Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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JP, I cannot actually believe you said:
They had not intention of 'COASTING IN', therefore any arguement you have about mis-identing a lighthouse or whatever is ENTIRELY irrelevant.
That they DID coast in meant [to me at least] that they did not have control over the aircraft flying systems. I have flown thousands of hours at low level, including the Mull area, and in similar circumstances weather-wise, and I can assure you that I would NEVER have continued in a straight line towards the cloud-covered hills IF I COULD PREVENT IT.
I really cannot figure out your arguments. You seem to be missing the whole point of this thread: NOBODY CAN SAY, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, WHY THESE TWO HIGHLY EXPERIENCED PILOTS ALLOWED THE AIRCRAFT TO FLY INTO SOLID GROUND. All of us can theorise until the cows come home, but even if one of us hit the nail on the head describing precisely what caused the accident, IT CANNOT BE PROVED.
I hope that I have clarified the position. Now please stop claiming that you know what happened, because you can't.
I, too, will heed An Teallach's advice.
It seems to me thereore that the crew were likely to be relying on a visual fix as they coasted in, and tragically got it wrong.
That they DID coast in meant [to me at least] that they did not have control over the aircraft flying systems. I have flown thousands of hours at low level, including the Mull area, and in similar circumstances weather-wise, and I can assure you that I would NEVER have continued in a straight line towards the cloud-covered hills IF I COULD PREVENT IT.
I really cannot figure out your arguments. You seem to be missing the whole point of this thread: NOBODY CAN SAY, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, WHY THESE TWO HIGHLY EXPERIENCED PILOTS ALLOWED THE AIRCRAFT TO FLY INTO SOLID GROUND. All of us can theorise until the cows come home, but even if one of us hit the nail on the head describing precisely what caused the accident, IT CANNOT BE PROVED.
I hope that I have clarified the position. Now please stop claiming that you know what happened, because you can't.
I, too, will heed An Teallach's advice.
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W5,
No offence taken, you express yourself clearly and honestly.
Regarding my selective use of the HoL evidence, I was attempting to reply to your earlier claims made in post# 1994
which contrasts with your later statement
To which I simply replied:
You then challenged me to
I responded by quoting Witness As reference to the manual you originally claimed did not exist and went on to say:
I hope this explains what appears to you to be selective quoting.
I accept that we differ on our recollection of events 13 years ago, however, I felt I could not leave your claims of post #1994 unchallenged.
No offence taken, you express yourself clearly and honestly.
Regarding my selective use of the HoL evidence, I was attempting to reply to your earlier claims made in post# 1994
There were no manuals for the MkII at the time. We got the GS screwdrivers and opened every panel we could to locate major components and see where items such as magnetic plugs and temperature bulbs were located. We had the task of understanding where the indications in the cockpit originated. I wholly understand how you can find this hard to believe; it is just outrageous. However it is what happened.
The original manual was at best weak, worst misleading and thin on information throughout.
I'm sorry but this urban myth is simply untrue. ..... however, to claim that there were no manuals is very far wide of the mark
Perhaps you can provide evidence of a freely available, aircrew manual at the time of the crash
Not sure what I was expected to provide 13 years later
I accept that we differ on our recollection of events 13 years ago, however, I felt I could not leave your claims of post #1994 unchallenged.
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Aircrew Manual
I am reluctant to enter the debate on yet another topic, but given the posts of W5 and yourself regarding the Aircrew Manual I wondered if the following extract from my full Engineering Assessment of Oct 03 would help shed further light on the topic. The extract relates mainly to the FRCs, where the Board did take some evidence, but as far as I can see no serious attempt was made to assess the rest of the aircrew and engineering publication, despite their key role in the airworthiness chain.
Extract:
One of the concerns in all that has gone on in the various Inquiries since the accident and the many questions in Parliament and elsewhere must be that MOD does not appear to have carried out any form of serious, and independent, internal review of the issues being raised for themselves. Everything in this Review is from public domain information – MOD would have the advantage of having a lot more information to either support or disprove the comments being made. Instead MOD has hidden behind the “flag” of no new evidence (although if they looked they would see plenty of unused evidence), and has continued to ignore or even obfuscate those “facts” and questions that they do not like. A classic example of this relates to the FRCs:
Questioned by the Board Witness 20 was asked:
Question:
“Were these malfunctions covered by drills in the Chinook HC2 Flight Reference Cards (FRC)?”
