Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: Liverpool based Geordie, so calm down, calm down kidda!!
Age: 60
Posts: 2,051
Likes: 0
Received 17 Likes
on
6 Posts
!!!!!!!
I made the mistake of viewing the last posting and once again it is rubbish. Instead of repeating myself again, Walter, read my earlier posts why they took this aircraft. Jon told me about his reasons for not wanting the Mk2, I posted them on this site, more than once. What bit of this do you not understand??? Do you want me to forget what he said to me and the others in the crewroom, then lie, so that your views can be correct??
My words are not speculation like yours, They are real.
PS, Cazatou, I still use the ADF to listen to Radio5Live if we are flying when a football match is on. It doesn't distract me from the job in hand and if things get busy, I turn it off. I listen to the radio when I drive my car as well.
I made the mistake of viewing the last posting and once again it is rubbish. Instead of repeating myself again, Walter, read my earlier posts why they took this aircraft. Jon told me about his reasons for not wanting the Mk2, I posted them on this site, more than once. What bit of this do you not understand??? Do you want me to forget what he said to me and the others in the crewroom, then lie, so that your views can be correct??
My words are not speculation like yours, They are real.
PS, Cazatou, I still use the ADF to listen to Radio5Live if we are flying when a football match is on. It doesn't distract me from the job in hand and if things get busy, I turn it off. I listen to the radio when I drive my car as well.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 1,777
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I read Whooper5's comment about 'crawling all over it with a screwdriver' as being figurative. Of course aircrew don't disassemble an aircraft, but they often go through the engineering manuals to learn and understand the systems. Often with an engineer.
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: Sadland
Posts: 14
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There were no manuals for the MkII at the time. We got the GS screwdrivers and opened every panel we could to locate major components and see where items such as magnetic plugs and temperature bulbs were located. We had the task of understanding where the indications in the cockpit originated. I wholly understand how you can find this hard to believe; it is just outrageous. However it is what happened.
W 5
W 5
Aircraft Documentation
"There were no manuals for the MkII at the time".
This fact has been pointed out many times before. It calls into question the completeness of the safety audit trail. No documentation = no "pass" on the Configuration Audits. So on what basis was the CA Release signed?
This fact has been pointed out many times before. It calls into question the completeness of the safety audit trail. No documentation = no "pass" on the Configuration Audits. So on what basis was the CA Release signed?
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: Hampshire
Posts: 112
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Whooper 5,
I'm sorry but this urban myth is simply untrue. I accept that you were there at the time and this sort of scaremongering helps the case of this thread, however, to claim that there were no manuals is very far wide of the mark. There was certainly an aircrew manual, which you would have had access to. I'm sure you would have crawled all over the aircraft to locate components, everyone did to improve their familiarity, but you paint a picture of having never been shown where these items were or had any other way of finding them.
It was all a long time ago and memories of events in and around the accident may fade, but I submit that your claims are misleading.
There were no manuals for the MkII at the time
I'm sorry but this urban myth is simply untrue. I accept that you were there at the time and this sort of scaremongering helps the case of this thread, however, to claim that there were no manuals is very far wide of the mark. There was certainly an aircrew manual, which you would have had access to. I'm sure you would have crawled all over the aircraft to locate components, everyone did to improve their familiarity, but you paint a picture of having never been shown where these items were or had any other way of finding them.
It was all a long time ago and memories of events in and around the accident may fade, but I submit that your claims are misleading.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
jayteeto,
I am sure that we have all used the ADF to listen to the radio. In my case it was often at the request of the Lady in the armchair down the back; to get the latest news bulletins. If, however, we required the ADF for navigation purposes she was so informed.
In the case of the Chinook accident I would suggest that it would have been more appropriate to have the ADF tuned to a suitable Airfield beacon, to which the aircraft could have homed to seek a radar letdown, in the highly likely event of the aircaft being forced to climb by the forecast poor weather. An appropriate subscale setting on the Captains altimeter would not have gone amiss either.
FJJP
It didn't work:-
Walter is still here!!
I am sure that we have all used the ADF to listen to the radio. In my case it was often at the request of the Lady in the armchair down the back; to get the latest news bulletins. If, however, we required the ADF for navigation purposes she was so informed.
In the case of the Chinook accident I would suggest that it would have been more appropriate to have the ADF tuned to a suitable Airfield beacon, to which the aircraft could have homed to seek a radar letdown, in the highly likely event of the aircaft being forced to climb by the forecast poor weather. An appropriate subscale setting on the Captains altimeter would not have gone amiss either.
FJJP
It didn't work:-
Walter is still here!!
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: Sadland
Posts: 14
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Twinact
Perhaps you can provide evidence of a freely available, aircrew manual at the time of the crash however my recollection was very much working off photocopies of various documents and publications many of which contradicted each other.
