The evidence is overwhelming that the MoD’s “robust airworthiness regulatory framework” isn’t actually implemented. Good processes and procedures, but then……… Part of this process is Risk Management. It’s treated the same way. You create a Risk Register, develop mitigation plans, but…….. The same attitude seeps throughout MoD. As long as you have a robust process, it’s tick tick tick in the box. There is absolutely nothing to gain from being able to actually implement the process, even if you are granted resources in the first place. Those who can do it are cast aside and are, in the words of one aircraft Director, “an embarrassment to the Department”.
I’d like to see an examination of the Nimrod 2000/RMPA/MRA4 programme here. Clearly, an obvious risk in such a programme is slippage/delay. This can be for any number of reasons, and to be fair to that team much of this can be political, or driven by changes in industry. However, and I may have mentioned this before, it is vital to consider “affected” programmes and contractors. This is the basic discipline which underpins integration, be it systems or programmatic. (And its greatest enemy is stovepiped IPTs).
If RMPA had a risk associated with slippage, the mitigation plan MUST have included what actions were necessary to keep MR2 in service. The MR2 team (not the same as RMPA, and still isn’t) would have a “wish list” of what needed doing to the MR2 to keep it in service for x years, and each individual component would have an associated timescale. This wish list would be developed with BAeS – some of their safety related recommendations have been noted here. Critically, some of these are entirely related to the airframe and/or materiel being life-ex in certain areas – the BAeS and QQ reports support this. And remember, the QQ report may be dated 2006, but it emphasises the problems have been known since at least 1995 and were the subject of previous reports. In fact, in many ways the 2006 report reads as if it was merely a confirmatory visit to Kinloss to check what, if anything, had improved in 10 years or so. Mid-90s? That’s when RMPA kicked off. Perhaps that’s what prompted the report?? If RMPA announced slippage a few months at a time, the MR2 team would, perhaps reluctantly, have to concede that little could be done and no benefit gained. But, if one huge block of slippage was suddenly announced, say 3 years, then they would have ample time to implement any changes – and those changes would have a useful life and be more easily justified. I know, in theory safety related changes shouldn’t have to worry about this, but remember the process of maintaining safety and airworthiness has been grossly underfunded for over 15 years and is considered by many to be a “waste of money”. See above comment by the Director – same attitude.
This is not being wise after the event. What I describe is routine stuff you learn to plan and implement, before being promoted into procurement, and I have no doubt the respective (unsanitised) Risk Registers (RPMA and MR2) fully record the plans and decisions. (Sanitised Registers are created to hide unpalatable risks). It is the recommendations and the decisions I’d like to examine. And precisely when slippage was (a) discovered and (b) notified. As the Sqn Ldr said to the XD, “Ah, so you haven’t been told about the 3 year slip”.