Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Hi everyone.
Good to see healthy debate continuing, whilst was (still) wait for a response from Mr Browne. There’s nothing much to add on that front, other than I am aware that checks on ‘certain issues’ are being made within the MoD. At least things are moving along. I was hoping for an announcement on the last day of Parliament when there was the MoD input to the House but, sadly, it was not to be. Hopefully not too much longer for the families to wait though.
There have been several issues raised since my last post. Please don’t think I’m ignoring people as that is not the case. I am more than happy to contribute when I have something worthwhile to say (or to post an update). I’ve also gone from cable connected to wireless internet and had a few teething issues (I know, I know – if it’s not broken etc…).
Just to answer a few points – there is no evidence I have seen that suggests that FTS equipment was on board ZD576, whether in an active, passive or redundant role. Doesn’t mean it wasn’t there, but I have read a substantial amount of paperwork and asked several direct questions on this subject and never had even a hint of any such equipment.
Airworthiness does get a mention in the document submitted to the MoD, but that’s all I’m saying on that.
Unfortunately, it is still a waiting game. However, we are confident in the work put in to, and content of, our submission. We also believe that Mr Browne will give the submission due consideration and then make his decision. Until then, as I keep getting reminded by others, I will have to be patient!
I assure you that as soon as we hear anything, our fantastic supporters on PPRuNe will be first to hear of it.
I thank you all for your patience and continued support.
Regards, as always.
Brian
“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook
Good to see healthy debate continuing, whilst was (still) wait for a response from Mr Browne. There’s nothing much to add on that front, other than I am aware that checks on ‘certain issues’ are being made within the MoD. At least things are moving along. I was hoping for an announcement on the last day of Parliament when there was the MoD input to the House but, sadly, it was not to be. Hopefully not too much longer for the families to wait though.
There have been several issues raised since my last post. Please don’t think I’m ignoring people as that is not the case. I am more than happy to contribute when I have something worthwhile to say (or to post an update). I’ve also gone from cable connected to wireless internet and had a few teething issues (I know, I know – if it’s not broken etc…).
Just to answer a few points – there is no evidence I have seen that suggests that FTS equipment was on board ZD576, whether in an active, passive or redundant role. Doesn’t mean it wasn’t there, but I have read a substantial amount of paperwork and asked several direct questions on this subject and never had even a hint of any such equipment.
Airworthiness does get a mention in the document submitted to the MoD, but that’s all I’m saying on that.
Unfortunately, it is still a waiting game. However, we are confident in the work put in to, and content of, our submission. We also believe that Mr Browne will give the submission due consideration and then make his decision. Until then, as I keep getting reminded by others, I will have to be patient!
I assure you that as soon as we hear anything, our fantastic supporters on PPRuNe will be first to hear of it.
I thank you all for your patience and continued support.
Regards, as always.
Brian
“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook
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Cazatou
I did not realise you meant such an extensive study of the BOI, annexes and cross-references. If you have read all that then my hat is off to you. My interest is not to nitpick at other contributors as you --like little typos in spelling and things. My focus is an attempt to understand the tragedy and it cause as best we can. Fact is we will only ever arrive at a best fit answer and even in that there will be differences of opinion. Unfortunate I know....
I have no clue as to the consequences, if any, regarding any STF equipment being fitted. There is a possibilty that it was installed, regardless of its status, it may still have represented a threat. Nigegilb made a very valuable post at #3543. It seems one neutralising procedure carried out to disable any STF is to rip out the cabling. The idea being that it returns the craft to it original state. Wrong!! As it is equipment still in it beta stage --its support software is still beta, which can be very unstable. This software is installed in the Chinooks AFCS Computers (which also controls the Baro and rad alts) and presumably left running at start up. On a home PC have you ever uninstalled something and then run a common application like Acrobat or MS Word to find that as soon as you activate it something strange happens or the system tries to connect to a network. My point is that millions of users are using these applications every day and report bugs consistantly --and they are still not bug free. Whereas, military/aviation software is more exclusive and with less frequent bug fixes because they are often only discovered in the field. If STF is involved and even removed --would we really know for sure if the software was left running and may have re-configured something in its attempts to communicate with the mysterious STF? The STF software and Alt meter software are all using the same resources. This may not answer your question regarding the sub scale settings but it may have contributed to the problem.
T.
Ps. One must also keep in mind that there was a high demand on all these resources simulteanously because the SuperTANS was calculating the location at WP change.
I did not realise you meant such an extensive study of the BOI, annexes and cross-references. If you have read all that then my hat is off to you. My interest is not to nitpick at other contributors as you --like little typos in spelling and things. My focus is an attempt to understand the tragedy and it cause as best we can. Fact is we will only ever arrive at a best fit answer and even in that there will be differences of opinion. Unfortunate I know....
I have no clue as to the consequences, if any, regarding any STF equipment being fitted. There is a possibilty that it was installed, regardless of its status, it may still have represented a threat. Nigegilb made a very valuable post at #3543. It seems one neutralising procedure carried out to disable any STF is to rip out the cabling. The idea being that it returns the craft to it original state. Wrong!! As it is equipment still in it beta stage --its support software is still beta, which can be very unstable. This software is installed in the Chinooks AFCS Computers (which also controls the Baro and rad alts) and presumably left running at start up. On a home PC have you ever uninstalled something and then run a common application like Acrobat or MS Word to find that as soon as you activate it something strange happens or the system tries to connect to a network. My point is that millions of users are using these applications every day and report bugs consistantly --and they are still not bug free. Whereas, military/aviation software is more exclusive and with less frequent bug fixes because they are often only discovered in the field. If STF is involved and even removed --would we really know for sure if the software was left running and may have re-configured something in its attempts to communicate with the mysterious STF? The STF software and Alt meter software are all using the same resources. This may not answer your question regarding the sub scale settings but it may have contributed to the problem.