Reply:
“No, the Chinook HC2 FRC were based primarily on the Chinook D model, which is not fitted with FADEC. Drills relating to FADEC were based on the best information on how the system would respond during certain malfunctions.”
Question:
“Were there any areas where the Chinook HC2 FRC, valid on 2 Jun 94, were confusing?”
Reply:
“Yes, a number of emergency drills, in particular electrical and hydraulic, were poorly laid out and required the crew to be familiar with the drill to avoid confusion. The shortfall in the Chinook HC2 FRC was discussed with crews during their conversion courses.”
In their findings the Board, at paragraph 46c comments:
“The relative inexperience of the crew on the Chinook HC2 could have amplified the degree of distraction created by even a relatively minor technical occurrence. Any distraction could have been further amplified by the poor guidance provided by the Chinook HC2 Flight Reference Cards.”
In their observations at paragraph 70a the Board states:
“The Chinook HC2 FRCs valid at the time of the accident were confusing.”
Despite the fact that the Board has identified the FRCs as an issue (and the place of FRCs in the airworthiness “chain” is a key one) this is not followed up. The “relative inexperience” of the crew raises the issue of why the Chinook HC2 was chosen for such a high profile passenger sortie – this is not followed up at all by the Board. (It is interesting to note that the HC2 was used despite a request from Flt Lt Tapper to retain an extra HC1 in Northern Ireland “because of the limited operational capabilities of the HC2 due to its Controller Aircraft Release” – statement by witness 11). The same witness also confirms that he was happy with Flt Lt Tapper’s ability to operate the HC2 inter alia, “because he knew his way around the Chinook HC2 Flight Reference Cards, which are particularly confusing”. (Hardly a ringing endorsement for the suitability of the HC2 for passenger operations, although further confirmation that Flt Lt Tapper was taking the problems of the HC2 seriously.)
It is also interesting that apart from the FRCs the Board, despite the clear implications of statements such as those from Witness 20, makes no attempt to assess the completeness and effectiveness of the rest of the Aircrew (or Engineering) Publications system – nor did the TORs of the Board ask them to do so.
Of further interest is that MOD officials seem to have deliberately misinformed Ministers, and they in turn Parliament, about the true situation with the FRCs. On 13 June 2000 Mr Brake raised the following written Parliamentary question:
“To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if his Department requires manufacturers to provide complete flight reference cards prior to releasing an aircraft into operational service; if the Chinook Mk 2 had a complete set of flight reference cards at the time of the fatal crash of ZD 576 in June 1994, and if these included drills covering the possibility of FADEC malfunctions. [125300]”
In his reply Mr Spellar said:
“All manufacturers of new Ministry of Defence aircraft are contractually required to provide full aircrew documentation prior to release to operational service. This documentation includes both Aircrew Manual and Flight Reference Cards. The Chinook Mk 2 had a complete set of Flight Reference Cards in June 1994. This contained all the normal and emergency operating drills in force at that time, including drills for a possible FADEC malfunction.”
I am sure that MOD chose its words very carefully and they are probably all in the strictest sense true – however, they do not reflect the Board’s findings and the real situation facing the Chinook HC2 aircrews, and one has to wonder why MOD chose to offer this apparent misinformation.
JB
Extract:
One of the concerns in all that has gone on in the various Inquiries since the accident and the many questions in Parliament and elsewhere must be that MOD does not appear to have carried out any form of serious, and independent, internal review of the issues being raised for themselves. Everything in this Review is from public domain information – MOD would have the advantage of having a lot more information to either support or disprove the comments being made. Instead MOD has hidden behind the “flag” of no new evidence (although if they looked they would see plenty of unused evidence), and has continued to ignore or even obfuscate those “facts” and questions that they do not like. A classic example of this relates to the FRCs:
Questioned by the Board Witness 20 was asked:
Question:
“Were these malfunctions covered by drills in the Chinook HC2 Flight Reference Cards (FRC)?”
