Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)

[On_The_Top_Bunk]

BBC NEWS | UK | Nimrod review reveals 'failures'

Prevetable accident from Sky

For the full revew here

Download the PDF report

On page 559 of the report the conclusions with regard to personnel issues. How many can you put a tick against? I would say all.

2. There are currently weaknesses in the area of personnel in the MOD, namely:
(1) Undervaluing and dilution of engineers and engineering skills.
(2) Engineers are not required to have professional status.
(3) Decline in the ability of the MOD to act as an “intelligent customer”.
(4) Turf wars and inter-service rivalries for jobs and roles.
(5) Short term two-year postings.
(6) Constant re-naming of posts.
(7) ‘Double-hatting’ and ‘gapping’.
(8) Lack of trained Safety Engineers.
(9) Selfishness, rewards and promotion for ‘change’.
(10) Shortage of manpower and skills fade.

[BEagle]

• A military airworthiness system not fit for purpose
  
• A safety case regime which is ineffective and wasteful
  
• A safety culture that has allowed "business" to eclipse airworthiness

And what changes will now be made?

[Alber Ratman]

Something akin to the SRG of the CAA?? That is what Haddon Cave seems to be alluding to.

[danieloakworth]

Interesting that BAe and QinetiQ have both been named and shamed for their work on the Safety Case yet those ortganisation still produce 99% of platform Safety Cases (QQ doing Typhoon as we speak). Will MOD actually learn from this?

[jumpseater]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/h..._09_nimrod.pdf
Dont press print unless you've got a lot of paper...


Just watched the press statement live on Sky Telly news.

My guess is it sounds like HC is expecting an SRG 'type' of accountability and overview system to be established. See CH21 in report

21.1 The purpose of the Recommendations in this Chapter is to provide a blueprint to enable the MOD to develop a clear, coherent, comprehensive and comprehensible pan-MOD Military Airworthiness Regime to which everyone in the organisation can subscribe, which adopts elements of the Civil Model where there is self-evident benefit, and which demonstrably addresses Risk to Life without compromising capability, and which drives new attitudes, behaviours and a new Safety Culture. In both peacetime and in military operations, the military need to operate, in a safe manner, aircraft which are available, capable and safe.
An effective Airworthiness Regime which demonstrably assures and ensures this will take several years to mature. I recognise that implementation will be a major undertaking. The structural, substantive, cultural and behavioural changes required are significant. A sea-change in attitudes will be required. I am confident that the effort will be worthwhile in terms of Availability, Capability and Risk to Life


Many comments on the focus drift to 'budget target' rather than 'safety targets' in all three organisations MOD/BAe/Quinetic, across a number of quite specific years 98-06 which included significant defence reviews and BAe's downsizing/restructuring/job cuts in the commercial marketplace. (NB I mean as a business not whether supplying mil/civil contracts).

The Beebs expert, an ex Nimrod F/E? seems very competant. He stated there were a few surprises in the report. The anchor, (perfect ryhming slang in this case), asked what surprises there were?, to which the expert gave a brief summation of one example i.e a sentence about the possibilty of it being fuel re-entering the aircraft from an external leak. 'Ah yes but that's a specific point' says the '#anchor'... Quite how he didn't say 'thats what you asked for less than ten seconds ago' was beyond me, well played matey for the restraint shown. Maybe if they got James May to read the news when there's bits about technical stuff like machinery, may help the beeb to get a little bit of credibility in their news.
Skys bint was no better stating that HC had said the accident was 'unavoidable', whereas he said 'preventable'. Suggest at Skys chrimbo party they give her a dictionary as her pressy with instructions on how to use it.

Hopefully people will read the report rather than swallow beebsky wholesale dumbing down and misinterpretation which can reasonably be expected ..

[Satellite_Driver]

I sat down to have a quick skim of the report and an hour later, even on a cursory read-through, my blood is boiling.

