Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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J B
I, too, have not been saying much lately but not for reasons of waiting on the establishment but I feel obliged to challenge some points made in you recent post.
<<If indeed you were to "banjo" your aircraft into the hillside "whilst doing a low level Navex in marginal weather conditions" (a situation that did not apply to this flight anyway) ...>>
Well, many parameters point that way why are you so certain? Has anyone come forward as a witness to the preflight briefing? Have you had a privileged look at the hitherto absent flight plan?
<< ... having failed, for reasons beyond your control, to make the planned turn as selected for the next waypoint,...>>
As I have pointed out in detail on several occassions, they had already come in very close when they made the change in waypoint which presumably implied that they were under control at that point see the map I posted some time ago. Furthermore, despite the misleading track presented at one of the inquiries by the RAF showing a straight track through a misplaced position of waypoint change to the impact area they had actually turned right at that change and held that track and there is reason to believe that track was planned.
<<...you were struggling to get over the hill you knew was in front of you with an uncommanded engine run-up...>>
That's out because the engines were found at an intermediate power level and MATCHED strongly suggesting a steady state that neither the pilots nor the FADEC had had time to disturb with the full collective pulled up in the last second manouevre. Boeing's analysis had it that they had slowed down (in air speed) in the last leg which would have required less power than the preceding cruise level and therefore further negates the probability of an uncontrolled run up.
I have argued before that they had no intentions of going over the hill as they seemed to be going for the LZ at waypoint A and had altimeters set for landing at that height which is why I suggest they were slowing down.
<<... or a jammed control crate ...>>
That could only have happened when they were already too close as per argument above and they seemed to hold the track OK of 035 from waypoint change to the last seconds when the a/c appeared to respond as expected to the emergency actions evidenced by the control positions you remember, 035 was set on the handling pilot's HSI. Just what part of this leg shows any evidence of jammed controls? Let's look at collective alone by way of example:
The rotors RPMs at impact tells us a lot:
they were down about 10% from memory;
the collective was fully up and they had gained some height in those last seconds so the rotor pitch had responded;
if you check with Boeing's specs, the rotors could loose a significant bit more RPM and still function that is, there was still some significant lift to be had in an immediate emergency lift or (air) braking effort regardless of what the turbines were doing;
they very nearly cleared that cliff and were starting a full slew that is a good way of slowing a twin rotor without loosing height a bit more time and they may have landed in a heap but at a significantly reduced speed;
that they did not cause the rotor RPM to have reduced further before impact suggests not that there was a control problem but rather that they were surprised at their proximity to the ground.
<<...Actually, more likely you entire thoughts would be devoted to trying to get out of an impossible situation!>>
I agree that it was an impossible situation that they were in at the end but for different reasons than yours:
Now I could well be wrong with the following description of the power situation but I think that you in a much better position to know should think about this just to get the ball rolling is my tuppence worth that hopefully you will constructively correct as required:
Starting with Boeing's condition that, after the right turn, they had started to slow down (in air speed, but they had gotten very close to the Mull by that time and the very much increased local wind speed had resulted in the ground speed remaining unchanged);
straight and level but slowing down when still at high speed in a helo is a minimum power sitiuation (thrust just balances the weight drag does the slowing) and further, there is a tendency for the rotors to speed up as the drag decreases on the leading etc etc such that the FADEC (as fitted in this case) would be reducing the fuel to maintain (ie limit to) 100% rotor RPM (you lot could explain this better than me) this may introduce a slight further delay in FADEC response and/or turbine lag when emergency power is demanded/collective pulled up;
in this condition, you must remember that the thrust = the weight and that any sudden turns, for example, before the turbines can spool up, would result in a loss of height without using the stored energy of the rotors by way of increased collective;
so if you were intending to land just before steeply rising ground (with no option for an overshoot) and for whatever reason misjudged your distance to go, you would be flying into a vertical corner.
So what could you do if you had got too close before slowing down enough?:
if you suddenly realise that you are approaching steeply rising ground in this power situation, a steeply banked turn is out because you don't want to loose height, you would use your rotor energy best by gaining height whilst slewing sideways (thrust still vertical) to wash of speed (takes no energy to slew in a Chinook) and this is what they had started to do.
Yet one S.O.A.B said at one of the inquiries that this was not a recognised manouevre for a Chinook yet you see it at air shows all the time and it is described in American docs and yet further, not one of you venerable aviators challenged that S.O.A.B.
<<As to the true cause of this accident it is a fact that "no-one will ever know" - a position acknowledged by the House of Lords Select Committee >>
What does this mean? - a directive from those on high? - how can this be a fact?
IMHO there is a good deal more that can be established about the circumstances if you regulars could drop that mantra for a while.
Now to other posters:
While you all seem to like blasting Mssrs Wratten & Day, you are not appreciating the position that they may have been in: at the time; any open findings that allowed any possibility of foul play had to be dismissed a.s.a.p. or there may have been significant public unrest and perhaps disquiet within the police/security forces involved in NI in the absence of anything positive to prove an accident/equipment failure, what else could they have done if directed by the politicians to contain speculation? - the verdict implied absolutely no doubt whatsoever did it not? Nothing less would have done it. They would surely have accepted that it was their duty to do this for the greater good.
A (difficult and distasteful) job well done and probably amply rewarded but they have to live with themselves which may be very hard if it were to eventually emerge that the crew had been involved in an extra activity which may or may not have left them exposed to an error by a third party whether accidental or wilful and their action had delayed investigation for so many years.
