Nimrod Information
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Scotland
Age: 49
Posts: 134
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Accepting the previous few posts is it possible that the IPT having seen XV230 through Equalized Maintenance became aware of a 'deep' fault, i.e. not immediate enough to warrant grounding of the jet but potentially serious if the one in a million happened? Something that the groundies would not have been aware of.
For example a risk assessment is done and the fault is scored as serious but it's impact in normal operating conditions is scored as minimal, i.e. million to one chance things could go badly wrong.
Any thoughts?
For example a risk assessment is done and the fault is scored as serious but it's impact in normal operating conditions is scored as minimal, i.e. million to one chance things could go badly wrong.
Any thoughts?
Last edited by Da4orce; 6th Jul 2007 at 14:14.
Nigegilb posted on the Parliamentary Questions thread:
Little chance of that given the dyed in the wool attitudes being displayed by some on this thread. Talk about Horses and Water! When push comes to shove is when captains earn the status that they enjoy, and saying NO to Fleet Managers, Ops Managers, Engineers, 4*s, Station Commanders, Uncle Tom Cobbley and all and standing firm whenever moral, disciplinary, financial or any other pressure be applied. There seems to be a grim determination to close ranks and resist any help and advice from outside, no matter how experienced or informed that might be. I have a high incidence of suspicion (to use the formulate wording of an old CRM manual) that TD is onto something, knows he's onto something, and is going to keep on at it like a dog at a bone. Nigegilb wants to get a result for the kipper fleet (probably non PC, sorry) similar to what has been achieved for the Herc one. Tucumseh exposes the lies, damn lies, and downright cynicism of the MOD apparatchiks. All these guys are on your side. They want to help you to help yourselves to make your aircraft safer. If I were you I'd consider them, then look at your present circumstances, then look at them again. I think I would be glad of their help, as were the Herc crews IINM, but that's up to you guys!
Just hope the RAF and MOD see sense over Nimrod safety issues
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: lincoln
Posts: 15
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If you mean can an IPT make groundcrew sign off a short term problem such as a fuel leak in theatre.....then absolutely not, and I dont think that they would. Its upto the engineering team in theatre to sort those types of problems out. They are guided and governed by their maintenance manuals and APs and cannot just come up with a quick fix.
Sure they can call on as much advice and technical expertise as they want but no one can make them sign off the jet as serviceable. If there is any doubt on a safety critical system to make the ground crew in any way shape or form doubt its integrity, the ac is going nowhere. Knowing the vast majority of guys at ISK and being proud to have worked alongside them, I can say that with confidence.
An IPTs job is to provide recovery action and logistical support for longer term issues generally, they cannot get involved with short term snags. Thats the job of NLS. If those short term problems display patterns and regularity, then it is the job of the IPT to investigate and correct/monitor/recover. Not to be a 1000 yard screwdriver to situations they are not all that familiar with (ie on ops).
Does that answer your question TD?
Sure they can call on as much advice and technical expertise as they want but no one can make them sign off the jet as serviceable. If there is any doubt on a safety critical system to make the ground crew in any way shape or form doubt its integrity, the ac is going nowhere. Knowing the vast majority of guys at ISK and being proud to have worked alongside them, I can say that with confidence.
An IPTs job is to provide recovery action and logistical support for longer term issues generally, they cannot get involved with short term snags. Thats the job of NLS. If those short term problems display patterns and regularity, then it is the job of the IPT to investigate and correct/monitor/recover. Not to be a 1000 yard screwdriver to situations they are not all that familiar with (ie on ops).
Does that answer your question TD?
Registered User **
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Cambridge
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SpannerSpinner, are you absolutely sure about what you post. The Air Systems Group (formerly ADRP) changed some fairly key definitions in the JSP553 last year, and many people were not happy with the changes I don't have a copy to hand, but they changed the way they refer to designer, design organisation, design authority etc. I don't know if it's been changed back.
