Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[An Teallach]

JP

At the risk of this debate getting reminiscent of an episode from Father Ted; I can understand small/near as opposed to distant/large. I fail to understand near/slow as opposed to distant/fast unless it's over distances at which an a/c would hardly be recognisable as a helicopter.

[Arkroyal]

Ah,

K52 aka cazatou!

Well, we have been in France for 4 years or so, I guess we have been telling you for 5 years.

Err... telling me what?

You stated:

people who have actually flown the Chinook have pointed out to you that the BOI were correct that the forecast weather conditions would have permitted a climb to Safety Altitude

You are not one, so pray show me evidence to back up your statement.

Oh, and while you're at it perhaps you'd like to answer my other points.

Never before have I had anything to do with someone who is ABSOLUTELY certain that he knows better than 1*/2*/3*/4*/5* Officers who reviewed this BOI.

Your allocation of trust in integrity based on an officer's star rating is simply naïve. You also ignore the fact that none of us has ever presumed to suggest that we are ABSOLUTELY certain of anything in this sorry affair. That is our entire point. NO-ONE knows ABSOLUTELY what happened, and therefore the finding is unsafe.

Now, pleaase don't evade the points you raise when they are answered. Either defend them or retract.

[dalek]

Cazatou, You seem to believe that expertise is directly proportional to rank. In which case Aire Cdre Blakely's comments on the engineering aspects of the accident should carry some weight with you. He has rank and engineering experience.
Did you watch any of the HOL enquiry? In my opinion ( and that of their Lordships )' Sqn Ldr Burke came across as a far more credible witness than Wratten or Day.
I do not question the helicopter experience of AM Day, but Sqn Ldr Burke's experince was both more current and more relevant to type. Any comments?

[John Purdey]

Chinook

An Teallach.
This is becoming a word game, and must stop; meanwhile - it was a helicopter that he saw; he said so Regards JP

[cazatou]

"Absolute Certainty"

Ark Royal,
You say we cannot be "absolutely certain of anything in this sorry affair". At post #2007 however, you state "A climb to MSA was never an option". Seeing as that viewpoint is at odds with the view of the Air Staffs at HQ 1Gp/HQSTC and MOD at that time; am I to take it that you meant something along the lines of "In my opinion a climb to MSA was not a viable option"?
You also state "The flight was planned and flown VFR in
"marginal VMC" which the BOI agreed was "suitable for the mission". I fail to see how any BOI could conclude that flight "in marginal VMC" was "suitable for the mission" if "A climb to MSA was never an option". Far from being "suitable" I would suggest a more appropriate description would be "suicidal".

[John Blakeley]

Weather

Cazatou,
Not sure where the comments about the Board considering the weather to be marginal come from - what they actually said was:
42. Weather - The Board considered that the weather information available to the crew at RAF Aldergrove prior to flight was comprehensive and adequate for the task, and the Board was content that the crew had considered the weather relevant to their flight. The Board then considered the suitability of the forecast and actual weather for the VFR flight planned by the crew. The weather documentation faxed to the crew indicated that conditions entirely suitable for helicopter low level VFR flight would prevail over the greater portion of their route, but that over coastal areas there would be an occasional risk of less favourable but acceptable conditions, and an isolated risk of conditions sufficiently poor to preclude VFR flight. These indications were reflected in the associated TAFs and METARs. Along the crews planned route, these occasional and isolated conditions would only have been expected in the area of the Mull of Kintyre, with a specific risk of a 30% probability of weather below VFR limits being forecast for Machrihanish. In the opinion of the Board, a forecast of a 30% probability of en-route weather below VFR limits was not sufficient to preclude an attempt at a VFR flight (my underlining). However, a suitable bad weather contingency plan would have been required. This might have been a VFR diversion around the bad weather, a VFR return to the point of departure, or a pre-planned climb and conversion to IFR flight (my underlining). The possibility of a lightning strike affecting the aircraft was also considered by the Board, but as there were no reports of lightning activity in the area, and no evidence of a lightning strike was found in the technical investigation, it was discounted. Similarly, the Board also considered the part that turbulence may have played in the accident and, as the aftercast indicates that the turbulence in the area was only moderate, the Board concluded that it could have provided no more than a distraction to the crew, particularly when flying in IMC. However, as the actual weather in the area of the crash site at the time of the accident was very poor, with very low cloud bases and low visibilities, the Board concluded that weather was a contributory factor in the accident.
Clearly the comment that weather was a contributory factor is a potentially valid statement, but it was also part of the Board's sudden change to the idea that the crew had decided to overfly the Mull - in itself a conclusion that has few facts to support it, and if true as you say a "suicidal" decision. In reality the fact that the waypoint change took place well before the Mull (and nobody can say with certainty exactly where) indicates that the crew had every intention of staying VFR and to their flight plan. Nobody knows why they ended up in cloud still approaching the Mull as opposed to making an abort to IFR iaw SOPs - I can only point out that there are still as many technical reasons based on known facts why this might have happened as there are operational hypotheses - and before he changed direction at paragraph 5 of his comments the Stn Cdr Odiham also pointed this out. Even more relevant read Shy Torque's posting on the operational impact of some to the then Chinook airworthiness problems.