My point here is that it is of no use targetting those two AVMs look at the bigger picture.
One aspect that is not in doubt is that this crash took the teeth out of the anti-terrorism effort leaving the concilliatory path the only option the ceasefire followed so very soon afterwards the secret negotiations had triumphed Clinton had a feather in his cap Westminster could wash its hands of its most difficult obligations to the people of those provinces.
But it is important to look at Ireland and realise that the end did not justify the means the peace process has proved lousy for all sides.
Looking back, is it enough to just clear the pilots' names based upon the AVMs not satisfying the legal niceties? - or is it in the peoples best interest to get as full a picture as possible of what actually happened just in case this dreadful event was not just a convenient, fortuitous break for the politicians?
I, too, have not been saying much lately but not for reasons of waiting on the establishment but I feel obliged to challenge some points made in you recent post.
<<If indeed you were to "banjo" your aircraft into the hillside "whilst doing a low level Navex in marginal weather conditions" (a situation that did not apply to this flight anyway) ...>>
Well, many parameters point that way why are you so certain? Has anyone come forward as a witness to the preflight briefing? Have you had a privileged look at the hitherto absent flight plan?
<< ... having failed, for reasons beyond your control, to make the planned turn as selected for the next waypoint,...>>
As I have pointed out in detail on several occassions, they had already come in very close when they made the change in waypoint which presumably implied that they were under control at that point see the map I posted some time ago. Furthermore, despite the misleading track presented at one of the inquiries by the RAF showing a straight track through a misplaced position of waypoint change to the impact area they had actually turned right at that change and held that track and there is reason to believe that track was planned.
<<...you were struggling to get over the hill you knew was in front of you with an uncommanded engine run-up...>>
That's out because the engines were found at an intermediate power level and MATCHED strongly suggesting a steady state that neither the pilots nor the FADEC had had time to disturb with the full collective pulled up in the last second manouevre. Boeing's analysis had it that they had slowed down (in air speed) in the last leg which would have required less power than the preceding cruise level and therefore further negates the probability of an uncontrolled run up.
I have argued before that they had no intentions of going over the hill as they seemed to be going for the LZ at waypoint A and had altimeters set for landing at that height which is why I suggest they were slowing down.
<<... or a jammed control crate ...>>
That could only have happened when they were already too close as per argument above and they seemed to hold the track OK of 035 from waypoint change to the last seconds when the a/c appeared to respond as expected to the emergency actions evidenced by the control positions you remember, 035 was set on the handling pilot's HSI. Just what part of this leg shows any evidence of jammed controls? Let's look at collective alone by way of example:
The rotors RPMs at impact tells us a lot:
they were down about 10% from memory;
the collective was fully up and they had gained some height in those last seconds so the rotor pitch had responded;
if you check with Boeing's specs, the rotors could loose a significant bit more RPM and still function that is, there was still some significant lift to be had in an immediate emergency lift or (air) braking effort regardless of what the turbines were doing;
they very nearly cleared that cliff and were starting a full slew that is a good way of slowing a twin rotor without loosing height a bit more time and they may have landed in a heap but at a significantly reduced speed;
that they did not cause the rotor RPM to have reduced further before impact suggests not that there was a control problem but rather that they were surprised at their proximity to the ground.
<<...Actually, more likely you entire thoughts would be devoted to trying to get out of an impossible situation!>>
I agree that it was an impossible situation that they were in at the end but for different reasons than yours:
Now I could well be wrong with the following description of the power situation but I think that you in a much better position to know should think about this just to get the ball rolling is my tuppence worth that hopefully you will constructively correct as required:
Starting with Boeing's condition that, after the right turn, they had started to slow down (in air speed, but they had gotten very close to the Mull by that time and the very much increased local wind speed had resulted in the ground speed remaining unchanged);
straight and level but slowing down when still at high speed in a helo is a minimum power sitiuation (thrust just balances the weight drag does the slowing) and further, there is a tendency for the rotors to speed up as the drag decreases on the leading etc etc such that the FADEC (as fitted in this case) would be reducing the fuel to maintain (ie limit to) 100% rotor RPM (you lot could explain this better than me) this may introduce a slight further delay in FADEC response and/or turbine lag when emergency power is demanded/collective pulled up;
in this condition, you must remember that the thrust = the weight and that any sudden turns, for example, before the turbines can spool up, would result in a loss of height without using the stored energy of the rotors by way of increased collective;
so if you were intending to land just before steeply rising ground (with no option for an overshoot) and for whatever reason misjudged your distance to go, you would be flying into a vertical corner.
So what could you do if you had got too close before slowing down enough?:
if you suddenly realise that you are approaching steeply rising ground in this power situation, a steeply banked turn is out because you don't want to loose height, you would use your rotor energy best by gaining height whilst slewing sideways (thrust still vertical) to wash of speed (takes no energy to slew in a Chinook) and this is what they had started to do.
Yet one S.O.A.B said at one of the inquiries that this was not a recognised manouevre for a Chinook yet you see it at air shows all the time and it is described in American docs and yet further, not one of you venerable aviators challenged that S.O.A.B.
<<As to the true cause of this accident it is a fact that "no-one will ever know" - a position acknowledged by the House of Lords Select Committee >>
What does this mean? - a directive from those on high? - how can this be a fact?
IMHO there is a good deal more that can be established about the circumstances if you regulars could drop that mantra for a while.
