Nimrod Information
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DV, I am aware of that post, and yet that would still not cover what I was actually asking.
There has been much discussion about events prior to the loss of 230, and many opinions about what may or may not have happened on the actual day she was lost to us, however not one person has so far been able to stand forward and say "Yes I know with full fact what happened to cause the loss of 230 and 14 men".
The point which I'm making with this, is that not one of you actually do know, and no amount of discussion, or debate or speculation is going to bring about any of the answers which you so want to know, the only time this can come even close is with the release of the BOI.
So just like me and all the other families and those related to the Nimrod, you are also having to be patient and wait.
As has already been noted, the speculation has got you no where, and until the BOI is released with the factual findings, it will continue to get you no where.
So what is the point?
There has been much discussion about events prior to the loss of 230, and many opinions about what may or may not have happened on the actual day she was lost to us, however not one person has so far been able to stand forward and say "Yes I know with full fact what happened to cause the loss of 230 and 14 men".
The point which I'm making with this, is that not one of you actually do know, and no amount of discussion, or debate or speculation is going to bring about any of the answers which you so want to know, the only time this can come even close is with the release of the BOI.
So just like me and all the other families and those related to the Nimrod, you are also having to be patient and wait.
As has already been noted, the speculation has got you no where, and until the BOI is released with the factual findings, it will continue to get you no where.
So what is the point?
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Lab Queen:
As Mike Jenvey has already stated, we will possibly never know exactly what happened on XV230. With no Cockpit Voice Recorder, limited information available on the DARU, and a hostile crash site, even the BoI will not have all of the facts.
...and until the BOI is released with the factual findings
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Mr Point
Which is why I have said, even come close is with the release.
However many facts we can be given by the BOI findings, and I am fully aware of all the obstacles involved, they will still be factual findings.
Which is why I have said, even come close is with the release.
However many facts we can be given by the BOI findings, and I am fully aware of all the obstacles involved, they will still be factual findings.
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DV
I do not 'claim' to be anything but I have worked on keeping these aircraft flying for the last 6 years and have completed 7 Gulf Operations in various locations and have been proud to work with the aircrew, good times and bad.
As for your questions, I have been aware of the report and its content which could be said of any RAF Sqn at present. If you yourself were still serving you would be aware of the massive outflow of experience technicians who are fed up with blah and blah and are voting with their feet.
As for the RAMS team they have now been amalgamated into NLS. As for the civilian workers, I cannot comment on something I know nothing about, unlike yourself.
I do not 'claim' to be anything but I have worked on keeping these aircraft flying for the last 6 years and have completed 7 Gulf Operations in various locations and have been proud to work with the aircrew, good times and bad.
As for your questions, I have been aware of the report and its content which could be said of any RAF Sqn at present. If you yourself were still serving you would be aware of the massive outflow of experience technicians who are fed up with blah and blah and are voting with their feet.
As for the RAMS team they have now been amalgamated into NLS. As for the civilian workers, I cannot comment on something I know nothing about, unlike yourself.
Last edited by MightyHunter AGE; 12th Nov 2007 at 19:26.
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JB,
Thanks for getting back on that.
My main point though, wasn't what each of the individual risks was about, or what the ES or recommendations say, but
which would still seem to be missing, and I agree that if BAES can't say if the risk is ALARP, pre or post implementation, then it is all "woolly".
I also think your statement "that aviation is very unforgiving of compromised airworthiness standards no matter how great the operational imperatives" is very apt.
As an aside, I got round to reading JSP 553 Change 5, effective 1 Nov, today. It has an interesting addition that says if any platform can't meet the stated airworthiness targets (or limits as delegated), this must be recognised in the safety case and the appropriate DG informed.
sw
Thanks for getting back on that.
My main point though, wasn't what each of the individual risks was about, or what the ES or recommendations say, but
it would be interesting to see how the IPT manage them - what 'target' were they aiming at, did / do they aggregate risk (6 x HRI B potentially = an overall A) etc.
I also think your statement "that aviation is very unforgiving of compromised airworthiness standards no matter how great the operational imperatives" is very apt.
As an aside, I got round to reading JSP 553 Change 5, effective 1 Nov, today. It has an interesting addition that says if any platform can't meet the stated airworthiness targets (or limits as delegated), this must be recognised in the safety case and the appropriate DG informed.
sw
"It has an interesting addition that says if any platform can't meet the stated airworthiness targets (or limits as delegated), this must be recognised in the safety case and the appropriate DG informed".
I must admit I thought this was mandated anyway, perhaps elsewhere. It matters not - the last DG I reported such an event to did nothing except ensure I was criticised in my next annual report. 2 dead. And without naming names, this is the most appropriate thread for this recollection.