T.
Ps. One must also keep in mind that there was a high demand on all these resources simulteanously because the SuperTANS was calculating the location at WP change.
Last edited by tiarna; 30th Jul 2008 at 18:05.
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Cazatou
What a disgraceful way to try and obfuscate a new poster – you yourself posted on the issue of baro alts and so why would he have to go through all the other stuff to get an answer?
My experience at the FAI told me what to expect from the authorities ...
So Caz and Jayteeto I would like to refresh your memories with the information and my interpretation of it below (Jayteeto – it was the RADALT ALARMS that were of interest):
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The QNH at that time at Aldergrove aerodrome was 998,
The QNH at that time at Campbeltown aerodrome was 998,
The regional QNH (used by all aircraft in the area for route flying – briefly so they all have the same reference for altitude rel to each other, ATC info, etc) forecast was given by Aldergrove ATC to ZD576 as follows:
“The Belfast regional QNH from sixteen to seventeen hundred is niner niner one, changing on the hour niner niner zero and the Portree regional QNH sixteen to seventeen hundred niner niner one changing to niner niner zero”.
.
The AAIB Investigation/Racal Report gives:
<<… Barometric altimeter subscale settings were probably at 989 and 991.5 mb. Several defects in the radar altimeter system were identified but had probably not severely degraded its performance and signs suggested generally correct indication at impact; low level warning cursors were at 850 feet and 69 feet, the selection of the audio warning could not be established>>
The “probably” indicating a high degree of confidence that the settings found in the wreckage had been set at these values before the crash.
Obviously the 991.5 makes sense as the regional QNH setting and thus increases confidence that both settings as found were as before the crash.
The 989 setting is a significant indication of their immediate intentions as explained below.
.
The elevation of the base of the lighthouse is taken here as the elevation of the meteorological equipment located there at ground level according to the Met Office – this is 82m or 267ft. The lighthouse landing pad is right there and the“green triangle” landing area (that I have described in many previous posts) is nearby (waypoint A is 280m to the SE) on the same local area of flat ground – let us say roundly, 270ft ASL.
[Using the approximation of 1 millibar for 30 ft altitude change.]
For a QFE (a subscale setting that gives a reading of zero at ground level) to use for landing at that landing area at 270ft el, one would use the nearest suitable local QNH (from Met Office archives, RAF Macrihanish QNH at the time was 998) and compensate for its altitude by reducing the figure by 270/30 = 9 millibar to give an altimeter subscale setting of 989.
This is what was found set on one of the altimeter subscales.
.
The suggestion by the BOI that the subscale setting of 989 could have been the Aldergrove QFE without equal consideration of the lighthouse landing pad nor the “green triangle” landing area (used previously by mil helos incl Chinooks) is misleading for the following reasons:
While the QFE for Aldergrove could have been 989 (at an elevation of 268 ft and with its local QNH of 998), they left with good visibility around the aerodrome and so would not have needed a QFE setting and indeed ATC informed them of the Aldergrove QNH which should imply a directive to use that setting;
It was 40 miles behind them;
They had crossed the Antrim hills with their track over a substantial area of ground in the region of 1000 ft ASL and with peaks nearby to 1500 ft;
There is a requirement that, if you are flying below Transition Altitude, regional QNH MUST be set unless approaching for a landing – that is to say, at the time of the flight, they should have had 991 set on BOTH subscales unless they were imminently landing at (or passing close to) a specific location.
.
The Rad alt warnings set support the idea that they were attempting to land – an experienced pilot has given this description:
”The Rad Alt warnings were not set in accordance with the SOP. One was set above cruising altitude and the other at minimum* where it would have given little, if any, warning of impact with the ground. Again there was no indication that these settings had been altered by the impact.”
*The lower Rad Alt warning was set at 69 ft – this would only make sense if they were imminently intending to use the Rad Alt for touching down in bad local visibility.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
tiarna
The system as described too me when fitted to the HC2 Chinooks seems to have been “stand alone” - however, without a fully detailed technical desciption of the fit I do not know if there was any feed to the HSIs – manufacturers of the on board equipment have supplied diagrams showing the route of data to HSIs which is a normal and common fit – easy where there is a CDU and BUS architecture (eg 1553) that supports interfacing with inputs from several navaids as was the case in even the first HC2 Chinooks (eg HSI can select the nav aid to work from via the mode selector panels – typically either pilot can have his own HSI course selector working off the Doppler/GPS nav computer [SuperTANS in this case] or say a TACAN) and it makes sense to have the handling pilot's course selector working off a feed from such an interrogator as the ARS6 as they close in with the target – but perhaps the MOD preferred the captain having to relay the info to the handling pilot rather than have the trivial addition – do they still use speaking tubes?
Had the common practice of feeding the CDU with the data from the ARS6 (or whatever it is called in the RAF – we havn't even got that clear yet) been the case then the handling pilot's (HP's) course selector being set on 035 is apparent – from the position of waypoint change to the crash site was 035 mag (at the time) which would strongly suggest that the ground handset (PRC112 that such interrogators work off) was on that bearing from the position of waypoint change (someone on the ground with it who should have been at the landing area but who was ½ a mile or so up the hill for whatever reason explains all thet is known about this crash).
