Nimrod Information
While I understand the reluctance of people to been seen to supply answers to DV, it must be obvious that he and others are, effectively, acting as investigative journalists simply because MoD has been caught, yet again, lying and withholding vital evidence in a case where deaths could have been avoided.
I don’t apologise for repeating myself here. What has been uncovered, by asking these questions, are not revelations. It is well known in the MoD that, for nearly two decades, the implementation of airworthiness regulations has been systematically underfunded, to the point where senior staffs have ruled it is effectively optional. But this fact, and all the evidence underpinning it, has been kept in-house fairly successfully by MoD. And people – your colleagues – have demonstrably died because of it. The facts are now being exposed to those who have most to lose – their lives.
DV, TD and others here have, through asking pointed questions, exposed this gross and criminal abrogation of duty. Sometimes the question goes down a rabbit hole, but others have culminated in Mr Browne’s admission to the House last month that MoD was liable. I say again – read the QQ and BAeS reports and ask yourself if you would treat your pushbike this way, never mind an aeroplane.
I’d like to be a fly on certain walls in Whitehall as other parts of MoD continue to flatly deny there is a problem, but I’m sure the Coroner will lean toward Mr Browne’s admission when considering this disconnect. This is important – they must not be allowed, yet again, to dismiss this as an isolated case. What I find interesting, and this is purely from a personal perspective, is something that happened in mid-December. For no apparent reason, a key note opening address at a routine briefing (albeit on a large programme) was to be made by a certain person who is well known for treating airworthiness as an option of last resort (and had no knowledge of the subject matter). I thought, you’re a brave man, Q&A should be entertaining. Lo and behold, there followed a table thumping session extolling the virtues of these mandated processes, procedures and regulations which he’d spent 10 years rejecting out of hand. I have no doubt whatsoever that this change of tack was a direct result of the BoI report and Browne’s statement. While this is no comfort to bereaved families (not just Nimrod), I think safety will feature heavily in his domain from now on. I look forward to others following suite. Better still, sack them anyway.
Please, DV’s questions and TD’s quest are prompting very tangible changes in MoD, for the better. Be glad, for the song has no ending.
I don’t apologise for repeating myself here. What has been uncovered, by asking these questions, are not revelations. It is well known in the MoD that, for nearly two decades, the implementation of airworthiness regulations has been systematically underfunded, to the point where senior staffs have ruled it is effectively optional. But this fact, and all the evidence underpinning it, has been kept in-house fairly successfully by MoD. And people – your colleagues – have demonstrably died because of it. The facts are now being exposed to those who have most to lose – their lives.
DV, TD and others here have, through asking pointed questions, exposed this gross and criminal abrogation of duty. Sometimes the question goes down a rabbit hole, but others have culminated in Mr Browne’s admission to the House last month that MoD was liable. I say again – read the QQ and BAeS reports and ask yourself if you would treat your pushbike this way, never mind an aeroplane.
I’d like to be a fly on certain walls in Whitehall as other parts of MoD continue to flatly deny there is a problem, but I’m sure the Coroner will lean toward Mr Browne’s admission when considering this disconnect. This is important – they must not be allowed, yet again, to dismiss this as an isolated case. What I find interesting, and this is purely from a personal perspective, is something that happened in mid-December. For no apparent reason, a key note opening address at a routine briefing (albeit on a large programme) was to be made by a certain person who is well known for treating airworthiness as an option of last resort (and had no knowledge of the subject matter). I thought, you’re a brave man, Q&A should be entertaining. Lo and behold, there followed a table thumping session extolling the virtues of these mandated processes, procedures and regulations which he’d spent 10 years rejecting out of hand. I have no doubt whatsoever that this change of tack was a direct result of the BoI report and Browne’s statement. While this is no comfort to bereaved families (not just Nimrod), I think safety will feature heavily in his domain from now on. I look forward to others following suite. Better still, sack them anyway.
Please, DV’s questions and TD’s quest are prompting very tangible changes in MoD, for the better. Be glad, for the song has no ending.