They made changes such that the IPT is regarded as the Design Authority, in the sense that they have the ultimate authority over the design of an aircraft. The designer or design organisation can make recommendations, but the IPT can go it's own way. This would obviously be a move that would be fraught with risk, and would take some justification, but it reflects the legal situation. You can't get away from the fact that the MoD owns the aircraft, maintains and operates the aircraft and is also the regulator. So using your strange analogy of judge and jury, yes the MoD is ! Does it all lie within the IPT, good question. IPTL signs the MAR, RTSA looks after the RTS, but look at the size of the IPT and its resources, then look at the RTSA, and you'll see who's really making the decisions.
The front of the JSP553 contains a statement from the SofS for Defence, it states that the MoD will regulate it's aircraft such that airworthiness is maintained to as standard which is at least as good as the civil world. Think about that statement and its implications very carefully. I wonder if anyone could ever show a conflict of interests: owner v operator v regulator ?
S_H
They made changes such that the IPT is regarded as the Design Authority, in the sense that they have the ultimate authority over the design of an aircraft. The designer or design organisation can make recommendations, but the IPT can go it's own way. This would obviously be a move that would be fraught with risk, and would take some justification, but it reflects the legal situation. You can't get away from the fact that the MoD owns the aircraft, maintains and operates the aircraft and is also the regulator. So using your strange analogy of judge and jury, yes the MoD is ! Does it all lie within the IPT, good question. IPTL signs the MAR, RTSA looks after the RTS, but look at the size of the IPT and its resources, then look at the RTSA, and you'll see who's really making the decisions.
The front of the JSP553 contains a statement from the SofS for Defence, it states that the MoD will regulate it's aircraft such that airworthiness is maintained to as standard which is at least as good as the civil world. Think about that statement and its implications very carefully. I wonder if anyone could ever show a conflict of interests: owner v operator v regulator ?
S_H
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: lincoln
Posts: 15
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SH,
Agreed. I think thats why people like BAE systems, Northrop Grumman and Lockheed are now DO rather than DA. The IPT do not hold sole responsibility for the aircraft though, thats what I'm getting at.
People like the release to service authority, QinetiQ and others all play an important role and the structure/organisation/responsibilies is a complex model.
I felt that PN made it sound as though the IPT are the only players responsible for the airworthiness of the ac.
I'm trying to keep it relatively simple for people not so familiar with the system
Agreed. I think thats why people like BAE systems, Northrop Grumman and Lockheed are now DO rather than DA. The IPT do not hold sole responsibility for the aircraft though, thats what I'm getting at.
People like the release to service authority, QinetiQ and others all play an important role and the structure/organisation/responsibilies is a complex model.
I felt that PN made it sound as though the IPT are the only players responsible for the airworthiness of the ac.
I'm trying to keep it relatively simple for people not so familiar with the system
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I am trying to understand the role of IPT along with everyone else. Still not clear if Nimrod IPT act as DA. However consensus appears to be that short term engineering issues are dealt with by the front line, but longer term issues/defects could well be dealt with by IPT?
Certainly in the case of Hercules, the Herc IPT looked at Foam in 2002/03 after a risk analysis was carried out and decided it was not required. Not laying blame here, just trying to set out the decision making process. I understand something similar may have happened with Nimrod. The one in a million scenario?
Certainly in the case of Hercules, the Herc IPT looked at Foam in 2002/03 after a risk analysis was carried out and decided it was not required. Not laying blame here, just trying to set out the decision making process. I understand something similar may have happened with Nimrod. The one in a million scenario?
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Nimrod IPT Judge and Jury?
The IPT hold sway, in a longer term engineering sense, over the project. They control the extent of any engineering investigations (& hold the purse strings..). The IPT ‘contracts’ BAE SYSTEMS to investigate issues on MR2. The IPT issue the ‘engineering solution’ to issues on MR2 be it a modification or otherwise. The IPT issue Technical Instructions, Routine/Urgent/Special/Servicing (RTI/UTI/STI/SI). The IPT issue ‘service modifications’ (SM’s) as in the fitting of flight deck Armour to MR2. Within the ‘service’ the IPT is THE engineering authority. Notwithstanding ... The 'end user' (squadron/unit level) has a degree of authority, in a day to day sense, to enable them to carry out taskings (ENGO/SENGO & up etc..).