If the captain was verbally guiding him, it could only have been that the HP had selected 035 as an aide memoire for the course to follow – hardly worth it at such short range.
But alas unless some have the balls to come forward describing the actual configuration in HC2 Chinooks when they actually had then (which they did at some time) such discussions can't get anywhere.
What a disgraceful way to try and obfuscate a new poster – you yourself posted on the issue of baro alts and so why would he have to go through all the other stuff to get an answer?
My experience at the FAI told me what to expect from the authorities ...
So Caz and Jayteeto I would like to refresh your memories with the information and my interpretation of it below (Jayteeto – it was the RADALT ALARMS that were of interest):
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The QNH at that time at Aldergrove aerodrome was 998,
The QNH at that time at Campbeltown aerodrome was 998,
The regional QNH (used by all aircraft in the area for route flying – briefly so they all have the same reference for altitude rel to each other, ATC info, etc) forecast was given by Aldergrove ATC to ZD576 as follows:
“The Belfast regional QNH from sixteen to seventeen hundred is niner niner one, changing on the hour niner niner zero and the Portree regional QNH sixteen to seventeen hundred niner niner one changing to niner niner zero”.
.
The AAIB Investigation/Racal Report gives:
<<… Barometric altimeter subscale settings were probably at 989 and 991.5 mb. Several defects in the radar altimeter system were identified but had probably not severely degraded its performance and signs suggested generally correct indication at impact; low level warning cursors were at 850 feet and 69 feet, the selection of the audio warning could not be established>>
The “probably” indicating a high degree of confidence that the settings found in the wreckage had been set at these values before the crash.
Obviously the 991.5 makes sense as the regional QNH setting and thus increases confidence that both settings as found were as before the crash.
The 989 setting is a significant indication of their immediate intentions as explained below.
.
The elevation of the base of the lighthouse is taken here as the elevation of the meteorological equipment located there at ground level according to the Met Office – this is 82m or 267ft. The lighthouse landing pad is right there and the“green triangle” landing area (that I have described in many previous posts) is nearby (waypoint A is 280m to the SE) on the same local area of flat ground – let us say roundly, 270ft ASL.
[Using the approximation of 1 millibar for 30 ft altitude change.]
For a QFE (a subscale setting that gives a reading of zero at ground level) to use for landing at that landing area at 270ft el, one would use the nearest suitable local QNH (from Met Office archives, RAF Macrihanish QNH at the time was 998) and compensate for its altitude by reducing the figure by 270/30 = 9 millibar to give an altimeter subscale setting of 989.
This is what was found set on one of the altimeter subscales.
.
The suggestion by the BOI that the subscale setting of 989 could have been the Aldergrove QFE without equal consideration of the lighthouse landing pad nor the “green triangle” landing area (used previously by mil helos incl Chinooks) is misleading for the following reasons:
While the QFE for Aldergrove could have been 989 (at an elevation of 268 ft and with its local QNH of 998), they left with good visibility around the aerodrome and so would not have needed a QFE setting and indeed ATC informed them of the Aldergrove QNH which should imply a directive to use that setting;
It was 40 miles behind them;
They had crossed the Antrim hills with their track over a substantial area of ground in the region of 1000 ft ASL and with peaks nearby to 1500 ft;
There is a requirement that, if you are flying below Transition Altitude, regional QNH MUST be set unless approaching for a landing – that is to say, at the time of the flight, they should have had 991 set on BOTH subscales unless they were imminently landing at (or passing close to) a specific location.
.
The Rad alt warnings set support the idea that they were attempting to land – an experienced pilot has given this description:
”The Rad Alt warnings were not set in accordance with the SOP. One was set above cruising altitude and the other at minimum* where it would have given little, if any, warning of impact with the ground. Again there was no indication that these settings had been altered by the impact.”
*The lower Rad Alt warning was set at 69 ft – this would only make sense if they were imminently intending to use the Rad Alt for touching down in bad local visibility.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
tiarna
The system as described too me when fitted to the HC2 Chinooks seems to have been “stand alone” - however, without a fully detailed technical desciption of the fit I do not know if there was any feed to the HSIs – manufacturers of the on board equipment have supplied diagrams showing the route of data to HSIs which is a normal and common fit – easy where there is a CDU and BUS architecture (eg 1553) that supports interfacing with inputs from several navaids as was the case in even the first HC2 Chinooks (eg HSI can select the nav aid to work from via the mode selector panels – typically either pilot can have his own HSI course selector working off the Doppler/GPS nav computer [SuperTANS in this case] or say a TACAN) and it makes sense to have the handling pilot's course selector working off a feed from such an interrogator as the ARS6 as they close in with the target – but perhaps the MOD preferred the captain having to relay the info to the handling pilot rather than have the trivial addition – do they still use speaking tubes?
Had the common practice of feeding the CDU with the data from the ARS6 (or whatever it is called in the RAF – we havn't even got that clear yet) been the case then the handling pilot's (HP's) course selector being set on 035 is apparent – from the position of waypoint change to the crash site was 035 mag (at the time) which would strongly suggest that the ground handset (PRC112 that such interrogators work off) was on that bearing from the position of waypoint change (someone on the ground with it who should have been at the landing area but who was ½ a mile or so up the hill for whatever reason explains all thet is known about this crash).
If the captain was verbally guiding him, it could only have been that the HP had selected 035 as an aide memoire for the course to follow – hardly worth it at such short range.
