Nimrod Information
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Norfolk England
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Airworthiness
Tapper's Dad - please check PMs
Sadly, the captain does not seem to be able to question the under-lying airworthiness of the aircraft he is tasked to fly - something that I guess is of concern to many Nimrod crews at present. If you want a good example look again at the Chinook Crash on the Mull of Kintyre - the NI detachment commander and captain on the day of the accident did not want to use a Chinook Mk 2 because of its known problems, eg performance limitations and flight safety critical distractions such as false engine fail warnings lasting up to 12 seconds (even written up as a warning in the CA RTS recommendations), but he was of course over-ruled. As OC Rotary Wing Squadron, commenting on those same Chinook problems, wrote with amazing prescience earlier on the day of the accident, and after A&AEE had decided to stop flight trials:
Crews of the RAF have no such luxury and are likely at higher risk than A&AEE crews. As such, RWTS deem it imperative that, in the strongest possible terms, the RAF should be provided with a recommendation to cease Chinook HC2 operations.”
I understand from comments in the Sunday Times that the Stn Cdr at RAF Kinloss made similar comments on the standard of his Nimrods that were ignored as well.
JB
Sadly, the captain does not seem to be able to question the under-lying airworthiness of the aircraft he is tasked to fly - something that I guess is of concern to many Nimrod crews at present. If you want a good example look again at the Chinook Crash on the Mull of Kintyre - the NI detachment commander and captain on the day of the accident did not want to use a Chinook Mk 2 because of its known problems, eg performance limitations and flight safety critical distractions such as false engine fail warnings lasting up to 12 seconds (even written up as a warning in the CA RTS recommendations), but he was of course over-ruled. As OC Rotary Wing Squadron, commenting on those same Chinook problems, wrote with amazing prescience earlier on the day of the accident, and after A&AEE had decided to stop flight trials:
Crews of the RAF have no such luxury and are likely at higher risk than A&AEE crews. As such, RWTS deem it imperative that, in the strongest possible terms, the RAF should be provided with a recommendation to cease Chinook HC2 operations.”
I understand from comments in the Sunday Times that the Stn Cdr at RAF Kinloss made similar comments on the standard of his Nimrods that were ignored as well.
JB
The captain then sees a fuel leak from a charted position and does not believe it is acceptable and wishes to reject the aircraft on that basis. He must either enter that leak in the documents as a new fault and await ground engineering examination to certify it as acceptable or not or, without doing any paperwork, he can (bravely) take his crew away and explain his actions to his Sqn Cdr. Although captains do have the final say, they are still part of a structured organisation and they have to answer for their decisions when they do not go with the plan.
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: N Scotland
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I suggested it would be brave to walk away without raising any paperwork. Its always possible that the captain/crew see something differently from the groundcrew and yes, the crew will always take their lead from their captain and nothing can physically stop him and them from walking away. However, he should discuss his concerns with the AGE in the first instance and, if not convinced, he must then raise a maintenance work order. If he doesn't do that, he must expect to explain to his commander why he chose not to raise an entry in the maintenance document and/or why he decided, off his own bat, that he knows better than the engineers what is acceptable and what is not.
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Bridgwater Somerset
Posts: 459
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It appears then that an "Aircraft Ground Engineer (AGE) of SNCO status" is the person who having checked the ac, signs to say that the ac is fit to fly.
That is some responsibility then isn't it . I should imagine the poor guy who signed off XV230 has been put through the mill by the BOI questioning him then.
Having read about the command structure I suppose a lot of people have been questioned though.
That is some responsibility then isn't it . I should imagine the poor guy who signed off XV230 has been put through the mill by the BOI questioning him then.
Having read about the command structure I suppose a lot of people have been questioned though.
OK, missed that AC, point taken and agreed. Indeed if a fault that is offered as an acceptable deferred defect is seen as not acceptable by a Captain refusing an aircraft, he has a moral responsibility to the next captain to be so invited to enter the fact that it has not been accepted and why. That then starts one of Tucs "audit trails" which will tell a tale, loud and clear, to those who follow it later. As to:
I refer you to the statement that I made earlier:
His boss may agree or disagree with that decision, either way it was made, and recorded!
why he decided, off his own bat, that he knows better than the engineers what is acceptable and what is not.
If you don't like what you see you don't take it, whatever anyone else says.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: wilts
Posts: 1,667
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Chug, refusing to accept a mission on grounds of aircraft safety, be it lack of self-protection or airworthiness is a very difficult thing to do.
Something similar happened on the Herc Fleet a few years ago and it all got very messy. Careers can be ruined, and lots of questions raised about moral fibre etc.