Reply:
“No, the Chinook HC2 FRC were based primarily on the Chinook D model, which is not fitted with FADEC. Drills relating to FADEC were based on the best information on how the system would respond during certain malfunctions.”
Question:
“Were there any areas where the Chinook HC2 FRC, valid on 2 Jun 94, were confusing?”
Reply:
“Yes, a number of emergency drills, in particular electrical and hydraulic, were poorly laid out and required the crew to be familiar with the drill to avoid confusion. The shortfall in the Chinook HC2 FRC was discussed with crews during their conversion courses.”
In their findings the Board, at paragraph 46c comments:
“The relative inexperience of the crew on the Chinook HC2 could have amplified the degree of distraction created by even a relatively minor technical occurrence. Any distraction could have been further amplified by the poor guidance provided by the Chinook HC2 Flight Reference Cards.”
In their observations at paragraph 70a the Board states:
“The Chinook HC2 FRCs valid at the time of the accident were confusing.”
Despite the fact that the Board has identified the FRCs as an issue (and the place of FRCs in the airworthiness “chain” is a key one) this is not followed up. The “relative inexperience” of the crew raises the issue of why the Chinook HC2 was chosen for such a high profile passenger sortie – this is not followed up at all by the Board. (It is interesting to note that the HC2 was used despite a request from Flt Lt Tapper to retain an extra HC1 in Northern Ireland “because of the limited operational capabilities of the HC2 due to its Controller Aircraft Release” – statement by witness 11). The same witness also confirms that he was happy with Flt Lt Tapper’s ability to operate the HC2 inter alia, “because he knew his way around the Chinook HC2 Flight Reference Cards, which are particularly confusing”. (Hardly a ringing endorsement for the suitability of the HC2 for passenger operations, although further confirmation that Flt Lt Tapper was taking the problems of the HC2 seriously.)
It is also interesting that apart from the FRCs the Board, despite the clear implications of statements such as those from Witness 20, makes no attempt to assess the completeness and effectiveness of the rest of the Aircrew (or Engineering) Publications system – nor did the TORs of the Board ask them to do so.
Of further interest is that MOD officials seem to have deliberately misinformed Ministers, and they in turn Parliament, about the true situation with the FRCs. On 13 June 2000 Mr Brake raised the following written Parliamentary question:
“To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if his Department requires manufacturers to provide complete flight reference cards prior to releasing an aircraft into operational service; if the Chinook Mk 2 had a complete set of flight reference cards at the time of the fatal crash of ZD 576 in June 1994, and if these included drills covering the possibility of FADEC malfunctions. [125300]”
In his reply Mr Spellar said:
“All manufacturers of new Ministry of Defence aircraft are contractually required to provide full aircrew documentation prior to release to operational service. This documentation includes both Aircrew Manual and Flight Reference Cards. The Chinook Mk 2 had a complete set of Flight Reference Cards in June 1994. This contained all the normal and emergency operating drills in force at that time, including drills for a possible FADEC malfunction.”
I am sure that MOD chose its words very carefully and they are probably all in the strictest sense true – however, they do not reflect the Board’s findings and the real situation facing the Chinook HC2 aircrews, and one has to wonder why MOD chose to offer this apparent misinformation.
JB
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Firstly, my apologies for my absence but it was unavoidable. I believe Brian Dixon made my apologies at the time. Secondly, I doubt that I will be able to contribute as regulary as I did for a little time yet.
dalek - your post 2054
"I do not question the helicopter experience of AM Day but Sqn Ldr Burkes experience was both more current and relevant to type. Any comments?"
Well, yes actually.
At the same time as the Chinook BOI was going through HQ 1 GP there was, amongst the dozen or so other Aircraft Accident BOI's going through Group at that time, a BOI into a Tornado crash which had happened at a well known NATO range in Sardinia.
The Accident aircraft was No 2 of a pair doing practice laydown attacks. As the No 2 was approaching on his first pass there was a muffled thump and No 2 engine ran down. The Pilot carried out the shutdown drill, informed his Nav they had lost No 2 engine, called the Range to abandon his attack run and informed his leader of the problem and asked for a visual inspection. He then instructed the Nav to read the engine shut down checks.