But alas unless some have the balls to come forward describing the actual configuration in HC2 Chinooks when they actually had then (which they did at some time) such discussions can't get anywhere.
Walter,
Like some others on this thread you do have a tendency to ignore questions, and answers, which do not suit your particular arguments.
May I therefore repeat a question which I asked you some time ago and which you ignored.
If a landing on the Mull was planned, why do you think that they changed the Tans waypoint to Coran just before they reached the lighthouse? It just doesn't make any sense to me, especially in marginal weather and using an untested navaid as you suggest. Surely, they would have used a Tans waypoint more appropriate for the landing site as a back up, either the field itself or an IP.
Like some others on this thread you do have a tendency to ignore questions, and answers, which do not suit your particular arguments.
May I therefore repeat a question which I asked you some time ago and which you ignored.
If a landing on the Mull was planned, why do you think that they changed the Tans waypoint to Coran just before they reached the lighthouse? It just doesn't make any sense to me, especially in marginal weather and using an untested navaid as you suggest. Surely, they would have used a Tans waypoint more appropriate for the landing site as a back up, either the field itself or an IP.
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Walter
Your reply mostly details hardware and perhaps my post was not clear but when I mention 'shared resources' I mean purely in the virtual sense of software code. The ARS-6 may phyisically be stand alone but if it is accompanied with support software then that is I presume installed within the system cabinet. I would then imagine that it is not reliably 'standalone' if it makes any function or subroutine calls on any of the (virtual) system resources, it could even write a single line of code which might effectly re-configure a shared block of computer code. If you have ever experienced a computer virus then you can see what a single line of code can do.
T.
PS. I only just came across this and you might find it interesting;
CCSR:The Chinook Helicopter Disaster
Your reply mostly details hardware and perhaps my post was not clear but when I mention 'shared resources' I mean purely in the virtual sense of software code. The ARS-6 may phyisically be stand alone but if it is accompanied with support software then that is I presume installed within the system cabinet. I would then imagine that it is not reliably 'standalone' if it makes any function or subroutine calls on any of the (virtual) system resources, it could even write a single line of code which might effectly re-configure a shared block of computer code. If you have ever experienced a computer virus then you can see what a single line of code can do.
T.
PS. I only just came across this and you might find it interesting;
CCSR:The Chinook Helicopter Disaster
Last edited by tiarna; 31st Jul 2008 at 00:57.
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I certainly do not wish to challenge the veracity of nigegilb's statement:
But we have to complete the loop here so we don't keep going around in circles,
If it was to be proven that a redundant STF was in place, then this opens up a debate of possibilities that nigegilb and tiarna have alluded to.
I have also been shown evidence which indicates that ZD576 was carrying STF equipment on that fateful day
there is no evidence I have seen that suggests that FTS equipment was on board ZD576, whether in an active, passive or redundant role. Doesn’t mean it wasn’t there, but I have read a substantial amount of paperwork and asked several direct questions on this subject and never had even a hint of any such equipment.
Last edited by Sand4Gold; 31st Jul 2008 at 15:21.
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AA, I am wary of stepping on anyones toes here, I do not think it is for me to present the facts known about STF, some facts are still being teased out. My own background is no secret and I have some knowledge about how trials equipment can appear on aircraft. I was serving on a specialist section when our fleet lead aircraft was destroyed in the Kosovo war.
Given that the pilots were SF-trained and the kit was originally intended for such people, there are different methods and routes as to how that trials equipment might have been;
a Purchased,
b Fitted,
which are not necessarily "mainstream". With the MoD teams responsible having no experience whatsoever in the implementation of airworthiness, treating it as an unnecessary evil.
As for POSSIBLE breaches of the regs, it is probably safe to start from the generally accepted baseline that the Mk2 was not airworthy at the time (as described by John Blakeley). It is highly unlikely that, against that baseline, a SM/STF installation was implemented iaw the regs because it is one very obvious area where MoD don't adhere to their own regs. (See Nimrod evidence, for more recent breaches).
Regarding the delayed response from Des Browne. Could the reason for the delay be because Government and MoD has realised the implications of “allowing” an “appeal” which is largely based on airworthiness issues. A “result” on any one of those would re-enforce the position on Nimrod and demonstrate wider and longer term failures by MoD, and stop it claiming Nimrod was a one-off?
MoD suddenly looks very weak and vulnerable on airworthiness issues.
Given that the pilots were SF-trained and the kit was originally intended for such people, there are different methods and routes as to how that trials equipment might have been;
a Purchased,
b Fitted,
which are not necessarily "mainstream". With the MoD teams responsible having no experience whatsoever in the implementation of airworthiness, treating it as an unnecessary evil.
As for POSSIBLE breaches of the regs, it is probably safe to start from the generally accepted baseline that the Mk2 was not airworthy at the time (as described by John Blakeley). It is highly unlikely that, against that baseline, a SM/STF installation was implemented iaw the regs because it is one very obvious area where MoD don't adhere to their own regs. (See Nimrod evidence, for more recent breaches).
Regarding the delayed response from Des Browne. Could the reason for the delay be because Government and MoD has realised the implications of “allowing” an “appeal” which is largely based on airworthiness issues. A “result” on any one of those would re-enforce the position on Nimrod and demonstrate wider and longer term failures by MoD, and stop it claiming Nimrod was a one-off?
MoD suddenly looks very weak and vulnerable on airworthiness issues.
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pulse1
<<Like some others on this thread you do have a tendency to ignore questions, and answers, which do not suit your particular arguments.>>
I would have thought that I have made my best efforts to answer all questions put – despite lousy feedback and often misleading answers.