I also believe I have said that there was a short conversion course (three days?) however we were then isolated in NI with no means to consolidate this training.
I have no desire to mislead anyone or slant my writing to any hidden agenda.
Thank you for your reply
W 5
Perhaps you can provide evidence of a freely available, aircrew manual at the time of the crash however my recollection was very much working off photocopies of various documents and publications many of which contradicted each other.
I also believe I have said that there was a short conversion course (three days?) however we were then isolated in NI with no means to consolidate this training.
I have no desire to mislead anyone or slant my writing to any hidden agenda.
Thank you for your reply
W 5
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
John Purdey
Thankyou.
I am looking forward to a reply from BEagle to my post 1990.
That, I think, goes to the heart of the matter!!
It may be that BEagle does not consider my post worthy of reply. I would therefore humbly point out that, in the 4414 flying hours that I accummulated whilst in Post as an Aircraft Captain on what is now No 32 (Royal) Sqn, I accept that I never progressed further than being an 'A' Category Captain, Flight Instructor/ Local Examiner/ MG/ IRE.
I realise that this limited experience reduces the usefulness of any contribution I make.
Thankyou.
I am looking forward to a reply from BEagle to my post 1990.
That, I think, goes to the heart of the matter!!
It may be that BEagle does not consider my post worthy of reply. I would therefore humbly point out that, in the 4414 flying hours that I accummulated whilst in Post as an Aircraft Captain on what is now No 32 (Royal) Sqn, I accept that I never progressed further than being an 'A' Category Captain, Flight Instructor/ Local Examiner/ MG/ IRE.
I realise that this limited experience reduces the usefulness of any contribution I make.
Last edited by cazatou; 7th Apr 2006 at 19:07.
What you asked for was speculation....
As a fellow ex-A Cat, A2QFI, MG, IRE, TAARI, EWO, Full Flight Test Capt, Examiner, FSO, blah blan blah, I trust you will agree with me that fact is the only consideration.
"Rule books are only paper, they will not cushion impacts between metal and stone"
We don't know the true facts. Neither did Wratten or Day. Everything else was informed hearsay and/or speculation. Certainly not enough to bring the unjust verdict which they did.
As a fellow ex-A Cat, A2QFI, MG, IRE, TAARI, EWO, Full Flight Test Capt, Examiner, FSO, blah blan blah, I trust you will agree with me that fact is the only consideration.
"Rule books are only paper, they will not cushion impacts between metal and stone"
We don't know the true facts. Neither did Wratten or Day. Everything else was informed hearsay and/or speculation. Certainly not enough to bring the unjust verdict which they did.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
BEagle
I totally agree. Fact is everything. The major discrepancy in the altimeter subscale settings of the two Pilots; the ADF set to a Commercial Radio station; the lack of "outbrief" as required by ASI's, insufficient crew duty time to complete the task. Then let us add in the requirements for crew meals, allowable crew duty time etc.
We could then add a little spice by mentioning that one would require the approval of SRAFONI to have a further extension of Crew Duty (with its associated "hats on" interview) or the approval of HQNI to nightstop out of theatre; even more "gold braid" behind the desk at the "hats on" interview.
Then, of course, is the fact that the planning they were using had been done by the RN Captain of the other crew. How familiar were they with the planning and the route? (This is not in any way intended to question the integrity or professionalism of Lt K)
We then have to consider that they still had a major problem with crew duty time. Despite having been granted all the allowable crew duty extensions; there remained a very real possibility that they would not be able to complete the task within those parameters.
The only alternative to the "hats on interview" was to try to complete the task as quickly as possible.
Have I got something wrong here? (That was asked with my FSO hat on)
I totally agree. Fact is everything. The major discrepancy in the altimeter subscale settings of the two Pilots; the ADF set to a Commercial Radio station; the lack of "outbrief" as required by ASI's, insufficient crew duty time to complete the task. Then let us add in the requirements for crew meals, allowable crew duty time etc.
We could then add a little spice by mentioning that one would require the approval of SRAFONI to have a further extension of Crew Duty (with its associated "hats on" interview) or the approval of HQNI to nightstop out of theatre; even more "gold braid" behind the desk at the "hats on" interview.
Then, of course, is the fact that the planning they were using had been done by the RN Captain of the other crew. How familiar were they with the planning and the route? (This is not in any way intended to question the integrity or professionalism of Lt K)
We then have to consider that they still had a major problem with crew duty time. Despite having been granted all the allowable crew duty extensions; there remained a very real possibility that they would not be able to complete the task within those parameters.
The only alternative to the "hats on interview" was to try to complete the task as quickly as possible.
