DV,
I'm not trying to score points, but your reply is worth further discussion:
You imply that prior to the BOI being set up, it was already established that there had been no fire in the bomb.
If I gave you that impression then, sorry, it was not my intention. What I was trying to indicate was that the BOI inspected the damage to the airframe at the crash site and noted the lack of any evidence of fire in the bomb bay (which was confirmed by specialists). Therefore, there was no purpose in investigating or analysing fault trends associated with any components (hot air ducts, hydraulic pipes and electrical wiring) in the bomb bay. It was outside their terms of reference to expand their analysis of the airframe beyond the location of the fire and the possible causes in that location.
Also, if you read my postings #2246 and 2247 you will be reminded of what the BOI said about hot air leaks in the bomb bay area. They make reference to the BAE duct study, but appear to be under the impression that no report was available. Whoever, gave them this impression mislead them.
The only reference to the duct study in the BOI report (that I could find) is in their review of XV227's incident, where they state that when the study is complete, it will be used to derive a lifing policy. They probably didn't have any significant interest in 227's incident because 230's SCP duct had been replaced (we must assume it didn't fail). The only outstanding business from 227's report was the checking of similar ducts (ie the crosfeed duct), but the lack of evidence of a fire in the bomb bay or the lack of a red light to indicate an air leak in the 7 tank dry bay, meant that no similar duct suffered a large failure. So, it didn't matter what the duct report would say; it wouldn't add to the evidence. However, the BOI team recognised that, regardless of the duct report, a small leak below the threshold for a warning was a possibility. A report is not needed in order to take that view. So, I can only speculate that they were on the dist list for the duct report but they chose not to take it into evidence, for the reasons I have just given. You speculate that they were misled, I speculate that they weren't. I think we should leave it at that.
DV, you are interested in Nimrod safety post-accident, so the duct report has some value in its own right. Even if the report had said that the crossfeed duct is riddled with holes, we actually stopped pressurizing it after engine start on the ground on the 4 Sep 07. It has not been charged with air in flight since the accident. It will never again be charged with air in flight unless we make a major mod to the jet. Therefore, belated as it was, the duct report is only of academic interest today. Had it been issued before 2 Sep 07, we might have taken the actions we took on 4 Sep, before the 2 Sep, thus preventing a probable cause of the accident. Its a sobering thought.