Nimrod Information
Not so much cynical as realistic I'd say, Tucumseh. This thread is waiting for a QC's review, the Chinook one is waiting for the SoS's review, and the Hercules one for a Coroner's inquiry that the government openly wishes to nobble. Delay and obfuscation are the weapons of choice for this incompetent and disreputable gang. What goes around comes around, the more these contemptible politicos treat decent people with contempt the more they will rue the day. Will you give in to them? Will anyone? As WSC said, "Let them do their worst, and we will do our best!".
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'One in three RAF Nimrod planes fit for use'
Noticed this in the telegraph yesterday:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main...ilitary324.xml
Two thirds of the Royal Air Force's Nimrod spy planes are not fit for purpose, the Ministry of Defence has admitted.
Da4orce,
Can you define 'fit for purpose', because depending on the definition, the creditability of the article is in question?
Are they fit to fly, or only fit to carry out certain missions?
Thanks
Can you define 'fit for purpose', because depending on the definition, the creditability of the article is in question?
Are they fit to fly, or only fit to carry out certain missions?
Thanks
Asked to define “Quality”, most engineers will have been taught to reply “fit for purpose”, as measured against a defined requirement and specification. It means both generally (in simple terms an aircraft must be able to fly) and specifically (it must be able to carry out its stated roles) – safely and underpinned by correct application of all the safety and airworthiness process, procedures and regulations described at length in this thread.
Browne and Ainsworth (and before him, Ingram), and their respective advisors, are at loggerheads over this (having given contrasting answers to the same questions regarding the above). How they must be hoping the QC’s review recommends cancellation of MRA4.
Browne and Ainsworth (and before him, Ingram), and their respective advisors, are at loggerheads over this (having given contrasting answers to the same questions regarding the above). How they must be hoping the QC’s review recommends cancellation of MRA4.
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This is an old chestnut. When you discount aircraft that are undergoing servicing, waiting to undergo servicing (and cannot be flown in the meantime due to hours in the log) and other aircraft set aside from normal flying due to trial and test equipment on board, you are not left with many.
The only stat worth pursuing or monitoring, in any fleet of airframes, is the number (percentage) of aircraft that are not available due to rectification. Even then you need to be more specific about rectification. As I write, I am quite certain that a jet is having a black box (associated with its mission, not its airworthiness) replaced, or waiting for the replacement. While this routine repair is going on, the aircraft is not available because of the open entry in the maintenance log. Most of these routine faults do not have any real effect on the aircraft's availability to fly. Clearly there will also be other faults that are unsafe to take airborne, but most of them are repairable within hours (tyre worn outside limits, fuel coupling leak, generator fault) and while they make the aircraft unavailable while they are being fixed, they are not having any effect on the flying programme because the aircraft is also receiving routine servicing simultaneously. Its common throughout the world as a front line system.
Where it becomes serious is when the defects cannot be fixed within a day (or so) and the aircraft has to come off the front line and wait for spares, manpower or space in a hangar, etc. Its not that the aircraft is necessarily in a dangerous condition; it just need some increasingly scarce resources. Today, at a guess, I think there is less than 30% of the whole fleet that meets this narrow category, and its the only category that really matters to the planners because we cannot plan for it, airframe by airframe. Add to that category the previously mentioned reasons for unavailablity and we get to the two thirds unavailability.
The only stat worth pursuing or monitoring, in any fleet of airframes, is the number (percentage) of aircraft that are not available due to rectification. Even then you need to be more specific about rectification. As I write, I am quite certain that a jet is having a black box (associated with its mission, not its airworthiness) replaced, or waiting for the replacement. While this routine repair is going on, the aircraft is not available because of the open entry in the maintenance log. Most of these routine faults do not have any real effect on the aircraft's availability to fly. Clearly there will also be other faults that are unsafe to take airborne, but most of them are repairable within hours (tyre worn outside limits, fuel coupling leak, generator fault) and while they make the aircraft unavailable while they are being fixed, they are not having any effect on the flying programme because the aircraft is also receiving routine servicing simultaneously. Its common throughout the world as a front line system.