.
<<May I therefore repeat a question which I asked you some time ago and which you ignored.
If a landing on the Mull was planned, why do you think that they changed the Tans waypoint to Coran just before they reached the lighthouse? >>
.
I believe that I have thoroughly addressed this in numerous previous posts if you care to read through them – I will nevertheless summarise here and now:
From data recovered at the known position of the crash, it was possible to make two significant conclusions as to the accuracy of the SuperTANS, which were:
1 The SuperTANS position at power down accurately reflected the actual crash position;
2 The accuracy of the Doppler component was sufficiently accurate to suggest that the a/c had not been manouvring much/had been on steady tracks for a significant period (briefly, if you are turning the Doppler system does not get a steady velocity component and this throws its algorithms out).
(This latter point reinforces the argument that they had been on a steady course and were surprised at their proximity to the ground in the last seconds.)
So the SuperTANS would have been an accurate aid which gives us two conclusions:
1 The position according to the SuperTANS for the waypoint change was accurate (and as can be seen from the maps I posted some time ago, this was very close in);
2 Their position relative to waypoint A would have been invaluable (as had been mentioned by one of the RAF witnesses at one of the inquiries who said in so many words that in changing it, they had thrown away their only accurate reference of use to them in their situation) – so the question you ask is very relevant – and I repeat my thoughts:
Although it had been accurate on the day, Flt LT Tapper was an acknowledged expert in nav systems and knew full well the limitations of the SuperTANS especially after a flight over water (the Doppler usually gets screwed up and this usually is dominant in the algorithms when mixing with the GPS data) – in fact he had warned others in his outfit his concerns over this;
the bottom line is that he would not have trusted it to have been accurate to within ½ a mile or so after a sea crossing;
this has two consequences:
1 with no other (permanent) external radio navaid within range (other than the Mac NDB which would not have been of much use in their situation) there is no way he would have thought it prudent to have got anywhere near as close in as the position of waypoint change (up to and including which they surely had no control problems) relying upon the SuperTANS alone (the margin for possible error was greater than the distance to the shoreline);
2 The only thing an experienced pilot would trust to be relied upon in those circumstances and which would be taken as more accurate than SuperTANS would be a local DME system of some kind – as they do when extracting personnel in exercises and operations, approaching a FAF in bad conditions, avoiding a local hazard near FAFs, etc, etc, relying so often on an ARS6/PRC112 combination.
.
But still, as you so rightly ask, why drop waypoint A in the SuperTANS?
My only suggestions for this are:
1 The captain had decided that the SuperTANS was in disagreement with some other prefered reference and so no longer needed in the immediate locale and so it was moved on to the next waypoint to which they would be headed immediately after the completion of their immediate planned manouvre;
2 If ARS6 was being used and if data from it could have and was being used to drive the HP's HSI, perhaps such data and waypoint A data from the SuperTANS was too close to be unambigious (not much obvious difference) and so waypoint A was dropped so that the HP could not have inadvertently steered on it had his HSI been left selected to the SuperTANS.
.
<<It just doesn't make any sense to me, especially in marginal weather and using an untested navaid as you suggest.>>
The “marginal” weather that I have gone to great lengths to describe in past posts that affected them was the local upslope mist that converged with the orographic cloud at about 800ft – they were not lost in fog but the land ahead had its ground detail obscurred and the hill top topography was obscurred such that visual judgment of their distance off would have been seriously impaired – they would not have approached at any sort of speed without some local, accurate reference for range – as they did not have radar the only thing I can think of is a PRC112.
“untested navaid” ? - it is intrinsically accurate as a local DME and its interfaces with the a/c are by design simple – as likely to interefere with other systems as plugging a GPS into your car's cigarette lighter (as I have described before).
.
<< Surely, they would have used a Tans waypoint more appropriate for the landing site as a back up, either the field itself or an IP. >>
I have been to the site with a GPS and plotted on maps/charts the position of waypoint A – it is the obvious (virtual) inner marker for the landing area (the “green triangle” that I have described in previous posts) – the site used by Chinooks previously – waypoint A is just off the cliff that is the threshold for that reasonably spacious, firm, level area of ground.
The landing pad at the lighthouse (the marked hardstanding) is too small for a Chinook.
You could not want for a better waypoint to put in your system if you were wanting to land on that green triangle – Flt Lt Tapper had himself landed a helo at that site on at least one previous occasion – it used to be used frequently for exercises by mil helos incl Chinooks.
Funny how no one on this site nor anyone in any of the inquiries (Oh!, apart from one of the AVMs who was quite specific about Chinooks landing there) had mentioned the relevance of waypoint A to a known landing area.
.
I hope this answers your questions – now how about some constructive feedback?
.
Tiarna
Much of the software debate has centred on the FADEC – I have made numerous posts pointing out that the engines were found to have been matched – this is a condition achieved when in steady state for at least several seconds when either the FADEC has actively matched them or the pilot has himself matched them with his beep trim buttons – it would be an unexpected state for a Chinook that was experiencing some sort of undemanded power surge or in a situation where the pilot was making emergency manouevres.
The Special Trials Fit (STF) issue cropped up from the clue of the work done on the anti-vibration mounts immediately before the final flight (a common consequence of STFs was initially incorrect anti-vib mounts being fitted) – in no way do I expect that ARS6 equipment (had it been fitted), because of the simplistic interface requirements, had anything to do with any other avionics malfunction that may have contributed to this crash.