[cazatou]

John Blakely,

Thankyou, Sir, for a most courteous and informative reply.

The comments regarding the weather being poor as well as the aircraft being unable to climb to MSA came from an Ex Naval Officers fertile mind. We must, however, face the fact that the Aircraft did not climb to MSA or turn away from the high ground in its path.

There does not appear to be any evidence of an aircraft malfunction so severe as to preclude the flight deck crew from concentrating on the primary task of flying the aircraft and ensuring its safety; or a malfunction which physically prevented them from so flying the aircraft. There was no distress call or attempt to squawk "EMERGENCY"; either of which would have alerted SARSAT.

One possible explanation could be distraction from the primary task by visitors to the flight deck or an unusual occurrence in the passenger cabin. Many years experience as a Comms Fleet Captain ingrained the potential danger posed by such distractions; particularly on crew members unfamiliar with such happenings.

One thing that we do know is that they had a potential major problem with Crew Duty time; particularly as they would need approval from HQNI to nightstop outside Theatre.

One other factor is that the BOI concluded that during their first task the crew would have been unlikely to have had anything to eat other than a few biscuits. Although the Co Pilot and the ALM's had Breakfast in their respective messes, there was no record of the Captain doing so. At the very best no member of the Crew had eaten a proper meal for some 10 hrs when they took off on that fatal sortie. One wonders whether low blood sugar levels could have had an effect on decision making processes.

My thanks once again for a most informative reply.

[Arkroyal]

K52

The comments regarding the weather being poor as well as the aircraft being unable to climb to MSA came from an Ex Naval Officers fertile mind. We must, however, face the fact that the Aircraft did not climb to MSA or turn away from the high ground in its path.

I'll take 'fertile mind' as a compliment, then, as it is certainly more use in this situation than an infertile, closed (and rather sycophantic) one.

The crew planned a VFR sortie, which the BoI agreed was quite possible to have been flown (thank you, John Blakely for posting the detail), a far cry from the suicidal scenario you attempt to paint. Indeed, such dramatic nonsense simply highlights your lack of expertise and experience in SH operations. The 4degC level was at about 2500ft ASL, and the local MSA 2800ft. Perhaps you can explain how the crew might have planned, or even flown, a climb to SALT without exceeding the aircraft's limitations?

Why it did not turn away, neither I, you or anyone can say. Whilst there is no evidence that a malfunction did occur, equally there is no evidence that one did not. The AAIB investigators at the HOL inquiry were at pains to point out that the serviceability of the aircraft could not be assured.

Similarly, your harping on about breakfast is a sideshow. In that theatre, a days work involved visits to many army bases where plentiful food was available to helo crews. You have no idea what food the captain had taken during the day.