Now to other posters:
While you all seem to like blasting Mssrs Wratten & Day, you are not appreciating the position that they may have been in: at the time; any open findings that allowed any possibility of foul play had to be dismissed a.s.a.p. or there may have been significant public unrest and perhaps disquiet within the police/security forces involved in NI in the absence of anything positive to prove an accident/equipment failure, what else could they have done if directed by the politicians to contain speculation? - the verdict implied absolutely no doubt whatsoever did it not? Nothing less would have done it. They would surely have accepted that it was their duty to do this for the greater good.
A (difficult and distasteful) job well done and probably amply rewarded but they have to live with themselves which may be very hard if it were to eventually emerge that the crew had been involved in an extra activity which may or may not have left them exposed to an error by a third party whether accidental or wilful and their action had delayed investigation for so many years.
My point here is that it is of no use targetting those two AVMs look at the bigger picture.
One aspect that is not in doubt is that this crash took the teeth out of the anti-terrorism effort leaving the concilliatory path the only option the ceasefire followed so very soon afterwards the secret negotiations had triumphed Clinton had a feather in his cap Westminster could wash its hands of its most difficult obligations to the people of those provinces.
But it is important to look at Ireland and realise that the end did not justify the means the peace process has proved lousy for all sides.
Looking back, is it enough to just clear the pilots' names based upon the AVMs not satisfying the legal niceties? - or is it in the peoples best interest to get as full a picture as possible of what actually happened just in case this dreadful event was not just a convenient, fortuitous break for the politicians?
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Looking back, is it enough to just clear the pilots' names based upon the AVMs not satisfying the legal niceties? - or is it in the peoples best interest to get as full a picture as possible of what actually happened just in case this dreadful event was not just a convenient, fortuitous break for the politicians?
However, I agree that it would be in the best interest of a great many people to get as full a picture as possible. There is a great deal of information somewhere that has not been made available. I was told, quite a while ago, by the MoD, that they have an 800+ page spreadsheet relating to documents associated with the Chinook incident (and, I believe the whole Chinook HC2 situation). It was decided that it would be too costly to let me have sight of that spreadsheet and the list of documents it contained.
As and when it is decided that all this information can be released into the public domain, someone may be able to piece together everything.
What can be done at this precise moment in time is restore the reputations of Jon Tapper and Rick Cook, who were found guilty of negligence despite the lack of evidence required to prove their guilt with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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<<...they have an 800+ page spreadsheet relating to documents associated with the Chinook incident (and, I believe the whole Chinook HC2 situation). ....As and when it is decided that all this information can be released into the public domain, someone may be able to piece together everything. >>
This would be regarding the aircraft's airworthiness? What a dreadful waste of time if there was nothing (pertinent to this accident) wrong with the damned aircraft.
And it sure as hell shouldn't prevent in the meantime consideration of the numerous parameters I have brought to your attention that point to a deliberate local activity in the vicinity of the Mull that would only require your group to assess their meaning using their knowledge and contacts and hopefully arrive at a reasoned concensus a few days or one meeting at most.
What have you got to lose?
This would be regarding the aircraft's airworthiness? What a dreadful waste of time if there was nothing (pertinent to this accident) wrong with the damned aircraft.
And it sure as hell shouldn't prevent in the meantime consideration of the numerous parameters I have brought to your attention that point to a deliberate local activity in the vicinity of the Mull that would only require your group to assess their meaning using their knowledge and contacts and hopefully arrive at a reasoned concensus a few days or one meeting at most.
What have you got to lose?
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Walter,
with the greatest of respect, it doesn't matter what 'reasoned concensus' is reached it will not fulfil the requirement of absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
Please believe me when I say that we have discussed many a scenareo, including one of negligence, but there is no hard evidence to support any one option. The Board of Inquiry concluded that the most likely cause was an inappropriate rate of climb and the reviewing officers used a degree of speculation, but no one is in a position to say that they know exctly what happened on that terrible day.
I am not actually dismissing your theory, but if the MoD say that the equipment you suggest was not in use, there is no available documentation relating to this equipment being used on this flight, there is no documentation available about an alternative landing site and there is no one speaking out about this scenareo, where do you suggest we look?
The only right conclusion, taking into account the rules in place at the time, and the limited amount of evidence available, should be 'cause not positively determined'. If there is evidence proving negligence with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, let the MoD produce it and we can all get on with something else.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
with the greatest of respect, it doesn't matter what 'reasoned concensus' is reached it will not fulfil the requirement of absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
Please believe me when I say that we have discussed many a scenareo, including one of negligence, but there is no hard evidence to support any one option. The Board of Inquiry concluded that the most likely cause was an inappropriate rate of climb and the reviewing officers used a degree of speculation, but no one is in a position to say that they know exctly what happened on that terrible day.
I am not actually dismissing your theory, but if the MoD say that the equipment you suggest was not in use, there is no available documentation relating to this equipment being used on this flight, there is no documentation available about an alternative landing site and there is no one speaking out about this scenareo, where do you suggest we look?