Such a system is intrinsically very accurate but, and this is the thrust of my argument that this aspect be thoroughly checked out, the handset on the ground being somewhere other than where the pilots expected it to be would explain everything that is known about this crash – EVERYTHING.
.
Ancient Aviator
There are others who have said privately that it was definitely on board but subsequently are loathe to put their heads up in the public forum – no doubt they have had a flea in their ear.
Why anyone with information would hold back in these circumstances is beyond me – what personal or group considerations outweigh the public good of examining whether a system was being used that could have been wilfully misled by a third party bearing in mind the people on board – the implications for this in our country are just too profound.
<<Like some others on this thread you do have a tendency to ignore questions, and answers, which do not suit your particular arguments.>>
I would have thought that I have made my best efforts to answer all questions put – despite lousy feedback and often misleading answers.
.
<<May I therefore repeat a question which I asked you some time ago and which you ignored.
If a landing on the Mull was planned, why do you think that they changed the Tans waypoint to Coran just before they reached the lighthouse? >>
.
I believe that I have thoroughly addressed this in numerous previous posts if you care to read through them – I will nevertheless summarise here and now:
From data recovered at the known position of the crash, it was possible to make two significant conclusions as to the accuracy of the SuperTANS, which were:
1 The SuperTANS position at power down accurately reflected the actual crash position;
2 The accuracy of the Doppler component was sufficiently accurate to suggest that the a/c had not been manouvring much/had been on steady tracks for a significant period (briefly, if you are turning the Doppler system does not get a steady velocity component and this throws its algorithms out).
(This latter point reinforces the argument that they had been on a steady course and were surprised at their proximity to the ground in the last seconds.)
So the SuperTANS would have been an accurate aid which gives us two conclusions:
1 The position according to the SuperTANS for the waypoint change was accurate (and as can be seen from the maps I posted some time ago, this was very close in);
2 Their position relative to waypoint A would have been invaluable (as had been mentioned by one of the RAF witnesses at one of the inquiries who said in so many words that in changing it, they had thrown away their only accurate reference of use to them in their situation) – so the question you ask is very relevant – and I repeat my thoughts:
Although it had been accurate on the day, Flt LT Tapper was an acknowledged expert in nav systems and knew full well the limitations of the SuperTANS especially after a flight over water (the Doppler usually gets screwed up and this usually is dominant in the algorithms when mixing with the GPS data) – in fact he had warned others in his outfit his concerns over this;
the bottom line is that he would not have trusted it to have been accurate to within ½ a mile or so after a sea crossing;
this has two consequences:
1 with no other (permanent) external radio navaid within range (other than the Mac NDB which would not have been of much use in their situation) there is no way he would have thought it prudent to have got anywhere near as close in as the position of waypoint change (up to and including which they surely had no control problems) relying upon the SuperTANS alone (the margin for possible error was greater than the distance to the shoreline);
2 The only thing an experienced pilot would trust to be relied upon in those circumstances and which would be taken as more accurate than SuperTANS would be a local DME system of some kind – as they do when extracting personnel in exercises and operations, approaching a FAF in bad conditions, avoiding a local hazard near FAFs, etc, etc, relying so often on an ARS6/PRC112 combination.
.
But still, as you so rightly ask, why drop waypoint A in the SuperTANS?
My only suggestions for this are:
1 The captain had decided that the SuperTANS was in disagreement with some other prefered reference and so no longer needed in the immediate locale and so it was moved on to the next waypoint to which they would be headed immediately after the completion of their immediate planned manouvre;
2 If ARS6 was being used and if data from it could have and was being used to drive the HP's HSI, perhaps such data and waypoint A data from the SuperTANS was too close to be unambigious (not much obvious difference) and so waypoint A was dropped so that the HP could not have inadvertently steered on it had his HSI been left selected to the SuperTANS.
.
<<It just doesn't make any sense to me, especially in marginal weather and using an untested navaid as you suggest.>>
The “marginal” weather that I have gone to great lengths to describe in past posts that affected them was the local upslope mist that converged with the orographic cloud at about 800ft – they were not lost in fog but the land ahead had its ground detail obscurred and the hill top topography was obscurred such that visual judgment of their distance off would have been seriously impaired – they would not have approached at any sort of speed without some local, accurate reference for range – as they did not have radar the only thing I can think of is a PRC112.
“untested navaid” ? - it is intrinsically accurate as a local DME and its interfaces with the a/c are by design simple – as likely to interefere with other systems as plugging a GPS into your car's cigarette lighter (as I have described before).
.
<< Surely, they would have used a Tans waypoint more appropriate for the landing site as a back up, either the field itself or an IP. >>
I have been to the site with a GPS and plotted on maps/charts the position of waypoint A – it is the obvious (virtual) inner marker for the landing area (the “green triangle” that I have described in previous posts) – the site used by Chinooks previously – waypoint A is just off the cliff that is the threshold for that reasonably spacious, firm, level area of ground.
The landing pad at the lighthouse (the marked hardstanding) is too small for a Chinook.
You could not want for a better waypoint to put in your system if you were wanting to land on that green triangle – Flt Lt Tapper had himself landed a helo at that site on at least one previous occasion – it used to be used frequently for exercises by mil helos incl Chinooks.
Funny how no one on this site nor anyone in any of the inquiries (Oh!, apart from one of the AVMs who was quite specific about Chinooks landing there) had mentioned the relevance of waypoint A to a known landing area.
.
I hope this answers your questions – now how about some constructive feedback?
.