Where it becomes serious is when the defects cannot be fixed within a day (or so) and the aircraft has to come off the front line and wait for spares, manpower or space in a hangar, etc. Its not that the aircraft is necessarily in a dangerous condition; it just need some increasingly scarce resources. Today, at a guess, I think there is less than 30% of the whole fleet that meets this narrow category, and its the only category that really matters to the planners because we cannot plan for it, airframe by airframe. Add to that category the previously mentioned reasons for unavailablity and we get to the two thirds unavailability.
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Spanners123
In answer my definition is:- having due consideration for the defined role and purpose of the aircraft is it fit to perform that role as effectively and safely as is reasonable. Next question, what is reasonable?
I think what is interesting about this article is how stark a reminder it is that simply by rephrasing the same information you can change the whole context of a statement:
or
Fit for use and fit for purpose are very different things so from a qualitative aspect i would agree that the articles value is negligible. What it does do however is serve to keep this very emotive incident in the public arena, the exact place where many in the RAF, MOD and the government do not want the issue to be.
Can you define 'fit for purpose', because depending on the definition, the creditability of the article is in question?
I think what is interesting about this article is how stark a reminder it is that simply by rephrasing the same information you can change the whole context of a statement:
One in three RAF planes not fit for use.
Two thirds of the Royal Air Force's Nimrod spy planes are not fit for purpose.
Ed
Simple question. What level of availability was guaranteed under NISC, and is it being achieved? Is this availability 'from depth' or a more meaningful 'availability for flying'? Is the contractor being penalised for any shortfall?
Simple question. What level of availability was guaranteed under NISC, and is it being achieved? Is this availability 'from depth' or a more meaningful 'availability for flying'? Is the contractor being penalised for any shortfall?
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DV, I'm not defending the undefensible. I completely concur with the BOI's findings which, quite rightly, concentrate on a specific aspect of the Nimrod's design, maintenance and operation. It is a fact that, in that specific area (fuel and hot pipes in close proximity), the airworthiness of the aircraft was catestrophically lacking. That was undefensible and I do not defend that failure.
My earlier contribution tonight was critical of the headline statistic. When the stats are analysed, and we take out irrelevant data, we get the true picture, which probably doesn't sell newspapers.
Jacko,
I believe the contractors are fulfilling their contractual output from scheduled servicings. The front line, with the usual rate of daily repairs, is meeting its commitment to training and operations. We have a number of aircraft awaiting repair in the depth area due to a lack of resources. 10 years ago, these aircraft would have been fixed within days. Its a sign of the times, exacerbated by the fleet's most protracted and demanding tasking, ever.
My earlier contribution tonight was critical of the headline statistic. When the stats are analysed, and we take out irrelevant data, we get the true picture, which probably doesn't sell newspapers.
Jacko,
I believe the contractors are fulfilling their contractual output from scheduled servicings. The front line, with the usual rate of daily repairs, is meeting its commitment to training and operations. We have a number of aircraft awaiting repair in the depth area due to a lack of resources. 10 years ago, these aircraft would have been fixed within days. Its a sign of the times, exacerbated by the fleet's most protracted and demanding tasking, ever.
Last edited by EdSet100; 26th Mar 2008 at 01:06.
The question is not so much whether the contractor is meeting the contractual requirements (which is of course important), but whether the materiel and financial provisioning (an “HQ” task) was, and remains, commensurate with the planned usage of the aircraft and all its components, support infrastructure, training, personnel etc etc.
In broad terms, these are called “Support Parameters” and it is the responsibility of the respective IPTs to ensure and demonstrate they are met. Critically, if insufficient provision has been requested or made by the Customers, the IPT MUST “renegotiate” the support parameters with them, thus redefining their task and agreeing what is possible within the provision available to them. From EdSett’s reply it would seem quite a lot is lacking in this (mandated) process. The same principle applies to, say, the aircraft. We talked of “fit for purpose”. If that purpose (or role) has changed, one would expect a new or updated Aircraft Specification and complementary (Whole Aircraft) Safety Case. I’ll leave it to others to say if the Nimrod MR2 roles have changed in recent years but as the designator remains “MR2” it would appear not.