The only right conclusion, taking into account the rules in place at the time, and the limited amount of evidence available, should be 'cause not positively determined'. If there is evidence proving negligence with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, let the MoD produce it and we can all get on with something else.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
walter kennedy:
So a known conspiracy, that is to subvert the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations over the last twenty odd years, as testified to on the Hercules (Parliamentary Questions) and the Nimrod accident threads, should go unconsidered on the presumption that even if it adversely affected the airworthiness of the Chinook, such consideration would be "a dreadful waste of time if there was nothing (pertinent to this accident) wrong with the damned aircraft"? Some presumption, Walter! Others have paid you the compliment that your realpolitik conspiracy theory may or may not have substance, but it does at least compel us to review and revisit all facets of this dreadful accident, and for that they applaud you. In return you pour scorn on another possible explanation, that airworthiness shortcomings in the HC2 at that time might have a bearing on why this aircraft crashed. You should set your sights on the MOD, not those who like you question their motives. There are those who simply say this was pilot error, and grossly negligent error at that. There are others who say that is not proven, and W & D's finding should be put aside, though pilot error was the most likely explanation. Others such as you and I feel that there were other factors at work involving skulduggery. Your skulduggery was committed on the Mull, mine in the MOD. Perhaps those 800 pages will tell which of us, if either, is right
This would be regarding the aircraft's airworthiness? What a dreadful waste of time if there was nothing (pertinent to this accident) wrong with the damned aircraft
The spreadsheet referred to will have been initiated to track the plethora of questions from various sources over the years; and, more to the point, ensure consistent answers were given. (Because the Mull team in MoD could not possibly retain the same staff for 14 years). To this end, they failed.
This is partly because the referenced documents, that is, a large part of the airworthiness audit trail, do not exist or cannot be found. These gaps in the spreadsheet are crucial, because they equate to gross failures or breakdown of process. Wherever you look, Hercules, Nimrod and others, this is the common denominator failure to maintain airworthiness, including an audit trail. In the case of Mk2, an obvious example was the Boscombe decision to discontinue flying accompanied by their expert advice to MoD(PE) as to why they made this decision. To close the loop (audit trail) it was incumbent upon MoD(PE) and their Customer (the RAF) to be equally clear, in writing, why they chose to disregard this advice. I predict a large gap in the spreadsheet around this time.
This does not mean people have deliberately withheld evidence, although of course that is common practice. It is more an indication of the management ethos; call it the arrogance of power if you will, whereby senior staffs of the day (throughout the 90s) felt confident enough to issue edicts that airworthiness shall NOT be maintained. I well remember the Director responsible for a large part of this process gathering his troops together in the St Giles cinema and telling us (those holding delegation and responsible for maintaining airworthiness) that we were the rump end of PE and no longer needed. That would be about early-1992. Think of that timescale in the context of ZD576 and Mk2 in general, and youll see what Im getting at. Quite frankly, the system was falling apart at the seams.
It would be an easy task to simply burn a CDR of the spreadsheet, even if the referenced documents have not been scanned and held electronically. The cost would be in redacting classified material, which one assumes is already done. No, I suspect the reason why Brian has been denied the information is because of what it doesnt contain.
This is partly because the referenced documents, that is, a large part of the airworthiness audit trail, do not exist or cannot be found. These gaps in the spreadsheet are crucial, because they equate to gross failures or breakdown of process. Wherever you look, Hercules, Nimrod and others, this is the common denominator failure to maintain airworthiness, including an audit trail. In the case of Mk2, an obvious example was the Boscombe decision to discontinue flying accompanied by their expert advice to MoD(PE) as to why they made this decision. To close the loop (audit trail) it was incumbent upon MoD(PE) and their Customer (the RAF) to be equally clear, in writing, why they chose to disregard this advice. I predict a large gap in the spreadsheet around this time.
This does not mean people have deliberately withheld evidence, although of course that is common practice. It is more an indication of the management ethos; call it the arrogance of power if you will, whereby senior staffs of the day (throughout the 90s) felt confident enough to issue edicts that airworthiness shall NOT be maintained. I well remember the Director responsible for a large part of this process gathering his troops together in the St Giles cinema and telling us (those holding delegation and responsible for maintaining airworthiness) that we were the rump end of PE and no longer needed. That would be about early-1992. Think of that timescale in the context of ZD576 and Mk2 in general, and youll see what Im getting at. Quite frankly, the system was falling apart at the seams.
It would be an easy task to simply burn a CDR of the spreadsheet, even if the referenced documents have not been scanned and held electronically. The cost would be in redacting classified material, which one assumes is already done. No, I suspect the reason why Brian has been denied the information is because of what it doesnt contain.
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Let me make myself clear (er).
It was an aeroplane.
It was flown by pilots. (like me)
Pilots make mistakes.
Sometimes pilots do stupid things (IMHO like these guys....but I'd still buy them a beer)
I too, have done stupid things (in an aeroplane, but maybe these guys would still have bought me a beer
)
But, luckily, I'm still alive!
Now I'm not qualified to say what really happened. period!
However I am an ex Loganair pilot who's been into Campletown a great many times. (but not for a few years).
Used to be the MAC had no DME- might have saved them?
The Mull is oft shrouded in orographic cloud. These guys were in a VFR machine- presumably in VMC.
Their aeroplane was not an IFR aeroplane.
Why not turn back?
(Thats what the PPL accident reports usually say...."the commander elected to continue etc.etc.)
I'm sorry guys but they WERE negligent. They had pax.
They pressed on.
They fu%&ed up.
Not bad pilots in any way-well no worse than all the other live pilots who'll die in accidents in the next year or two.
But **** it up, they did!
It was an aeroplane.
It was flown by pilots. (like me)
Pilots make mistakes.
Sometimes pilots do stupid things (IMHO like these guys....but I'd still buy them a beer)
I too, have done stupid things (in an aeroplane, but maybe these guys would still have bought me a beer
)But, luckily, I'm still alive!
Now I'm not qualified to say what really happened. period!
However I am an ex Loganair pilot who's been into Campletown a great many times. (but not for a few years).
Used to be the MAC had no DME- might have saved them?
