Nimrod Information
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Magnersdrinker, you've obviously been drinking magners. Of course there is firewire in the Bomb bay and if you read my previous post PROPERLY you would see that I was not at all implying that Firewire would be a source of ignition.
DS
Sorry DS , Im just not with it at the moment , work is difficult with all thats going on. Ok i just got it , FW down the main pannier side before the bomb doors all the way down , you can tell im not a leccy !!! 17 years on type and ive just realised , but again that just shows not everyone knows all.
Im gonna go back now lick my wounds and sip some more magners and come monday night ill look again and reassure myself im not mad !!!
DS
Sorry DS , Im just not with it at the moment , work is difficult with all thats going on. Ok i just got it , FW down the main pannier side before the bomb doors all the way down , you can tell im not a leccy !!! 17 years on type and ive just realised , but again that just shows not everyone knows all.
Im gonna go back now lick my wounds and sip some more magners and come monday night ill look again and reassure myself im not mad !!!
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After 20 years flying I fully accept my job has plenty of risk attached to it and when flying on Op's that risk is exacerbated but unless my eyes deceive me there are folk posting on here that advocate the fact that up to two tons of aviation fuel sloshing round a bomb bay is nothing to be concerned about, in fact not even worthy of a Mayday Call 
Can someone please clear this up for me?
Can someone please clear this up for me?
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After 20 years flying I fully accept my job has plenty of risk attached to it and when flying on Op's that risk is exacerbated but unless my eyes deceive me there are folk posting on here that advocate the fact that up to two tons of aviation fuel sloshing round a bomb bay is nothing to be concerned about, in fact not even worthy of a Mayday Call
Can someone please clear this up for me?
Well I know for fact that there was not 2 tons of fuel rolling about the bomb bay. People blowing things out of proportion. If 2 tons of fuel were in the bomb bay then there is severe major issues, its impossible for that to happen . The bomb bay is not air tight , with airflow and the usual low pressure high pressure it would be sucked out . One thing that not many are aware of is the keel drain system , when a major hyd component is changed there is a tendency like all AC for all hyd oil to leak when changing a component, when component is replaced the system is replenished and thats it . But all the oil has to sit somewhere, in the nimrod case the keels, when in flight and pressurized the excess hyd oil gets blown out into the bomb bay and into the keel drains bottles, sometimes the pipe into the bottle pops out (no major drama) and that can give the impression of leaks, think of the length of a Nimrod by about 1 inch high, thats a lot of fluid plus water ingress blah. Ok its not going to smell of fuel but that drains can kick out a lot of residual hyd fluid. in this case unlikely at 20k ft plus that would already have been done !! But its common things like this that can get mistaken
Can someone please clear this up for me?
Well I know for fact that there was not 2 tons of fuel rolling about the bomb bay. People blowing things out of proportion. If 2 tons of fuel were in the bomb bay then there is severe major issues, its impossible for that to happen . The bomb bay is not air tight , with airflow and the usual low pressure high pressure it would be sucked out . One thing that not many are aware of is the keel drain system , when a major hyd component is changed there is a tendency like all AC for all hyd oil to leak when changing a component, when component is replaced the system is replenished and thats it . But all the oil has to sit somewhere, in the nimrod case the keels, when in flight and pressurized the excess hyd oil gets blown out into the bomb bay and into the keel drains bottles, sometimes the pipe into the bottle pops out (no major drama) and that can give the impression of leaks, think of the length of a Nimrod by about 1 inch high, thats a lot of fluid plus water ingress blah. Ok its not going to smell of fuel but that drains can kick out a lot of residual hyd fluid. in this case unlikely at 20k ft plus that would already have been done !! But its common things like this that can get mistaken
Chug said……….
“By ground testing the AR system and over pressurising it at that, it would seem that consistently no leaks resulted, but as you say that did not guarantee no leakage, indeed it occurred, and seemingly in some abundance. A classic case of 'ground tested and found serviceable'?”
I recall similar discussions some while back on the Mull thread. This very simplistic attitude in the MoD toward diagnosis, testing, repair (including verifying the repair, which many like to conveniently regard as a separate issue) led to a single damaged LRU being recovered from the Chinook, “tested” in glorious isolation by the contractor using highly dubious and unvalidated methodology – and as a result of that test the MoD declared the entire navigation system serviceable in the minutes prior to the impact. Also, and related to another fatal example, MoD insisted that it was sufficient to bench test IFF systems in the factory and accept the result as evidence of airworthiness, without further testing, when integrated (or not, as the case may be) into the aircraft and other systems.
These are not leaps of faith. They are the depths of incompetence.