In reality, if the IPT, (in this case), declares the aircraft airworthy, the AOC is happy to state it is safe enough to fly, then it is very difficult to do otherwise. That sadly, is reality.
Something similar happened on the Herc Fleet a few years ago and it all got very messy. Careers can be ruined, and lots of questions raised about moral fibre etc.
In reality, if the IPT, (in this case), declares the aircraft airworthy, the AOC is happy to state it is safe enough to fly, then it is very difficult to do otherwise. That sadly, is reality.
Nige, I'm not talking about vague concepts as "Airworthiness", or even specific deficiencies such as lack of ESF, which I flew without for my entire career, civil and military! I was discussing with AC the pre flight problems that present themselves on a daily basis to captains. Drips of fuel from wings, damage to tyres, cracks in windscreens, u/s systems etc, all offered as "fit to fly". Nothing philosophical, just plain acceptable or not. If not don't take it. If it then gets very "messy", one should ask oneself if this is a good environment in which to be a captain. To be fair I had nothing but support from my bosses, in the mob and outside. But that was a long time ago, and I'd better stop there before this post is diverted to the "Generic" thread!
PS On consideration, the above may seem a rather flippant response. It was not meant to, but I should have addressed the larger point you made Nige, sorry! I think the dividing line here is between the airworthiness of different aircraft types and marks and of individual airframes. The former is the province of the appropriate authorities the latter of, in respect of this discussion, the authorised captain. Of course if the former have messed up then all the airframes offered to our captain are compromised. His difficulty, unlike theirs, is that he has little or no way of assessing that degree of compromise. None the less the inevitable constraints placed on the operation of such a fleet surely gives room to dissent. "The mission threatened to fall outside the cleared operating envelope" or such like. Again the decision to abort may well be condemned. Tough, you're back to wearing out carpet again. Just as managers have to be prepared to withstand outrageous demands from above, so in the end do captains. For with them the buck finally stops.
PS On consideration, the above may seem a rather flippant response. It was not meant to, but I should have addressed the larger point you made Nige, sorry! I think the dividing line here is between the airworthiness of different aircraft types and marks and of individual airframes. The former is the province of the appropriate authorities the latter of, in respect of this discussion, the authorised captain. Of course if the former have messed up then all the airframes offered to our captain are compromised. His difficulty, unlike theirs, is that he has little or no way of assessing that degree of compromise. None the less the inevitable constraints placed on the operation of such a fleet surely gives room to dissent. "The mission threatened to fall outside the cleared operating envelope" or such like. Again the decision to abort may well be condemned. Tough, you're back to wearing out carpet again. Just as managers have to be prepared to withstand outrageous demands from above, so in the end do captains. For with them the buck finally stops.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 7th Jul 2007 at 14:14. Reason: Added PS
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Norfolk England
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Is Airworthiness a Vague Concept?
Chugalug 2
I think I know what you are getting at, but I do not accept that airworthiness should be a vague concept. Unless things have changed JSP 318 (Regulation of Ministry of Defence Aircraft) defines “Airworthiness” as “the ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, groundcrew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which the airborne systems are flown.” The elements of an airworthiness system include:
The captain could argue that many of these items are well beyond his control, and possibly even knowledge, but I would suggest that even after 20 years if you know that the design is inadequate, and there seems to be plenty of continuing evidence that the Nimrod IFR installation did not meet, or come anywhere near meeting, the AvP970 design requirements for these sytems on military aircraft, then you still have an airworthiness problem as sadly has been tragically demonstrated. The problem was well known so who in the case of the Nimrod decided that they could live with it - or did the fleet just "drift" into this situation without anybody putting the pieces of the jigsaw together?
I wonder if the MRA4 gets a tick in all these boxes as well - is the design any better?
JB
I think I know what you are getting at, but I do not accept that airworthiness should be a vague concept. Unless things have changed JSP 318 (Regulation of Ministry of Defence Aircraft) defines “Airworthiness” as “the ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, groundcrew, passengers (where relevant) or to the general public over which the airborne systems are flown.” The elements of an airworthiness system include:
- System Definition
- Contract Requirements
- Design
- Development – hardware and software
- Qualification testing of components and systems including software verification and validation to the appropriate standards.
- Quality Systems and Standards
- Flight Trials - both Manufacturer’s and MOD’s
- Certification
- Release to Service Recommendations from Boscombe Down
- RAF Release to Service including Flight Limitations
- Configuration Management
- Training of air and ground crews.
- Documentation, Publications and Orders including such vital publications as Flight Reference Cards (FRCs) – the first line of reference in any emergency.