The Mull is oft shrouded in orographic cloud. These guys were in a VFR machine- presumably in VMC.
Their aeroplane was not an IFR aeroplane.
Why not turn back?
(Thats what the PPL accident reports usually say...."the commander elected to continue etc.etc.)
I'm sorry guys but they WERE negligent. They had pax.
They pressed on.
They fu%&ed up.
Not bad pilots in any way-well no worse than all the other live pilots who'll die in accidents in the next year or two.
But **** it up, they did!
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For the record my personal mode of transport, while at work is a 4 engine jet that's certificated for 'known ice' and IFR.
And that is how I operate it, on behalf of my employer.
Were it to be otherwise, I'd have to operate it otherwise.
If the company said it was VFR, VFR it would be!
The poor guys who flew this aircraft are dead now. As are their passengers.
In the medium to short term, we'll join them.
Those who continue the fight to make out that they screwed up a bit less than they're getting the blame for are only taking time out of their own lives with this futile (look it up!) struggle which-QED-will change nothing.
Let it GO!
And that is how I operate it, on behalf of my employer.
Were it to be otherwise, I'd have to operate it otherwise.
If the company said it was VFR, VFR it would be!
The poor guys who flew this aircraft are dead now. As are their passengers.
In the medium to short term, we'll join them.
Those who continue the fight to make out that they screwed up a bit less than they're getting the blame for are only taking time out of their own lives with this futile (look it up!) struggle which-QED-will change nothing.
Let it GO!
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As a former member of the "Mull" team I think I can comment usefully that you need to get real and smell the coffee. My recollection and knowledge of the spreadsheet is that it simply records dates of communication from members of the public, MPs, Lords etc. It has no information in it other than the subject matter of the correspondence and where it is filed. It certainly does not contain the airworthiness audit trail because that was not the purpose for which the speadsheet was designed. It was purely to track correspondence nothing else.
Atlantic Cowboy
I agree. What I said is that it should contain references to other documents, which themselves would form part of the audit trail. Those documents would surely be necessary to ensure the reply was accurate or consistent with the party line? (Two entirely different things). The problem with persisting with a party line in favour of the truth is that, over time, and as postholders change, it breeds inconsistency. The Chinook case drips with such inconsistency, and gets even worse when you take a wider view and study the answers given in other cases. Many of the replies I see are arrant nonsense. On occasion, you even find someone in post who refuses to lie or mislead, putting the cat well and truly among the pigeons. And MoD's position becomes ever more untenable.
I agree. What I said is that it should contain references to other documents, which themselves would form part of the audit trail. Those documents would surely be necessary to ensure the reply was accurate or consistent with the party line? (Two entirely different things). The problem with persisting with a party line in favour of the truth is that, over time, and as postholders change, it breeds inconsistency. The Chinook case drips with such inconsistency, and gets even worse when you take a wider view and study the answers given in other cases. Many of the replies I see are arrant nonsense. On occasion, you even find someone in post who refuses to lie or mislead, putting the cat well and truly among the pigeons. And MoD's position becomes ever more untenable.
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Chinook
Tucumseh. Your statement above is fascinating '.....senior staffs of the day (throughout the 90s) felt confident enough to issue edicts that airworthiness shall NOT be maintained. Nothing of course to do directly with the Chinook disaster, but could you kindly give chapter and verse for what seems to be an incredible deriliction of duty? Regards. JP
Now now John, weve discussed this before and Ive said I draw the line at naming people who arent public figures. You accepted this gracefully. If MoD wants to withdraw the content of personal letters to me, then Ill gladly post stating the policy/rulings I refer to have been rescinded. As it stands, they continue to happily support these rulings, in writing, through Ministers (AF), past and present. In doing so, they are continually at odds with various audit reports and committees which take an opposite view. I happen to support the latter. I know others disagree.
MoD euphemistically calls this a difference of opinion. One side, supported by the mandated regulations, says airworthiness should be maintained; the other says its ok not to. I concede the latter have been very consistent, so perhaps Im wrong. To anyone, on any aircraft, not just Chinook, that is a very dangerous subject to have a 20 year difference of opinion about. Perhaps Mr Haddon-Caves review will recommend changes.
MoD euphemistically calls this a difference of opinion. One side, supported by the mandated regulations, says airworthiness should be maintained; the other says its ok not to. I concede the latter have been very consistent, so perhaps Im wrong. To anyone, on any aircraft, not just Chinook, that is a very dangerous subject to have a 20 year difference of opinion about. Perhaps Mr Haddon-Caves review will recommend changes.
John Purdey:
Fascinating? Fascinating? Of all the adjectives that might sum up tuc's revelations about the murky machinations at the MOD over the past two decades concerning the way that the entire UK military airfleet's airworthiness has been compromised by the complicity and direction of senior officers there are surely more appropriate words than fascinating to describe them? Shocking and appalling are two that come to mind for a start. As for...
That statement is based on what precisely? The BoI, W&D's bombshell? Neither to my mind determined the cause of this accident. There are more worms to be extracted from this can yet. In the meantime the only honourable thing for the Royal Air Force to do is to ensure that this travesty of justice is righted forthwith. Every day that it continues is a stain on its honour.
Let Right Be Done
Tucumseh. Your statement above is fascinating '.....senior staffs of the day (throughout the 90s) felt confident enough to issue edicts that airworthiness shall NOT be maintained.
Nothing of course to do directly with the Chinook disaster,
Let Right Be Done
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BarbiesBoyfriend(Ken?)