The section leader turned tightly in behind his No2 and saw that the entire rear end if the Tornado was a mass of flames and ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. This the crew did and the aircraft crashed into the sea.
The BOI President was as a Tornado Sqn Ldr Navigator, with a Flt Lt tornado Pilot and a Flt Lt Tornado Eng O making up the BOI. The BOI, after considering all the evidence, found the Tornado crew negligent to a gross degree for failing to carry out the fire drill on the failed engine.
The salvage crew who had raised the wreck of the Tornado had done an excellent job and amongst their finds was the CVR; thus we had a tape recording of the final moments. When this was played one thing was immediately apparent : there was NO aural fire warning!! Nor was there a visual warning on the MWS ( The analysis of the engine data did show that the fire warning did illuminate approx 6 times -each time for a duration of approx 1/10 th of a second. If you saw it flicker then by the time you had blinked and looked again it had gone).
My own view was that an engine which had obviously had some kind of mechanical failure MAY catch fire, but that it would be foolish to carry out the fire drill as a matter of routine because if it caught fire a minute or so later you have already used your one & only chance to extinguish it.
Searching through the rest of the BOI we came upon 2 more interesting items:
No1. The engine bay doors had been found on the beach on the run in to the Range. These had taken with them a large portion of the engine bay fire detection system. The loss of the doors also meant that the fire extinguishent would simply dissipate into the atmosphere.
No2. The explosion which lead to the fire had destroyed the HP fuel cock so that, no matter what selections were made by the Pilot, it would have been impossible to stem the flow of fuel feeding the fire in the engine bay.
The AOC set aside the finding of "Gross negligence" against the crew and absolved them from blame EVEN THOUGH HE HAD NO EXPERIENCE ON THE TORNADO WHATSOEVER.
There have been several people on this thread who have expressed the opinion that an AOC should never be able to alter the findings of a "properly constituted BOI".
I am not one of those; I doubt that Tornado crew are either.
dalek - your post 2054
"I do not question the helicopter experience of AM Day but Sqn Ldr Burkes experience was both more current and relevant to type. Any comments?"
Well, yes actually.
At the same time as the Chinook BOI was going through HQ 1 GP there was, amongst the dozen or so other Aircraft Accident BOI's going through Group at that time, a BOI into a Tornado crash which had happened at a well known NATO range in Sardinia.
The Accident aircraft was No 2 of a pair doing practice laydown attacks. As the No 2 was approaching on his first pass there was a muffled thump and No 2 engine ran down. The Pilot carried out the shutdown drill, informed his Nav they had lost No 2 engine, called the Range to abandon his attack run and informed his leader of the problem and asked for a visual inspection. He then instructed the Nav to read the engine shut down checks.
The section leader turned tightly in behind his No2 and saw that the entire rear end if the Tornado was a mass of flames and ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. This the crew did and the aircraft crashed into the sea.
The BOI President was as a Tornado Sqn Ldr Navigator, with a Flt Lt tornado Pilot and a Flt Lt Tornado Eng O making up the BOI. The BOI, after considering all the evidence, found the Tornado crew negligent to a gross degree for failing to carry out the fire drill on the failed engine.
The salvage crew who had raised the wreck of the Tornado had done an excellent job and amongst their finds was the CVR; thus we had a tape recording of the final moments. When this was played one thing was immediately apparent : there was NO aural fire warning!! Nor was there a visual warning on the MWS ( The analysis of the engine data did show that the fire warning did illuminate approx 6 times -each time for a duration of approx 1/10 th of a second. If you saw it flicker then by the time you had blinked and looked again it had gone).
My own view was that an engine which had obviously had some kind of mechanical failure MAY catch fire, but that it would be foolish to carry out the fire drill as a matter of routine because if it caught fire a minute or so later you have already used your one & only chance to extinguish it.
Searching through the rest of the BOI we came upon 2 more interesting items:
No1. The engine bay doors had been found on the beach on the run in to the Range. These had taken with them a large portion of the engine bay fire detection system. The loss of the doors also meant that the fire extinguishent would simply dissipate into the atmosphere.