This is NOT an indictment on maintainers. Those who read this know that I am fully aware of the different roles – engineering set the standards, QA ensure they are met by production (which includes inspection). But if engineering (in this case the IPT and DEC, representing the higher echelons of the MoD and Government) do not make materiel and financial provision to provide maintainers with the necessary tools (up to date APs, test equipment, spares etc) then maintainers cannot be held liable. In days gone by, if any of these tools were missing or not to the correct standard, QA snagged it and work stopped pending corrective action. The fact that probably less than 1% of IPT staff have the vaguest notion of what I’m talking about IS an indictment. If they don’t understand, how on earth can they, (a) calculate and (b) seek, proper materiel and financial provision in the first place? This is not just me saying this – the MoD’s own auditors have long been critical of the dismantling of these vital competencies and processes; which are simply regurgitated in the QinetiQ report mentioned here.
I can just about see where the MoD is coming from – they are associating the leaks with AAR, so stopping that mitigates the risks back to an ALARP level. But go back to the risk classification matrix I mentioned earlier. With this most recent event, do you think the probability of occurrence is still “remote”, or has it been raised one level to “occasional” (and therefore, to Class A)? As the good book says, “Class A risks represent an unacceptable level of risk, which can only be tolerated under truly exceptional circumstances”. And what constitutes “truly exceptional” is not decided on the whim of a lowly IPTL – the deciding factor is the political imperative.
“By ground testing the AR system and over pressurising it at that, it would seem that consistently no leaks resulted, but as you say that did not guarantee no leakage, indeed it occurred, and seemingly in some abundance. A classic case of 'ground tested and found serviceable'?”
I recall similar discussions some while back on the Mull thread. This very simplistic attitude in the MoD toward diagnosis, testing, repair (including verifying the repair, which many like to conveniently regard as a separate issue) led to a single damaged LRU being recovered from the Chinook, “tested” in glorious isolation by the contractor using highly dubious and unvalidated methodology – and as a result of that test the MoD declared the entire navigation system serviceable in the minutes prior to the impact. Also, and related to another fatal example, MoD insisted that it was sufficient to bench test IFF systems in the factory and accept the result as evidence of airworthiness, without further testing, when integrated (or not, as the case may be) into the aircraft and other systems.
These are not leaps of faith. They are the depths of incompetence.
This is NOT an indictment on maintainers. Those who read this know that I am fully aware of the different roles – engineering set the standards, QA ensure they are met by production (which includes inspection). But if engineering (in this case the IPT and DEC, representing the higher echelons of the MoD and Government) do not make materiel and financial provision to provide maintainers with the necessary tools (up to date APs, test equipment, spares etc) then maintainers cannot be held liable. In days gone by, if any of these tools were missing or not to the correct standard, QA snagged it and work stopped pending corrective action. The fact that probably less than 1% of IPT staff have the vaguest notion of what I’m talking about IS an indictment. If they don’t understand, how on earth can they, (a) calculate and (b) seek, proper materiel and financial provision in the first place? This is not just me saying this – the MoD’s own auditors have long been critical of the dismantling of these vital competencies and processes; which are simply regurgitated in the QinetiQ report mentioned here.
I can just about see where the MoD is coming from – they are associating the leaks with AAR, so stopping that mitigates the risks back to an ALARP level. But go back to the risk classification matrix I mentioned earlier. With this most recent event, do you think the probability of occurrence is still “remote”, or has it been raised one level to “occasional” (and therefore, to Class A)? As the good book says, “Class A risks represent an unacceptable level of risk, which can only be tolerated under truly exceptional circumstances”. And what constitutes “truly exceptional” is not decided on the whim of a lowly IPTL – the deciding factor is the political imperative.
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The wider BBC Story
As a consultant I have been working with the BBC on the Nimrod story for some time now, and the news items you saw on Friday night had been planned long before the latest incident. However, the latest incident and the detailed Incident Report meant that even as the fuller story was being prepared the detail and emphasis were changing to reflect the more immediate story, and although I was disappointed that some of the points we had ready to be made were not able to be used, I think the BBC did a very good job on this story, particularly on the fuller version on Radio 4 PM. Although as always it is no longer on the front pages today I can assure you that the story and MOD’s reaction are continuing, and will continue to be, very closely monitored for future news items. (I am not under contract to the BBC or their spokesman – so the above reflects my personal opinion.)
Had there been sufficient air time to put everything we had together (probably needing a documentary rather than a news item) then as well as picking up on the QinetiQ report we would have included the 765B on XV227 in November 2004. Go to http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/nimrodreport.pdf to see the complete report and read the Stn Cdr’s comments in particular. As the QinetiQ report points out as well, bomb bay fuel leaks are not the only problem and had this aircraft (227) been airborne for just a few minutes longer you would be reading an accident report – the photographs were included in the Panorama programme. I wonder how many more unmonitored, and indeed unmonitorable areas of corrosion there are and how many apply to MR4 where, if the Independent story is right, previously unknown corrosion has been found on the re-used fuselage – perhaps another contributor knows about this.