Registered User **
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Cambridge
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Nige, in safety terms, the IPTL's responsibility, and hence the IPT, is bounded by the Military Aircraft Release (MAR), in theory this should be underpinned by a full Safety Case, in practice there will be a lot of claims for grandfather rights etc, based on the aircraft's previous operating history.
The MAR defines the defines the build (design) standard for the aircraft, it defines how it should be maintained/serviced etc, and of course the limits to how the aircraft can be flown and operated, all this is will be defined in the Aircraft Document Set (ADS).
The Release To Service Authority (RTSA) then produces a Release To Service (RTS) based on the MAR, for a line pilot, the RTS would generally be more restrictive than the MAR. Of course there can be more than one level of RTS, for example a test pilot would be able to use more of the operational envelope. The RTSA may also define different limits for various operational reasons, perhaps be prepared to accept greater risk in certain circumstances. I don’t think this would normally mean the acceptance of greater levels of unserviceability though.
In terms of maintenance and servicing, the IPT defines how the aircraft should be maintained and serviced in the ADS. The Aircraft Operating Authority (AOA) is responsible for ensuring that the aircraft is maintained in accordance with the ADS. It’s all about maintaining that build standard, or design intent, faults are rectified and the aircraft is serviced to prevents to prevent failures. What the people on the line can do is very tightly defined by the IPT, the ADS will contain all sorts of limits, for things like fuel leaks, cracks, husbandry etc. Anything outside these limits has to be referred to higher authority, ultimately up to the IPTL who has delegated responsibility for airworthiness, a responsibility that ultimately comes from SofS.
Simple really !
S_H
The MAR defines the defines the build (design) standard for the aircraft, it defines how it should be maintained/serviced etc, and of course the limits to how the aircraft can be flown and operated, all this is will be defined in the Aircraft Document Set (ADS).
The Release To Service Authority (RTSA) then produces a Release To Service (RTS) based on the MAR, for a line pilot, the RTS would generally be more restrictive than the MAR. Of course there can be more than one level of RTS, for example a test pilot would be able to use more of the operational envelope. The RTSA may also define different limits for various operational reasons, perhaps be prepared to accept greater risk in certain circumstances. I don’t think this would normally mean the acceptance of greater levels of unserviceability though.
In terms of maintenance and servicing, the IPT defines how the aircraft should be maintained and serviced in the ADS. The Aircraft Operating Authority (AOA) is responsible for ensuring that the aircraft is maintained in accordance with the ADS. It’s all about maintaining that build standard, or design intent, faults are rectified and the aircraft is serviced to prevents to prevent failures. What the people on the line can do is very tightly defined by the IPT, the ADS will contain all sorts of limits, for things like fuel leaks, cracks, husbandry etc. Anything outside these limits has to be referred to higher authority, ultimately up to the IPTL who has delegated responsibility for airworthiness, a responsibility that ultimately comes from SofS.
Simple really !
S_H
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Oh dear, just when I think I understand it!!!
SH this all sounds very technical, procedural and rigorous. However, how do you explain the ability of AOC2Gp to simply wave his magic wand and ordain that, contrary to serious concerns by aircrew at Kinloss, the Nimrod is granted authority to continue AAR, within days of the crash, solely with his permission?
One of the SDs says that if operationally essential and if no other alternatives exist then the aircraft can tank, albeit with AOC 2 Gp permission. So, we had a jet AARing over Kandahar 4 days after the accident!!
SH this all sounds very technical, procedural and rigorous. However, how do you explain the ability of AOC2Gp to simply wave his magic wand and ordain that, contrary to serious concerns by aircrew at Kinloss, the Nimrod is granted authority to continue AAR, within days of the crash, solely with his permission?
One of the SDs says that if operationally essential and if no other alternatives exist then the aircraft can tank, albeit with AOC 2 Gp permission. So, we had a jet AARing over Kandahar 4 days after the accident!!
Safety-Helmut
“The Air Systems Group (formerly ADRP) changed some fairly key definitions in the JSP553 last year, and many people were not happy with the changes I don't have a copy to hand, but they changed the way they refer to designer, design organisation, design authority etc. I don't know if it's been changed back”.
