Nimrod Information

[Pontius Navigator]

Looks more like a creative fishing trip. THE REPORT seems to be the QQ one so the story is just a Sunday rerun of the weeklies.

[Da4orce]

Maybe it's just the way I was reading it but it seems to relate in the main to the Qinetiq report not a leak of the BoI maybe with the exception of this...

Details relating to prospective repairs on the plane that exploded over Afghanistan could not be traced by those examining the fuel tank system of the plane.

Other documents appear to corroborate this view. Something that will of made the BoI a more difficult task that it already was.

The 12 deficiencies mentioned in the Qinetiq report, published in March 2006, focus on mechanics' working practices. They cite staff using out-of-date generic manuals that did not relate to the specifics of the spy plane and the lack of an 'adhesion promoter' to properly carry out repairs to the aircraft's fuel tanks. So alarmed were the authors of the report that they recommend that a team of specialists should review the findings and make urgent improvements.

Did a team of specialists review the findings and make urgent improvements?

'The overall control and quality of the [mechanics'] work was not helped by the loss of venting equipment, inadequate tooling and poor upkeep,' said the report. Experts highlighted a 'critical need to improve the training' of Nimrod mechanics, a 'deficiency of appropriate tooling for sealant stripping', and a 'lack of expertise and critical loss of experienced personnel that has had a major impact on the efficiency of RAMS [mechanics] in carrying out fuel tank repair work'.
The lack of suitably skilled mechanics was serious enough, the report adds, to have 'diminished the consistency of fuel tank repair work with a possible impact on the reliability of those repairs' and may have compromised the 'effective sealing of leaks'.

This Qinetiq report should have the MoD lawyers working overtime trying to wriggle out of a charge of gross negligence.

[Safeware]

As regards overall risk, and there being 6 Hazard Risk Index (HRI) 'B' hazards (and I do wish that those selling themselves as consultants could use the correct terminology ) it would be interesting to see how the IPT manage them - what 'target' were they aiming at, did / do they aggregate risk (6 x HRI B potentially = an overall A) etc.

sw

[MightyHunter AGE]

DV

Once again I find your comments abrasive and frankly quite rude.

Those operators on here who are far more current on the Nimrod than you have stated that the bomb bay periscope is used to monitor the bay during AAR.

Why then would you, an outsider with little knowledge on the matter, then decide to call them liar's?

I have a SIMPLE question for you.
When was the last time you operated or maintained a Nimrod?

An answer of most recent currency will suffice, nothing more.

Far too many times you have come on here demanding or calling people liars.

You have overstepped the mark.

Get back into your box and stay there.

[Chugalug2]

Have I got this right? The bomb bay fire suppressant system is designed to work with the long range tanks filling the bomb bay, and would be ineffective without them. The AR system is highly suspect and is currently not used. Extended endurance is vital for the operational use of this fleet. With long range tanks fitted a much greater endurance would be achieved. So why don't......oh, of course, all the long range fuel tanks would have been sold off as scrap years ago by the beancounters. Well maybe they need to get Gordo to OK some more tinbashing quick time, or more likely I have it wrong and am about to be left in no doubt of that at least!

[Steve Austin]

Nige, I believe we met a number of years ago when we were both stuck in Azi; I respect what you have acheived wrt protection on the Herc and, indeed, what you are now trying to achive with the Nimrod. However, a word of caution now that you are dealing with an aircraft which is not your background (no offence intended at all). Be careful what you post as you can easily lead people astray.

In an earlier post (1464) you state that:

"Furthermore, BAe suggested that MR2 should fly with extended range tanks with fuel extinguishant. I am not particularly clever, but even I can work out that at a stroke this would negate the need for AAR and would provide fire protection at the same time."