It has been mentioned here already but we were also going to refer to the BAES report (obtained under FOI) of their Fire/Explosion Hazard Assessment for the Mk 2 and RMk1 dated August 2004 ie two years before the accident. I have only seen two pages of the Executive Summary so I hope I am not quoting anything out of its full context, but the BAES Report as well as identifying six areas of potential Human Risk Index Category B occurrences including an uncontrollable bomb bay fire (but assumed to be munitions rather than fuel based) suggested several areas where the IPT needed to consider palliative action – these included:
• A recommendation that MOD consider utilising the extended range tankage role fit fire detection (and) suppression system in normal operations (their emphasis).
• A change of hydraulic couplings from alloy to stainless steel to reflect current standards and best practice
• MOD to consider the possibility of retro-fitting a nitrogen inerting system to reduce the risk of fuel tank explosion.
Clearly none of this has happened for the Mk2 despite the basic design of a bomb bay fire detection and suppressant system already being available – I wonder if they have all been actioned for the Mk4. Clearly there is no guarantee that a bomb bay fire suppressant system would have prevented the loss of 230 – but it might have – especially if it had bought them more time to get to Kandahar.
The QinetiQ report was partially covered in the BBC news items, but the full report is far wider ranging than bomb bay fuel leaks alone. It covers for example fuel leaks and the possible resulting corrosion from the wing panels – the potential for failures in structural integrity - the “perils” of only partially replacing bolts in leak areas (presumably for the sake of speed and cost) – the breaks in the airworthiness chain caused by a failure to update APS, to keep up to date with more suitable repair materials, the loss of skill levels and the low standards used for checking aircraft after major servicing of fuel leak repairs, etc, etc. There is no space here to go into all the details, but it shows that once again, this time some 6 months before the crash, the IPT and their senior management were only too well aware of the risks they were running with aircrew lives and the loss of an aircraft with equipment considered essential for operations.
The spokesman “put up” by MOD Andrew Brooks commented along the lines that the Ministry had “no option” as the Nimrod MR Mk2 capability was essential for support of the troops and that unless aircraft were really falling out of the sky the risks had to be taken (although he did later accept that MOD was not being allowed to spend the money it should have been spending and at the end of the interview he had the grace to comment that given the situation he would probably join many of the crews in leaving for the British airline system!). He did not comment on the fact that 230 really had fallen out of the sky and that at least three and possibly four further incidents had taken place with major bomb bay fuel leaks whose cause remains unknown.
In my opinion there seems little doubt that some very poor decisions have been made over the past few years – almost certainly having a bottom line of no money, and maybe because nobody realised just how significant the role of the Nimrod Mk2 and the length of time it would have this role would be. I do not believe that the IPT can continue to ignore the airworthiness issues and if they want to operate the Mk 2 (not forgetting the RMk1 where the corrosion problems at least may be similar) for the next 5 years they have no choice but to spend some money – including a proper clearance of the AAR system ie full flight trials to identify and rectify the cause of so many leaks. I also hope that the tragic lessons that have now been so expensively learnt in the Mk 2 over the last year are being put right in the Mk 4 – but I wonder why I have my doubts!
Finally, for those people who are, rightly, concerned about any loss of MR Mk 2 capability over Afghanistan this MOD Press Release, dated 9 November the same day that Andrew Brooks was saying the MOD had no option, may bring some comfort
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/De...fghanistan.htm
JB
Had there been sufficient air time to put everything we had together (probably needing a documentary rather than a news item) then as well as picking up on the QinetiQ report we would have included the 765B on XV227 in November 2004. Go to http://extras.timesonline.co.uk/nimrodreport.pdf to see the complete report and read the Stn Cdr’s comments in particular. As the QinetiQ report points out as well, bomb bay fuel leaks are not the only problem and had this aircraft (227) been airborne for just a few minutes longer you would be reading an accident report – the photographs were included in the Panorama programme. I wonder how many more unmonitored, and indeed unmonitorable areas of corrosion there are and how many apply to MR4 where, if the Independent story is right, previously unknown corrosion has been found on the re-used fuselage – perhaps another contributor knows about this.
It has been mentioned here already but we were also going to refer to the BAES report (obtained under FOI) of their Fire/Explosion Hazard Assessment for the Mk 2 and RMk1 dated August 2004 ie two years before the accident. I have only seen two pages of the Executive Summary so I hope I am not quoting anything out of its full context, but the BAES Report as well as identifying six areas of potential Human Risk Index Category B occurrences including an uncontrollable bomb bay fire (but assumed to be munitions rather than fuel based) suggested several areas where the IPT needed to consider palliative action – these included:
• A recommendation that MOD consider utilising the extended range tankage role fit fire detection (and) suppression system in normal operations (their emphasis).
• A change of hydraulic couplings from alloy to stainless steel to reflect current standards and best practice
• MOD to consider the possibility of retro-fitting a nitrogen inerting system to reduce the risk of fuel tank explosion.
Clearly none of this has happened for the Mk2 despite the basic design of a bomb bay fire detection and suppressant system already being available – I wonder if they have all been actioned for the Mk4. Clearly there is no guarantee that a bomb bay fire suppressant system would have prevented the loss of 230 – but it might have – especially if it had bought them more time to get to Kandahar.