I must admit I thought this was mandated anyway, perhaps elsewhere. It matters not - the last DG I reported such an event to did nothing except ensure I was criticised in my next annual report. 2 dead. And without naming names, this is the most appropriate thread for this recollection.
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AC OVEE
I have been reading some of your recent postings and am frankly, astonished by some of your comments:
For example, on the subject of flying the Nimrod you said. ‘Yes, I would. And yes, I would do AAR. Why? Because AAR in a Nimrod is no more dangerous than AAR in any other aircraft’
On what exactly do you base that comment? Do you not think that with the several recent AAR fuel leak problems with the MR2 and the loss of 230, AAR in a Nimrod is just slightly more dangerous than say an E-3 or a VC-10 or a fast jet maybe?
You also said: ‘XV230 experienced a fuel fire due to any one of a number of causes, and I know that ALL of those causes have since been identified and mitigated. XV235 suffered ONLY a fuel leak. Yes, it sprayed into the bomb bay, but it would never have become a fire because there was nothing in there to ignite it’
That implies that you know what caused the fire on 230. Can you tell us what it was please? Can you also tell us what exactly has been done to eliminate the possible causes of fire in the bomb bay? I would suggest to you that ‘ONLY’ a fuel leak of the magnitude that 235 appears to have had, is a pretty major event. Certainly it was serious enough for the aircraft to be withdrawn from theatre, so it clearly wasn’t a ‘minor’ incident was it?
And your comment: ‘Those who know what a Mayday means will form the impression that the crew were in imminent danger. They were not. They never were’
This shows a high degree of ignorance on your part and implies that the crew and captain were wrong in their actions. Perhaps you were on board at the time, and can tell us how it really was? FYI I am a captain of a large 4 engine aircraft, and if I had a major fuel leak similar to that of 235, then I wouldn’t hesitate in putting out a MAYDAY, because you ARE in serious and imminent danger, and you DO need immediate assistance (CAP413)
I will refrain from commenting about what you wrote about Fuel and Ignition, because you are fundamentally wrong. High pressure fuel vapour is NOT difficult to ignite at all (why do you think we have such severe restrictions around aircraft during fuelling?)
You are quite correct however, when you say that ‘Crew captains, sat in the front of the jet, trying to locate the tanker in scattered cloud do not want their co-pilots, radar ops and beam lookouts being distracted by thoughts of, "we should not be doing this, I read it on pprune, etc"’ But the loss of 230 was a fact, and the fuel leak on 235 WAS a fact, as were all the other incidents of fuel leaks/AAR problems. PPrune isn’t responsible for that, and to suggest that the crews wouldn’t have known about it if they hadn’t read it on PPrune is stupid. And to say that PPrune doesn’t have a voice – how wrong you are! I would think that the postings from the likes of Tappers Dad and others on this forum has been a major factor in the delay in the publication of the BoI.
I look forward to your reply.
The Winco
I have been reading some of your recent postings and am frankly, astonished by some of your comments:
For example, on the subject of flying the Nimrod you said. ‘Yes, I would. And yes, I would do AAR. Why? Because AAR in a Nimrod is no more dangerous than AAR in any other aircraft’
On what exactly do you base that comment? Do you not think that with the several recent AAR fuel leak problems with the MR2 and the loss of 230, AAR in a Nimrod is just slightly more dangerous than say an E-3 or a VC-10 or a fast jet maybe?
You also said: ‘XV230 experienced a fuel fire due to any one of a number of causes, and I know that ALL of those causes have since been identified and mitigated. XV235 suffered ONLY a fuel leak. Yes, it sprayed into the bomb bay, but it would never have become a fire because there was nothing in there to ignite it’
That implies that you know what caused the fire on 230. Can you tell us what it was please? Can you also tell us what exactly has been done to eliminate the possible causes of fire in the bomb bay? I would suggest to you that ‘ONLY’ a fuel leak of the magnitude that 235 appears to have had, is a pretty major event. Certainly it was serious enough for the aircraft to be withdrawn from theatre, so it clearly wasn’t a ‘minor’ incident was it?
And your comment: ‘Those who know what a Mayday means will form the impression that the crew were in imminent danger. They were not. They never were’
This shows a high degree of ignorance on your part and implies that the crew and captain were wrong in their actions. Perhaps you were on board at the time, and can tell us how it really was? FYI I am a captain of a large 4 engine aircraft, and if I had a major fuel leak similar to that of 235, then I wouldn’t hesitate in putting out a MAYDAY, because you ARE in serious and imminent danger, and you DO need immediate assistance (CAP413)
I will refrain from commenting about what you wrote about Fuel and Ignition, because you are fundamentally wrong. High pressure fuel vapour is NOT difficult to ignite at all (why do you think we have such severe restrictions around aircraft during fuelling?)
