Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
FG
Best get yourself out of the crewroom and across to NLS or the IPT and find out everything that is going on as a consequence of the strip down - the information won't find you. You might still feel you have no problems flying (in) the aircraft, and I am not trying to convince you otherwise, but at least you choice will be based on the best facts currently available, rather than just faith in the 'old girl' and the system.
Best get yourself out of the crewroom and across to NLS or the IPT and find out everything that is going on as a consequence of the strip down - the information won't find you. You might still feel you have no problems flying (in) the aircraft, and I am not trying to convince you otherwise, but at least you choice will be based on the best facts currently available, rather than just faith in the 'old girl' and the system.
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EdSett100
I was briefed by a senior officer from Kinloss yesterday who rang me up and told me there were problems with corrosion and hydraulic pipes chafing and also informed me there would be an article in a Sunday paper. I asked the senior officer if corrosion could be a serious problem "Yes" he said "It can be"
I understand that a spokesman at the MOD said they had found untoward issues during stipdown.
I will be asking for a copy of the 1st Qinetiq report on the teardown of Nimrod MR2 XV236 via the FOI so I can read it for myself and let you know exactly what it said.
I was briefed by a senior officer from Kinloss yesterday who rang me up and told me there were problems with corrosion and hydraulic pipes chafing and also informed me there would be an article in a Sunday paper. I asked the senior officer if corrosion could be a serious problem "Yes" he said "It can be"
I understand that a spokesman at the MOD said they had found untoward issues during stipdown.
I will be asking for a copy of the 1st Qinetiq report on the teardown of Nimrod MR2 XV236 via the FOI so I can read it for myself and let you know exactly what it said.
Last edited by Tappers Dad; 21st Sep 2008 at 18:41.
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TD, thanks for your offer, but we have been told that the QQ report will be available to us to read all in the next few days.
I know that the photo in the Mail on Sunday was not taken during the teardown. It originated from the investigation into XV235's incident. The Mail's article suggests that it came from QQ. It didn't.
I know that the photo in the Mail on Sunday was not taken during the teardown. It originated from the investigation into XV235's incident. The Mail's article suggests that it came from QQ. It didn't.
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DV:
And I say to you, DV, that you are going into areas that you know little or nothing about. You are viewing this risk too simply. High Pressure (HP) air ducts exist in all jet engine compartments, worldwide. They all have joints that might fail, never mind corrosion and they all have the same type of mitigation (detectors). Anyway, regardless of the mode of failure, all of the HP ducts on the Nimrod that are charged in flight are within the fire zones of the engines. I don't have any argument with the upgrade from "remote" to "occasional", in determining the rate of failure. However, a more accurate assesment of the effect of a single duct failing in the most dramatic manner would be, "inconvenient" at worst. All of those ducts are surrounded by titanium panels and the engines themselves. Although they are also routed outside the engine compartments, they are not charged with any air in flight.
To confirm my point: Worst case: during take-off one of the ducts bursts and the associated engine loses some power. There might even be some damage within the engine compartment. The power loss leads us into well rehearsed reactions which lead us into a safe mode of operating the aircraft. A warning will be received on the flight deck and the engine will be shut down and the duct will become dead. A single engine shut down will never be a hazard to a Nimrod. If there was any damage within the engine compartment it will be engine associated but the engine is not now running, so its inconsequential. Catestrophic (loss of aircraft)? Thats a ridiculous assessement.
QQ are not Nimrod experts.
Regards
Ed Sett
So I say to the guys who are still flying, ask what mitigation is in place to cover this level of risk.
To confirm my point: Worst case: during take-off one of the ducts bursts and the associated engine loses some power. There might even be some damage within the engine compartment. The power loss leads us into well rehearsed reactions which lead us into a safe mode of operating the aircraft. A warning will be received on the flight deck and the engine will be shut down and the duct will become dead. A single engine shut down will never be a hazard to a Nimrod. If there was any damage within the engine compartment it will be engine associated but the engine is not now running, so its inconsequential. Catestrophic (loss of aircraft)? Thats a ridiculous assessement.
QQ are not Nimrod experts.
Regards
Ed Sett
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EdSett100
Can you tell us exactly what indications are there in the cockpit when a duct bursts, other than a slight loss of thrust, which I assume the pilots might feel? Are you saying that if a duct bursts (even a little burst) there will be an appreciable and noticeable decrease in thrust and there will be a warning in the cockpit?
And are you also saying that, if a slight decrease in thrust IS noticed, the actions for that are to shut the engine down?
Even if that were the case, and even if it was during your own 'worst case' scenario, surely there is a serious risk of fire/explosion immediately the duct fails or leaks, especially during the take off run?
Wouldn't it all be a bit too late then?
And as for saying the QQ are NOT Nimrod experts, I can't disagree with you, but may I ask who you believe are the experts on this subject?