Have I got something wrong here? (That was asked with my FSO hat on)
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Cazatou
<<The only alternative to the "hats on interview" was to try to complete the task as quickly as possible.>>
Again, the suggestion that they were going to fast – but their air speed (calculated average over the leg) was the norm for cruising at their altitude in that air temp even with a full load – a point I have made before and asked for comment here. I suggest, therefore, that your point may only be relevant in regard to route planning (eg. cutting corners, etc) as opposed to suggesting undue haste. Further, as (IMHO) they were not going to overfly the Mull but rather turn up the coast, they in fact overshot a corner rather than cut it – therefore one can remove pressure to take shortcuts in route planning from the equation also.
I have said before that, as covered in the FAI, they were within crew duty hours (even for the op area) when they crashed – so however overstretched/ fatigued they may have been later on in their journey, duty hours should not be a consideration of their ability to function by the time of the crash.
Just for information regarding the security of the site immediately after the crash, you had posted (1941):
<<The first people at the site were the Lighthouse Keeper and his Deputy. They secured the site until the Civil Police and Fire Services, as well as Medical Personnel, arrived from Campbeltown to assist. Later RAF Personnel from RAF Kinloss took over as Crash Guard. Nobody else was allowed on the site until the search for any possible survivors was completed.>>
This gives readers the impression that the site was well secure BUT I have been informed that the first (single) policeman arrived on the scene 40 minutes after the crash and who, from his comments, would have been the first other than the lighthouse keepers and tourists – that’s FORTY minutes; further, assuming the lighthouse keeper raised the alarm with a conventional ‘phone, there would have been a period in that 40 minutes when only a couple of individuals were known to be around the site. Trying to be positive – perhaps a lesson for future high risk vip flights would be to keep in regular contact throughout so that response could be quicker rather than rely upon a distress call …
<<The only alternative to the "hats on interview" was to try to complete the task as quickly as possible.>>
Again, the suggestion that they were going to fast – but their air speed (calculated average over the leg) was the norm for cruising at their altitude in that air temp even with a full load – a point I have made before and asked for comment here. I suggest, therefore, that your point may only be relevant in regard to route planning (eg. cutting corners, etc) as opposed to suggesting undue haste. Further, as (IMHO) they were not going to overfly the Mull but rather turn up the coast, they in fact overshot a corner rather than cut it – therefore one can remove pressure to take shortcuts in route planning from the equation also.
I have said before that, as covered in the FAI, they were within crew duty hours (even for the op area) when they crashed – so however overstretched/ fatigued they may have been later on in their journey, duty hours should not be a consideration of their ability to function by the time of the crash.
Just for information regarding the security of the site immediately after the crash, you had posted (1941):
<<The first people at the site were the Lighthouse Keeper and his Deputy. They secured the site until the Civil Police and Fire Services, as well as Medical Personnel, arrived from Campbeltown to assist. Later RAF Personnel from RAF Kinloss took over as Crash Guard. Nobody else was allowed on the site until the search for any possible survivors was completed.>>
This gives readers the impression that the site was well secure BUT I have been informed that the first (single) policeman arrived on the scene 40 minutes after the crash and who, from his comments, would have been the first other than the lighthouse keepers and tourists – that’s FORTY minutes; further, assuming the lighthouse keeper raised the alarm with a conventional ‘phone, there would have been a period in that 40 minutes when only a couple of individuals were known to be around the site. Trying to be positive – perhaps a lesson for future high risk vip flights would be to keep in regular contact throughout so that response could be quicker rather than rely upon a distress call …
Just a numbered other
cazatou,
Your list of quals is impressive, but I suspect gained some distance from the world of SH, and so not as relevant as they might be.
You say:
The Mk 2 Chinook had NO icing clearance below +4 Deg C, which meant that a climb to MSA was never an option. The flight was planned and flown VFR in marginal VMC, which the BoI agreed was suitable for the mission.
What subsequently happened will never be known to the standard of proof required to find dead man guilty of gross negligence.
I frequently operated in that theatre without partaking of Aldergrove's grease mountain. I do not consider it relevant, or any way proof of youe assumed slap-dash approach to the job. The flght could have returned them to theatre within crew duty time, or permission later sought to remain in Scotland. We simply do not have the facts, which must give the benefit of the doubt to Jon and Rick.
Your list of quals is impressive, but I suspect gained some distance from the world of SH, and so not as relevant as they might be.
You say:
In the case of the Chinook accident I would suggest that it would have been more appropriate to have the ADF tuned to a suitable Airfield beacon, to which the aircraft could have homed to seek a radar letdown, in the highly likely event of the aircaft being forced to climb by the forecast poor weather
What subsequently happened will never be known to the standard of proof required to find dead man guilty of gross negligence.