- Servicing Recommendations
- Maintenance Standards and Responsibilities
- Recording Systems
- Defect Investigation and Feedback
The captain could argue that many of these items are well beyond his control, and possibly even knowledge, but I would suggest that even after 20 years if you know that the design is inadequate, and there seems to be plenty of continuing evidence that the Nimrod IFR installation did not meet, or come anywhere near meeting, the AvP970 design requirements for these sytems on military aircraft, then you still have an airworthiness problem as sadly has been tragically demonstrated. The problem was well known so who in the case of the Nimrod decided that they could live with it - or did the fleet just "drift" into this situation without anybody putting the pieces of the jigsaw together?
I wonder if the MRA4 gets a tick in all these boxes as well - is the design any better?
JB
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: N Scotland
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Chugalug you wrote:
I know what you're saying, but the examples you quoted are always referred to documented limits, so there is never any decision based on front line opinion, only. Cuts in tyres, cracked windscreens, small fuel leaks, once entered the maintenance document, are always checked against limits in the books, taking the no-go option if there is any doubt. If the defect is clearly in limits and hasn't worsened (and they are usally checked before every flight or daily), the crew are obliged to accept the engineering decision. If the fault isn't in the books the front line engineers are obliged to seek guidance from supporting organisations; usually the IPT, who might then take advice from the manufacturer, etc.
I think we are all singing from the same songsheet, here.
Drips of fuel from wings, damage to tyres, cracks in windscreens, u/s systems etc, all offered as "fit to fly"
I think we are all singing from the same songsheet, here.
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: N Scotland
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TD, you wrote:
Massive. But, he can only take responsibility for the actions that he signs for. He does not open up panels and doors to check fluid levels. Someone else has already done that (and certified that there is sufficient fluid). However, the AGE will certify that the panels and doors are shut before flight. Overall, systematically, his job is backed up by solid teamwork by those around him in the engineering world and the aircrew themselves.
It appears then that an "Aircraft Ground Engineer (AGE) of SNCO status" is the person who having checked the ac, signs to say that the ac is fit to fly.
That is some responsibility then isn't it .
That is some responsibility then isn't it .
OK AC, a little bit of role play. You can be handsome, tanned, lean (sorry bad connotations how about lithe?) Eng WO, and for our purposes AGE. Scene F700 office (or whatever), enter left sallow pale self, authorised for circuits and bumps MCT (whatever). Have just looked at cut in left main tyre, having been alerted by my Flt Eng. Don't like what I see. You tell me in a polite measured way that its dimensions in length, depth, width etc all well within book figure. I say that I had a tyre lose its tread/ blew out/ deflated to rim (whatever), and had a cut smaller than this one. You repeat same mantra, even more measured, but somewhat louder, and start calling me captain. This gets everyone's attention, and I am aware that all eyes are now on me. I mutter something about still not being happy with it, you reply "Well, will you accept the aircraft or not, Captain?" Faced with this ultimatum I have to make a decision. "No", I say, hoping to sound convincing and determined, but knowing I appear neither. Suddenly you are all bustle and action. "Just fill this out then please captain, and this, and sign here", and receive the evidence back in triumph. Crew and self re-board bus and go back to squadron. Crew subdued having witnessed scene in Eng Ops. Back at Squadron have to immediately report to boss (you didn't hang about did you AC?). Get bollocking and final warning. You go home to adoring wife and amuse her with tale of numpty pilot, adding that aircraft still flying with same tyre, same cut, same dimensions. I go home to mess and get pissed, receive final warning from PMC. You've done your job and I've done mine as far as I can tell, how about you?
JB, I added a PS to my previous post before reading yours, but in part dealing with some of your points. I do not say that Airworthiness is a vague concept per se, but merely that it is one level above my preceeding thrilling scene , ie the cut tyre IMHO affects the airworthiness of that aircraft, and in AC's opinion it does not, so that really doesn't help us. We deal with the tangible components of airworthiness, and let those more worthy (sorry!) deal with the larger picture, which is Nigegilb's point, I think.
JB, I added a PS to my previous post before reading yours, but in part dealing with some of your points. I do not say that Airworthiness is a vague concept per se, but merely that it is one level above my preceeding thrilling scene , ie the cut tyre IMHO affects the airworthiness of that aircraft, and in AC's opinion it does not, so that really doesn't help us. We deal with the tangible components of airworthiness, and let those more worthy (sorry!) deal with the larger picture, which is Nigegilb's point, I think.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 7th Jul 2007 at 15:54.