The QinetiQ report was partially covered in the BBC news items, but the full report is far wider ranging than bomb bay fuel leaks alone. It covers for example fuel leaks and the possible resulting corrosion from the wing panels – the potential for failures in structural integrity - the “perils” of only partially replacing bolts in leak areas (presumably for the sake of speed and cost) – the breaks in the airworthiness chain caused by a failure to update APS, to keep up to date with more suitable repair materials, the loss of skill levels and the low standards used for checking aircraft after major servicing of fuel leak repairs, etc, etc. There is no space here to go into all the details, but it shows that once again, this time some 6 months before the crash, the IPT and their senior management were only too well aware of the risks they were running with aircrew lives and the loss of an aircraft with equipment considered essential for operations.
The spokesman “put up” by MOD Andrew Brooks commented along the lines that the Ministry had “no option” as the Nimrod MR Mk2 capability was essential for support of the troops and that unless aircraft were really falling out of the sky the risks had to be taken (although he did later accept that MOD was not being allowed to spend the money it should have been spending and at the end of the interview he had the grace to comment that given the situation he would probably join many of the crews in leaving for the British airline system!). He did not comment on the fact that 230 really had fallen out of the sky and that at least three and possibly four further incidents had taken place with major bomb bay fuel leaks whose cause remains unknown.
In my opinion there seems little doubt that some very poor decisions have been made over the past few years – almost certainly having a bottom line of no money, and maybe because nobody realised just how significant the role of the Nimrod Mk2 and the length of time it would have this role would be. I do not believe that the IPT can continue to ignore the airworthiness issues and if they want to operate the Mk 2 (not forgetting the RMk1 where the corrosion problems at least may be similar) for the next 5 years they have no choice but to spend some money – including a proper clearance of the AAR system ie full flight trials to identify and rectify the cause of so many leaks. I also hope that the tragic lessons that have now been so expensively learnt in the Mk 2 over the last year are being put right in the Mk 4 – but I wonder why I have my doubts!
Finally, for those people who are, rightly, concerned about any loss of MR Mk 2 capability over Afghanistan this MOD Press Release, dated 9 November the same day that Andrew Brooks was saying the MOD had no option, may bring some comfort
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/De...fghanistan.htm
JB
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Me Old Mukka!!
Originally Posted by Charlie Luncher
Vage come on now you know that all the experts on here know better than you, remember they have left and are much smarter now
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Manning of bomb bay periscope
NigeGilb said:
Santiago15 said:
There might be no “formal” requirement but that is not what NigeGilb said and the air incident follow-up report on the XV235 incident appears to back him up.
It says:
because as part of the post XV230 procedure a crew member was stationed to look for leaks in the bomb bay.
That is factually incorrect; there is no formal requirement to monitor the bomb bay during AAR.
It says:
THE DECISION TO MAN THE BOMB BAY PERISCOPE IS A CREW PROCEDURE THAT HAS BEEN USED SINCE SEP 06.
Last edited by Mick Smith; 11th Nov 2007 at 13:44. Reason: making clear it was follow-up report not original air incident report
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Mick,
The IR said "it was a crew procedure"
To a layman this might be construed as a procedure carried out by crews.
Not so.
In that context it would have been SOP - standard operating procedures carried out by all crews.
A crew procedure, on the other hand, is an additional procedure usually additional to SOPs that may have been advised by others (Staneval etc) or in the case of a large crew such as on the Nimrod, by the crew themselves.
We used to have 'crew procedures'. We routinely carried mission mapping that other crews did not. We routinely carried out additional pre-flight checks, as we had time, that had been advised by the standards unit but which were not SOP.
It would be wrong therefore to infer that a crew procedure instituted in Sep 06 was in fact required by higher authority or indeed used by all crews.
The IR said "it was a crew procedure"
To a layman this might be construed as a procedure carried out by crews.
Not so.
In that context it would have been SOP - standard operating procedures carried out by all crews.
A crew procedure, on the other hand, is an additional procedure usually additional to SOPs that may have been advised by others (Staneval etc) or in the case of a large crew such as on the Nimrod, by the crew themselves.
We used to have 'crew procedures'. We routinely carried mission mapping that other crews did not. We routinely carried out additional pre-flight checks, as we had time, that had been advised by the standards unit but which were not SOP.
It would be wrong therefore to infer that a crew procedure instituted in Sep 06 was in fact required by higher authority or indeed used by all crews.
Last edited by Pontius Navigator; 11th Nov 2007 at 14:39. Reason: typo and confirmation by Santiago
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Santiago,
You may be splitting hairs but are correct in your comments regarding crew procedures. This was a case of the crew, and particularly the Captain and Flight Engineer, using excellent judgement to monitor the bomb bay during the AAR.
As for speculation, there are plenty of non-specialists, but also a handful of "specialists", making comments regarding the safety of the aircraft. The SCP and bomb bay heating may have been isolated, but until the BoI release their findings none of will know the source of ignition.