No2. The explosion which lead to the fire had destroyed the HP fuel cock so that, no matter what selections were made by the Pilot, it would have been impossible to stem the flow of fuel feeding the fire in the engine bay.
The AOC set aside the finding of "Gross negligence" against the crew and absolved them from blame EVEN THOUGH HE HAD NO EXPERIENCE ON THE TORNADO WHATSOEVER.
There have been several people on this thread who have expressed the opinion that an AOC should never be able to alter the findings of a "properly constituted BOI".
I am not one of those; I doubt that Tornado crew are either.
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Hi Everyone,
A very few are going around too many buoys I think, but this may be (of no) help ---
I submitted a contribution many moons ago (can't find it at this time of night, pub again) in which I re-called being President of a BoI concerning a Tornado fatal accident off Spurn Head (1985 I think). The crew was attempting, at night, to join up with another aircraft at around 2000ft, and in that procedure flew into the sea. We had no clues for a couple of weeks until a tape from London Radar was offered which traced the track of the aircraft's last two minute flight path - and that of the aircraft on which it was trying to approach. We (myself and the other Board members) immediately 'concluded' that the pilot had become disorientated in the join-up manoeuvre and pointed the jet into the sea.
Without any other tangible evidence from the ADR (which was recovered, damaged) or technical findings from the wreckage, we all remained somewhat 'convinced' that the the pilot 'probably' screwed up. BUT, we had nothing to show that this 'assumption' could be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Our submission to the AOC (1Gp) was therefore, as referred to in those days, an open verdict; both he and the CinC accepted the Board's finding.
Most people at the time, including most of the squadron aircrew, agreed with my Board's private view. However, there was a 'universal' view that there could be no apportion of negligence. There were lots of other conspirancy theories that could have been concocted (by conspiritors), but none could be substantiated. Ever.
Justice was done, beyond any reasonable doubt.
Regards JB - several memories!
Apologies if I've repeated myself, but what the hell!
A very few are going around too many buoys I think, but this may be (of no) help ---
I submitted a contribution many moons ago (can't find it at this time of night, pub again) in which I re-called being President of a BoI concerning a Tornado fatal accident off Spurn Head (1985 I think). The crew was attempting, at night, to join up with another aircraft at around 2000ft, and in that procedure flew into the sea. We had no clues for a couple of weeks until a tape from London Radar was offered which traced the track of the aircraft's last two minute flight path - and that of the aircraft on which it was trying to approach. We (myself and the other Board members) immediately 'concluded' that the pilot had become disorientated in the join-up manoeuvre and pointed the jet into the sea.
Without any other tangible evidence from the ADR (which was recovered, damaged) or technical findings from the wreckage, we all remained somewhat 'convinced' that the the pilot 'probably' screwed up. BUT, we had nothing to show that this 'assumption' could be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Our submission to the AOC (1Gp) was therefore, as referred to in those days, an open verdict; both he and the CinC accepted the Board's finding.
Most people at the time, including most of the squadron aircrew, agreed with my Board's private view. However, there was a 'universal' view that there could be no apportion of negligence. There were lots of other conspirancy theories that could have been concocted (by conspiritors), but none could be substantiated. Ever.
Justice was done, beyond any reasonable doubt.
Regards JB - several memories!
Apologies if I've repeated myself, but what the hell!
Last edited by jindabyne; 19th Apr 2006 at 22:06.
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Cazatou
Re your post #2136.
I'll have to defer to your knowledge of this particular accident because it is not one with which I am intimately familiar. However, it does provoke two immediate thoughts:
1. If the BoI had before it all of the evidence you quoted (and presumably with access to the same supporting technical advice), and no other conflicting evidence, I cannot understand how even the most amateur Board could have reached the initial conclusion that it did. I am therefore bound to wonder if you are really giving us the full picture. Nevertheless, having said that .....