You wrote:
One of the fundamental issues that you have not yet grasped (and you are not alone) is that they may well have tried to turn back but, for some reason (eg a control restriction or UFCM) may not only have prevented them from doing so, but may also have caused them to fly into the hill despite their best efforts to avoid this. I'm not saying that this what definitely happened, but it is a possibility and, so long as this possibility exists (along with other possibilities mentioned elsewhere on this thread, some more plausible than others!), there are no grounds for finding the deceased pilots grossly negligent (or even vanilla negligent) "beyond any doubt whatsoever". Neither you nor I (nor anyone else) knows that they "WERE negligent", nor can we know that "they pressed on". They may have been frantically trying to overcome a control restriction or figure out how to negate a UFCM until they hit the ground and, if a CVR had been fitted to the aircraft we would have been able to prove "beyond any doubt whatsoever" whether or not this was the case, but neither CVR nor ADR were fitted, so we'll never know.
It has been suggested that the pilots were in control of the aircraft when it hit the ground, but this may or may not be the case and, again, we'll never know. Indeed, even if they were in control at impact, it should be borne in mind that they may have only regained control a few seconds earlier.
Finallly, the fact that they had Pax on board is singularly irrelevant. Like you, I now ply my trade around the World with a whole bunch of trusting passengers in the back, but I would never take a more risky option when on a positioning (empty) flight than when I have passengers on board. Would you?
I agree that they may have "fu%&ed up" but this can only be one of a number of possibilities and, lacking any proof of this, the verdicts of their Airships remain unsafe and should be expunged from the record.
Please take a few minutes to consider the above and you will, I believe, realise that, whilst they definitely flew into the Ground it may not have been Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).
You wrote:
Why not turn back?
(Thats what the PPL accident reports usually say...."the commander elected to continue etc.etc.)
I'm sorry guys but they WERE negligent. They had pax.
They pressed on.
They fu%&ed up.
(Thats what the PPL accident reports usually say...."the commander elected to continue etc.etc.)
I'm sorry guys but they WERE negligent. They had pax.
They pressed on.
They fu%&ed up.
It has been suggested that the pilots were in control of the aircraft when it hit the ground, but this may or may not be the case and, again, we'll never know. Indeed, even if they were in control at impact, it should be borne in mind that they may have only regained control a few seconds earlier.
Finallly, the fact that they had Pax on board is singularly irrelevant. Like you, I now ply my trade around the World with a whole bunch of trusting passengers in the back, but I would never take a more risky option when on a positioning (empty) flight than when I have passengers on board. Would you?
I agree that they may have "fu%&ed up" but this can only be one of a number of possibilities and, lacking any proof of this, the verdicts of their Airships remain unsafe and should be expunged from the record.
Please take a few minutes to consider the above and you will, I believe, realise that, whilst they definitely flew into the Ground it may not have been Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).
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Atlantic Cowboy, you state the following about spreadsheet:
Happy to accept your word on this, you were there. However can you enlighten us if there was a seperate document drawn up that recorded the airworthiness audit trail as part of the investigation and if such a document exists has it (to your knowledge) been made publicly available?
It certainly does not contain the airworthiness audit trail because that was not the purpose for which the speadsheet was designed.
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That spreadsheet will keep them going in innocuous circles for a while, eh? Total red herring I hope it was not intended to be so.
BarbiesBoyfriend
You wrote:
<<However I am an ex Loganair pilot who's been into Campletown a great many times ... The Mull is oft shrouded in orographic cloud.>>
I wonder if you could comment on the photos and charts I posted #3095/96/97 (page 155 on this thread) 10th Jan 2008?
Do you agree that a strong southerly late after a warm day can be relied upon to get a mist running up the slope starting at a level well below the orographic cloud and that this causes a problem not of seeing the landmass but of judging distance off? (fuzzes up the ground details).
<<Used to be the MAC had no DME- might have saved them?>>
I believe that the Old MAZ TACAN (west end of runway) was still working on that day ZD576's TACAN control unit was set for it (107x) and so it could have had DME if it had line of sight (LOS). Mitchel (who did Boeing's Analysis of Available Data) mused upon this aspect but recognised that the bearing did not fit with the a/c track. Further, LOS is well blocked at the height they were travelling at during the last leg. However for interest, the captain's HSI was found with 028 set which was the exact mag bearing of the TACAN from the position of waypoint change - the a/c's altitude at and prior to this position is not known other than by what an eye witness thought but even so probably not enough for LOS.
BarbiesBoyfriend
You wrote:
<<However I am an ex Loganair pilot who's been into Campletown a great many times ... The Mull is oft shrouded in orographic cloud.>>
I wonder if you could comment on the photos and charts I posted #3095/96/97 (page 155 on this thread) 10th Jan 2008?
Do you agree that a strong southerly late after a warm day can be relied upon to get a mist running up the slope starting at a level well below the orographic cloud and that this causes a problem not of seeing the landmass but of judging distance off? (fuzzes up the ground details).