Until then there remains serious doubt in my "specialist" mind regarding the safety of the aircraft.
You may be splitting hairs but are correct in your comments regarding crew procedures. This was a case of the crew, and particularly the Captain and Flight Engineer, using excellent judgement to monitor the bomb bay during the AAR.
As for speculation, there are plenty of non-specialists, but also a handful of "specialists", making comments regarding the safety of the aircraft. The SCP and bomb bay heating may have been isolated, but until the BoI release their findings none of will know the source of ignition.
Until then there remains serious doubt in my "specialist" mind regarding the safety of the aircraft.
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PM, Santiago15 and Mr Point. Sorry, but you "current" guys are not as current as you think you are. The follow up signal says "The decision to man the bomb bay periscope is a procedure that has been used since Sep 06" Of course this could be a load of Bull S**t from Kinloss (The originator) to give the impression that everything was under control.
DV
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I am just glad the Captain used sound judgement and asked a crew member to carry out a crew procedure that has been in use since September 2006.
Is there a Nimrod crew out there that would not monitor the bomb bay for fuel leaks?
I take exception to anyone here suggesting the actions of the Captain to instigate a Mayday and divert to Kandahar with a fuel leak spraying all over his bomb bay were unnecessary. The actions of the crew were exemplary, anyone stating that it would have been a better to recover to base should state clearly who they are. If the BoI know the source of ignition it should already have been promulgated to the crews. There are people here suggesting it is possible to design out a risk of fuel explosion. I suggest you write to the FAA or Mr Boeing. Airline manufacturers believed for years that through sound engineering practice they could design out the possiblilty of fuel tanks exploding. However, incidents continued to happen. FAA is now in the process of regulating for the mandatory fitment of fuel tank protection.
It was not the fuel that ignited on XV179 it was the fuel vapours in the ullage. I reject any suggestion that a bomb bay full of fuel is safe. The very thought is laughable. Anyone suggesting it is safe should clearly state the cause of the ignition of the fuel/fuel vapour in XV230.
Furthermore, BAe suggested that MR2 should fly with extended range tanks with fuel extinguishant. I am not particularly clever, but even I can work out that at a stroke this would negate the need for AAR and would provide fire protection at the same time. Anyone suggesting here that bomb bay fire protection in XV230 would have made no difference to the outcome is a fool. The guys were 8 miles or so from landing. You simply cannot say that. BAe warned of the possibility of losing aircraft if the recommendation was not taken up. The RAF ignored this warning.
Finally there has been a defence of the CoC on this thread. Your CoC ordered crews to continue AAR sorties 2 days after the crash. This is an absolute failure of leadership in my view. A leadership that has refused to insist on fuel tank protection, bomb bay protection and flight deck armour on the replacement aircraft.
I invite you to read this press release.
SAN DIEGO, July 20 /-- Developed by San Diego-based technology development company Phyre Technologies Inc., the GOBIGGS(TM) (Green On-Board Inert Gas Generation System) is the first environmentally friendly fuel tank safety system developed for large passenger jets. The system, designed to protect aircraft from fuel tank explosions like that of TWA Flight 800 11 years ago, was successfully demonstrated in May 2007 at the FAA's Atlantic City Technology Center.
The result of several years' development in the anticipation of the pending FAA ruling that will require improved fuel tank safety systems on commercial passenger aircraft, the GOBIGGS(TM) fuel tank inerting system reduces flammability levels of fuel tank vapors by dramatically reducing the oxygen level. This removes the likelihood of a potential explosion from an ignition source.
This technology is similar to existing OBIGGS technology, in that it was designed to be used by both commercial and military aircraft, to dramatically reduce the chance of a fuel tank explosion. Yet, unlike existing OBIGGS, which continually exhausts raw fuel vapor into the environment, Phyre's GOBIGGS(TM) system uses a state-of-the-art closed-loop catalyst design that converts the fuel vapor into an inert gas that is recycled back into the fuel tank. This means pollutants, such as hydrocarbons, are not pumped out into the atmosphere. Not only does GOBIGGS(TM) eliminate the damage to the environment caused by the fuel vapor, it also eliminates the hazard to airport personnel.
With the almost certain, yet-pending FAA ruling that will require retrofitting of all, large airplane designs with a fuel tank safety system, the successful debut of Boeing's new Dreamliner 787 aircraft (the first commercial passenger jet built with a non-green inerting system), and the current worldwide focus on global warming, the environmentally friendly GOBIGGS(TM) is positioned to be one of the most significant technologies developed for large passenger aircraft to date.
Is there a Nimrod crew out there that would not monitor the bomb bay for fuel leaks?