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: N Scotland
Posts: 85
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Well, the procedure we went through is, theoretically, the way it should be. But, your previous experience with a similar fault should protect you from the wrath of your boss and some understanding from me. Also, doubtless you would have recorded the details of your previous fault and you might have enquired to the cause after the investigation and wheel change. If that small cut was deemed to be the only cause (no binding brake, excessive wear, or another unseen cut on the underside of the tyre that was on the ground) I would expect the IPT and manufacturer to have already reviewed the acceptable limits. Of course, your previous event could have ocurred yesterday, so the investigation has hardly started. So, in that circumstance I, the Eng WO, and your boss, should be less draconian. The jet would remain on the programme.
However, your specific example is not at all realistic. If the book states that a small cut in a tyre is acceptable, it will be because the manufacturer has provided that assurance. Its not the RAF engineers that have made the decision unilaterally. So, in your example you are suggesting that manufacturers limits are not acceptable. I don't believe that you really mean that.
I'm comfortable that when the ground crew can make a clear "safe or nor not safe" decision (based on quality information), that we can trust them do it. If its safe, its acceptable. When they are faced with a grey area, their instinct is "not safe" and the jet is grounded until further information is received. I'm more than happy with this principle.
I've lost count of the number of times the types I've been associated with have been fleet-grounded over a weekend until the manaufacturer comes to work on Monday morning (you know what I mean) to give advice.
I remain convinced that you and I basically agree.
However, your specific example is not at all realistic. If the book states that a small cut in a tyre is acceptable, it will be because the manufacturer has provided that assurance. Its not the RAF engineers that have made the decision unilaterally. So, in your example you are suggesting that manufacturers limits are not acceptable. I don't believe that you really mean that.
I'm comfortable that when the ground crew can make a clear "safe or nor not safe" decision (based on quality information), that we can trust them do it. If its safe, its acceptable. When they are faced with a grey area, their instinct is "not safe" and the jet is grounded until further information is received. I'm more than happy with this principle.
I've lost count of the number of times the types I've been associated with have been fleet-grounded over a weekend until the manaufacturer comes to work on Monday morning (you know what I mean) to give advice.
I remain convinced that you and I basically agree.
Well it all sounds rather formulaic, if you don't mind me saying so, AC. To misquote Clouseau, I trust everyone yet I trust no-one. If there were one philosophy that kept me alive to date it would be, "In the final analysis, trust no one". That may sound extreme, but a healthy distrust of assurances and promises is IMHO the secret of living long if not necessarily prospering. Being particularly alert for evidence that is not easily apparent is especially to be commended. I remember when manually produced loadsheets which bore witness to all the mistakes and corrections made in their compilation gave way to computer generated ones. All neat tabulated authoritative columns of figures, but every line a possible gross misrepresentation. Thus I always suspected those the more. I realise that there is an agenda running here, which I have every sympathy with, but if we quote Flight Safety, the only agenda running should be that alone. If the airworthiness of certain fleets is suspect, that is the direct responsibility of senior commanders. If and when they are brought to book you may be sure that they will not say that they were carrying out orders, for that defence bit the dust in 1945. Rather they will blame subordinates, who should have challenged/ advised/ alerted etc. So my advice would be to use every means of reporting deficiencies possible via CoC, MORs etc. Those who post here, well done. it cannot be easy, but it is a means of alerting all in the system that all is not well that would not have been possible just a few years ago. Lack of equipment/ money/ manpower are not absolutes but problems that have to be resolved. If you want airpower, it costs. Endex.
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: On the outside looking in
Posts: 542
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As regards a captain rejecting an aircraft, if he is unhappy with something in the 703/704, then he could refuse to fly, at least until he had been satisfied that the entry was appropriate.
I've only seen one instance when a jet came to my unit from elsewhere, where the pilot should have rejected the aircraft because of a poorly judged 703 entry, but it turned out ok - we fixed the problem. I've heard of and seen others though, where the entry was rejected on consideration of the captain. Then the maintenance entry raised is to clear that lim / adf.
It shouldn't happen though if the groundcrew and aircrew are working together and talking about problems.
sw
I've only seen one instance when a jet came to my unit from elsewhere, where the pilot should have rejected the aircraft because of a poorly judged 703 entry, but it turned out ok - we fixed the problem. I've heard of and seen others though, where the entry was rejected on consideration of the captain. Then the maintenance entry raised is to clear that lim / adf.
It shouldn't happen though if the groundcrew and aircrew are working together and talking about problems.
sw
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Norfolk England
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Airworthiness - Forget It?
I am sorry to see that nobody apart from Chugalug wants to take up the airworthiness issues in my previous postings and that the thread continues to concentrate on the sharp end issues important as they are (the line chief and the aircrew represent the final links in the airworthiness chain for any aircraft and sortie).