The reason people weren’t happy is simple. Yet again, faceless people with little or no experience, and without consultation or regard to the consequences, re-invent the wheel and cause havoc.
The bottom line is that there is a perfectly good Def Stan which covers these procedures for Air, Land and Sea. (Its sole purpose is to describe the procedures for maintaining the build standard, including safety. I’d be astonished if the Nimrod IPT even has a copy, and they certainly don’t have the accompanying Specifications it invokes).
If ASG issue a JSP which contradicts the Def Stan, the IPT or project manager must disregard the JSP as the Def Stan sits higher in the mandated “Order of Preference or Hierarchy for the Selection of Standards for MOD Acquisition”. Thus, the IPT appoint the Design Authority or Design Custodian; as they appoint, in agreement with other stakeholder IPTs, the Co-ordinating System Design Authority. (Or would, if they understood what I’m talking about). There are a few cases where the IPT are the Design Authority, Service Engineered Mods being the most obvious. Even then, IPTs routinely breach mandated safety rules which require them to have SEMs appraised by the DAs (both aircraft and equipment). Has this caused safety problems? Yes, most certainly.
“The Air Systems Group (formerly ADRP) changed some fairly key definitions in the JSP553 last year, and many people were not happy with the changes I don't have a copy to hand, but they changed the way they refer to designer, design organisation, design authority etc. I don't know if it's been changed back”.
The reason people weren’t happy is simple. Yet again, faceless people with little or no experience, and without consultation or regard to the consequences, re-invent the wheel and cause havoc.
The bottom line is that there is a perfectly good Def Stan which covers these procedures for Air, Land and Sea. (Its sole purpose is to describe the procedures for maintaining the build standard, including safety. I’d be astonished if the Nimrod IPT even has a copy, and they certainly don’t have the accompanying Specifications it invokes).
If ASG issue a JSP which contradicts the Def Stan, the IPT or project manager must disregard the JSP as the Def Stan sits higher in the mandated “Order of Preference or Hierarchy for the Selection of Standards for MOD Acquisition”. Thus, the IPT appoint the Design Authority or Design Custodian; as they appoint, in agreement with other stakeholder IPTs, the Co-ordinating System Design Authority. (Or would, if they understood what I’m talking about). There are a few cases where the IPT are the Design Authority, Service Engineered Mods being the most obvious. Even then, IPTs routinely breach mandated safety rules which require them to have SEMs appraised by the DAs (both aircraft and equipment). Has this caused safety problems? Yes, most certainly.
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: On the outside looking in
Posts: 542
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Up the Chain
One also has to remember that the RTS is signed off by ACAS, on the advice of those down the chain. Also, remember this:
So, if someone in the middle wants the aircraft to fly (and I mean any type, not just Nimrod) and they are prepared to "interpret" the information coming in to them, then as it says, "**** happens"
sw
In the beginning was the plan.
And then came the Assumptions.
And the Assumptions were without form.
And the Plan was without substance.
And darkness was upon the face of the Workers.
And they spoke among themselves, saying,
"It is a crock of ****, and it stinketh."
And the Workers went unto their Supervisors and said,
"It is a pail of dung, and none may abide the odor thereof."
And the Supervisors went unto their Managers, saying,
"It is a container of excrement, and it is very strong,
such that none may abide by it."
And the Managers went unto their Directors, saying,
"It is a vessel of fertilizer, and none may abide its strength."
And the Directors spoke amongst themselves, saying one to another,
"It contains that which aids plant growth, and it is very strong."
And the Directors then went unto the Vice-Presidents, saying unto them,
"It promotes growth, and it is very powerful."
And the Vice-Presidents went unto the President, saying unto him,
"This new plan will actively promote the growth and vigor
of the company, with powerful effects."
And the President Looked upon the Plan, and saw that it was good.
And the Plan became Policy.
This is how **** Happens
And then came the Assumptions.
And the Assumptions were without form.
And the Plan was without substance.
And darkness was upon the face of the Workers.
And they spoke among themselves, saying,
"It is a crock of ****, and it stinketh."
And the Workers went unto their Supervisors and said,
"It is a pail of dung, and none may abide the odor thereof."
And the Supervisors went unto their Managers, saying,
"It is a container of excrement, and it is very strong,
such that none may abide by it."