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I support what Tuc is saying here. In many ways answering questions directly is far more effective than obfuscating. Ed set's contribution should also be acknowledged. It was the complete lack of a flow of info about Nimrod that added to the problems of those affected by this tragedy. He has set me right on more than one occasion and I thank him for that. However, the fact that MoD lawyers did not think airworthiness regs were anything to do with this case should be setting off alarm bells.
Agreeing to pay compensation ahead of the Inquest was good news and I suspect something to do with all the pressure and unearthing of facts in the long wait for the BoI. More good news shortly to come from the Herc Inquest, again possibly to do with the high profile generated.
Like I said before, they don't like it up 'em.
Agreeing to pay compensation ahead of the Inquest was good news and I suspect something to do with all the pressure and unearthing of facts in the long wait for the BoI. More good news shortly to come from the Herc Inquest, again possibly to do with the high profile generated.
Like I said before, they don't like it up 'em.
Whilst I accept and support the comments of tucumseh and nigeglib, I find the arrogance of comments like this distasteful.
Every comment, and the reason for it, is open to debate, and EVERYONE is entitled to an opinion.... not just a select few.
Who pulled your chain, fergineer. I am not a reporter, and I am not looking for a story. I simply posted a follow-up question to someone I respect. Your remarks were uncalled for.
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Defence Standard 00-970 PART 1 SECTION 9 - MILITARY SPECIFIC SYSTEMS
9.5.15 Fuel pipes shall not run through:
a. passenger,
b. crew,
c. cargo or
d. baggage compartments,
nor in hazardous proximity to:
e. hot air ducts,
f. electrical wiring and
g. electrically operated equipment contained in bays
unless they are without couplings and adequately
protected against potential sources of ignition and
damage.
Any space between a pipe and its protection shall be adequately vented and drained.
Such protection would involve the use of a design that contains the fuel in the event of leakage from the fuel pipes,however caused, and subsequently vents the fuel into a
suitable drain system.
Typical examples of such a design are double-skinned/walled, jacketed or shrouded.
Whenever lagging is used in compartments in which pipes,tanks or equipment containing flammable fluids are installed, suitable precautions shall be taken to prevent the wetting of the lagging by flammable fluids as a result of normal operation, damage, failures of the equipment or leakages from joints or unions.
9.5.15 Fuel pipes shall not run through:
a. passenger,
b. crew,
c. cargo or
d. baggage compartments,
nor in hazardous proximity to:
e. hot air ducts,
f. electrical wiring and
g. electrically operated equipment contained in bays
unless they are without couplings and adequately
protected against potential sources of ignition and
damage.
Any space between a pipe and its protection shall be adequately vented and drained.
Such protection would involve the use of a design that contains the fuel in the event of leakage from the fuel pipes,however caused, and subsequently vents the fuel into a
suitable drain system.
Typical examples of such a design are double-skinned/walled, jacketed or shrouded.
Whenever lagging is used in compartments in which pipes,tanks or equipment containing flammable fluids are installed, suitable precautions shall be taken to prevent the wetting of the lagging by flammable fluids as a result of normal operation, damage, failures of the equipment or leakages from joints or unions.
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I guess the MOD broke most of those recomendations with the nimrod at some time or another then. Well found TD. However, when was that document written and is it still valid?
Ed Set
One of your previous replies stated that the SCP ducting had some sort of heat/fire detection system. This was clearly not the case on XV227, I am sure that the only fire detection system would be the in the bomb bay. We had no warnings of the potential danger we were in at the time. If I remember correctly the only indications we had on the aircraft was a problem with the SCP dropping out. As result we continued to operate the aircraft on one conditioning system. The first we new about the problem was on landing when the Crew Chief reported a missing panel. Reports at the time suggested that the fuel in the 7 tank would have been near to boiling due to the hot air leak we were still operating the crossfeed air in those days.
There but for the grace of god....