<<Used to be the MAC had no DME- might have saved them?>>
I believe that the Old MAZ TACAN (west end of runway) was still working on that day ZD576's TACAN control unit was set for it (107x) and so it could have had DME if it had line of sight (LOS). Mitchel (who did Boeing's Analysis of Available Data) mused upon this aspect but recognised that the bearing did not fit with the a/c track. Further, LOS is well blocked at the height they were travelling at during the last leg. However for interest, the captain's HSI was found with 028 set which was the exact mag bearing of the TACAN from the position of waypoint change - the a/c's altitude at and prior to this position is not known other than by what an eye witness thought but even so probably not enough for LOS.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 9th Dec 2008 at 04:56. Reason: addition
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Low Level Navex
Walter,
I am not sure I have enough time left on this planet to respond to all the points you make in your post of 3 December, but we have met and talked several times, and you are well aware that I am not trying to give an opinion on the cause of this accident - I have always stated that I do not make any claims to know this, and that the facts (real not hypotheses) that I quote may or may not not have anything to do with the accident - but they do cast doubt on the justice of a finding of gross negligence. However, you do castigate me for my comment that this was not a low level NAVEX - perhaps, since like you I was not a pilot in the RAF (although I was lucky enough to do a couple of hundred hours flying during engineer cadet training), I have the wrong terminology, but to me a NAVEX is different from a properly planned VFR flight - I would be happy to be corrected. We do know it was a planned VFR flight because this is what the BOI, who did talk to witnesses contrary to your comments, said about it:
30. Operational Procedures. The Board considered that the tasking information was made available to the detachment in sufficient time and detail to enable the crew to properly plan for the flight. Although the maps used by the crew were not recovered, the Board determined that the sortie to Inverness was thoroughly planned, by both pilots and crewmen, as a low level VFR flight. The crew obtained suitable weather information for the flight, and they arranged for the passengers to be issued with appropriate safety equipment and given a comprehensive pre-flight safety briefing. The crew had access to adequate NOTAM information and arranged for their intended flight in the UK Low Flying System to be properly notified. The flight was self authorised by Flt Lt TAPPER, who indicated on the F1575B that he would occupy the left hand cockpit seat. The Board considered that there were only 3 areas of particular note:
a. Outbriefing Procedures. The RAF Aldergrove Flying Order Book (FOB) and the No 230 Sqn Standing Orders (SSO) required Chinook captains to self authorise and to outbrief the 230 Sqn Duty Authorising Officer (DAO) prior to flight. The orders regarding outbriefs, contained in the 2 documents, differ slightly; the RAF Aldergrove FOB implies that aircraft captains are always to carry out an outbrief, but the 230 Sqn SSO implies that an outbrief is not required outside normal working hours. The HQNI Flying Order Book states that the 230 Sqn DAO was to ensure that Chinook captains outbrief through him before departure. On this occasion the DAO was involved with a 230 Sqn Puma formation brief and was unavailable. Flt Lt TAPPER self-authorised and left photocopies of a map showing his intended route with the SHFNI Ops Clerk. The Board considered that in leaving the copy of his route with the Ops Clerk, Flt Lt TAPPER had attempted to comply with the requirement to conduct an outbrief with the DAO. Although it is likely that the weather situation would have been discussed at a face to face outbrief, the Board considered it unlikely that this brief would have involved a detailed analysis of the crew's intentions. The DAO was not the authorising officer for the flight and the normal outbrief for the Chinook crew consisted of a brief outline of the task, and a statement that a crew brief had taken place in accordance with SOPs. The Board concluded that it is most unlikely that a face to face outbrief would have changed the crew's intentions or actions, and that this non-compliance with procedures was not a factor in the accident.
b. This was a comment on crew duty time - and confirmed that they were totally legal at the time of the accident although it was not clear what the crew planned to do from Inverness onwards.
c. Flight Planning Considerations. The Chinook HC2 icing clearance precluded flight in icing conditions in indicated temperatures colder than +4 degrees C. When planning the task to Inverness during the evening of 1 Jun, Flt Lt TAPPER decided, because of the forecast weather, the en-route terrain elevations, the available diversions and the limitations of the Chinook HC2 icing clearance, that it would be unwise to attempt an IFR transit. He planned instead for a low level VFR flight, and included calculations of the Safety Altitudes for each leg of the sortie in his plan. Following his pre-flight preparation for the NI tasking, on the morning of 2 Jun, it remained Flt Lt TAPPER's intention to fly the subsequent sortie to Inverness in VMC. The Board considered that there are indications in the accounts of the people with whom Flt Lt TAPPER spoke prior to his departure to Inverness, that he had mentally ruled out the option of flying under IFR. However, it is unclear whether he had dismissed the idea of IMC penetration completely, or just the option of flying the route to Inverness under IFR. Following their return from the NI tasking, and prior to their departure for Inverness the crew updated their weather information by fax. The Board determined from this information that, in the forecast conditions, the Chinook HC2 icing clearance would most likely have precluded flight in IMC above safety altitude over the Highlands of Scotland, and that Flt Lt TAPPER's decision not to plan to fly to Inverness under IFR was correct. Nevertheless, in the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre, and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow. There was no evidence to indicate that Flt Lt TAPPER was unaware of his option to legally penetrate IMC in the weather conditions in the area of the Mull of Kintyre at the time of the accident. Nevertheless, the Board considered that if Flt Lt TAPPER had mentally dismissed the possibility of flight in IMC, it may have reduced his willingness, if only for a brief period, to convert from VFR to IFR flight on encountering bad weather during the approach to the Mull of Kintyre. The Board concluded that this could have been a contributory factor in the accident.
The "no-one will ever know" comment was certainly not a "directive" from on high - it is a plain and very obvious statement of fact - indeed one of very few facts most people including the Air Marshals can agree on - your ideas are just as much hypotheses as those of the Reviewing Officers. If you think you have facts to support them then, as others have said before me, please provide them - interesting as they are, and plausible as they may be to you and possibly others, your suggestions as to what the crew intended to do have not been supported by a single verifiable fact that I am aware of, and I have even tried to help you find such collateral information - as you are aware.