And the Managers went unto their Directors, saying,
"It is a vessel of fertilizer, and none may abide its strength."
And the Directors spoke amongst themselves, saying one to another,
"It contains that which aids plant growth, and it is very strong."
And the Directors then went unto the Vice-Presidents, saying unto them,
"It promotes growth, and it is very powerful."
And the Vice-Presidents went unto the President, saying unto him,
"This new plan will actively promote the growth and vigor
of the company, with powerful effects."
And the President Looked upon the Plan, and saw that it was good.
And the Plan became Policy.
This is how **** Happens
sw
Last edited by Safeware; 6th Jul 2007 at 21:25.
Registered User **
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Cambridge
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
However, how do you explain the ability of AOC2Gp to simply wave his magic wand and ordain that, contrary to serious concerns by aircrew at Kinloss, the Nimrod is granted authority to continue AAR, within days of the crash, solely with his permission?
To answer your question though, the IPT should reconsider the MAR and the RTSA should reconsider the RTS, if they don't change, then the aircraft is still cleared to AAR.
It is a simple principle of safety regulation, and it's also common sense, that those regulating should be free of operational and financial pressures. Is this the case in MoD ?
S_H
Registered User **
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Cambridge
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The reason people weren’t happy is simple. Yet again, faceless people with little or no experience, and without consultation or regard to the consequences, re-invent the wheel and cause havoc.
S_H
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: On the outside looking in
Posts: 542
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
With respect to limitations on AAR etc, the following should have been considered:
Every limitation within the ADS must be directly traceable to a potential hazard identified within the Safety Case, or to a source that shows clearly that it has been introduced for reasons other than safety, eg performance, husbandry. Note, however, that safety may be affected by ‘husbandry’ limitations: eg a reduction in flying hours, to save on fuel or maintenance costs, could lead to lower standards of aircrew currency than had been assumed in the Safety Case, which would therefore needs revision. Limitations that are not already based on the Safety Case cannot be imposed - or relaxed - without appropriate consideration of the continued validity of the Safety Case.
And, as someone once said "Not a lot of people know that", but they should.
sw
Every limitation within the ADS must be directly traceable to a potential hazard identified within the Safety Case, or to a source that shows clearly that it has been introduced for reasons other than safety, eg performance, husbandry. Note, however, that safety may be affected by ‘husbandry’ limitations: eg a reduction in flying hours, to save on fuel or maintenance costs, could lead to lower standards of aircrew currency than had been assumed in the Safety Case, which would therefore needs revision. Limitations that are not already based on the Safety Case cannot be imposed - or relaxed - without appropriate consideration of the continued validity of the Safety Case.
And, as someone once said "Not a lot of people know that", but they should.
sw
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SW, in all seriousness, could AOC 2Gp possibly have satisfactorily completed this onerous task inside 4 days? It is ridiculous. I have an email from a senior Nimrod pilot who was exasperated by this decision. The subsequent massive fuel migrations caused by pressure spikes and leaks during AAR only bear out his fears.
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: up north
Posts: 32
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Winco,
As I have said in my only post during this discussion, any acceptable wing tank leak, which we get airborne with, is highly unlikely to deteriorate suddenly in flight. Even given all the factors you describe. The tank pressure is minimal and protected by relief valves. Any fuel which does leak would stream off the wing due to airflow, so even if the wing tank ruptured the risk of fire would be minimal. We do not accept any leaks in areas where the fuel could gather. Lots of people on here are still missing the fact that acceptable leaks are acceptable because they pose a minute if not zero threat to aircraft safety. This is due to the nature of what is causing the leak and the location of it. These acceptable leaks you are all talking about did not cause the tragic events which have prompted this discussion. Please, one and all, keep the discussion focussed on the real problems.