You are quite correct however, when you say that ‘Crew captains, sat in the front of the jet, trying to locate the tanker in scattered cloud do not want their co-pilots, radar ops and beam lookouts being distracted by thoughts of, "we should not be doing this, I read it on pprune, etc"’ But the loss of 230 was a fact, and the fuel leak on 235 WAS a fact, as were all the other incidents of fuel leaks/AAR problems. PPrune isn’t responsible for that, and to suggest that the crews wouldn’t have known about it if they hadn’t read it on PPrune is stupid. And to say that PPrune doesn’t have a voice – how wrong you are! I would think that the postings from the likes of Tappers Dad and others on this forum has been a major factor in the delay in the publication of the BoI.
I look forward to your reply.
The Winco
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SW
As all FW platforms contribute to the CA AMG, it is a requirement to detail Loss Rates and any High Class Risks. DG CA is a forum member.
As an aside, I got round to reading JSP 553 Change 5, effective 1 Nov, today. It has an interesting addition that says if any platform can't meet the stated airworthiness targets (or limits as delegated), this must be recognised in the safety case and the appropriate DG informed.
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r supwoods,
What I was getting at was the inclusion, at para 1.37.4, of a direct relationship between the 2 immediately preceding targets, and failure to meet them in JSP553, but since you were so dismissive of JSP553 last time out, you probably didn't notice.
sw
What I was getting at was the inclusion, at para 1.37.4, of a direct relationship between the 2 immediately preceding targets, and failure to meet them in JSP553, but since you were so dismissive of JSP553 last time out, you probably didn't notice.
sw
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Winco,
Well, I have conducted AAR on different aircraft throughout the years; tanking and receiving. While different aircraft types route the pipes differently, the same principles and materials are generally used. But, I have heard that there are some types that have double-skinned pipework. The MR2 has the same where the pipe passes through the crew compartment. I agree that the Nimrod is far from the the latest design in AAR, but that doesn't make it unsafe just because of that. What makes it safe, if safe means that it will not suffer a fire, is answered below.
Prior to the accident, Nimrod AAR might have carried a fire risk that is not there now: fuel flowing at high pressure in pipes in the vicinity of other pipes carrying hot air. I cannot say (because I haven't been told) that on 2 Sep 06 fuel leaked from its pipe and then came into contact with a nearby charged up air pipe, but it is a recognised possibility. Due to that possibility, the use of all hot air pipes in the fuselage is now prohibited during flight. The bomb bay and surrounding areas is now cold and dormant. Only fuel, hydraulic fluid and warm air to/from the cabin, pass through there. Yes, there is electricity, but unless you want to believe that there is a risk of a simultaneous major electrical fault, not known to the crew (otherwise they wouldn't do/continue the AAR), any fuel leak in that bay will not ignite. We dump fuel using the same pipes, except for one pipe dedicated to AAR due to an NRV. The pipes, throughout the jet, are liable to leak during dumping and they occasionally do so. Should we now cease dumping for fear of a leak from the same pipes that are used for AAR, despite the fact that dump pipe leaks have occurred regularly, without any fires, throughout the life of the Nimrod?
The system operating limitations we have now imposed on the Nimrod have removed all possible causes of a fuel fire while it is airborne with fully serviceable electrics. Someone here asked about motors and commutators, etc, in the bay. There are one or two in there, but they are sealed units, checked regularly and are not unreliable.
Firstly, it was reported by the media as a "major" fuel leak. I didn't edit the news, so I might be wrong, but if the crew use "Mayday" it would be a reasonable deduction by the media to report it as a major leak; even you believe it was a major leak. It wasn't. It was a spray that ceased shortly after the disconnect and was later described by the crew themselves as probably a few gallons.
We can argue about the use of Mayday until the cows come home, but if you are on fire: mayday, if you are without engines: mayday; if you are out of control: mayday, if you are about to crash: mayday. If you have 300 pax you might want to get the ATC on your side for lesser problems and a mayday achieves that.
But you didn't refrain:
I agree that its not difficult with a naked flame, which is at the core of the severe restrictions. However, remove the naked flame and all heat sources and it becomes very difficult. Aircraft do not power down to take on fuel. 200V is humming everywhere and despite the "no switching" rule, many refuel systems include float switches on the walls of the tanks and electrical contents systems (including your big widebody jet with all the crew and cleaners in there on a refuel stop, yes?). The systems are allowed to switch on/off while refuelling because they are serviceable. We do not cater for double faults: ie a fuel leak/vapour with a simultaneous unrelated electrical fault nearby. Even when we want to deliberately light the fuel on an aircraft we have to employ HE igniters then spread the naked flame around the liners.