Tiarna
Much of the software debate has centred on the FADEC – I have made numerous posts pointing out that the engines were found to have been matched – this is a condition achieved when in steady state for at least several seconds when either the FADEC has actively matched them or the pilot has himself matched them with his beep trim buttons – it would be an unexpected state for a Chinook that was experiencing some sort of undemanded power surge or in a situation where the pilot was making emergency manouevres.
The Special Trials Fit (STF) issue cropped up from the clue of the work done on the anti-vibration mounts immediately before the final flight (a common consequence of STFs was initially incorrect anti-vib mounts being fitted) – in no way do I expect that ARS6 equipment (had it been fitted), because of the simplistic interface requirements, had anything to do with any other avionics malfunction that may have contributed to this crash.
Such a system is intrinsically very accurate but, and this is the thrust of my argument that this aspect be thoroughly checked out, the handset on the ground being somewhere other than where the pilots expected it to be would explain everything that is known about this crash – EVERYTHING.
.
Ancient Aviator
There are others who have said privately that it was definitely on board but subsequently are loathe to put their heads up in the public forum – no doubt they have had a flea in their ear.
Why anyone with information would hold back in these circumstances is beyond me – what personal or group considerations outweigh the public good of examining whether a system was being used that could have been wilfully misled by a third party bearing in mind the people on board – the implications for this in our country are just too profound.
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Walter
Thanks for your detail rundown in response to my post. Can I stick my neck out once more and ask (I was aware of the FADEC software issue) could there have also been an ARS-6 software issue. If as you say that ARS-6 was fitted but undisclosed then any software issues relating to same would hardly be disclosed. My understanding of ARS-6 is basically silch, but are there two versions? -exclusively standalone hardware and a software supported version and if so which was fitted? You have stated standalone but both can be referred to as standalone --just as a scanner or printers are standalone but there must be compatible software on the pc to recognise and operate them.
T.
Thanks for your detail rundown in response to my post. Can I stick my neck out once more and ask (I was aware of the FADEC software issue) could there have also been an ARS-6 software issue. If as you say that ARS-6 was fitted but undisclosed then any software issues relating to same would hardly be disclosed. My understanding of ARS-6 is basically silch, but are there two versions? -exclusively standalone hardware and a software supported version and if so which was fitted? You have stated standalone but both can be referred to as standalone --just as a scanner or printers are standalone but there must be compatible software on the pc to recognise and operate them.
T.
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Not operate - just take in the bearing and range data - by analogy, the HSI can get, say, data from a TACAN (via some other black boxes for now) but the radio system working off the TACAN is set up by the pilot - the data is effectively just routed (that is if it is connected at all which we still don't know).
I'll explain the role of the main nav computer in HC2 in some detail by PM when I have a little more time - v briefly just now, it would have to have the s/ware to recognise the data (as per all the other nav data it receives) - not to operate the unit, though.
And I have no idea about the HC2's equivalent of the 47D's HSI mode select panel (which has good descriptions in the public domain) - only that it appears (to the eyeball) to have a good many more options.
Again, for academic interest alone, it would be interesting if someone who was familiar with the systems would come forward to give us a functional description (excluding any sensitive bits, of course).
I'll explain the role of the main nav computer in HC2 in some detail by PM when I have a little more time - v briefly just now, it would have to have the s/ware to recognise the data (as per all the other nav data it receives) - not to operate the unit, though.
And I have no idea about the HC2's equivalent of the 47D's HSI mode select panel (which has good descriptions in the public domain) - only that it appears (to the eyeball) to have a good many more options.
Again, for academic interest alone, it would be interesting if someone who was familiar with the systems would come forward to give us a functional description (excluding any sensitive bits, of course).
Last edited by walter kennedy; 1st Aug 2008 at 00:49. Reason: additional text
Just a numbered other
Caz,
Your post once again indicates your total lack of any knowledge of SH opererations.
Barometric altimeters mean nothing in low level ops, unless you have any chance of requiring an abort to high altitude.
Such an abort was not available and unflyable to the accident aircraft due to the icing level.
The turn left along the coast was available and (most likely) intended.
Why the aircraft continued to imact the mull in local fog is a mystery. It has nothing to do with subscale settings.
Clutch at any straw you like, you have NO evidence with which to assume Gross Negligence, any more than did Wratten and Day.
Your post once again indicates your total lack of any knowledge of SH opererations.
Barometric altimeters mean nothing in low level ops, unless you have any chance of requiring an abort to high altitude.
Such an abort was not available and unflyable to the accident aircraft due to the icing level.
The turn left along the coast was available and (most likely) intended.
Why the aircraft continued to imact the mull in local fog is a mystery. It has nothing to do with subscale settings.
Clutch at any straw you like, you have NO evidence with which to assume Gross Negligence, any more than did Wratten and Day.
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Ark Royal
Nice to hear from you again.
I agree that I have limited experience of SF operations - prior to 1968. I would point out that in 1968 and later years one (meaning "I") was occupied with SF operations involving not only "the Hooligans from Hereford" but also other (perhaps less newsworthy} tasks performed by Special forces other than the SAS.
Or, perhaps, I was not?
Nice to hear from you again.
I agree that I have limited experience of SF operations - prior to 1968. I would point out that in 1968 and later years one (meaning "I") was occupied with SF operations involving not only "the Hooligans from Hereford" but also other (perhaps less newsworthy} tasks performed by Special forces other than the SAS.
Or, perhaps, I was not?
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WK Warning
I have thought long and hard about this but I feel that the time has come to point out the dangers of involvement with the fantasies of Walter Kennedy.