JB
I am not sure I have enough time left on this planet to respond to all the points you make in your post of 3 December, but we have met and talked several times, and you are well aware that I am not trying to give an opinion on the cause of this accident - I have always stated that I do not make any claims to know this, and that the facts (real not hypotheses) that I quote may or may not not have anything to do with the accident - but they do cast doubt on the justice of a finding of gross negligence. However, you do castigate me for my comment that this was not a low level NAVEX - perhaps, since like you I was not a pilot in the RAF (although I was lucky enough to do a couple of hundred hours flying during engineer cadet training), I have the wrong terminology, but to me a NAVEX is different from a properly planned VFR flight - I would be happy to be corrected. We do know it was a planned VFR flight because this is what the BOI, who did talk to witnesses contrary to your comments, said about it:
30. Operational Procedures. The Board considered that the tasking information was made available to the detachment in sufficient time and detail to enable the crew to properly plan for the flight. Although the maps used by the crew were not recovered, the Board determined that the sortie to Inverness was thoroughly planned, by both pilots and crewmen, as a low level VFR flight. The crew obtained suitable weather information for the flight, and they arranged for the passengers to be issued with appropriate safety equipment and given a comprehensive pre-flight safety briefing. The crew had access to adequate NOTAM information and arranged for their intended flight in the UK Low Flying System to be properly notified. The flight was self authorised by Flt Lt TAPPER, who indicated on the F1575B that he would occupy the left hand cockpit seat. The Board considered that there were only 3 areas of particular note:
a. Outbriefing Procedures. The RAF Aldergrove Flying Order Book (FOB) and the No 230 Sqn Standing Orders (SSO) required Chinook captains to self authorise and to outbrief the 230 Sqn Duty Authorising Officer (DAO) prior to flight. The orders regarding outbriefs, contained in the 2 documents, differ slightly; the RAF Aldergrove FOB implies that aircraft captains are always to carry out an outbrief, but the 230 Sqn SSO implies that an outbrief is not required outside normal working hours. The HQNI Flying Order Book states that the 230 Sqn DAO was to ensure that Chinook captains outbrief through him before departure. On this occasion the DAO was involved with a 230 Sqn Puma formation brief and was unavailable. Flt Lt TAPPER self-authorised and left photocopies of a map showing his intended route with the SHFNI Ops Clerk. The Board considered that in leaving the copy of his route with the Ops Clerk, Flt Lt TAPPER had attempted to comply with the requirement to conduct an outbrief with the DAO. Although it is likely that the weather situation would have been discussed at a face to face outbrief, the Board considered it unlikely that this brief would have involved a detailed analysis of the crew's intentions. The DAO was not the authorising officer for the flight and the normal outbrief for the Chinook crew consisted of a brief outline of the task, and a statement that a crew brief had taken place in accordance with SOPs. The Board concluded that it is most unlikely that a face to face outbrief would have changed the crew's intentions or actions, and that this non-compliance with procedures was not a factor in the accident.
b. This was a comment on crew duty time - and confirmed that they were totally legal at the time of the accident although it was not clear what the crew planned to do from Inverness onwards.
c. Flight Planning Considerations. The Chinook HC2 icing clearance precluded flight in icing conditions in indicated temperatures colder than +4 degrees C. When planning the task to Inverness during the evening of 1 Jun, Flt Lt TAPPER decided, because of the forecast weather, the en-route terrain elevations, the available diversions and the limitations of the Chinook HC2 icing clearance, that it would be unwise to attempt an IFR transit. He planned instead for a low level VFR flight, and included calculations of the Safety Altitudes for each leg of the sortie in his plan. Following his pre-flight preparation for the NI tasking, on the morning of 2 Jun, it remained Flt Lt TAPPER's intention to fly the subsequent sortie to Inverness in VMC. The Board considered that there are indications in the accounts of the people with whom Flt Lt TAPPER spoke prior to his departure to Inverness, that he had mentally ruled out the option of flying under IFR. However, it is unclear whether he had dismissed the idea of IMC penetration completely, or just the option of flying the route to Inverness under IFR. Following their return from the NI tasking, and prior to their departure for Inverness the crew updated their weather information by fax. The Board determined from this information that, in the forecast conditions, the Chinook HC2 icing clearance would most likely have precluded flight in IMC above safety altitude over the Highlands of Scotland, and that Flt Lt TAPPER's decision not to plan to fly to Inverness under IFR was correct. Nevertheless, in the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre, and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow. There was no evidence to indicate that Flt Lt TAPPER was unaware of his option to legally penetrate IMC in the weather conditions in the area of the Mull of Kintyre at the time of the accident. Nevertheless, the Board considered that if Flt Lt TAPPER had mentally dismissed the possibility of flight in IMC, it may have reduced his willingness, if only for a brief period, to convert from VFR to IFR flight on encountering bad weather during the approach to the Mull of Kintyre. The Board concluded that this could have been a contributory factor in the accident.
The "no-one will ever know" comment was certainly not a "directive" from on high - it is a plain and very obvious statement of fact - indeed one of very few facts most people including the Air Marshals can agree on - your ideas are just as much hypotheses as those of the Reviewing Officers. If you think you have facts to support them then, as others have said before me, please provide them - interesting as they are, and plausible as they may be to you and possibly others, your suggestions as to what the crew intended to do have not been supported by a single verifiable fact that I am aware of, and I have even tried to help you find such collateral information - as you are aware.
JB