I wrote that the lesser experienced guys could be influenced by what they read here.
You and others have been writing words to the effect that AAR is not safe. Using the name Winco isn't accidental. I doubt that you left us as an SAC. You write in an authoritative manner and you clearly intend to influence people (as I do). My point is that, while pprune, "etc" might not spawn distractions, your influence and contributions run the risk of adding to them.
In the context of my statement, pprune does not have a voice that would influence CAS and others to stop AAR. Anonymity carries no authority. Yes, pprune has a function. TD has asked questions and we have answered some of them with fact, not opinion, unless we said so. Discussions about policy before 2 Sep 07 is clearly useful to those who wish to seek compensation.
Clearly, Winco, we do not share the same opinion on this and I doubt very much that either of us will give much ground to the other. I accept that my comments about the Mayday were cutting, but I simply wished to make it known that it was not a major fuel leak.
On what exactly do you base that comment? Do you not think that with the several recent AAR fuel leak problems with the MR2 and the loss of 230, AAR in a Nimrod is just slightly more dangerous than say an E-3 or a VC-10 or a fast jet maybe?
Can you also tell us what exactly has been done to eliminate the possible causes of fire in the bomb bay?
The system operating limitations we have now imposed on the Nimrod have removed all possible causes of a fuel fire while it is airborne with fully serviceable electrics. Someone here asked about motors and commutators, etc, in the bay. There are one or two in there, but they are sealed units, checked regularly and are not unreliable.
FYI I am a captain of a large 4 engine aircraft, and if I had a major fuel leak similar to that of 235, then I wouldn’t hesitate in putting out a MAYDAY, because you ARE in serious and imminent danger, and you DO need immediate assistance (CAP413)
We can argue about the use of Mayday until the cows come home, but if you are on fire: mayday, if you are without engines: mayday; if you are out of control: mayday, if you are about to crash: mayday. If you have 300 pax you might want to get the ATC on your side for lesser problems and a mayday achieves that.
I will refrain from commenting about what you wrote about Fuel and Ignition, because you are fundamentally wrong.
High pressure fuel vapour is NOT difficult to ignite at all (why do you think we have such severe restrictions around aircraft during fuelling?)
PPrune isn’t responsible for that, and to suggest that the crews wouldn’t have known about it if they hadn’t read it on PPrune is stupid.
we should not be doing this, I read it on pprune, etc"
And to say that PPrune doesn’t have a voice – how wrong you are!
In the context of my statement, pprune does not have a voice that would influence CAS and others to stop AAR. Anonymity carries no authority. Yes, pprune has a function. TD has asked questions and we have answered some of them with fact, not opinion, unless we said so. Discussions about policy before 2 Sep 07 is clearly useful to those who wish to seek compensation.
Clearly, Winco, we do not share the same opinion on this and I doubt very much that either of us will give much ground to the other. I accept that my comments about the Mayday were cutting, but I simply wished to make it known that it was not a major fuel leak.
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AC Ovee,
Thank you for your reply, but as you conclude, we do not agree.
Can you honestly, at any time in your carreer, tell us what other aircraft has EVER experienced the same problems that the Nimrod fleet are curreently experiencing with AAR and fuel leaks? Because I too have flown one or two other military aircraft, all with AAR facilities, and I can categorically assure you that none of them ever had the same level of problems that the MR2's are having. My concern is that you seem to be simply dismissing all of these events in a quite bizarre way. These incidents really happened, and good men died as a result. You give the impression that these incidents no more than a routing operating hazard, but I don't agree. Am I wrong in that assumption? The fact remains that in the last 12 - 18 months, there ahave been a number of incidents, all relating to Fuel leaks and all relating to AAR. Doesn't that concern you just a little bit? And after the 235 incident, are you still as confident with the aircraft as you were before it?
Thank you for explaing what has been done in the Bomb Bay (post XV230) to illiminate the ignition source. But are you now saying that there is NO electrical current running through any wiring systems located in the bomb bay duriong AAR? If there is, even just one, then that is a source of ignition. Thats all it needs, just one little tiny spark. Just read the accident report on the TWA 800 jet, where a single, low voltagle cable brought down the aircraft. There are no aircraft that I know that have naked flames as a matter of course. The flames eminates from a spark or something of that nature, and that is why it is vital that the cause of the fuel leak/pipe failure, whatever, is located. The aircraft is old. The wiring is old, and it is impossible to guarantee the integrity of every bit of wiring on the aircraft I would suggest. Sparks will and do occur. Something ignited XV230 and something else could have ignited 235. To sit back and wait for it to happen again and then look for 'another' solution or fix is madness surely?