2. The AOC (rightly, if your picture is correct) did not support the Board's recommendations, but in coming to that conclusion he had hard technical evidence in front of him that the Board had formed the wrong conclusion. Those who have argued against your point of view of the Chinook accident will continue to point out that there is precious little, if any, hard evidence of anything in the Chinook case, but merely a loosely-linked connection of sightings, assumed speeds, imprecise time data and the like. This type of evidence can frequently be reconstructed in a number of ways, depending on one's point of view, to "prove" anything one wishes. That must leave doubt. If there is doubt, then the Chinook verdict was unjust and should not stand.
Regards
Ginseng
I'll have to defer to your knowledge of this particular accident because it is not one with which I am intimately familiar. However, it does provoke two immediate thoughts:
1. If the BoI had before it all of the evidence you quoted (and presumably with access to the same supporting technical advice), and no other conflicting evidence, I cannot understand how even the most amateur Board could have reached the initial conclusion that it did. I am therefore bound to wonder if you are really giving us the full picture. Nevertheless, having said that .....
2. The AOC (rightly, if your picture is correct) did not support the Board's recommendations, but in coming to that conclusion he had hard technical evidence in front of him that the Board had formed the wrong conclusion. Those who have argued against your point of view of the Chinook accident will continue to point out that there is precious little, if any, hard evidence of anything in the Chinook case, but merely a loosely-linked connection of sightings, assumed speeds, imprecise time data and the like. This type of evidence can frequently be reconstructed in a number of ways, depending on one's point of view, to "prove" anything one wishes. That must leave doubt. If there is doubt, then the Chinook verdict was unjust and should not stand.
Regards
Ginseng
Just a numbered other
the aircraft was, just a few seconds before impact, seen at low level and high speed heading towards cloud covered hills. This was the negligence - defined as doing something which a reasonable person would not do, given the same circumstances.
Cazatou.
I am intrigued by your logic in only defending the Tornado crew in Decci because of the subsequent evidence found. The finding was a nonsense anyway. Yet here, with no firm evidence of anything you are not willing to extend the benefit of any doubt you must have to the pilots.
It is now almost 2 months since my MP, the PM-in-waiting David Cameron, wrote again on my behalf to Dr Reid. One hopes that this delay means that, instead of the usual brush-offs, Reid will now give greater consideration to a agreeing that an impartial review should be conducted by a senior judicial figure.
The Chinook accident findings continue to cause considerable disquiet and are continually speculated upon and questioned by many - including MPs from all the major political parties. An independent and impartial review conducted by a senior judicial figure would surely end such disquiet once and for all.
The Chinook accident findings continue to cause considerable disquiet and are continually speculated upon and questioned by many - including MPs from all the major political parties. An independent and impartial review conducted by a senior judicial figure would surely end such disquiet once and for all.
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That would be Dave the Chemelion, Camellien, Chemolium, ohhhhh Lizard!!
Jindabyne, I think your post was particularly good, in that we are not saying the Chinook crew DIDN'T get it badly wrong, just that with the evidence available it is not certain. Nice one.
Jindabyne, I think your post was particularly good, in that we are not saying the Chinook crew DIDN'T get it badly wrong, just that with the evidence available it is not certain. Nice one.
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Cazatou,
Ginseng at post 2138 replies as I would.
I have made no attempt to belittle AM Day whose credentials are well known and whose interpretations of possible / probable / certain chain of events may well be correct.
The whole point is that there are many other "experts", (Sqn Ldr Burke, with his excellent presentation to the HOL committee being one) who interpret those events in a different light.
Hence the doubt, hence the failure to provide the required level of proof
Ginseng at post 2138 replies as I would.
I have made no attempt to belittle AM Day whose credentials are well known and whose interpretations of possible / probable / certain chain of events may well be correct.
The whole point is that there are many other "experts", (Sqn Ldr Burke, with his excellent presentation to the HOL committee being one) who interpret those events in a different light.
Hence the doubt, hence the failure to provide the required level of proof
Cazatou
“The salvage crew who had raised the wreck of the Tornado had done an excellent job and amongst their finds was the CVR; thus we had a tape recording of the final moments. When this was played one thing was immediately apparent: there was NO aural fire warning!! Nor was there a visual warning on the MWS.”
A very enlightening post. No aural warning. No visual warning. That smacks of lack of proper systems integration (or poor servicing). And, bears a remarkable resemblance to similar omissions on the Tornado lost to friendly fire during GW2, as noted in the BOI report.
