots' control of the engines through Fadec cannot be assured."
Software linked to Chinook tragedy
Evidence has emerged suggesting a Chinook helicopter crash which wiped out much of Northern Ireland's intelligence community could have been caused by faulty computer software.
The scene of the Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre
Evidence has emerged suggesting a Chinook helicopter crash which wiped out much of Northern Ireland's intelligence community could have been caused by faulty computer software.
An internal Ministry of Defence document written nine months before the tragedy in 1994 said the engine control computer software was "positively dangerous".
Written by experts working for the MoD's aircraft testing centre at Boscombe Down, it points to serious concerns with the software, warning of "catastrophic effects".
The report, obtained by the BBC, said the 174 deficiencies found in the software meant the pilot's full control of the engines "could not be assured". The document has reignited the debate over the cause of the accident on June 2 1994, which killed 29 people including 25 senior military, police and intelligence officers.
The helicopter, which flew from Belfast, was transporting the group to a security conference at the Fort George military base in Inverness when it crashed in thick fog on the Mull of Kintyre. Their deaths were described at the time as a "catastrophic loss in the fight against terrorism".
An official RAF inquiry concluded the aircraft was airworthy and found the two pilots guilty of gross negligence, saying they were flying too low and too fast.
But three subsequent inquiries since have found the cause of the crash inconclusive. Inquiries in the House of Commons and the House of Lords found the verdicts of gross negligence were unsustainable and unjustified.
The document said that the release of the Chinook Mark 2 into service could not be recommended and called for a rewrite of the computer software.
"The hazard analysis of Chinook Mark 2 identifies the software in the engine Fadec (control system) as safety critical and states that any malfunctions or design errors could have catastrophic effects," it read.
"Twenty-one category 1 and 153 category 2 anomalies have been revealed. One of these is considered to be positively dangerous. The density of deficiencies is so high that the software is unintelligible. Pilots' control of the engines through Fadec cannot be assured."
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I must congratulate all involved in bringing this case that much closer to resolution. It took a lot of perseverance to get to this point after so many knock-backs. I had always felt the crash was software related and reason why I thought Walter may not be so wrong (if even not completely right either) his reference to AR6 certainly perked my interest. Whatever interaction this equipment (or any other STF used) may have had with the Chinooks software, even if removed at the time of the flight, could have left resident bugs in the aircraft's software.
I wish the families of the pilots a speedy resolution from here forth so they can resume with their lives having had this travesty hang over them for so long.
I wish the families of the pilots a speedy resolution from here forth so they can resume with their lives having had this travesty hang over them for so long.
Last edited by tiarna; 5th Jan 2010 at 01:43.
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Nutloose, yes, that quote reflects what some of us have been saying ever since the BOI report was published, almost fifteen years ago.
It was good to see Bob Burke's face again, being interviewed on TV last night; it's been a very long time. His views exactly reflect my own.
It was good to see Bob Burke's face again, being interviewed on TV last night; it's been a very long time. His views exactly reflect my own.