I take exception to anyone here suggesting the actions of the Captain to instigate a Mayday and divert to Kandahar with a fuel leak spraying all over his bomb bay were unnecessary. The actions of the crew were exemplary, anyone stating that it would have been a better to recover to base should state clearly who they are. If the BoI know the source of ignition it should already have been promulgated to the crews. There are people here suggesting it is possible to design out a risk of fuel explosion. I suggest you write to the FAA or Mr Boeing. Airline manufacturers believed for years that through sound engineering practice they could design out the possiblilty of fuel tanks exploding. However, incidents continued to happen. FAA is now in the process of regulating for the mandatory fitment of fuel tank protection.
It was not the fuel that ignited on XV179 it was the fuel vapours in the ullage. I reject any suggestion that a bomb bay full of fuel is safe. The very thought is laughable. Anyone suggesting it is safe should clearly state the cause of the ignition of the fuel/fuel vapour in XV230.
Furthermore, BAe suggested that MR2 should fly with extended range tanks with fuel extinguishant. I am not particularly clever, but even I can work out that at a stroke this would negate the need for AAR and would provide fire protection at the same time. Anyone suggesting here that bomb bay fire protection in XV230 would have made no difference to the outcome is a fool. The guys were 8 miles or so from landing. You simply cannot say that. BAe warned of the possibility of losing aircraft if the recommendation was not taken up. The RAF ignored this warning.
Finally there has been a defence of the CoC on this thread. Your CoC ordered crews to continue AAR sorties 2 days after the crash. This is an absolute failure of leadership in my view. A leadership that has refused to insist on fuel tank protection, bomb bay protection and flight deck armour on the replacement aircraft.
I invite you to read this press release.
SAN DIEGO, July 20 /-- Developed by San Diego-based technology development company Phyre Technologies Inc., the GOBIGGS(TM) (Green On-Board Inert Gas Generation System) is the first environmentally friendly fuel tank safety system developed for large passenger jets. The system, designed to protect aircraft from fuel tank explosions like that of TWA Flight 800 11 years ago, was successfully demonstrated in May 2007 at the FAA's Atlantic City Technology Center.
The result of several years' development in the anticipation of the pending FAA ruling that will require improved fuel tank safety systems on commercial passenger aircraft, the GOBIGGS(TM) fuel tank inerting system reduces flammability levels of fuel tank vapors by dramatically reducing the oxygen level. This removes the likelihood of a potential explosion from an ignition source.
This technology is similar to existing OBIGGS technology, in that it was designed to be used by both commercial and military aircraft, to dramatically reduce the chance of a fuel tank explosion. Yet, unlike existing OBIGGS, which continually exhausts raw fuel vapor into the environment, Phyre's GOBIGGS(TM) system uses a state-of-the-art closed-loop catalyst design that converts the fuel vapor into an inert gas that is recycled back into the fuel tank. This means pollutants, such as hydrocarbons, are not pumped out into the atmosphere. Not only does GOBIGGS(TM) eliminate the damage to the environment caused by the fuel vapor, it also eliminates the hazard to airport personnel.
With the almost certain, yet-pending FAA ruling that will require retrofitting of all, large airplane designs with a fuel tank safety system, the successful debut of Boeing's new Dreamliner 787 aircraft (the first commercial passenger jet built with a non-green inerting system), and the current worldwide focus on global warming, the environmentally friendly GOBIGGS(TM) is positioned to be one of the most significant technologies developed for large passenger aircraft to date.
Last edited by nigegilb; 11th Nov 2007 at 21:45.
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Without going into un-necessary detail, does the R1 also suffer from these problems? It would be shocking if the secrecy of its mission was being used to cover up known flight safety risks.
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BAe Report
Did IPT arrange for trails to be carried out in order to evaluate the effectiveness, or otherwise, of the bomb bay fire suppression system before rejecting the idea. I doubt it. It was more likely to be a "paper study" judgement.
No one can say it would, or would not work under nornal conditions unless it has been tested. But of course we are now talking about money.
DV
No one can say it would, or would not work under nornal conditions unless it has been tested. But of course we are now talking about money.
DV
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A further point about XV179, which was shot down when a round penetrated the fuel tank. Within days tactics in theatre were changed and crews were discouraged from flying low level unless absolutely necessary. This instruction came out almost a year before the BoI was published. Crews were also instructed to manage fuel in the tanks to be in a safer condition, quantity wise when making approaches to hot strips. This instruction came out a full year or so before the BoI report.
Crews should be informed immediately of any findings materially affecting the way missions are carried out or risks inherent.
The fact that a crew member has been stationed to look through a periscope during AAR post Sep 06, confirms that contrary to anything CAS has been saying, there are central themes to these fuel leaks.
I have no idea if the cause of ignition for the fire on XV230 is known, I have no idea if the cause of a possible fuel tank explosion on XV230 is known.. However, if the BoI do know, then I would hope that crews taking big risks on the front line are in the loop.
Crews should be informed immediately of any findings materially affecting the way missions are carried out or risks inherent.
The fact that a crew member has been stationed to look through a periscope during AAR post Sep 06, confirms that contrary to anything CAS has been saying, there are central themes to these fuel leaks.