I left the RAF two years ago after seventeen years as an engineering officer. (Comms-electronics rather than Aerosystems, but I did two nominally AS tours in my time.) This report comprehensively tears to pieces nearly every change foisted upon us during that period, not least of which was the almost fetishistic worship of change itself.

There's so much I want to say that it's probably best if I take the time to properly read and digest this report first. Even on a quick read-through, so many of the changes, bad decisions and cultural and organisational failures highlighted are ones that I and my fellow EngOs shook our heads at at the time. But if there's one phrase from the report that epitomises the decline in the RAF and MoD's engineering standards and culture in my time it is "...outsourced its thinking." (p11).

I took my ORD for several reasons. But one factor was my growing feeling that if a job required you to think (something pretty important for my job satisfaction) then it was assumed we'd outsource it to contractors. That, together with the removal of a specialised professional engineer career past my own rank, made me feel that the job I'd joined up to do was fast disappearing. Being told in a career brief that "the problem is that you're seen as an expert" was the last straw. Funnily enough, the Haddon-Cave report has quite a lot to say about engineering expertise, or rather the steady erosion of it.

[green granite]

From the Guardian: Haddon-Cave concluded that the plane "was lost because of a systemic breach of the military covenant brought about by significant failures on the part of all those involved. This must not be allowed to happen again."

In all, Haddon-Cave singled out 10 named individuals for criticism: five from the MoD, three from BAE Systems and two from QinetiQ.

RAF Nimrod crash was preventable, inquiry finds | World news | guardian.co.uk

[Melchett01]

So between this and the Puma report, will people now start to take any notice when we say 'we' are now throroughly broken after years of non-stop thrashing???

It's all well and good naming the various starred officers, but this is what you get when you politicise and transform a fighting service into a business. Wonder if the politicians are feeling twitchy? Probably not.

[Chugalug2]

Here, buried deep, is the possible flaw in Mr H-C's cunning plan:

Independent MAA but part of MOD

21.15 In my view, it is important that the MAA is independent but remains part of the MOD. There is a logical

argument which can be made for the MAA to be entirely separate from the MOD so that it can provide a

totally independent voice untrammelled by financial or political pressures. Given the failings identified in this
Report, I see force in this argument.
21.16 However, the military element adds an entirely different dimension to the picture. The MOD has the
responsibility for delivering a certain military capability and balancing risk with task. A military organisation
must be ‘risk sensible’ but not too ‘risk averse’. The MAA must understand and appreciate operational
relevance and, importantly, be seen by military operators to understand and appreciate this, if it is to enjoy
their confidence. In my view, it would not be sensible or practicable to position the MAA legally and physically
outside the MOD. Sufficient independence will be assured by having: (a) the MAA working direct for 2

nd PUS;

(b) a high-ranking 3-Star officer as Head of the MAA; (c) full time MAA Regulators who do not have other

potentially conflicting responsibilities,

i.e. do not have responsibilities for delivery which give rise to potential

conflicts of interest; (d) clear Regulations which spell out different roles and responsibilities and assure the

MAA’s independence and immunity; and (e) stronger links with the CAA and HSE, including non-executives
from such organisations sitting on an MAA board with an express responsibility to watch for, and report
annually, on the MAA’s independence from financial, political and operational pressures.

So the MAA will be independent of the MOD and yet a part of it. A Humphreyism if ever there were one. A bit like the "separate but equal" status of non-whites in Apartheid South Africa. The question I have of Mr Haddon-Cave is; "How will your arrangements prevent the RTS of a known unairworthy aircraft over the objections of Boscombe Down, as was the case with the Chinook HC Mk2?"

[SRENNAPS]

but this is what you get when you politicise and transform a fighting service into a business. Wonder if the politicians are feeling twitchy

And what of those serving that have fully embraced the business culture (in the name of change) I wonder if they are feeling twitchy?