This is nothing new; it applies to most aircraft and equipment and has done for years. In fact, the 3 Services have long since stopped making such provision routinely, despite it being a mandated requirement by PUS, the Chief Accounting Officer. In simple terms, if you don’t ask, you don’t get. If you don’t ask, don’t complain if you don’t have. If you don’t ask, you get what you got last year (if you’re lucky), regardless of the fact that your flying rate has quadrupled. If you ask, but don’t get, the liability rests above you. In this context “you” is at 2 Star level, but the principle applies from the bottom to top. For example, if you don’t have the test equipment to verify a repair, the repair is not complete and you push the problem upwards. A JENGO (or whoever) may issue a concession, but must also continue to push upwards and advise of the risk he has taken; and so on. It’s called an audit trail (and I assume one exists for Nimrod).
By addressing the problem at this level, or above, you get to the nub of the problem. Not to is to risk, YET AGAIN, focusing too narrowly on a specific component of Nimrod and missing the big picture. I cannot emphasise enough that ACM Loader’s comment (that the airworthiness regs were not implemented) was NOT a revelation; it is common knowledge and, because the most senior staffs have been warned about the risks on many occasions, it is effectively policy. Elsewhere this past week there is a thread about the Sea King AEW crash five years ago. The BoI report, issued later that year, reported PRECISELY the same thing. The Tornado/Patriot report alluded to it; they refrained from overt criticism but the meaning was crystal clear. Not only that, the BoI reports are almost word for word what he had been advised to the relevant 2 Star YEARS BEFORE. And, as I have said, this got to Ministerial level long before XV230 crashed. He denied there was a problem. Wrong.
In broad terms, these are called “Support Parameters” and it is the responsibility of the respective IPTs to ensure and demonstrate they are met. Critically, if insufficient provision has been requested or made by the Customers, the IPT MUST “renegotiate” the support parameters with them, thus redefining their task and agreeing what is possible within the provision available to them. From EdSett’s reply it would seem quite a lot is lacking in this (mandated) process. The same principle applies to, say, the aircraft. We talked of “fit for purpose”. If that purpose (or role) has changed, one would expect a new or updated Aircraft Specification and complementary (Whole Aircraft) Safety Case. I’ll leave it to others to say if the Nimrod MR2 roles have changed in recent years but as the designator remains “MR2” it would appear not.
This is nothing new; it applies to most aircraft and equipment and has done for years. In fact, the 3 Services have long since stopped making such provision routinely, despite it being a mandated requirement by PUS, the Chief Accounting Officer. In simple terms, if you don’t ask, you don’t get. If you don’t ask, don’t complain if you don’t have. If you don’t ask, you get what you got last year (if you’re lucky), regardless of the fact that your flying rate has quadrupled. If you ask, but don’t get, the liability rests above you. In this context “you” is at 2 Star level, but the principle applies from the bottom to top. For example, if you don’t have the test equipment to verify a repair, the repair is not complete and you push the problem upwards. A JENGO (or whoever) may issue a concession, but must also continue to push upwards and advise of the risk he has taken; and so on. It’s called an audit trail (and I assume one exists for Nimrod).
By addressing the problem at this level, or above, you get to the nub of the problem. Not to is to risk, YET AGAIN, focusing too narrowly on a specific component of Nimrod and missing the big picture. I cannot emphasise enough that ACM Loader’s comment (that the airworthiness regs were not implemented) was NOT a revelation; it is common knowledge and, because the most senior staffs have been warned about the risks on many occasions, it is effectively policy. Elsewhere this past week there is a thread about the Sea King AEW crash five years ago. The BoI report, issued later that year, reported PRECISELY the same thing. The Tornado/Patriot report alluded to it; they refrained from overt criticism but the meaning was crystal clear. Not only that, the BoI reports are almost word for word what he had been advised to the relevant 2 Star YEARS BEFORE. And, as I have said, this got to Ministerial level long before XV230 crashed. He denied there was a problem. Wrong.
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Ed Set, you said,
So let us look at the bottom line stat (achieved sorties against planned sorties) for a period of time, last year:
12th to 18th March. 21 planned, 11 achieved
19th to 25th March. 18 planned, 9 achieved
26th March to 1st April. 21 planned, 6 achieved
2nd to 8th April. 16 planned, 11 achieved.
Maximum number of aircraft available during that period was 3. Is that OK for the press?