I have no idea if the cause of ignition for the fire on XV230 is known, I have no idea if the cause of a possible fuel tank explosion on XV230 is known.. However, if the BoI do know, then I would hope that crews taking big risks on the front line are in the loop.
Nigel,
I believe that the BAe recommendation was for the Long Range Tank Fire Supression System, not the long range tanks. I cannot recall these tanks being fitted anytime between 1978 and my last Nimrod flight in 2005.
Indeed not even sure if the capability is even in the MR2 RTS (or whatever it is called these days).
I believe that the BAe recommendation was for the Long Range Tank Fire Supression System, not the long range tanks. I cannot recall these tanks being fitted anytime between 1978 and my last Nimrod flight in 2005.
Indeed not even sure if the capability is even in the MR2 RTS (or whatever it is called these days).
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This is how it has been described to me without tanks present. Not massively useful, but better than nothing. I would have thought flying with the tanks is a suitable cobbled together solution.
"On the face of it it would appear to relate to the rational that for most training operations the MR2 carries very little in the bomb bay, as I understand it the standard fit on most training sorties is just the ASR (Air Sea Rescue) kit - dingy packs. This leaves a large portion (volume) of the bomb bay empty.
The fire suppressant is of finite quantity designed to be used when carrying extended range tanks (the volume of which is almost equal to that of the bomb bay) and if discharged into an almost empty bomb bay, as opposed to one where most of the volume is taken up with extended range tanks, would be so diluted as to not be effective as a suppressant. The bomb bay is not airtight either... adding to the dilution.
The suppressant has not only to be discharged into the bay but has to remain in the bay in sufficient concentration for a period of time to ensure that any fire extinguished, does not immediately re-ignite."
More.....
Regarding the bomb bay fire extinguisher issue. The Nimrod has a 'trooping role' and in order to be used in that manner 6 extended range fuel tanks would be fixed in the bomb bay. With this fit 10 fire extinguishers would also be fitted. However, in the normal fit we do not have either the extended range tanks or the fire extinguishers fitted. That means that day to day there is no fire protection in the bomb bay. However, the bomb bay fire drill calls for all stores to be jettisoned, and to my knowledge there has only been one actual bomb bay fire in the life of the ac. This was caused by an electrical fault causing a flare to ignite when power was supplied to the weapons carrier.
"On the face of it it would appear to relate to the rational that for most training operations the MR2 carries very little in the bomb bay, as I understand it the standard fit on most training sorties is just the ASR (Air Sea Rescue) kit - dingy packs. This leaves a large portion (volume) of the bomb bay empty.
The fire suppressant is of finite quantity designed to be used when carrying extended range tanks (the volume of which is almost equal to that of the bomb bay) and if discharged into an almost empty bomb bay, as opposed to one where most of the volume is taken up with extended range tanks, would be so diluted as to not be effective as a suppressant. The bomb bay is not airtight either... adding to the dilution.
The suppressant has not only to be discharged into the bay but has to remain in the bay in sufficient concentration for a period of time to ensure that any fire extinguished, does not immediately re-ignite."
More.....
Regarding the bomb bay fire extinguisher issue. The Nimrod has a 'trooping role' and in order to be used in that manner 6 extended range fuel tanks would be fixed in the bomb bay. With this fit 10 fire extinguishers would also be fitted. However, in the normal fit we do not have either the extended range tanks or the fire extinguishers fitted. That means that day to day there is no fire protection in the bomb bay. However, the bomb bay fire drill calls for all stores to be jettisoned, and to my knowledge there has only been one actual bomb bay fire in the life of the ac. This was caused by an electrical fault causing a flare to ignite when power was supplied to the weapons carrier.
Last edited by nigegilb; 11th Nov 2007 at 17:56.
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An honestly held opinion
Pontius, Santiago and Mr Point
Thanks for the clarification, which given Santiago's original post confirmed my suspicions of what the follow-up report meant.
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On a wider issue, and apologies for the length of this post. I am a complete outsider here. I post as who I am for reasons of honesty and you guys know who I am and that I have no knowledge of aircraft maintenance, and don't pretend to. I do think however that a number of posters have paid something less than respect to a number of people on this thread who do know what they are talking about and whose intentions are entirely honourable.
This is directed and aimed honestly at Charlie Luncher, Vage Rot, Wrathmonk, and others who think like them. Every generation thinks they know everything there is to know. Charlie Luncher you are where you are, so there is no doubt a lot you do know that others don't.
But that doesn't change the fact that those who went before you, have a great deal of experience of keeping aircraft serviceable and in the air, and know what should and should not be done. They aren't idiots. They have the tee-shirt.
Nor does it change the fundamental truth that an aircraft should not have fuel leaking internally at the rate that it has been doing in a number of cases of Nimrod AARing over Afghanistan which have been documented in official reports written by your colleagues.