The use of a MAYDAY was, IMHO, fully justified, particularly in the hostile environment the crew faced. As it was, their distress call wasn't even answered and had to be relayed by the Tristar. Now, if you need immediate help, like they felt they did, then to NOT use a Distress call would have been irresponsible. As you well know from your training, you can always downgrade it to a Pan or even cancel it. I take it therefore, that in your opinion, the crew were wrong for declaring an emergency?
I think that your comment 'we do not cater for double faults' may well prove to be the crux of the problems you are facing on the Nimrod fleet. The fact that the aircraft is old and tired, is reason enough why you SHOULD be catering for double faults and even more possibly. Modern aircraft have faults granted, but I don't think I have ever had two faults occuring within the same system at the same time on the same aircraft etc. Do you see what I'm getting at? My aircraft is modern and quite new, yours is not, and thereby lies your biggest problem.
I do not blame you or the groundcrew in any way whatsoever. The groundcrew, in particular, are being put in an appalling position by IPT organisations and others who are coming up with, what I consider to be, knee-jerk reactions and 'solutions' to, what is, a very major and serious problem. My dig at CAS and AOC 2Gp is that they are ultimately playing with peoples lives at the end of the day, and that is not right. It is unfair and wrong that you are being further put at risk, in an already risky environment by lack of funding to fix the current problems with your aircraft, as well as getting it right on the MRA4, but that's another argument. The fact that CAS and AOC 2 Gp are not taking this problem by the ba££s and saying, 'no more flying until we sort it' is, I believe, irresponsible, negligent and seriously lacking in judgement.
And finally, let me just say that I do believe that AAR is safe. I did it for many years, on a number of aircraft and I can only ever recount one incident when I had a problem, and that was when the probe tip got snapped off and stayed in the basket. However, do I feel that it is safe at the moment in the MR2? Absolutely not Sir!
The Winco
Thank you for your reply, but as you conclude, we do not agree.
Can you honestly, at any time in your carreer, tell us what other aircraft has EVER experienced the same problems that the Nimrod fleet are curreently experiencing with AAR and fuel leaks? Because I too have flown one or two other military aircraft, all with AAR facilities, and I can categorically assure you that none of them ever had the same level of problems that the MR2's are having. My concern is that you seem to be simply dismissing all of these events in a quite bizarre way. These incidents really happened, and good men died as a result. You give the impression that these incidents no more than a routing operating hazard, but I don't agree. Am I wrong in that assumption? The fact remains that in the last 12 - 18 months, there ahave been a number of incidents, all relating to Fuel leaks and all relating to AAR. Doesn't that concern you just a little bit? And after the 235 incident, are you still as confident with the aircraft as you were before it?
Thank you for explaing what has been done in the Bomb Bay (post XV230) to illiminate the ignition source. But are you now saying that there is NO electrical current running through any wiring systems located in the bomb bay duriong AAR? If there is, even just one, then that is a source of ignition. Thats all it needs, just one little tiny spark. Just read the accident report on the TWA 800 jet, where a single, low voltagle cable brought down the aircraft. There are no aircraft that I know that have naked flames as a matter of course. The flames eminates from a spark or something of that nature, and that is why it is vital that the cause of the fuel leak/pipe failure, whatever, is located. The aircraft is old. The wiring is old, and it is impossible to guarantee the integrity of every bit of wiring on the aircraft I would suggest. Sparks will and do occur. Something ignited XV230 and something else could have ignited 235. To sit back and wait for it to happen again and then look for 'another' solution or fix is madness surely?
The use of a MAYDAY was, IMHO, fully justified, particularly in the hostile environment the crew faced. As it was, their distress call wasn't even answered and had to be relayed by the Tristar. Now, if you need immediate help, like they felt they did, then to NOT use a Distress call would have been irresponsible. As you well know from your training, you can always downgrade it to a Pan or even cancel it. I take it therefore, that in your opinion, the crew were wrong for declaring an emergency?
I think that your comment 'we do not cater for double faults' may well prove to be the crux of the problems you are facing on the Nimrod fleet. The fact that the aircraft is old and tired, is reason enough why you SHOULD be catering for double faults and even more possibly. Modern aircraft have faults granted, but I don't think I have ever had two faults occuring within the same system at the same time on the same aircraft etc. Do you see what I'm getting at? My aircraft is modern and quite new, yours is not, and thereby lies your biggest problem.
I do not blame you or the groundcrew in any way whatsoever. The groundcrew, in particular, are being put in an appalling position by IPT organisations and others who are coming up with, what I consider to be, knee-jerk reactions and 'solutions' to, what is, a very major and serious problem. My dig at CAS and AOC 2Gp is that they are ultimately playing with peoples lives at the end of the day, and that is not right. It is unfair and wrong that you are being further put at risk, in an already risky environment by lack of funding to fix the current problems with your aircraft, as well as getting it right on the MRA4, but that's another argument. The fact that CAS and AOC 2 Gp are not taking this problem by the ba££s and saying, 'no more flying until we sort it' is, I believe, irresponsible, negligent and seriously lacking in judgement.