One possible explanation could be distraction from the primary task by visitors to the flight deck

have you ever been inside a Chinook? Thought not.

There was no distress call or attempt to squawk "EMERGENCY"; either of which would have alerted SARSAT.

It would appear that the time scale would have precluded this. Yes, just my opinion.

Now, how about dropping your constant references to your qualifications, (which, impressive as they are, were gained a long way from SH, and BTW no more impressive than those of many of us who know a little more about such operations) and answer my points, rather than trawling up new ones.

[walter kennedy]

Shy Torque
I just put the reference to Captain Hadlow as I came across it whilst digging up other references (which, of the top of my head, were from Sqn Ldr Burke and possibly Boeing somewhere in a report – will get to it soon and post).
The point I have made is that this is a real manoeuvre (as opposed to a struggle for control) and should have been pointed out by twin rotor pilots on this thread as a possibility – yet again the opportunity to get this straight is ignored. I believe that it has special relevance in this incident as it suggests that they were surprised at crossing the shoreline when they did and took emergency action in those last few seconds ( the mist started right on the shoreline and so they would have realised that they were in strife on entering it/ crossing the shoreline, etc.) thus pointing to a nav/ judgment of distance error.
XM147 & Brian
Regarding speed
I rather thought the judgment of the a/c’s speed by Mr Holbrook had been thoroughly dealt with by post 1934 and others immediately subsequent – there was no way he could have been close to judging the speed of a large, unfamiliar a/c without a familiar object near it. The calculation of long term average speed would have had to have it at cruising speed in the area in which he observed it, etc..
John Blakeley
You wrote <<In reality the fact that the waypoint change took place well before the Mull (and nobody can say with certainty exactly where) indicates that the crew had every intention of staying VFR and to their flight plan.>>
While I agree with you for many reasons that “ … that the crew had every intention of staying VFR and to their flight plan.” I do not see where you get “In reality the fact that the waypoint change took place well before the Mull ...”
If you look where waypoint A is on a chart/ OS map, you will see that waypoint A is already VERY CLOSE IN – they would have had to have changed waypoint well in advance for your statement to be reasonable. Having talked to a witness who was in a position to know and witnessing myself such a turn in such conditions, I believe that it was the practice to turn up the coast very close in – those weather conditions for mist on the Mull starting just about on the shoreline but clear at sea right up to that point are common and would normally allow this practice.

[walter kennedy]

Arkroyal
In response to another quote “There was no distress call or attempt to squawk "EMERGENCY"; either of which would have alerted SARSAT.”
You wrote
<<> It would appear that the time scale would have precluded this. Yes, just my opinion.>>
I agree, the maximum time they had to react to a problem (waypoint change to impact) would surely not have been sufficient in view of the predicament they would have been in (being so close to danger whatever the problem) for them to attend to such. Indeed, I believe it is the recommendation in sudden emergencies not to attempt to change SSR code as such an action may cause ATC to lose contact (if there was any in the first place) and if they had attempted such the resulting confusion as to what code was set in this incident is an example of why this should not be done!
Which only leaves it that the SSR code found set got there by impact or was an unusual code set for a special task.
For the former, think of the selector switch type and that one wheel had to have been moved 2 places, another 1 – both in the middle, yet the other two (outers) had to be undisturbed – get hold of a gash unit and use a variety of “soft objects”, etc sort of like the “mythbusters” TV team do.
Only one possibility left really.

[FJJP]

Caz & Ark.

Can I summarise?

Two experienced pilots bowling along pointing at lump of rock, knowing a left turn coming up to fly along the coast.

They didn't. They flew into lump of rock.

Why?

Nobody knows. No proof of anything one way or the other.

At best, it could have been caused by factors beyond their control in the timescale and surroundings.

Ergo, should have not been found negligent - given the benefit of the doubt.

The rest is speculation that adds nothing of value to the cause.

FJJP

[Arkroyal]

FJJP, exactly, and that simple argument is everything. That some still can't grasp it gives rise to the continual exchange in this forum.