[BEagle]

And what of those serving that have fully embraced the business culture (in the name of change) I wonder if they are feeling twitchy?

Nope - they will merely 'hear what you say' and 'run it up the flagpole' before 'imagineering the holistic synergy'.....

[ian16th]

This piece from the Telegraph says a lot to me.

He quoted a former senior RAF officer who told his inquiry: "There was no doubt that the culture of the time had switched."

"In the days of the RAF chief engineer in the 1990s, you had to be on top of airworthiness."

"By 2004 you had to be on top of your budget if you wanted to get ahead."

Bean Counters!

[cynicalint]

Can do, will do’ culture

13.72 The ‘Strategic Goal’ played straight into to the hierarchical, process-driven, but otherwise wholly admirable, ‘Can do, will do’ culture of the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, ‘Can do, will do’ became ‘Make Do’.

13.73 Every platform and department was expected to deliver its share, irrespective of special pleading. Ambitious officers on short two-year tours saw delivering, and being seen to deliver, whatever ‘change’, savings and efficiency targets that were demanded as the route to preferment.The zealots were on the fast track to promotion.

The report highlights the problems across the whole of the logistsics and procurement world; the consequences highlighted here quite rightly concentrate on Airworthiness failings but the criticisms also cut across promotion and the wholesale acceptance of the 'Business culture'.

[Da4orce]

What of any action against the named individuals? Used car Bob says that the serving RAF officers have been moved sideways (promoted in 1 case).

Some might say that this report suggests that working for the MOD (RAF), Qinetiq or BAE Systems allows individuals to get away with manslaughter.

14 men paid with their lives, the least we can expect is those responsible to pay with the loss of their jobs.

Currently the silence is deafening on this front!

[insty66]

Chap 24 is just like some-one has been earwigging in a Ground crew crewroom for the last ten years or so!

I hope it brings about the right kind of change and not the promotion chasing sort! Chap 24.10

[pulse1]

Chugalug2,

It seems to me that HC openly discusses the issues involved with an independent MAA very well and ackowledges the "force of your argument".

However, do you not feel that his demand for "(e) stronger links with the CAA and HSE, including non-executives from such organisations sitting on an MAA board with an express responsibility to watch for, and report annually, on the MAA’s independence from financial, political and operational pressures." meets your concerns very well?

[Chugalug2]

pulse1:

However, do you not feel that his demand for "(e) stronger links with the CAA and HSE, including non-executives from such organisations sitting on an MAA board with an express responsibility to watch for, and report annually, on the MAA’s independence from financial, political and operational pressures." meets your concerns very well?

In a word, pulse, no! I'm sorry to have to sound so churlish but the key word is Independent. To call it that and then confirm it is to be part of the MOD still is a nonsense, no matter what the justifications. This will still be Self Regulation and I'm sure you know my attitude to that well enough by now. The MOD has shown it is not to be trusted with Airworthiness, but now we see it still will be. Painting new titles on the doors and bringing in non execs from outside doesn't change that. They will simply be the fall guys next time there is a rumpus. The MOD philosophy seems to me to be Flight Safety costs money and is for wimps. Of course no-one will spell it out quite like that and will make sure to mouth the sort of platitudes we heard today from good ole Bob, but this won't change that nor the contempt for those in the "Airworthiness Empire". You know people like Boscombe Down. We are I'm afraid so near and yet so far. By the time that the MOD has "modded" this Review I'm afraid we'll be even further. Sad

[unclenelli]

BBC East Midlands Today have just show "Library Footage" of an R1 taxiing at Waddington and a E3-D!!!!!!

Muppets!

[Cows getting bigger]

I had thought about reading the whole report (I will when I get a spare weekend). However, the cover page seems to make a very clear summary

A FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP, CULTURE
AND PRIORITIES

[AHORSE]

Almost as bad as the local TV in the South West showing a graphic of a Nimrod refuelling from a wing pod of a 707 tanker (not even a 135)