However, the (pre BOI) “fact” remains that XV 230 did not crash because the captain or the line chief failed – clearly in saying this we still need to wait the BOI (which continues to be delayed so inevitably adding to informed speculation and programmes like Panorama – more need to situate the appreciation as on the Chinook perhaps?) - it crashed, if all the leaked reports are to be believed, because it was not an airworthy aircraft, and it would appear that not only was the accident predictable but it was predicted, and the rest of the Nimrod fleet may be in the same state. Why is this – because it appears that what should have been a temporary installation to meet the urgent operational needs of the Falklands War has become a permanent fit, and in the meantime other systems in the aging aircraft have been subject to deterioration, eg hot gas leaks, fuel leaks, etc. For a permanent fit the installation design should have been subject to the requirements of AvP 970 Issue 5 Part 5 Powerplant (which covers fuel systems), ) and in particular the following leaflets:
5.1.7 A full safety analysis of the system - I wonder if MOD can confirm that this was carried out for the MRA2 when MOD decided to retain the original “temporary” installation. I also wonder if it has been done for the MRA4 and what the results were/are of this analysis for both aircraft?
5.1.18 A zonal analysis of the installation to identify weak points – again I wonder it has been done for both the MRA4 and the MRA2
5.1.19 A fire analysis (for both marks of aircraft).
5.1.20 An analysis of proper fuel system functioning under all probable operating conditions including all probable equipment failures (which includes hot air leaks) should be shown for the MRA2. Is it being done for the MRA4?
Perhaps somebody can confirm that for the MRA4, even if the installation is similar, at least these analyses have been done and their results incorporated into any necessary design changes. For those who are interested AvP 970 is available on the web via www.dstan.mod.uk
MOD had had twenty plus years to make the Nimrod IFR installation “safe” – I wonder if the BOI will address the question as to why they allegedly did not do it, or, like the Chinook BOI, ignore airworthiness issues altogether. My guess as to why it has not been done is money, just like ESF on the C130, and it is the same command chain (albeit different people) civilian and service, and bean counters as well as engineers and operators which “approves” this happening by letting airworthiness problems (which do not always have an immediate or obvious flight safety issue and which you may feel you can solve with procedures) have a low priority in the funding battle – their position is then compounded by the lower levels in the command chain continuing to accept standards, and even, with the usually commendable “can do” attitude of most people, “paper over” problems that they know have flight safety implications. No, they will not of course offer an aircraft they know at that instant to be non-airworthy or unsafe – rather they will ignore the issues they know the system has “approved” even if they do not agree with them themselves. I am guilty myself!
MOD is always short of money, but as a grumpy old man I now think that we could have had a lot of “airworthiness” and self-protection modifications for 10% of the costs of Main Building and Abbey Wood or some of the failed or late IT systems, or even the MRA4 and Typhoon over-run costs– but then when many of these decisions were made it was always going to be a cold war rather than hot peace enforcement!
Given that budgetary pressures can only get worse I guess things will only change when one of the bereaved families files a “duty of care” criminal charge against a series of people in MOD and wins the day in Court.
JB
However, the (pre BOI) “fact” remains that XV 230 did not crash because the captain or the line chief failed – clearly in saying this we still need to wait the BOI (which continues to be delayed so inevitably adding to informed speculation and programmes like Panorama – more need to situate the appreciation as on the Chinook perhaps?) - it crashed, if all the leaked reports are to be believed, because it was not an airworthy aircraft, and it would appear that not only was the accident predictable but it was predicted, and the rest of the Nimrod fleet may be in the same state. Why is this – because it appears that what should have been a temporary installation to meet the urgent operational needs of the Falklands War has become a permanent fit, and in the meantime other systems in the aging aircraft have been subject to deterioration, eg hot gas leaks, fuel leaks, etc. For a permanent fit the installation design should have been subject to the requirements of AvP 970 Issue 5 Part 5 Powerplant (which covers fuel systems), ) and in particular the following leaflets:
5.1.7 A full safety analysis of the system - I wonder if MOD can confirm that this was carried out for the MRA2 when MOD decided to retain the original “temporary” installation. I also wonder if it has been done for the MRA4 and what the results were/are of this analysis for both aircraft?
5.1.18 A zonal analysis of the installation to identify weak points – again I wonder it has been done for both the MRA4 and the MRA2
5.1.19 A fire analysis (for both marks of aircraft).
5.1.20 An analysis of proper fuel system functioning under all probable operating conditions including all probable equipment failures (which includes hot air leaks) should be shown for the MRA2. Is it being done for the MRA4?