Ed Set
One of your previous replies stated that the SCP ducting had some sort of heat/fire detection system. This was clearly not the case on XV227, I am sure that the only fire detection system would be the in the bomb bay. We had no warnings of the potential danger we were in at the time. If I remember correctly the only indications we had on the aircraft was a problem with the SCP dropping out. As result we continued to operate the aircraft on one conditioning system. The first we new about the problem was on landing when the Crew Chief reported a missing panel. Reports at the time suggested that the fuel in the 7 tank would have been near to boiling due to the hot air leak we were still operating the crossfeed air in those days.
There but for the grace of god....
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and available for all to read at http://www.dstan.mod.uk
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Def-Stan 00-970 Part 5 has not yet been published.
DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/5
SECTION 5
5.2 FUEL SYSTEMS
5.2.87 No vent or drainage provision may end at
any point:
(a) Where the discharge of fuel from the vent
outlet would constitute a fire hazard.
(b) From which fumes could enter personnel
compartments.
5.2.129 Fuel or vapour shall not enter any part of
the aeroplane as a result of fuel jettisoning
DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/5
SECTION 5
5.2 FUEL SYSTEMS
5.2.87 No vent or drainage provision may end at
any point:
(a) Where the discharge of fuel from the vent
outlet would constitute a fire hazard.
(b) From which fumes could enter personnel
compartments.
5.2.129 Fuel or vapour shall not enter any part of
the aeroplane as a result of fuel jettisoning
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Nav Attacking:
I doubt very much that I would have written that. I would have written that the crossfeed duct had overheat detectors around it. The crossfeed air duct supplies air to the SCP shut off valve. It is not a part of the SCP.
DV, I cannot answer your question asking if we are currently conducting AAR. Its a capability matter and I'm NOt sure that I can discuss it publicly.
Ed Set
One of your previous replies stated that the SCP ducting had some sort of heat/fire detection system.
One of your previous replies stated that the SCP ducting had some sort of heat/fire detection system.
DV, I cannot answer your question asking if we are currently conducting AAR. Its a capability matter and I'm NOt sure that I can discuss it publicly.
Just as tucumseh and nigegilb try to point out the whole tree or trees, rather than the in depth study of a particular branch which a technical review tends to as in the case of this thread, might I take the opportunity yet again to direct attention at the entire wood? The cavalier way that the MOD has treated its airworthiness obligations over the last few decades is instanced not only in this thread, and the aircraft type to which it refers, but in numerous others, the subjects of accidents and other types on this Forum. Whether the MOD and its apparatchiks are covering their tracks and are rearranging the deck chairs into orderly rows now is bye the bye. They have shown by their actions, by their neglect and by their sheer deception that they are not to be trusted with such awesome responsibility. That those who dedicate their lives to the pursuit of technical excellence and the provision of proper airworthiness standards have been betrayed is galling, but they at least may live to savour their bitterness. What is absolutely appalling is the knowledge that there have been avoidable fatal accidents suffered by military aircraft because airworthiness standards have not been enforced by the airworthiness authority, ie the MOD. I repeat my claim that it is a contradiction in terms to have the same authority responsible for Airworthiness Regulation as well as Operational Control. Self regulation is a nonsense wherever it occurs. Can anyone instance a case where it serves anyone other than the ‘self’ in question? In the case of Airworthiness, self regulation is a disaster which has been visited on too many loved ones. Surely now enough is enough? Military Airworthiness Authority must be removed from the MOD into the hands of a separate and independent Military Airworthiness Authority, along the lines of the CAA. Leave it with the MOD and more compromises, more cover-ups, more expediency, more accidents, more deaths will follow. This is a scandal that must be addressed!
For those unfamiliar with the tome, Def Stan 00-970 is the Design and Airworthiness Requirements for Service Aircraft, and is complemented by JSP 553 Military Airworthiness Regulations and other standards.
While it is true that close inspection of most aircraft would reveal breaches of 00-970 – especially in Service Engineered Modifications (part of the reason we have SEMs is that Design Authorities won’t underwrite designs which don’t conform, so by definition many are unsafe or don’t work) – the most disturbing thing in my experience lies in certain long-standing rulings by MoD concerning the implementation of these standards (which of course is the point ACM Sir Clive Loader made in the BoI report), for example;
• They may be treated as optional, in doing so rendering the aircraft or system unfit for purpose.