And finally, let me just say that I do believe that AAR is safe. I did it for many years, on a number of aircraft and I can only ever recount one incident when I had a problem, and that was when the probe tip got snapped off and stayed in the basket. However, do I feel that it is safe at the moment in the MR2? Absolutely not Sir!
The Winco
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Mad Mark,
I read the previous post quite clearly.
It stated that guys of lesser experience would under-perform for their captains as a result of posts on this forum and the opinions contained within them.
Yes those with less experience should be looking for guidance from those who have "been around the bazaars". Yes they should speak to their captians/P1s/Engs/Sqn Execs.
However, to suggest that this forum would degrade their performance and put pressure on the P1 is a slight on their professionalism.
This is my last post on the subject as I don't believe this is the correct forum for current kinloss aircrew to debate such matters,
all of which, if you had taken time to digest my previous post properly, could have been inferred
I read the previous post quite clearly.
It stated that guys of lesser experience would under-perform for their captains as a result of posts on this forum and the opinions contained within them.
Yes those with less experience should be looking for guidance from those who have "been around the bazaars". Yes they should speak to their captians/P1s/Engs/Sqn Execs.
However, to suggest that this forum would degrade their performance and put pressure on the P1 is a slight on their professionalism.
This is my last post on the subject as I don't believe this is the correct forum for current kinloss aircrew to debate such matters,
all of which, if you had taken time to digest my previous post properly, could have been inferred
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ADDs
MHAge
I read your post at 1498 with interest. You said with regard to fixing fuel leaks that they will always be fixed "when they exceed the acceptable leak rates as laid down by Lft 11 in the 2(R)1"
I am not suggesting for one moment that this could leave an unsafe fuel leak coming out of a major servicing, but if you do not fix them when you have the skills, the equipment, the aircraft access and, hopefully, the time but instead leave them to be fixed at station, or worse detachment, level what is the gain - unless of course you are so short of time and/or resources that you have no choice.
I assume, maybe wrongly, that most of the "safe" fuel leaks are in the wing and the QinetiQ report makes some interesting comments on these issues, and particularly whether these fuel leaks are an indication of the overall structural integrity of the wing ie a "safe" fuel leak may be hiding a bigger problem. Their concerns were reinforced by the high AUW sorties being flown in support of Gulf operations.
My background is avionics, but one paragraph of the QQ report, obtained of course under FOI or I would not be quoting it, which stood out for me was:
"The recurrence of significant fuel leaks at several points on the wings of the Nimrod aircraft may be taken as an indication of the age-related deterioration of the basic sealing systems employed in the aircraft as a barrier to leakage. The breakdown of the original interfay sealants is not easily recoverable and the conventional repair processes cannot be expected to prevent or halt that deterioration. This leads to a major concern with respect to the effects of that deterioration on the overall structural integrity of the subject joints, ie corrosion."
The QQ report then offers some recommendations for more detailed examinations using aircraft going to the MRA4 programme which one has to assume the IPT will action - presumably money permitting.
Thus a policy, presumably made from on high, of deliberately sending out aircraft from major servicing with ADD'd fuel leaks even though "safe" seems to be a very short-sighted and potentially expensive (in maintenance terms if nothing else) policy, and the leaks may be more of a problem than they appear.
If I have got it all wrong I am very happy to be corrected.
JB
I read your post at 1498 with interest. You said with regard to fixing fuel leaks that they will always be fixed "when they exceed the acceptable leak rates as laid down by Lft 11 in the 2(R)1"
I am not suggesting for one moment that this could leave an unsafe fuel leak coming out of a major servicing, but if you do not fix them when you have the skills, the equipment, the aircraft access and, hopefully, the time but instead leave them to be fixed at station, or worse detachment, level what is the gain - unless of course you are so short of time and/or resources that you have no choice.
I assume, maybe wrongly, that most of the "safe" fuel leaks are in the wing and the QinetiQ report makes some interesting comments on these issues, and particularly whether these fuel leaks are an indication of the overall structural integrity of the wing ie a "safe" fuel leak may be hiding a bigger problem. Their concerns were reinforced by the high AUW sorties being flown in support of Gulf operations.
My background is avionics, but one paragraph of the QQ report, obtained of course under FOI or I would not be quoting it, which stood out for me was:
"The recurrence of significant fuel leaks at several points on the wings of the Nimrod aircraft may be taken as an indication of the age-related deterioration of the basic sealing systems employed in the aircraft as a barrier to leakage. The breakdown of the original interfay sealants is not easily recoverable and the conventional repair processes cannot be expected to prevent or halt that deterioration. This leads to a major concern with respect to the effects of that deterioration on the overall structural integrity of the subject joints, ie corrosion."