The theories he has regarding the crash of ZD576 are his and his alone. They do NOT represent the views of any of the berieved families ; nor of the Civil & Military Authorities whose duty it was to investigate this Accident.
I would be prepared to meet WK at a venue of his choice and to receive from him whatsover evidence he has of malpractice in this investigation so that this matter may be laid to rest.
WK
Over to you
I have thought long and hard about this but I feel that the time has come to point out the dangers of involvement with the fantasies of Walter Kennedy.
The theories he has regarding the crash of ZD576 are his and his alone. They do NOT represent the views of any of the berieved families ; nor of the Civil & Military Authorities whose duty it was to investigate this Accident.
I would be prepared to meet WK at a venue of his choice and to receive from him whatsover evidence he has of malpractice in this investigation so that this matter may be laid to rest.
WK
Over to you
WK Warning
I have thought long and hard about this but I feel that the time has come to point out the dangers of involvement with the fantasies of Walter Kennedy.
I have thought long and hard about this but I feel that the time has come to point out the dangers of involvement with the fantasies of Walter Kennedy.
whatsover evidence he has of malpractice in this investigation so that this matter may be laid to rest.
Avoid imitations
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I think it is important to point out that ArkRoyal wrote SH, meaning Support Helicopters.
Cazatou, you were a VIP fixed wing pilot whilst operating over NI (operating under separate rules and different limits to SH operations).
You replied by referring to SF, meaning Special Forces, completely off topic.
How much personal flying experience of RAF support helicopter operations do you actually have?
Cazatou, you were a VIP fixed wing pilot whilst operating over NI (operating under separate rules and different limits to SH operations).
You replied by referring to SF, meaning Special Forces, completely off topic.
How much personal flying experience of RAF support helicopter operations do you actually have?
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Cazatou
<< I would be prepared to meet WK at a venue of his choice ...>>
I was in the west of France (not too distant from where you reside) for a couple of weeks last summer and I telephoned you - I told you that I had a lot of material with me - I offered to come to your town to meet you at your convenience - you politely declined.
I was in that region again Easter time.
Does this now mean that you are willing to come to Western Australia?
.
Don't be embarrassed - I spent a total of 5 months in UK this last year with all my info, maps, etc and tried hard to get a hearing with anyone in the Mull group - nothing.
.
Now about you and those subscale settings - I believe that you were fundamentally correct in drawing attention to them - trouble is, I found them to be relevant and thanked you for it way back when it first came up - then you changed tack and made statements as to distance from me - and here you go again - where are your balls, man?
Again, you are not the only one afraid of being seen to support this theory so don't feel too ashamed.
<< I would be prepared to meet WK at a venue of his choice ...>>
I was in the west of France (not too distant from where you reside) for a couple of weeks last summer and I telephoned you - I told you that I had a lot of material with me - I offered to come to your town to meet you at your convenience - you politely declined.
I was in that region again Easter time.
Does this now mean that you are willing to come to Western Australia?
.
Don't be embarrassed - I spent a total of 5 months in UK this last year with all my info, maps, etc and tried hard to get a hearing with anyone in the Mull group - nothing.
.
Now about you and those subscale settings - I believe that you were fundamentally correct in drawing attention to them - trouble is, I found them to be relevant and thanked you for it way back when it first came up - then you changed tack and made statements as to distance from me - and here you go again - where are your balls, man?
Again, you are not the only one afraid of being seen to support this theory so don't feel too ashamed.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 1st Aug 2008 at 22:49. Reason: correction
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SH/SF......... This is the Chinook thread for goodness sake!! Since when are some of these people concerned with facts?? It has an S in it, so that automatically qualifies!! In fairness to Caz, he is pretty consistent and is entitled to his view, even if the majority here disagree.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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I'm beginning to wonder if the MoD are deliberately holding off from releasing a decision as it would appear that everytime there is a period of waiting, the same arguments start, followed by personal abuse. It must be quite entertaining for them in a strange kind of way.
How about we all wait patiently (bit rich coming from me though!), or channel our energies towards the MoD to get them to respond to our submission, rather than vent our frustratioons on each other.
Not policing the thread, but trying all sorts in the hope that the MoD pull their finger out!
Regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
How about we all wait patiently (bit rich coming from me though!), or channel our energies towards the MoD to get them to respond to our submission, rather than vent our frustratioons on each other.
Not policing the thread, but trying all sorts in the hope that the MoD pull their finger out!
Regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Brian, I'm afraid that Nigegilb has it about right when he says that for the MOD to now allow an appeal in this case would open up a Pandora's Box for them. The understandable preoccupation of this thread has been to restore the reputations of two experienced and gallant pilots. In effect those reputations are held hostage by the MOD. If they are restored then the obvious question re-emerges. Who and/or what was responsible for this accident? The MOD knows that would shine a light into murky corners, as it has on the Nimrod and Hercules threads, as it has in fatal accidents on Tornado, Sea King and others. The connection in all these accidents, and possibly this one, is airworthiness or rather lack of. The judge and jury in this court room is also the chief suspect. I would not expect from the MOD; "I dunnit, I dunnit, I dunnit, its a fair cop, cor blimey you've got me banged to rights and no mistake, guvnor". Restoring the reputations of these two pilots is a noble cause, granted. Restoring the proper enforcement of UK Military Airworthiness Regulations by wresting them away from the MOD into an independent MAA will save many lives and avoid wholly unnecessary accidents in the future. I submit that is an even worthier cause.