• One may be instructed NOT to apply them, upon which refusing to ignore them becomes a disciplinary offence.
• It is sufficient for a system to be physically, but not functionally, safe.
And so on……… These are not temporary aberrations or isolated cases of insanity – they are consistent and quite deliberate rulings made or reiterated, to my knowledge, every year since 1998. They prove (to me) that ACM Loader’s statement is not a revelation. The Sea King ASaC BoI report detailed specific failures with regard to 00-970, condemning the design and implementation of a system as “unfit for purpose” (bullet 1). The Tornado/Patriot report clearly referred to (lack of) design features which were blatant breaches but, deliberately or otherwise, didn’t discuss them so those unfamiliar with the requirements wouldn’t necessarily realise the seriousness of the breach, which rendered the aircraft functionally unsafe (bullet 3). All of this is open source, but you have to be reasonably familiar with 00-970 and 553 to draw my conclusions.
While it is true that close inspection of most aircraft would reveal breaches of 00-970 – especially in Service Engineered Modifications (part of the reason we have SEMs is that Design Authorities won’t underwrite designs which don’t conform, so by definition many are unsafe or don’t work) – the most disturbing thing in my experience lies in certain long-standing rulings by MoD concerning the implementation of these standards (which of course is the point ACM Sir Clive Loader made in the BoI report), for example;
• They may be treated as optional, in doing so rendering the aircraft or system unfit for purpose.
• One may be instructed NOT to apply them, upon which refusing to ignore them becomes a disciplinary offence.
• It is sufficient for a system to be physically, but not functionally, safe.
And so on……… These are not temporary aberrations or isolated cases of insanity – they are consistent and quite deliberate rulings made or reiterated, to my knowledge, every year since 1998. They prove (to me) that ACM Loader’s statement is not a revelation. The Sea King ASaC BoI report detailed specific failures with regard to 00-970, condemning the design and implementation of a system as “unfit for purpose” (bullet 1). The Tornado/Patriot report clearly referred to (lack of) design features which were blatant breaches but, deliberately or otherwise, didn’t discuss them so those unfamiliar with the requirements wouldn’t necessarily realise the seriousness of the breach, which rendered the aircraft functionally unsafe (bullet 3). All of this is open source, but you have to be reasonably familiar with 00-970 and 553 to draw my conclusions.
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Des Browne Statement on 4th Dec 2007
"QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation into the fuel system and confirmed that, in the light of measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate"
Well, Mr Browne and Stn Cmdr, if the report is that good why is it impossible for the families of the lost crew to get a copy of it?
DV
Well, Mr Browne and Stn Cmdr, if the report is that good why is it impossible for the families of the lost crew to get a copy of it?
DV
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I think you know the answer to that one DV. Given the original Qinetiq report, it is impossible to see how Qinetiq could possibly have made that statement in quite the way it was portrayed by the Scottish, sorry Defence Secretary, to MPs.
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QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation into the fuel system and confirmed that, in the light of measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate
Interesting words they have said DV, the last few lines "in light measures taken since the crash" , many that read that will asume the system was unsafe before the crash. I know and others that operate type know it was as safe as we could have checked but Joe bloggs in public can pick that up the other way.
Without reading this report I best not say no more but wording could have been better.
Interesting words they have said DV, the last few lines "in light measures taken since the crash" , many that read that will asume the system was unsafe before the crash. I know and others that operate type know it was as safe as we could have checked but Joe bloggs in public can pick that up the other way.
Without reading this report I best not say no more but wording could have been better.
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Hi again, Magnersdrinker, haven't heard from you for a while. You say
They are right, that's why we had a crash. What many would like to know now is how safe is it at present. Whilst MoD refuse to release documents such as the 2007 QinetiQ report, that Des Browne and the Stn Cmdr boast about, and the combustion analysis report, there has to be doubts. As Mick Smith points out it is doubtful that QinetiQ gave the general fuel system a clean bill of health in Sept 2007 after their critical report of 2007. I suspect that the study report covers a selected section of the fuel system in the bomb bay, and contains several conditional statements.