I frequently operated in that theatre without partaking of Aldergrove's grease mountain. I do not consider it relevant, or any way proof of youe assumed slap-dash approach to the job. The flght could have returned them to theatre within crew duty time, or permission later sought to remain in Scotland. We simply do not have the facts, which must give the benefit of the doubt to Jon and Rick.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
To ex-Naval Sea King Pilot AKA Ark Royal
Ark Royal,
Long time no joust!!
I have lost count of how many times people who have actually flown the Chinook have pointed out to you that the BOI were correct that the forecast weather conditions would have permitted a climb to Safety Altitude; as stated in the BOI whose Aircrew members, you will recall, were a Wg Cdr and a Sqn Ldr; both of whom were current Pilots on the Chinook Mk 2.
What you, and all those who favour the "FADEC runaway" scenario, fail to take on board is that (if the scenario is correct) we are then dealing with a TRIPLE failure.
IF there was a FADEC runaway then the crew should have either climbed to above S Alt to avoid the high ground they knew was in front of them or, alternatively, to have turned away from the high ground. Failure to do so means either negligence or an inability to either climb or turn to avoid the imminent danger.
As you are adamant that there was no negligence then we are left with TWO more failures which miraculously disappeared without leaving any trace whatsoever: ie they were unable to either climb or turn.
I have a great deal of difficulty with a failure which left no trace as the cause of the accident - BUT THREE !!
Long time no joust!!
I have lost count of how many times people who have actually flown the Chinook have pointed out to you that the BOI were correct that the forecast weather conditions would have permitted a climb to Safety Altitude; as stated in the BOI whose Aircrew members, you will recall, were a Wg Cdr and a Sqn Ldr; both of whom were current Pilots on the Chinook Mk 2.
What you, and all those who favour the "FADEC runaway" scenario, fail to take on board is that (if the scenario is correct) we are then dealing with a TRIPLE failure.
IF there was a FADEC runaway then the crew should have either climbed to above S Alt to avoid the high ground they knew was in front of them or, alternatively, to have turned away from the high ground. Failure to do so means either negligence or an inability to either climb or turn to avoid the imminent danger.
As you are adamant that there was no negligence then we are left with TWO more failures which miraculously disappeared without leaving any trace whatsoever: ie they were unable to either climb or turn.
I have a great deal of difficulty with a failure which left no trace as the cause of the accident - BUT THREE !!
All of which are possibilities, albeit somewhat remote if considered together. And that's all....
Neither you, I , Wratten or Day know what actually happened - beyond any doubt whatsoever.
Which is the whole point.
Incidentally, it's been a long time since I was promised a further response from John Reid, so perhaps it's time to do some more stirring....
Neither you, I , Wratten or Day know what actually happened - beyond any doubt whatsoever.
Which is the whole point.
Incidentally, it's been a long time since I was promised a further response from John Reid, so perhaps it's time to do some more stirring....
vincit veritas
RAF rules in force at the time provided that the deceased air crew could be found negligent only where there was "absolutely no doubt whatsoever".
Cazatou. Do you understand this phrase?
Cazatou. Do you understand this phrase?
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
YES I UNDERSTAND
I also understand the blatent disregard for ASI's shown by the Pilots in respect of crew duty time, nightstops out of Theatre, crew meals, outbriefs etc.
I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER THAT ANY FORM OF TECHNICAL FAULT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRASH.
No contributor to this thread has been able to PROVEa technical defect which contributed to, let alone caused, the Crash. A FADEC runaway would not itself have caused the Crash. The Pilots should have been able to climb to Safety Altitude or turn away from the Mull. The failure to do so would mean,if the "technical defect" theory is correct, that there was actually a triple defect preventing this which suddenly disappeared without trace in the mille-seconds before impact.
I find that "an untraceable defect" too far!
PS How many ASI's are you allowed to ignore before it ceases to be forgetfulness and becomes negligence?
I also understand the blatent disregard for ASI's shown by the Pilots in respect of crew duty time, nightstops out of Theatre, crew meals, outbriefs etc.
I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER THAT ANY FORM OF TECHNICAL FAULT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRASH.
No contributor to this thread has been able to PROVEa technical defect which contributed to, let alone caused, the Crash. A FADEC runaway would not itself have caused the Crash. The Pilots should have been able to climb to Safety Altitude or turn away from the Mull. The failure to do so would mean,if the "technical defect" theory is correct, that there was actually a triple defect preventing this which suddenly disappeared without trace in the mille-seconds before impact.
I find that "an untraceable defect" too far!
PS How many ASI's are you allowed to ignore before it ceases to be forgetfulness and becomes negligence?