The QQ report then offers some recommendations for more detailed examinations using aircraft going to the MRA4 programme which one has to assume the IPT will action - presumably money permitting.
Thus a policy, presumably made from on high, of deliberately sending out aircraft from major servicing with ADD'd fuel leaks even though "safe" seems to be a very short-sighted and potentially expensive (in maintenance terms if nothing else) policy, and the leaks may be more of a problem than they appear.
If I have got it all wrong I am very happy to be corrected.
JB
I think the main thing to remember with the MRA4 is that the wings are completely new - and thus so are the integral fuel tanks. So in that respect, the same problems should not occur. Assuming new sealing techniques have been developed since the original Nimrod design of course.
Fuel pipe leaks are a different matter, but again they should be of a completely new design, so I don't think it's fair to compare the two aircraft in regard of fuel leaks.
Fuel pipe leaks are a different matter, but again they should be of a completely new design, so I don't think it's fair to compare the two aircraft in regard of fuel leaks.
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MRA4 Wing
RAF Techie,
Sorry if the previous post was mis-leading - I did not mean to compare the new wing and the old - the QQ recommendation is to use the old MR2 wings which are presumably scrap to monitor the structural integrity for the remaining MR2 wings - I assume to ensure that the structural integrity and remaining service life are not on opposite sides of the equation!
JB
Sorry if the previous post was mis-leading - I did not mean to compare the new wing and the old - the QQ recommendation is to use the old MR2 wings which are presumably scrap to monitor the structural integrity for the remaining MR2 wings - I assume to ensure that the structural integrity and remaining service life are not on opposite sides of the equation!
JB
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AC Ovee,
I'm sure the crew out there are appreciative of your supportive comments over their recent incident.
The next time you want to go air to air refueling and want to use the bomb bay as a fuel tank, I suggest you weld the doors closed and remove all electrical wiring before hand.
I'm sure the crew out there are appreciative of your supportive comments over their recent incident.
The next time you want to go air to air refueling and want to use the bomb bay as a fuel tank, I suggest you weld the doors closed and remove all electrical wiring before hand.
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AC Ovee's comments about the unnecessary MAYDAY involving XV235 cannot go unchallenged. Neither can his assertion that a leak involving several gallons of fuel should not be referred to as a major leak.
At the time of the incident, fuel was spraying into the bomb bay like water coming out of a garden hose with one's thumb over the end. The Captain made an instant decision to break away and call a MAYDAY. I doubt there are many Captain's reading this thread who would have done anything different.
The fuel was atomising, mixing with oxygen and exposed to a bomb bay wired for electricity. The wiring system on Nimrod is old, and it is not possible to discount arcing and sparking. The Captain would not have known at that stage if the fuel leak would continue, or, indeed, what was causing it. The decision to land at the nearest suitable airfield has been praised by the MoD and many people here on pprune. It would appear AC Ovee stands in a cast of one, by stating that he would have RTB'd without the need for bothering with a MAYDAY. AC Ovee was highly critical of non-specialist contributors on this thread and the effect that comment here is having on his younger crews.
Well Sir, I would suggest that the only person being gung ho here is yourself. I would suggest that criticising the MAYDAY call and offering a blanket guarantee on the safety of the Nimrod bomb bay containing gallons of aviation fuel is foolish in the extreme. I would hope your subordinates are not listening to you. The Captain ordered a ground evacuation after landing, I would hope in the presence of Fire Crews and Med Teams, is this to be considered routine as well? All in a day's work?
The decision to call a MAYDAY was in my opinion, based on sound airmanship. The first thing I was ever told as a pilot, was, where there is doubt there is no doubt. To err on the side of caution, is surely the only way to approach aviation? Not that this Captain was being cautious, he was merely being sensible.
I find it sad that people like yourself think it is acceptable to keep pushing the old girl without the necessary levels of protection. It is becoming increasingly clear that XV230 should have had bomb bay fire protection on board; that the IPT should have been looking at fuel tank protection. It is very easy to say yes to every directive sent down from the MoD and much more difficult to say no.
AC Ovee, people with your attitude were content for the Hercules fleet to have just 5 airframes receive fuel tank protection, in no specific time frame Now, thankfully, every single Hercules exposed to the enemy has this protection on board.
I respectfully invite you to withdraw your criticisms of the Captain of XV235.
I also invite you to tell us your definition of a major fuel leak.