DV
many that read this will assume the system was unsafe before the crash
DV
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Magners,
There is little doubt that the system was NOT safe before the loss of 230, hence the accident.
Perhaps that is one of the reasons why AAR has been stopped (probably for good) by all Nimrods.
TSM
There is little doubt that the system was NOT safe before the loss of 230, hence the accident.
Perhaps that is one of the reasons why AAR has been stopped (probably for good) by all Nimrods.
TSM
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SM. The strange thing about AAR, is that it was not stopped until after the XV235 incident on 5th Nov. Yet according to Des Browne and the Stn Cmdr the QinetiQ report of Sept 2007 claims the fuel system is safe (with AAR), which can not be correct. This is why many of us have doubts as to what is stated in this protected report.
DV
DV
DV & MS
I believe your assessments to be correct. It is highly unlikely MoD / Nimrod IPT have staffed the numerous requirements, gathered funding together, let and delivered contracts and embodied/implemented all that would necessary to correct/ameliorate/mitigate the vast catalogue of risks and breaches of airworthiness regulations and requirements outlined by QinetiQ in their original report.
Whoever is briefing Browne is playing with peoples lives. Undoubtedly, Browne knows this. Remember the crux of the matter. ACM Sir Clive Loader stated that airworthiness regs were not implemented properly, by no means the first time this has been noted in a BoI report. Nor was it the first time it had been declared direct to Ministers – they are on record as denying it time after time, even in the face of irrefutable evidence, a fact which I hope comes out at the forthcoming QC’s review. All quiet on that front BTW – still not answering correspondence 3 months after Browne’s announcement.
I believe your assessments to be correct. It is highly unlikely MoD / Nimrod IPT have staffed the numerous requirements, gathered funding together, let and delivered contracts and embodied/implemented all that would necessary to correct/ameliorate/mitigate the vast catalogue of risks and breaches of airworthiness regulations and requirements outlined by QinetiQ in their original report.
Whoever is briefing Browne is playing with peoples lives. Undoubtedly, Browne knows this. Remember the crux of the matter. ACM Sir Clive Loader stated that airworthiness regs were not implemented properly, by no means the first time this has been noted in a BoI report. Nor was it the first time it had been declared direct to Ministers – they are on record as denying it time after time, even in the face of irrefutable evidence, a fact which I hope comes out at the forthcoming QC’s review. All quiet on that front BTW – still not answering correspondence 3 months after Browne’s announcement.
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Pre-Inquest Meeting
I understand that the families returned from another pre-inquest meeting last Friday with a pile of reports and documents supplied by MoD. However, missing from the pile were two important reports (yes, you have guessed them), the QinetiQ report referred to by Des Browne and the Stn Cmdr, and the QinetiQ combustion report. I wonder why?
Let's try this for size. The combustion report does not, as reported by Stn Cmdr, "provide compelling evidence that leaves little doubt that the cross feed or the SCP pipe assembly was the probable source of ignition". It simply states that, based on the little inforamtion available, the source identified by the BOI could be a source. And, the famous Des Browne QinetiQ report, does not state that the Nimrod fuel system, in total, is safe, it simply focusses on those sections identified in the BOI report, with conditions. It does not clear the items metioned in the 2006 report, nor does it clear the AAR system.
DV
Let's try this for size. The combustion report does not, as reported by Stn Cmdr, "provide compelling evidence that leaves little doubt that the cross feed or the SCP pipe assembly was the probable source of ignition". It simply states that, based on the little inforamtion available, the source identified by the BOI could be a source. And, the famous Des Browne QinetiQ report, does not state that the Nimrod fuel system, in total, is safe, it simply focusses on those sections identified in the BOI report, with conditions. It does not clear the items metioned in the 2006 report, nor does it clear the AAR system.
DV