This is not a criticism, because senior DPA staffs have specifically ruled that it is in order to deliver aircraft without such emergency systems properly integrated (Boscombe and some PMs disagree), but this merely emphasises yet again that perfectly serviceable systems can present no warning or indication that something is wrong because they have not been properly integrated (as a system of systems). In the case of emergency systems (at least) this would break the airworthiness chain – something discussed a lot recently on ZD576.
Regards
“The salvage crew who had raised the wreck of the Tornado had done an excellent job and amongst their finds was the CVR; thus we had a tape recording of the final moments. When this was played one thing was immediately apparent: there was NO aural fire warning!! Nor was there a visual warning on the MWS.”
A very enlightening post. No aural warning. No visual warning. That smacks of lack of proper systems integration (or poor servicing). And, bears a remarkable resemblance to similar omissions on the Tornado lost to friendly fire during GW2, as noted in the BOI report.
This is not a criticism, because senior DPA staffs have specifically ruled that it is in order to deliver aircraft without such emergency systems properly integrated (Boscombe and some PMs disagree), but this merely emphasises yet again that perfectly serviceable systems can present no warning or indication that something is wrong because they have not been properly integrated (as a system of systems). In the case of emergency systems (at least) this would break the airworthiness chain – something discussed a lot recently on ZD576.
Regards
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cazatou,
I have scratched my head (mind you, not a lot either on it or in it these days) several times with regards to your last post, and remain at a loss over its relevance to the debate. Care to enlighten me?
I have scratched my head (mind you, not a lot either on it or in it these days) several times with regards to your last post, and remain at a loss over its relevance to the debate. Care to enlighten me?
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Jindabyne,
It was in response to daleks question at Post #2054.
tucumseh,
I think suggests a titanium fire which destroyed everything in its path and blew the doors off.
It was in response to daleks question at Post #2054.
tucumseh,
I think suggests a titanium fire which destroyed everything in its path and blew the doors off.
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Shy Torque,
I will have to leave the debate on this subject for the time being for purely personal reasons, but I just wanted to reply to your post #2087.
Quote " Shiney arsed, idealistic. never flown SH, never been in theatre."
"Shiney arsed" - Well yes. When I joined 32 Sqn in 1977 the Sqn was required then, as now, to fly in No 2 Uniform; except on VVIP sorties when No 1's would be worn. My after tax pay then was £200 per month (if it was a 31 day month) - the cost of a new No 1. People got as much use out of their Uniforms as decency (in the legal sense) permitted.
"Idealistic" - Perhaps that's how I achieved an "A" category.
"Never flown SH" - Never made any secret of that.
"Never been in Theatre" - Well, after I passed the message back to our Passenger Mr Callaghan (then Home Secretary) on 14 August 1969 that Troops had been deployed in Belfast I must confess that it was not until 30 Sep 69 that I actually flew to Belfast. Our Passenger was the then CAS whose Son, a Lt in the Life Guards, had been critically injured by a negligent discharge from the rifle of one of one of his troopers.
My 293rd, and last, trip to Aldergrove was on 23 Feb 95. There were, of course, trips to Ballykelly and also Dublin (but I don't suppose Dublin counts as "in theatre").
Au Revoir
I will have to leave the debate on this subject for the time being for purely personal reasons, but I just wanted to reply to your post #2087.
Quote " Shiney arsed, idealistic. never flown SH, never been in theatre."
"Shiney arsed" - Well yes. When I joined 32 Sqn in 1977 the Sqn was required then, as now, to fly in No 2 Uniform; except on VVIP sorties when No 1's would be worn. My after tax pay then was £200 per month (if it was a 31 day month) - the cost of a new No 1. People got as much use out of their Uniforms as decency (in the legal sense) permitted.
"Idealistic" - Perhaps that's how I achieved an "A" category.
"Never flown SH" - Never made any secret of that.
"Never been in Theatre" - Well, after I passed the message back to our Passenger Mr Callaghan (then Home Secretary) on 14 August 1969 that Troops had been deployed in Belfast I must confess that it was not until 30 Sep 69 that I actually flew to Belfast. Our Passenger was the then CAS whose Son, a Lt in the Life Guards, had been critically injured by a negligent discharge from the rifle of one of one of his troopers.