Perhaps somebody can confirm that for the MRA4, even if the installation is similar, at least these analyses have been done and their results incorporated into any necessary design changes. For those who are interested AvP 970 is available on the web via www.dstan.mod.uk
MOD had had twenty plus years to make the Nimrod IFR installation “safe” – I wonder if the BOI will address the question as to why they allegedly did not do it, or, like the Chinook BOI, ignore airworthiness issues altogether. My guess as to why it has not been done is money, just like ESF on the C130, and it is the same command chain (albeit different people) civilian and service, and bean counters as well as engineers and operators which “approves” this happening by letting airworthiness problems (which do not always have an immediate or obvious flight safety issue and which you may feel you can solve with procedures) have a low priority in the funding battle – their position is then compounded by the lower levels in the command chain continuing to accept standards, and even, with the usually commendable “can do” attitude of most people, “paper over” problems that they know have flight safety implications. No, they will not of course offer an aircraft they know at that instant to be non-airworthy or unsafe – rather they will ignore the issues they know the system has “approved” even if they do not agree with them themselves. I am guilty myself!
MOD is always short of money, but as a grumpy old man I now think that we could have had a lot of “airworthiness” and self-protection modifications for 10% of the costs of Main Building and Abbey Wood or some of the failed or late IT systems, or even the MRA4 and Typhoon over-run costs– but then when many of these decisions were made it was always going to be a cold war rather than hot peace enforcement!
Given that budgetary pressures can only get worse I guess things will only change when one of the bereaved families files a “duty of care” criminal charge against a series of people in MOD and wins the day in Court.
JB
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: Bridgwater Somerset
Posts: 459
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks for you posting JB.
I found it very informative and I agree that the Crash of XV230 would appear that not only was the accident predictable but it was predicted.
However as far as bereaved families filing a “duty of care” criminal charge against a series of people in MOD is concerned, we have Distant Voices Catch 22 scenario.
DEF STAN 00-56 also implies that a/c can be flown that are "unacceptable". Because MOD's definition of "unacceptable" is " A level of risk that is tolerable only under exception circumstances" And that, they will claim is what the situation is in Afghanistan.
So even if XV230 was deemed to have airworthiness that was unacceptable it is possible that someone out there in a high ranking position could have over ruled the line chief.
They would therefore say that the ac was at a level of risk that was tolerable due to exception circumstances and any court case would have no chance of success.
I found it very informative and I agree that the Crash of XV230 would appear that not only was the accident predictable but it was predicted.
However as far as bereaved families filing a “duty of care” criminal charge against a series of people in MOD is concerned, we have Distant Voices Catch 22 scenario.
DEF STAN 00-56 also implies that a/c can be flown that are "unacceptable". Because MOD's definition of "unacceptable" is " A level of risk that is tolerable only under exception circumstances" And that, they will claim is what the situation is in Afghanistan.
So even if XV230 was deemed to have airworthiness that was unacceptable it is possible that someone out there in a high ranking position could have over ruled the line chief.
They would therefore say that the ac was at a level of risk that was tolerable due to exception circumstances and any court case would have no chance of success.
00-970
John Blakeley
Regarding your airworthiness comments, you know we sing from the same hymn sheet. There are so many documented failures in the application of MoD’s own mandated procedures and processes that their incompetence, and abrogation of responsibility and Duty of Care, has not been in doubt for many years.
However, this does not apply across the board. Your list of airworthiness elements at #811, which you acknowledge as incomplete, omits one very important factor - human input. There are good and bad everywhere. That is why, in our field, complex programmes are often delivered with effortless competence, ahead of time, under cost and to a better performance (yes, it can be done), while simple programmes become disasters. The trouble is; the former raise the benchmark of expectation. The “guilty” are termed an “embarrassment to the Department” and are offloaded at the first opportunity. The reason? Simple. If others, who have previously set a much lower benchmark yet been marked high, cannot match the new mark, then they must be marked lower in their next annual report. This is difficult to explain and manage, so it is easier to get rid of the problem. Never mind that the outcome can be huge delays and cost over-runs.
You mention AvP / Def Stan 00-970. I well recall one bollocking I got for insisting this be implemented. “Def Stans are not mandatory”. When asked him what standard I should apply (as I must apply something), I got no reply. His knowledge of standards, never mind their implementation, was on a par with most of MoD – learnt or overheard at a half day seminar (which probably took up one page in a 4 page c.v.). If MoD continues to employ non-technical staff like this as programme managers on technical projects ……. He (and others like him) was clearly pretty clever, in his own field. But if I decide to spend money on making an aircraft safe (which is not just within my remit, but an obligation), I do not want him having the authority to instruct me not to, just because it highlights the fact that he, or one of his mates, screwed up and signed to say it was airworthy in the first place. Nor do I want the 2*, 4* and above supporting him, just to avoid the embarrassment of having to admit their policy of ridding MoD of technical project managers (promulgated in 1996 by CDP) was barking. Another fundamental issue….. As a non-engineer, he/they do not have the “technical approval” signature. Why, then, are they permitted to make engineering design decisions, or over-rule such decisions already made by engineers who have the formal delegation?