This theme has now been picked up by others, but is incorrect. The AAR capability rendered the long range tanks obsolete, but it does not work the otherway round; long range tanks would not negate the need for AAR. You can take-on significatly more fuel through AAR (replenishing now empty tanks) than you can lift off the ground with long range tanks, due to the maximum take-off limitations of the aircraft. Without going into actual figures, if you filled all the fuselage and wing tanks on an MR2, you will be at (or just below) the design maximum take off weight. If long range tanks were available and could be fitted, you would only be able to increase the fuel load up to the overload maximum take-off weight. Not only would this reduce safety margins (especially in the hot climates) and increase fatigue, but it would only increase the endurance of the aircraft by about an hour.

TVM

[Mr Point]

DV,
Easy tiger - the reference to "specialists" was following Santiago15's comment:

Or where non-specialists make incorrect assumptions before going on to discuss hypothetical situations based on these assumptions.

I agree wholeheartedly that there are a range of "specialists" involved in aviation, including QinetiQ staff , but it all comes down to the context of comments made.

[Chomsky]

Posted by DV

Sorry, but you "current" guys are not as current as you think you are. The follow up signal says "The decision to man the bomb bay periscope is a procedure that has been used since Sep 06" Of course this could be a load of Bull S**t from Kinloss (The originator) to give the impression that everything was under control.


DV,

Just how current are you on nimrod ops and procedures!! What gives you the right to accuse the "current guys" of not being current on their type of aircraft!!! It's C**ts like you that post on here like you wrote the manual that wind me up. Maybe you should just step back and become a spectator instead of spouting s**te!!!

[nigegilb]

Thanks Steve, I stand corrected. What I don't understand is why would BAe recommend the fitting of bomb bay fire extinguishant without the long range tanks if it would be totally ineffective as a fire suppression/extinguishant system?

[AC Ovee]

Would ACoveee state where it says in the Nimrod FRCs that there is no requirement to land at the nearest suitable airfield in the event of a serious internal/external fuel leak?

The FRCs and aircrew manuals are not there to provide airmanship. Even the engine fire drill or the total engine failure drill does not say "land as soon as possible". Therefore, it will not give the opposite advice either. The FRC tells the crew which switches and levers to operate in various circumstances. Thereafter the captain decides what to do.

We have been training and practicing the handling of fuel leaks since the day the Nimrod MR1 first flew. If the leak can be stopped: stop it and think about the next move, and there are many. If the leak cannot be stopped and a fire is a possibility (even in area with fire extinguishant), an immediate diversion has to be considered. If fire isn't a possibility, other options come into play. If the leak has stopped and fire is not a possibility, more options come into consideration. There is no standard answer to any of this, hence no directions in the FRCs.

Nigegilb, please forgive me if you are a relative of the lost crew, but what drives you in this discussion? I am current Nimrod aircrew and I have a vested interest in the aircraft and the safety of my colleagues. As I have indicated earlier this weekend, there are many people here at Kinloss who read this forum and they form opinions (and personal feelings) based on the submissions made by the contributors. As aircrew, some of the lesser experienced people are really desperate to know if AAR is safe. Crew captains, sat in the front of the jet, trying to locate the tanker in scattered cloud do not want their copilots, radar ops and beam lookouts being distracted by thoughts of, "we should not be doing this, I read it on pprune, etc"

In anticipation of your answer that you, too, have everyone's safety in mind and that by "exposing" how wrong it is to continue with AAR, that pprune will convince CAS to stop AAR and then we will all be safe: Well, pprune has no voice, so you are wasting your time but, more importantly, you and the other critics of AAR are definitely causing distraction where it is needed least: on the front line, above the enemy and during a much needed procedure.

[nigegilb]

You are probably right. It is time to retire from the argument and wait for the BoI.

NG

[AC Ovee]

Also, what was the point of the tanks if the ac perf was so restricted?