Walter,

In terms of timescale, I would certainly expect that the order of dealing with any emergency or distraction of: Aviate, Navigate, Communicate would have made any distress call initiation way down the list.

You say:

If you look where waypoint A is on a chart/ OS map, you will see that waypoint A is already VERY CLOSE IN

You fall into the same trap as others. The position of the waypoint is utterly irrelevant. The way one flies VFR in SH Ops is to use prominent features as waypoints. That does not imply any intention to overfly them.

In this situation the obvious course would be to identify the Mull, change waypoint (simply to give rough predictions relative to arrival time and to keep the nav plot updated) and then turn left along the coast to the glen.

Why that didn't happen is the mystery.

[John Blakeley]

Waypont

Walter Kennedy

In reality nobody knows exactly where the WP change took place as the method of analysis of where it might have taken place depended on the critical assumption of aircraft speed working back from the impact point and the “ingenious and complicated” method employed to analyse the TANS data – an analysis where the TANS manufacturer Racal did issue a “health warning”. It was also a bedrock of this analysis that the aircraft had been serviceable and fully under the pilots’ control throughout. However the HofL hearing try to paint a “fair picture” stated as follows:

HofL Part 3

53. The aircraft was fitted with a Racal Avionics "SuperTANS" Tactical Area Navigation System providing navigation information from two independent sources. The system enables a number of way points to be fed into it before a flight. When flying from the point of departure to the first way point the screen[20] shows bearing, distance and "time to go" from the aircraft's current position to the way point. When the pilot alters the system from the first way point to the second, the distance and bearing of the former are replaced on the screen by those of the latter and so on as way points are progressively changed. Racal confirmed that the system was performing perfectly at the time of loss of power and extracted from its memory the information that way point B had been selected when way point A was 0.81 nautical miles distant, bearing 018°. The distance from the way point change to the point of impact was 0.95 nautical miles. The system gave no information as to height or time at the way point change but had recorded that at approximately 15-18 seconds before power down the aircraft was at a height of 468 feet ± 50 feet (Board report para 49). The manufacturers have told us that "18 seconds is likely to be a better estimate".[21] The TANS had also recorded that the height above sea level at impact was 665 ft[22], whereas in fact it was 810 ft. The investigating board noted this discrepancy (para 49); they considered it probably due to "the mechanics of the crash and the developing fireball", but we know of no evidence to support this. The TANS is not intended to act as a Flight Recorder or what is colloquially known as a Black Box, and the information referred to above was achieved by a somewhat complicated and ingenious method of extraction employed by Racal.

As you can see there is considerable doubt as to whether the height recorded at the WP change would have been accurate, but more importantly I understand that because the TANS does not have an external time reference the timing estimates taken from the system had to assume aircraft speed based on the assumption, albeit an informed one, of impact speed. Thus in terms of time and distance to the WP there is a danger of a circular hypothesis developing. Racal made it clear that the methods used to extract data from the TANS were certainly not equivalent to a forensic recorder such as an ADR, and hence the TANS information gives estimates thus adding to hypotheses not facts. However two questions, please, for those SH pilots out there:

 If we accept the TANS data as correct is 0.81NM, even with a GS of around 150kts (an assumption still based on TANS data – not a fact), an unusually close (or even dangerously close) distance to turn 7 degrees left in VFR conditions?
 Why does everyone assume that the aircraft was “serviceable” at the time of the waypoint change? If an emergency was developing, or indeed had developed, such that you had lost control of the aircraft or engines in some way would it not be quite reasonable for MALM Forbes in the middle seat to have selected the next waypoint as the safe heading to fly?