Def Stan 00-970 is important. Look at this (everyone, please pay attention, it concerns YOUR aircraft).
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/564AA...i_sea_king.pdf
Para 141. The… (anti collision light system) .. DOES NOT COMPLY with Def Stan 00-970 Vol 2 Ch 110 being located in a position detrimental to the crews’ vision. The requirement to turn it off in flight renders it UNFIT FOR PURPOSE.
Note - “Interferes with the crews’ vision”. Earlier in the report - “disorientating”. Pretty damning, eh? The aircraft collided at night. 7 dead. One would think this element would be explored in forensic detail.
But it doesn’t say much else. No indication that anyone asked “Why/How was if fitted. By Whom? Was it appraised by the Aircraft DA? Was it simply read across from another Mark of aircraft without a Trail Installation and proper trials? Given open-source photographic evidence shows it was in the previous iteration of the aircraft (noted in BOI), but removed and not in the Trials Installation aircraft for the new Mark (not noted), did anyone (IPT, BOI or Coroner) ask why it was removed, and then re-fitted? Presumably someone, years before the crash (TI picture is dated 2000, crash 2003), thought it should be removed for some reason. And why was it re-fitted, in the same place, and still, according to the BOI, unfit for purpose? Importantly, was it discussed at the (mandated) Aircraft installation Critical Design Review? Was such a CDR undertaken by MoD, and approved by MoD as part of a formal contract milestone? I’ve known them to be waived! If any of these questions haven’t been answered satisfactorily, may I suggest (a) the MoD have been somewhat less than open with the BOI and Coroner, thus (b) rendering both their verdicts unsafe. Heard that one before.
But then, 00-970 is not mandatory (to some protected species). Not sure the BOI, the Coroner or the families would agree. (And I apologise sincerely if this upsets anyone).
The point I am making here, and which John makes so eloquently, is that there are many common factors between the various incidents discussed here. (Mull, Hercules, Tornado, Sea King, Nimrod). But MoD seeks to deny this. The individual IPTs (none of whom existed when the critical decisions were made) are stovepiped and they just dismiss any notion of systematic failure of process or procedure with “this is the first such accident”, “our procedures are robust” or similar platitudes. But ask yourselves, at what level above the IPTs do these “isolated” factors converge? And what rulings have been made at this level. Oh, delivery of safety and airworthiness is optional. (Not to everyone apparently, just the chosen few). Funding to maintain safety and airworthiness to be slashed. Systems Integration can be ignored. The effects were predictable, predicted, and ignored.
Instead of always thinking of their next promotion, these people would do well to consider their duty. In days gone by this meant something else.
Regarding your airworthiness comments, you know we sing from the same hymn sheet. There are so many documented failures in the application of MoD’s own mandated procedures and processes that their incompetence, and abrogation of responsibility and Duty of Care, has not been in doubt for many years.
However, this does not apply across the board. Your list of airworthiness elements at #811, which you acknowledge as incomplete, omits one very important factor - human input. There are good and bad everywhere. That is why, in our field, complex programmes are often delivered with effortless competence, ahead of time, under cost and to a better performance (yes, it can be done), while simple programmes become disasters. The trouble is; the former raise the benchmark of expectation. The “guilty” are termed an “embarrassment to the Department” and are offloaded at the first opportunity. The reason? Simple. If others, who have previously set a much lower benchmark yet been marked high, cannot match the new mark, then they must be marked lower in their next annual report. This is difficult to explain and manage, so it is easier to get rid of the problem. Never mind that the outcome can be huge delays and cost over-runs.
You mention AvP / Def Stan 00-970. I well recall one bollocking I got for insisting this be implemented. “Def Stans are not mandatory”. When asked him what standard I should apply (as I must apply something), I got no reply. His knowledge of standards, never mind their implementation, was on a par with most of MoD – learnt or overheard at a half day seminar (which probably took up one page in a 4 page c.v.). If MoD continues to employ non-technical staff like this as programme managers on technical projects ……. He (and others like him) was clearly pretty clever, in his own field. But if I decide to spend money on making an aircraft safe (which is not just within my remit, but an obligation), I do not want him having the authority to instruct me not to, just because it highlights the fact that he, or one of his mates, screwed up and signed to say it was airworthy in the first place. Nor do I want the 2*, 4* and above supporting him, just to avoid the embarrassment of having to admit their policy of ridding MoD of technical project managers (promulgated in 1996 by CDP) was barking. Another fundamental issue….. As a non-engineer, he/they do not have the “technical approval” signature. Why, then, are they permitted to make engineering design decisions, or over-rule such decisions already made by engineers who have the formal delegation?