The RE tanks were only available when the MR1 was in Service. The MR1 ZFW was a lot less than the MR2, which meant that the jet had the capability to carry more weight in the fuselage. The designers believed this to be a valuable option so they came up with the RE tanks. As far as I know, they were never used because it was simpler to flag somewhere en route and, besides, once the tanks were fitted the bomb doors could not be opened in flight. Therefore, you would get to your destination and before you could go out and play at ASW you had to remove wet and noxious tanks from the bomb bay. Sadly, the aircraft manufacturer does not always have the full picture of how we operate.

The MR2 basic weight is much greater, so with full normal tanks we cannot carry extra RE fuel due to the max AUW, anyway. So, with that factor in mind, the tanks were scrapped.

We are now left with a cavernous bay that is not in anyway sealable to create a leak proof void to contain a fire that we could smother with inerting gas, foam or powder. As I mentioned before, the bomb bay heating system pumps hundreds of litres of warm air into the bay every minute, supplemented by 2 ram air valves (tumble drier hose size) at 350 kts TAS. The incoming air mix is not exhausted in any special way; it simply flows out around the edges of the doors and the bay does not pressurize. Therefore, if an extinguishant is to be effective (and sustained for approx 30 secs) it has to be supplied directly to the root of the fire (which will require a very smart detection and distribution system) or it has be enormous and space hungry in an already bulked out fuselage. If a system can be found to do this: great, I'm in, but I'm not convinced.

[fleece7]

"do not want their copilots, radar ops and beam lookouts being distracted by thoughts of, "we should not be doing this, I read it on pprune, etc"

AC Ovee-

ARE YOU SERIOUS???? do you think anyone weights some anonymous voice over their training, experience and knowledge!!

Can I have a side order of fries with my big fat helping of patronisation?

[Mad_Mark]

Fleece, what really grips my sh!t is people, like you, who don't read what is written properly before criticising the author. What AC O said was...

As aircrew, some of the lesser experienced people are really desperate to know if AAR is safe.

Note the bit that I bolded. He was talking about the new guys, the ones that could be deployed for the very first time, or carrying out AR for the very first time.

I often hear concerns from the newer guys that read misleading information on here and don't understand, due to their lack of experience, what the true facts are. It is nothing to do with training as AR is not a part of the OCU syllabus. When AR training is conducted it is a front-end thing and so not all rear crew members may have experienced it before their first live tanking trip on ops.

As can be seen, not all crew members have the "training, experience and knowledge" and they rely on the "training, experience and knowledge" of those that have been around the bazaars a little longer than them to dispel the fears gained from reading misinformed or misleading comments here and in the press.

Finally we have a fuel leak on the jet that is worth discussing, unlike those that the press and others latched on to recently. This leak was of a significant enough quantity and in an area that could have been disastrous and the crew actions were, IMHO, correct! This incident is worthy of causing concern; much else of what has been speculated about in this thread, mostly by those with little or no experience on type, has not been.

MadMark!!!

[John Blakeley]

HRI

Safeware,
Thank you for your clarification re HRI - as a consultant I am always happy to learn. In fact in other areas where I have done some work HRI does indeed stand for, or is used for, Human Risk Index and as far as I can see the definition of probability of the outcome and the results of the outcome are covered in a similar way, but clearly you are correct here, and Tucumseh has also kindly sent me the references to Def Stan 00-56 and the safety matrix.

Turning to your main point the BAES report said, after defining the six potential HRI B risks:

"These above mentioned hazards will require reference to the IPT for consideration as to whether further risk reduction is practicable or whether they shall remain acceptable without further action. The remainder [not defined in the ES I have seen] are recommended as being broadly acceptacle with MOD approval, as being mitigated to a level considered to be ALARP"

I am sure we both agree that ALARP stands for as low as reasonably practicable, and this was the overall rating that BAES gave to the risk of fire/explosion for both the R Mk1 and the MR2 "based on the assumption that (their) recommendations (from the zonal fire/expolosion assessment) be reviewed" - this is obviously a "woolly" position as the page of recommendations which follows is not prioritised and there is no further assessment of what the HRI case will be if the recommendations are not actioned. I do not know what action the IPT took against the BAES recommendations, but, clearly, the 3 I outlined in my last e-mail were never actioned. (Incidentally I have seen the comment that the ER tank fire suppression fit would not provide any cover - the BAES report says the opposite, but I have no idea who is correct.)