Jacko, Ref your "simple question" regarding NISC. We have been told the following:
(1) "Under NISC, from a fleet of 21, 12 were required each day".
(2) "With NISC 2, from a reduced fleet of 16 Nimrod MR2 aircraft,10 aircraft will be available each day, a huge proportional increase in efficiency".
(3) "NISC 3 is planned for April 2007 and gets us to full availability of the aicraft and all its systems".
DV
My earlier contribution was critical of headline static. When stats are analysed, and we take out the irrelevant data, we get the true picture, which probably does not sell papers
12th to 18th March. 21 planned, 11 achieved
19th to 25th March. 18 planned, 9 achieved
26th March to 1st April. 21 planned, 6 achieved
2nd to 8th April. 16 planned, 11 achieved.
Maximum number of aircraft available during that period was 3. Is that OK for the press?
Jacko, Ref your "simple question" regarding NISC. We have been told the following:
(1) "Under NISC, from a fleet of 21, 12 were required each day".
(2) "With NISC 2, from a reduced fleet of 16 Nimrod MR2 aircraft,10 aircraft will be available each day, a huge proportional increase in efficiency".
(3) "NISC 3 is planned for April 2007 and gets us to full availability of the aicraft and all its systems".
DV
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DV,
Forgive me if I'm misinterpreting here, but it sounds to me like you are trying to say that the Nimrod isn't fit for purpose, because it only met X number of taskings out of Y. Edsett appears to be saying that the aircraft are unfit inasmuch as there are faults to be rectified, whilst Tuc chips in with, as ever, a wider view of the problem - which extends beyond the kipper fleet, and probably covers everything in service.
A lack of spares, and trained manpower (or, more accurately, a dearth of trained manpower hours - ie enough trained people, for long enough) prevent aircraft being serviceable on any given day - that doesn't mean the Nimrod is unfit for purpose, it means that thanks to reductions in manning and spares that there are a number of aircraft that aren't operational, but10-15 years ago would have been. That's what happens when you don't give a monkey's about retention of skilled tradesmen, don't maintain an adequate stores backup, and figure it saves cash to civilianise outfits.
DV - you come across as determined to argue with Ed, and equally determined to tar him as an apologist for the RAF, whilst anything to do with the Nimrod is necessarily evil. I doubt you will find many actual crew members who agree with this demonisation. I'm ex-crew, but find Ed's posts informative rather than apologist. Having sat through several 'of course it's safe lads' chats in that past, only to find the same problem recurring in flight, I can assure you I am far from inclined to accept bland assurances of airworthiness. (Bahamas Mama, anyone?)
The aircraft certainly has problems, that have largely arisen through ill considered and thoroughly badly assessed modifications, and a stunning degree of inability to see how one change might impact on another - it's a far cry from that to deciding that the basic aircraft is palpably unsafe. As I've said, I've been on the thing when some decidedly unsafe things occurred, a number of times, and there's a world of difference between RAF bull**** when the problem is identified, and the sort you get when it isn't.
Your earnest desire to see justice served is admirable, but you are in danger of undermining your aim by exaggerating much smaller problems... the jet is not unsafe just because it couldn't fly the flypro. It's still a blody good aircraft, it's just a great shame that something equally as good at the job - but newer - hasn't arrived yet.
Dave
Forgive me if I'm misinterpreting here, but it sounds to me like you are trying to say that the Nimrod isn't fit for purpose, because it only met X number of taskings out of Y. Edsett appears to be saying that the aircraft are unfit inasmuch as there are faults to be rectified, whilst Tuc chips in with, as ever, a wider view of the problem - which extends beyond the kipper fleet, and probably covers everything in service.
A lack of spares, and trained manpower (or, more accurately, a dearth of trained manpower hours - ie enough trained people, for long enough) prevent aircraft being serviceable on any given day - that doesn't mean the Nimrod is unfit for purpose, it means that thanks to reductions in manning and spares that there are a number of aircraft that aren't operational, but10-15 years ago would have been. That's what happens when you don't give a monkey's about retention of skilled tradesmen, don't maintain an adequate stores backup, and figure it saves cash to civilianise outfits.
