I have now read the majority of the BOI Report. It paints a picture of an organisation in disarray. I have said in several posts before on various threads that the MoD's management and assurance of safety and airworthiness is in a shambles. The Report confirms this. It also confirms that there have been several indicators which gave forewarning of this type of accident on this aircraft.
The MoD, the IPTs and the RAF are all culpable in this. There are individuals within the IPTs and the Support Groups who are culpable, they should know who they are, but actually many of them are/were not competent to hold their positions. Look at the leadership and the expertise within what was ADRP. It is simply not competent. Look at the DASC, and its Aviation Safety Review Team. The resources they had meant that each aircraft would be reviewed every 10 to 15 years. If they hadn't disbanded the team of course.
The situation is not restricted to the Nimrod IPT. The majority of the in-service aircraft IPTs had Safety Cases that would not pass scrutiny. In fact there is no formal system for scrutinising the Safety Cases of current aircraft, it is done an ad hoc basis. I know, I have read many of those Safety Cases, they were in many cases not worth the paper they were printed on. Look at the Harrier IPT, they had no Safety Case at all for quite some time. Ask a previous Harrier IPT Leader about his attitude to the Safety Case.
It is now time to seriously ask the question as to whether the MoD is fit to self regulate ? It is time to ask ourselves the unthinkable, are MoD aircraft fit (demonstrably safe and airworthy) to fly in non-segregated airspace. Have a look at the Secretary of State's policy statement on safety, look at the definition of airworthiness. The answer I would give, is that in this current state, and until proven otherwise - No !
S_H