At the time of the incident, fuel was spraying into the bomb bay like water coming out of a garden hose with one's thumb over the end. The Captain made an instant decision to break away and call a MAYDAY. I doubt there are many Captain's reading this thread who would have done anything different.
The fuel was atomising, mixing with oxygen and exposed to a bomb bay wired for electricity. The wiring system on Nimrod is old, and it is not possible to discount arcing and sparking. The Captain would not have known at that stage if the fuel leak would continue, or, indeed, what was causing it. The decision to land at the nearest suitable airfield has been praised by the MoD and many people here on pprune. It would appear AC Ovee stands in a cast of one, by stating that he would have RTB'd without the need for bothering with a MAYDAY. AC Ovee was highly critical of non-specialist contributors on this thread and the effect that comment here is having on his younger crews.
Well Sir, I would suggest that the only person being gung ho here is yourself. I would suggest that criticising the MAYDAY call and offering a blanket guarantee on the safety of the Nimrod bomb bay containing gallons of aviation fuel is foolish in the extreme. I would hope your subordinates are not listening to you. The Captain ordered a ground evacuation after landing, I would hope in the presence of Fire Crews and Med Teams, is this to be considered routine as well? All in a day's work?
The decision to call a MAYDAY was in my opinion, based on sound airmanship. The first thing I was ever told as a pilot, was, where there is doubt there is no doubt. To err on the side of caution, is surely the only way to approach aviation? Not that this Captain was being cautious, he was merely being sensible.
I find it sad that people like yourself think it is acceptable to keep pushing the old girl without the necessary levels of protection. It is becoming increasingly clear that XV230 should have had bomb bay fire protection on board; that the IPT should have been looking at fuel tank protection. It is very easy to say yes to every directive sent down from the MoD and much more difficult to say no.
AC Ovee, people with your attitude were content for the Hercules fleet to have just 5 airframes receive fuel tank protection, in no specific time frame Now, thankfully, every single Hercules exposed to the enemy has this protection on board.
I respectfully invite you to withdraw your criticisms of the Captain of XV235.
I also invite you to tell us your definition of a major fuel leak.
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What ever happened to 'backing up your mates'?
The Captain would not have known at that stage if the fuel leak would continue, or, indeed, what was causing it. The decision to land at the nearest suitable airfield has been praised by the MoD and many people here on pprune. It would appear AC Ovee stands in a cast of one, by stating that he would have RTB'd without the need for bothering with a MAYDAY. AC Ovee was highly critical of non-specialist contributors on this thread and the effect that comment here is having on his younger crews.
Well Sir, I would suggest that the only person being gung ho here is yourself. I would suggest that criticising the MAYDAY call and offering a blanket guarantee on the safety of the Nimrod bomb bay containing gallons of aviation fuel is foolish in the extreme. I would hope your subordinates are not listening to you. The Captain ordered a ground evacuation after landing, I would hope in the presence of Fire Crews and Med Teams, is this to be considered routine as well? All in a day's work?
The decision to call a MAYDAY was in my opinion, based on sound airmanship. The first thing I was ever told as a pilot, was, where there is doubt there is no doubt. To err on the side of caution, is surely the only way to approach aviation? Not that this Captain was being cautious, he was merely being sensible.
Well Sir, I would suggest that the only person being gung ho here is yourself. I would suggest that criticising the MAYDAY call and offering a blanket guarantee on the safety of the Nimrod bomb bay containing gallons of aviation fuel is foolish in the extreme. I would hope your subordinates are not listening to you. The Captain ordered a ground evacuation after landing, I would hope in the presence of Fire Crews and Med Teams, is this to be considered routine as well? All in a day's work?
The decision to call a MAYDAY was in my opinion, based on sound airmanship. The first thing I was ever told as a pilot, was, where there is doubt there is no doubt. To err on the side of caution, is surely the only way to approach aviation? Not that this Captain was being cautious, he was merely being sensible.
AC Ovee
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ADD's
ADD's (ADF's) are what they are stated to be: Acceptable Defects (Faults) that are Deferred until the next servicing where they can be rectified. NOT WHEN THEY GET WORSE.
XV230 entered depot servicing with 11 ADD's and 1 limitation, and it came out with 7 ADD's remaining (Extended from 14th Aug 2006 to 30th Jan 2007). Why, when there is a contrctual requirement (according to the QinetiQ report) to release a "leak free" aircraft was this allowed to happen. Who approved the extension? And why -- "time constraints"?
DV
XV230 entered depot servicing with 11 ADD's and 1 limitation, and it came out with 7 ADD's remaining (Extended from 14th Aug 2006 to 30th Jan 2007). Why, when there is a contrctual requirement (according to the QinetiQ report) to release a "leak free" aircraft was this allowed to happen. Who approved the extension? And why -- "time constraints"?
DV