Thanks
RIP Boys
As I have said in my only post during this discussion, any acceptable wing tank leak, which we get airborne with, is highly unlikely to deteriorate suddenly in flight. Even given all the factors you describe. The tank pressure is minimal and protected by relief valves. Any fuel which does leak would stream off the wing due to airflow, so even if the wing tank ruptured the risk of fire would be minimal. We do not accept any leaks in areas where the fuel could gather. Lots of people on here are still missing the fact that acceptable leaks are acceptable because they pose a minute if not zero threat to aircraft safety. This is due to the nature of what is causing the leak and the location of it. These acceptable leaks you are all talking about did not cause the tragic events which have prompted this discussion. Please, one and all, keep the discussion focussed on the real problems.
Thanks
RIP Boys
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Bootflap, this means that the SD allowing Nimrod to continue AAR under exceptional circumstances signed off by AOC 2Gp was released by the RTS Authority?
Can you also explain who is/are the RTSA and what is their relationship with AOC 2Gp and Nimrod IPT?
Please... No rush!!
Can you also explain who is/are the RTSA and what is their relationship with AOC 2Gp and Nimrod IPT?
Please... No rush!!
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Bridgwater Somerset
Posts: 459
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sorry Guys I can hardly understand a word your saying .
I have two questions to ask, and bear in mind I don't know half the jargon so keep yor answers simple please.
Who is the last person to sign out an a/c saying its acceptable to fly, is it the Flight Engineer or something engineer ?
Have I got this right, a pilot can refuse to fly an a/c if he thinks it's unsafe and no-one can say he has too. Is that right, the pilot has the final say ?
PS Keep it simple
I have two questions to ask, and bear in mind I don't know half the jargon so keep yor answers simple please.
Who is the last person to sign out an a/c saying its acceptable to fly, is it the Flight Engineer or something engineer ?
Have I got this right, a pilot can refuse to fly an a/c if he thinks it's unsafe and no-one can say he has too. Is that right, the pilot has the final say ?
PS Keep it simple
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: up north
Posts: 32
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TD
The captain of the aircraft signs to accept the jet after the whole crew have completed there pre flight checks. They would bring his attention to any malfunction they encountered. It is then up to him to sign as accepting the aircraft. Before this the Before Flight servicing will have been carried out by the ground crew and a dispatch check by the crew chief. Any faults found during this stage would probably stop the crew from even getting to the aircraft, the crew chief will not allow the crew to start their pre flight until he is satisfied the aircraft is servicable, we could of course be carrying unservicable items but these would have to be detailed in the F700 and be deemed safe to fly iaw the servicing manuals. The captain retains the right to refuse an aircraft at any time. So you can see it is a team effort and anyone can flag up problems at any time.
The captain of the aircraft signs to accept the jet after the whole crew have completed there pre flight checks. They would bring his attention to any malfunction they encountered. It is then up to him to sign as accepting the aircraft. Before this the Before Flight servicing will have been carried out by the ground crew and a dispatch check by the crew chief. Any faults found during this stage would probably stop the crew from even getting to the aircraft, the crew chief will not allow the crew to start their pre flight until he is satisfied the aircraft is servicable, we could of course be carrying unservicable items but these would have to be detailed in the F700 and be deemed safe to fly iaw the servicing manuals. The captain retains the right to refuse an aircraft at any time. So you can see it is a team effort and anyone can flag up problems at any time.
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: N Scotland
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Who is the last person to sign out an a/c saying its acceptable to fly
Have I got this right, a pilot can refuse to fly an a/c if he thinks it's unsafe and no-one can say he has too. Is that right, the pilot has the final say ?
A example at the heart of this discussion would be: The AGE does his final checks and signs the aircraft as fit to fly. The captain then sees a fuel leak from a charted position and does not believe it is acceptable and wishes to reject the aircraft on that basis. He must either enter that leak in the documents as a new fault and await ground engineering examination to certify it as acceptable or not or, without doing any paperwork, he can (bravely) take his crew away and explain his actions to his Sqn Cdr. Although captains do have the final say, they are still part of a structured organisation and they have to answer for their decisions when they do not go with the plan.
Occasionally, a captain might discover that the aircraft, which is serviceable, does not have the role equipment he needs to carry out his duty, so he can reject it on that basis. Also, if a captain is taking a aircraft away from main base on a deployment with minimal engineering support and the extant acceptable fault(s) are too great for remote ops from home base, he can reject it. These kinds of decisions are usually made well before he is due to go to the aircraft.