DV - you come across as determined to argue with Ed, and equally determined to tar him as an apologist for the RAF, whilst anything to do with the Nimrod is necessarily evil. I doubt you will find many actual crew members who agree with this demonisation. I'm ex-crew, but find Ed's posts informative rather than apologist. Having sat through several 'of course it's safe lads' chats in that past, only to find the same problem recurring in flight, I can assure you I am far from inclined to accept bland assurances of airworthiness. (Bahamas Mama, anyone?)
The aircraft certainly has problems, that have largely arisen through ill considered and thoroughly badly assessed modifications, and a stunning degree of inability to see how one change might impact on another - it's a far cry from that to deciding that the basic aircraft is palpably unsafe. As I've said, I've been on the thing when some decidedly unsafe things occurred, a number of times, and there's a world of difference between RAF bull**** when the problem is identified, and the sort you get when it isn't.
Your earnest desire to see justice served is admirable, but you are in danger of undermining your aim by exaggerating much smaller problems... the jet is not unsafe just because it couldn't fly the flypro. It's still a blody good aircraft, it's just a great shame that something equally as good at the job - but newer - hasn't arrived yet.
Dave
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DV,
...and your
says more about over ambitious planning with extremely scarce resourses than safe/unsafe.
IIRC, your stats are correct ref the max available at 3, but I also recall the average availability over the period, - and it wasn't 2.
Can I refer you to an earlier post;
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpos...8&postcount=28
Result; 3 sorties planned (from 1 A/c), 0 achieved.
OK, perhaps a little artistic licence (but not much), point is, it was nothing to do with safe/unsafe
davejb
Ah, Bahama Mama, XV229 - remember it well.
Difference between then and now? (Apart from more Ac, more crews, greater experience, better dets, more support, better supply etc.) - no internet.
...and your
bottom line stat
12th to 18th March. 21 planned, 11 achieved
19th to 25th March. 18 planned, 9 achieved
26th March to 1st April. 21 planned, 6 achieved
2nd to 8th April. 16 planned, 11 achieved.
19th to 25th March. 18 planned, 9 achieved
26th March to 1st April. 21 planned, 6 achieved
2nd to 8th April. 16 planned, 11 achieved.
IIRC, your stats are correct ref the max available at 3, but I also recall the average availability over the period, - and it wasn't 2.
Can I refer you to an earlier post;
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpos...8&postcount=28
Result; 3 sorties planned (from 1 A/c), 0 achieved.
OK, perhaps a little artistic licence (but not much), point is, it was nothing to do with safe/unsafe
davejb
Ah, Bahama Mama, XV229 - remember it well.
Difference between then and now? (Apart from more Ac, more crews, greater experience, better dets, more support, better supply etc.) - no internet.
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Difference then and now... okay on internet (but only just - we had AOL, Compuserve etc) - the rest I'd actually say amounted to
1) Money
2) Something like integrity - there's some indefinable point in the past where people stopped being willing to resign over principle/do things because they're the right thing to do. The last one I actually recall was OC 206 during the Falklands, went on to become AOSNI or similar, and resigned, (at least this is what he told a few of us one quiet morning) because he'd figured his voice would carry some weight once he reached air rank, and had just found out it didn't - so there wasn't any point carrying on. His name escapes me (although I think he was a Dave for some reason...had an AFC from '82....)
Didn't serve under him myself, I was under a later style of management on 924 Sqn in time for the Bahamas Mama. (Being a pleb I got to enjoy the same experience over the Hebrides - no posh island havens whenever my turn for a scare came due - they div'd to Nassau, we landed at Lossie <sigh>).
1) Money
2) Something like integrity - there's some indefinable point in the past where people stopped being willing to resign over principle/do things because they're the right thing to do. The last one I actually recall was OC 206 during the Falklands, went on to become AOSNI or similar, and resigned, (at least this is what he told a few of us one quiet morning) because he'd figured his voice would carry some weight once he reached air rank, and had just found out it didn't - so there wasn't any point carrying on. His name escapes me (although I think he was a Dave for some reason...had an AFC from '82....)
Didn't serve under him myself, I was under a later style of management on 924 Sqn in time for the Bahamas Mama. (Being a pleb I got to enjoy the same experience over the Hebrides - no posh island havens whenever my turn for a scare came due - they div'd to Nassau, we landed at Lossie <sigh>).