Def Stan 00-970 is important. Look at this (everyone, please pay attention, it concerns YOUR aircraft).
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/564AA...i_sea_king.pdf
Para 141. The… (anti collision light system) .. DOES NOT COMPLY with Def Stan 00-970 Vol 2 Ch 110 being located in a position detrimental to the crews’ vision. The requirement to turn it off in flight renders it UNFIT FOR PURPOSE.
Note - “Interferes with the crews’ vision”. Earlier in the report - “disorientating”. Pretty damning, eh? The aircraft collided at night. 7 dead. One would think this element would be explored in forensic detail.
But it doesn’t say much else. No indication that anyone asked “Why/How was if fitted. By Whom? Was it appraised by the Aircraft DA? Was it simply read across from another Mark of aircraft without a Trail Installation and proper trials? Given open-source photographic evidence shows it was in the previous iteration of the aircraft (noted in BOI), but removed and not in the Trials Installation aircraft for the new Mark (not noted), did anyone (IPT, BOI or Coroner) ask why it was removed, and then re-fitted? Presumably someone, years before the crash (TI picture is dated 2000, crash 2003), thought it should be removed for some reason. And why was it re-fitted, in the same place, and still, according to the BOI, unfit for purpose? Importantly, was it discussed at the (mandated) Aircraft installation Critical Design Review? Was such a CDR undertaken by MoD, and approved by MoD as part of a formal contract milestone? I’ve known them to be waived! If any of these questions haven’t been answered satisfactorily, may I suggest (a) the MoD have been somewhat less than open with the BOI and Coroner, thus (b) rendering both their verdicts unsafe. Heard that one before.
But then, 00-970 is not mandatory (to some protected species). Not sure the BOI, the Coroner or the families would agree. (And I apologise sincerely if this upsets anyone).
The point I am making here, and which John makes so eloquently, is that there are many common factors between the various incidents discussed here. (Mull, Hercules, Tornado, Sea King, Nimrod). But MoD seeks to deny this. The individual IPTs (none of whom existed when the critical decisions were made) are stovepiped and they just dismiss any notion of systematic failure of process or procedure with “this is the first such accident”, “our procedures are robust” or similar platitudes. But ask yourselves, at what level above the IPTs do these “isolated” factors converge? And what rulings have been made at this level. Oh, delivery of safety and airworthiness is optional. (Not to everyone apparently, just the chosen few). Funding to maintain safety and airworthiness to be slashed. Systems Integration can be ignored. The effects were predictable, predicted, and ignored.
Instead of always thinking of their next promotion, these people would do well to consider their duty. In days gone by this meant something else.
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Norfolk England
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Acceptable for How Long
Tapper's Dad,
Please see PMs as well.
I think the test that has to be tried is for how long can MOD leave an aircraft in an unairworthy condition and still say that it is exceptional circumstances? Twenty years? Remember that the Coroner did not accept that MOD's failure to plan for enough body armour could then be over-ridden by the excuse of combat immunity.
JB
Please see PMs as well.
I think the test that has to be tried is for how long can MOD leave an aircraft in an unairworthy condition and still say that it is exceptional circumstances? Twenty years? Remember that the Coroner did not accept that MOD's failure to plan for enough body armour could then be over-ridden by the excuse of combat immunity.
JB
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: A Gaelic Country
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
JB
Is there anything like a Risk Register to formally register/identify/analyse/mitigate risks?
Who "owns the risk"?
Was a formal Risk Assessment needed in the aftermath of XV230?
Was there a case for a formal Flight Trial before AAR resumed?
Or is it the case that we are in an ongoing "exceptional circumstances situation"? In which case I personally feel that as adults, we ahould be kept in the picture and allowed to come to our own, informed decisions. I don't think that there would be a mass exodus although I cannot deny that some may "reconsider" their career path!
Is there anything like a Risk Register to formally register/identify/analyse/mitigate risks?
Who "owns the risk"?
Was a formal Risk Assessment needed in the aftermath of XV230?
Was there a case for a formal Flight Trial before AAR resumed?
Or is it the case that we are in an ongoing "exceptional circumstances situation"? In which case I personally feel that as adults, we ahould be kept in the picture and allowed to come to our own, informed decisions. I don't think that there would be a mass exodus although I cannot deny that some may "reconsider" their career path!