As with so many other things the real level of risk may be obscured by differing definitions, or even no definition, of the terms being used. Generally the definitions can anyway only be qualitative not quantitative.
Looking at the safety matrix of "probability of occurence" and "severity of harm" an "A" ie unacceptable (risk) category applies when:

The probabilty of occurence is "frequent" and the severity of harm is "marginal"
The probability is "probable" and the severity of harm is "critical"
The probability is "occasional" and the severity is "catastrophic"

I do not know what conclusions the IPT reached on the BAES report in 2004 or whether the risks were re-considered in the light of the QinetiQ report, but I would have thought that AAR operations with the Mk2 have been firmly in the A category since the loss of 230 - particlarly as the incidents since September 2006 have had inconclusive causes and the BOI has not reported -if the BOI has identified a definite cause one has to assume that even in the absence of the full report some specific engineering actions would have been taken.

My own view, reinforced by the BBC interview with the MOD "put up" spokesman Andrew Brooks, is that the airworthiness chain has been broken for the MR2 by deliberate actions of the IPT and senior management, and the bottom line reason for this is, as always, inadequate funding for people to do their job properly. I would be the first to admit that I am glad I was not put in the position to make these hard decisions, but the fact remains that aviation is very unforgiving of compromised airworthiness standards no matter how great the operational imperatives.

JB

[cm74]

It seems to me that this thread is mostly hack driven, looking for a story and a few quid off the back of a tragic incident.. nothing new there then.

And to boot, they are goading and baiting reactions from current Nimrod crews, angry at the speculation and crap that gets posted on here amongst a few gems of knowledge.

Go on DV, tell me once again to stop posting on your thread or even call me a few names again - wasn't it fairy the last time? I think you're out of order there.

There is a problem but it is being dealt with; not as fast as some would like, but it is happening. For the sake of the families of 230, I hope we get some knowledge soon.

I think, for now, its a case of we'll fly it, you talk about it.

[Distant Voice]

A very good question Mike J. An even better question is "how many QinetiQ recommendations have been taken up?"

DV

[MightyHunter AGE]

DV
AGAIN I ASK
When was the last time you operated or maintained a Nimrod?

An answer of your most recent currency will suffice, nothing more.

Or are you avoiding the question?

You obviously think you know more than those 'current' guys so let us know your years operating/maintaining the Mighty Hunter.

[tucumseh]

"A very good question Mike J. An even better question is "how many QinetiQ recommendations have been taken up?"


Mike J and Distant V, spot on both of you.

To those who say wait for the BoI, I say wait until you see the QQ report(s). I am utterly astonished it has been released under FoI - if it had still been under MoD control they would have refused to release it in any form, or denied its existence in the first place. And I say well done to whoever knew to ask for it.

I am disgusted at how, in the past, MoD have managed to wriggle out of their responsibilities and duty of care by lying, withholding vital evidence and obstructing natural justice. But I have a feeling in my water about this one.

[Distant Voice]

Mighty Hunter AGE: I will answer your question. It is many years since I worked on Nimrod, but the lack of "currency" on Nimrod does not negate past experience and judgement. You should realise that the final call on this issue will be made by a coroner, not the BoI, and he with not have had any Nimrod experience. But he will have better judgement than a Chief Chief, or a Flight Engineering, in determining the cause of the deaths of 14 service personnel.

Finally, Mighty Hunter AGE, please read what people have said, you seem to be a "specilist" in mis-quoting. I have never called anyone a liar.

If there is another life, do not come back as a fish, ----- you bite to easily.

By the way, how much of the QinetiQ report have you read and understood.?

DV