My 293rd, and last, trip to Aldergrove was on 23 Feb 95. There were, of course, trips to Ballykelly and also Dublin (but I don't suppose Dublin counts as "in theatre").
Au Revoir
Last edited by cazatou; 22nd Apr 2006 at 14:51.
Just a numbered other
Caz.
Whatever your reasons for leaving us for a while, I wish you well, and look forward to your return.
I would guess that Shytorque referred to those desk bound types who ponder long and pointlessly over the split-second decisions made at the sharp end.
That'll be the same A cat which I and many others here have. It doesn't come with blinkers.
Nor have you accepted that such a qualification might make your views more credible.
If you can't see that your experiences do not qualify to be considered to have "been in Theatre" then it shows how good your blinkers are.
Whatever your reasons for leaving us for a while, I wish you well, and look forward to your return.
"Shiney arsed"
"Idealistic" Perhaps that's how I achieved an "A" category.
"Never flown SH" - Never made any secret of that.
"Never been in Theatre"
Last edited by Arkroyal; 23rd Apr 2006 at 17:09.
Avoid imitations
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Ark, thank you for saving me the trouble.
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THE LAST CLUE
If you were heading towards someone on the ground who was using a PRC-112 and you had the requisite on board equipment (ARS6) you would not only get both range and bearing to him but you could talk to him – and he could talk you in. This would be very handy so you could be confident that you were heading for the right spot, etc – presumably it would normally be the handling pilot (the driver) who would be talking directly to the person on the ground with the PRC-112.
The on board equipment interfaces with the aircraft’s voice intercom system.
To talk to the PRC-112, the handling pilot would, I believe, select the emergency position on his intercom.
In this case, the handling pilot (Flt Lt Cook) had his intercom set to emergency.
It is surely understandable that a digital readout of range provided by an intrinsically accurate system together with a confident voice giving encouragement (saying something like “I can hear you approaching – you’re doing just fine …”) could outweigh one’s visual judgment when the person on the ground was not in the expected/ planned position.
Far from being in any way careless (nor indeed negligent) the crew were, IMHO, showing caution/ apprehension/ prudence in engaging in a cruise climb that would given them some extra height (as opposed to aborting the exercise) and, had they actually been the bit further out they thought they were, would have put them high enough at the turning point/ waypoint/ RV (at the planned position of the PRC-112) to get a second opinion from the Mac TACAN/ DME (to which the TACAN CU was set) and so save something from a test if conditions on the ground would have prevented visual confirmation of the performance – and perhaps confirm their reservations as to the actual position of the ground equipment.
If you were heading towards someone on the ground who was using a PRC-112 and you had the requisite on board equipment (ARS6) you would not only get both range and bearing to him but you could talk to him – and he could talk you in. This would be very handy so you could be confident that you were heading for the right spot, etc – presumably it would normally be the handling pilot (the driver) who would be talking directly to the person on the ground with the PRC-112.
The on board equipment interfaces with the aircraft’s voice intercom system.
To talk to the PRC-112, the handling pilot would, I believe, select the emergency position on his intercom.
In this case, the handling pilot (Flt Lt Cook) had his intercom set to emergency.
It is surely understandable that a digital readout of range provided by an intrinsically accurate system together with a confident voice giving encouragement (saying something like “I can hear you approaching – you’re doing just fine …”) could outweigh one’s visual judgment when the person on the ground was not in the expected/ planned position.
Far from being in any way careless (nor indeed negligent) the crew were, IMHO, showing caution/ apprehension/ prudence in engaging in a cruise climb that would given them some extra height (as opposed to aborting the exercise) and, had they actually been the bit further out they thought they were, would have put them high enough at the turning point/ waypoint/ RV (at the planned position of the PRC-112) to get a second opinion from the Mac TACAN/ DME (to which the TACAN CU was set) and so save something from a test if conditions on the ground would have prevented visual confirmation of the performance – and perhaps confirm their reservations as to the actual position of the ground equipment.