I am not saying this happened, but so far all of the operational scenarios seem to have been predicated on the pilots being guilty of gross negligence – how about you operators trying a few that would be based on their innocence! Remember even the Board started with the totally unsubstantiated (in terms of what they then found) statement that “Nevertheless, there was sufficient evidence to eliminate as possible causes: major technical malfunction or structural failure of the aircraft prior to impact; …… Therefore the Inquiry focused on the crew’s handling and operation of the aircraft.” But even then they did not find any totally conclusive proof of pilot error (a balance of probabilities is just what it says it is – and we must remember the pressure they would have been under the second time round) let alone negligence – just about all of their conclusions are hypotheses – later turned to “facts” by the Reviewing Officers. The central question that the Board does not seem to have considered at all, is whether, either as a result of the Release to Service process and/or the defect history of the aircraft, the “airworthiness chain” was still intact for ZD576. As any of you who have read my full report on the Chinook web site will know in my view there is clear evidence that it was not.

FJJP’s last post sums it up nicely, but while MOD continues to maintain this grossly unjust and criminal smear of “culpable homicide” against the pilot’s names we have to continue the fight. Nobody will ever know the cause of this accident, but we all know where the real issues lay then as now, and I suggest that eventually MOD may be more permanently embarrassed by what we are finding as we are able to dig deeper into the background to this accident, the problems with the introduction to service of the Chinook Mk2 and the inconsistent nature of RAF justice at the time, than they would be in the short term by any withdrawal of the Gross Negligence verdict.

[dalek]

Cazatou,
You conveniently sidestepped my last question.
Do you not accept that the "expert" opinions and hypothesis of Blakeley and Burke are at least as valid as the "expert" opinion of Day. What is the claim to expertise of Wratten?
Bye the way I know a couple of officers of Air Rank who are highly sceptical of the "official" findings, but are reluctant to come out in public.

[cazatou]

Ark Royal,

I note that you are appreciative that I consider that you have a fertile mind. Indeed I do. A Farmer will appreciate having a fertile field - but he will still have to sort the wheat from the chaff.

YES!! I do support the view point of Sir John Day; someone whom I admire and have known for, according to my calculations, some 35 years. Has anyone asked the Officer of YOUR former Service, who was the Captain of the other Crew, for his opinion on these matters? After all, when people start questioning the pre flight planning, they are calling into question the Professional competence of HIS crew.

However, regarding Sir John Day.

As I have said before. he was operating in the Jungles of South East Asia ON ACTIVE SERVICE before most of the contributors to this thread had even been thought of :- LET ALONE BORN!!

In addition, a further thought. Support Helicopters only had one engine in those days.

Now, those who wish to cast aspersions; WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE DONE?

Bear in mind that you are responsible for the resupply of all Army Bases in areas subject to terrorist activity, the insertion and active support of offensive patrols and also any "Special Forces" activities.

You also have to support the RUC and the UDF in their counter - insurgency activity.

There are people who have expressed extreme views on the deployment of personnel and aircraft to this theatre:

Well now is the time to stand up and be counted.

WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE DONE?????

[cazatou]

dalek

Apologies, I missed your post whilst composing mine.

Even us "superheroes" are fallible.

Oh. Ark. That was a joke!!

Well, now I come to think of it...........?

[Brian Dixon]

Cazatou,
As far as I'm concerned, no one is calling into question the service, or ability, of Air Vice Mashal Day (nor, for that matter, Air Chief Marshal Wratten).

What is being questioned is why they ignored the rule in place at the time - that of finding deceased aircrew guilty of negligence with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.

To answer your question to Ark Royal - "What would you do?", my own personal answer would be - I don't know, because no-one knows what was going on. In broad terms, I suppose would be trying to fly the aircraft.

May I also reassure you that us non-"superheroes" are fallible too!

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Tandemrotor]

Cazatou, you said:

Has anyone asked the Officer of YOUR former Service, who was the Captain of the other Crew, for his opinion on these matters? After all, when people start questioning the pre flight planning, they are calling into question the Professional competence of HIS crew.

Forgive me, but can you just explain that to me?

[Arkroyal]

K52

WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE DONE?????

About what? Conducting the flight, or judging the actions and findings of the BoI?

One of us, probably both, maybe had a little too much wine last night maybe.

[cazatou]

Arkroyal

I concur - Chateau les Placiols 2002.