No-one is criticising anyone at Kinloss. I have read people on this thread suggesting they are but seen absolutely no evidence of it either here or in the media. Reading the QinetiQ report produced six months before Sept 06, it makes clear that the teams trying to keep the MR2 in the air are "highly committed" and producing a "good" standard of workmanship. That point has been made by both the Sunday Times and the BBC.
Your response to the experienced people posting here is:
None of the people discussing the issue have ever shouted you down but you feel it is right to talk to them like that. I can't even think why you thought it appropriate to say the passage I have bolded up - or indeed why the mods let you do it. Worse, you are applauded for these comments by both Vage Rot and Wrathmonk.
The last part of your comment repeated your previous suggestion that the media reporting - in particular the leaked emails - has delayed the BOI report. Because you are where you are, when you first made this claim I believed you must know what you were talking about in this regard, although I did express some surprise it might be the case.
I'm glad I only did it in posts on this thread because when I asked senior officers who know far more about the situation with the BOI than you do, they assured me it was not the case. Yet you - who demands restraint - thought it was right in a previous post on the issue to suggest to TD that by passing the emails to Sky he was responsible for delays in the BOI report.
Everyone on this thread is discussing the issue because we don't want - as you put it - "to wait until something other than a Chinook/Herc/Nimrod is lost". The time for restraint will come when it is absolutely certain that we have got beyond that point. Last Monday's incident shows we are still some way from that point.
Thanks for the clarification, which given Santiago's original post confirmed my suspicions of what the follow-up report meant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
On a wider issue, and apologies for the length of this post. I am a complete outsider here. I post as who I am for reasons of honesty and you guys know who I am and that I have no knowledge of aircraft maintenance, and don't pretend to. I do think however that a number of posters have paid something less than respect to a number of people on this thread who do know what they are talking about and whose intentions are entirely honourable.
This is directed and aimed honestly at Charlie Luncher, Vage Rot, Wrathmonk, and others who think like them. Every generation thinks they know everything there is to know. Charlie Luncher you are where you are, so there is no doubt a lot you do know that others don't.
But that doesn't change the fact that those who went before you, have a great deal of experience of keeping aircraft serviceable and in the air, and know what should and should not be done. They aren't idiots. They have the tee-shirt.
Nor does it change the fundamental truth that an aircraft should not have fuel leaking internally at the rate that it has been doing in a number of cases of Nimrod AARing over Afghanistan which have been documented in official reports written by your colleagues.
No-one is criticising anyone at Kinloss. I have read people on this thread suggesting they are but seen absolutely no evidence of it either here or in the media. Reading the QinetiQ report produced six months before Sept 06, it makes clear that the teams trying to keep the MR2 in the air are "highly committed" and producing a "good" standard of workmanship. That point has been made by both the Sunday Times and the BBC.
Your response to the experienced people posting here is:
Vage come on now you know that all the experts on here know better than you, remember they have left and are much smarter now...
I have asked for restraint and consideration on this post but no you just cannot help yourselves. So when and if we meet I will ignore your calls for restraint, take your frustration with your lack of promotion or importance to another cause or shall we have to wait until something other than a Chinook/Herc/Nimrod is lost.
I have asked for restraint and consideration on this post but no you just cannot help yourselves. So when and if we meet I will ignore your calls for restraint, take your frustration with your lack of promotion or importance to another cause or shall we have to wait until something other than a Chinook/Herc/Nimrod is lost.
The last part of your comment repeated your previous suggestion that the media reporting - in particular the leaked emails - has delayed the BOI report. Because you are where you are, when you first made this claim I believed you must know what you were talking about in this regard, although I did express some surprise it might be the case.
I'm glad I only did it in posts on this thread because when I asked senior officers who know far more about the situation with the BOI than you do, they assured me it was not the case. Yet you - who demands restraint - thought it was right in a previous post on the issue to suggest to TD that by passing the emails to Sky he was responsible for delays in the BOI report.
Everyone on this thread is discussing the issue because we don't want - as you put it - "to wait until something other than a Chinook/Herc/Nimrod is lost". The time for restraint will come when it is absolutely certain that we have got beyond that point. Last Monday's incident shows we are still some way from that point.
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Mr Point: A simple question for you, what make some one a "specialist"? From several postings on the thread it would appear that the answer to that question is, anyone who flies or maintains a Nimrod. I prefer the official definition, " A person who is trained and experienced in a particular branch of a profession".
The people from QinetiQ were not "current" Nimrod fliers or maintenace crews, but they were specialist in their field. And being specialst, they uncovered facts about Nimrod opertions and maintenance that IPT and MoD should have know about years before their report was published.
DV
The people from QinetiQ were not "current" Nimrod fliers or maintenace crews, but they were specialist in their field. And being specialst, they uncovered facts about Nimrod opertions and maintenance that IPT and MoD should have know about years before their report was published.
DV
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From today's Observer:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanista...209288,00.html
Not sure what it adds, but interesting that the Observer has apparently had a leak of the BOI report.
S41
http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanista...209288,00.html
Not sure what it adds, but interesting that the Observer has apparently had a leak of the BOI report.
S41