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davejb,
OC 206 was Dave Emerson, diamond bloke
, and as you said he left because he was fed up being told off for telling the troops how is was, rather than being 'on message' from his lordships.
OC 206 was Dave Emerson, diamond bloke
, and as you said he left because he was fed up being told off for telling the troops how is was, rather than being 'on message' from his lordships.
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Ta,
I didn't work for him, but encountered him quite a lot, and it was plain to see that he was well regarded.
In flight? Did a taceval sortie once with no rations - the Nav had a packet of M&Ms that were religiously rationed out, and there was plenty of water for those who appreciated the zesty taste of swimming pools. Longest damn flight I was ever on, time being relative....Is that serious though, canx sorties for in flight? Surely not! (It's not April 1 yet...)
Get Mick Muttit in to explain how they did it on Shacklebombers - dropping off the junior siggie (whilst on night circuits) to nip to the chippy...
Dave
I didn't work for him, but encountered him quite a lot, and it was plain to see that he was well regarded.
In flight? Did a taceval sortie once with no rations - the Nav had a packet of M&Ms that were religiously rationed out, and there was plenty of water for those who appreciated the zesty taste of swimming pools. Longest damn flight I was ever on, time being relative....Is that serious though, canx sorties for in flight? Surely not! (It's not April 1 yet...)
Get Mick Muttit in to explain how they did it on Shacklebombers - dropping off the junior siggie (whilst on night circuits) to nip to the chippy...
Dave
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Regarding the issue of planning to fail: As I'm sure most of us know, the aircrew are allocated a number of flying hrs per year to achieve high operational standards (trg sorties) and contribute to operational tasking. Within that allocation is a minimum flying rate, per individual, to maintain basic currency. In recent times we have struggled to maintain currency in some skills, at home, due to a lack of available aircraft (for the reasons I have outlined elsewhere). It is not acceptable for the planners to look out of the window and assume that the few serviceable jets they see are not sufficient to meet our needs. If they don't plan and we don't fly, we will not produce the evidence of imbalance between resources and needs. The planners must continue to schedule the crews to fly, as they always have, knowing that there is a likelihood of failure. We then have the evidence that we are out of balance and we can then get the ears and eyes of the air staff. If we didn't plan to fail, we would not have augmented NLS with civilian tradesmen, nor would we have been given some respite from some of the op tasking.
DV, I am not a planner. I simply fly, with confidence, on whatever jet I'm given. I do like to think that I have a balanced view of the bigger picture, when I arrive in Ops, at oh god almighty hrs, to find out that the flight has been scrubbed due to a lack of airframes. This routine situation is almost certainly due to a lack of resources to repair a number of routine faults that many years ago would have been fixed within hours, rather than the days that it takes now. Engineering resources make up the pinch point at Kinloss, not airworthiness. Fortunately, in recent months we have recognised this problem and we have brought some balance back to resources and needs.
If you want to discuss Nimrod airworthiness issues you should concentrate on pre Sep 06, where there is plenty of material. However, the BOI has covered that ground with a fine tooth comb, so there is nothing left to discuss anyway....
Regards
Ed Sett
DV, I am not a planner. I simply fly, with confidence, on whatever jet I'm given. I do like to think that I have a balanced view of the bigger picture, when I arrive in Ops, at oh god almighty hrs, to find out that the flight has been scrubbed due to a lack of airframes. This routine situation is almost certainly due to a lack of resources to repair a number of routine faults that many years ago would have been fixed within hours, rather than the days that it takes now. Engineering resources make up the pinch point at Kinloss, not airworthiness. Fortunately, in recent months we have recognised this problem and we have brought some balance back to resources and needs.
If you want to discuss Nimrod airworthiness issues you should concentrate on pre Sep 06, where there is plenty of material. However, the BOI has covered that ground with a fine tooth comb, so there is nothing left to discuss anyway....
Regards
Ed Sett
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Nobody in the RAF or the MoD could find a copy of the airworthiness requirements for the version of the aircraft that caught fire
"There no longer exists an in-depth knowledge of working on the Nimrod aircraft," the QinetiQ report said.
At Kinloss, there have been examples of poor practice or human errors occurring which might otherwise have been avoided.