Thanks
TSM
Can you tell us exactly what indications are there in the cockpit when a duct bursts, other than a slight loss of thrust, which I assume the pilots might feel? Are you saying that if a duct bursts (even a little burst) there will be an appreciable and noticeable decrease in thrust and there will be a warning in the cockpit?
And are you also saying that, if a slight decrease in thrust IS noticed, the actions for that are to shut the engine down?
Even if that were the case, and even if it was during your own 'worst case' scenario, surely there is a serious risk of fire/explosion immediately the duct fails or leaks, especially during the take off run?
Wouldn't it all be a bit too late then?
And as for saying the QQ are NOT Nimrod experts, I can't disagree with you, but may I ask who you believe are the experts on this subject?
Thanks
TSM
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TSM, at the risk of turning this thread into a Nimrod OCU:
A red warning light comes on.
I very much doubt that they would feel a loss of thrust or even a swing towards the associated engine. A loss of HP air from a single engine does not significantly affect the handling of the Nimrod. A single engine flame-out is not hazardous, even if the pilot does nothing. There might be a drop in rpm, which might be observed.
No. I'm saying that if the red warning light comes on, the crew will shut off the air supply from that engine (best case) or in the worst case, reduce the power on that engine and it might have to be idled or shut down to put the light out. This all standard FRC stuff
No, it is only hot air coming out of a duct into a very secure area. There might be a bang. However, for obvious reasons there are no combustible materials in the engine compartment, except fuel/hyd liquids which are inside stainless steel pipes and routed well away from the hot air pipes. The electrical wire insulation will not burn. If the crew does not react immediately to the warning light, it is possible in the worst case that the firewire will activate and the engine will then be shutdown within seconds.
You are assuming that a burst HP air duct means instant explosion and fire. If it did, no aircraft in the World would get an airworthiness certificate, because no aircraft is airworthy if a single failure could cause that effect. As I said, most jet aircraft have HP air ducts connected to the engines.
The experts are the designers who put the ducts in the engine compartments, made sure that the compartments contain nothing that is flammable, gave us the warning systems in case of duct failures, carried out flight testing and issued us with the drills, which we practise regularly.
I would agree that a HP duct failure outside the engine compartment could be very serious if not dealt with immediately. XV227 is an example of this. However, no HP air exists outside the engine compartments in flight. Therefore, we flight deck aircrew are not worried in the slightest about the slow progress in replacing the ducts. This is a non-story from DV.
Regards
Ed
Can you tell us exactly what indications are there in the cockpit when a duct bursts, other than a slight loss of thrust,
which I assume the pilots might feel?
And are you also saying that, if a slight decrease in thrust IS noticed, the actions for that are to shut the engine down?
Even if that were the case, and even if it was during your own 'worst case' scenario, surely there is a serious risk of fire/explosion immediately the duct fails or leaks, especially during the take off run?
Wouldn't it all be a bit too late then?
may I ask who you believe are the experts on this subject?
I would agree that a HP duct failure outside the engine compartment could be very serious if not dealt with immediately. XV227 is an example of this. However, no HP air exists outside the engine compartments in flight. Therefore, we flight deck aircrew are not worried in the slightest about the slow progress in replacing the ducts. This is a non-story from DV.
Regards
Ed
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EdSett100
Why don't the MOD ask the experts are the designers who put the ducts in the engine compartments then. Why spend thousands and thousands asking QQ to do reports to then turn round and say sorry we are ignoring your advice.
Having read the report on XV235's incident it appears there are no Nimrod experts at Kinloss either:
RAF Form 765B (Revised Jul 05)
g. The tradesmen involved in the rectification of XV235's leak in Sep and Oct were relatively inexperienced on the Nimrod ac and neither had previous experience of working on Avimo couplings. Furthermore, the supervisors of these tasks had not been trained on Avimo couplings. The importance of pipe alignment and stress, differing pipe lengths with the same part number, joint spacing and all types of coupling assembly and locking must be emphasized through training. The training requirement for FRS couplings had already been identified following inconsistencies noted in coupling locking by the XV230 BOI. After consultation with, and support from the Nimrod IPT, a Training Improvement Form (TIF) was submitted to TDF by the NLS Prop Trade Spec on 27 Apr 07. The TIF recommendation was supported by OC TDF and sent to SOS Evaluation on 11 Jun 07. A reply was received from SOS Evaluation, RAF High Wycombe, on 6 Sep 07 stating that they had carried out an investigation and had been assured by NIMS that the training was adequately covered in the propulsion course at Kinloss and suggested that if the training was still considered to be unsatisfactory then an external validation should be completed. Further investigation by the Prop Trade Spec revealed that the NIMS training was insufficient providing only an overview of couplings but the detailed maintenance requirement of fitment and assembly was lacking. On 7 Sep 07 a further explanation of this urgent training requirement was e-mailed to SOS Evaluation by the Prop Trade Spec; OC FSW also sent an unambiguous e-mail on 7 Sep 07 giving the TIF his full support. To date the Prop Trade Spec has received no formal response from SOS Evaluation with regard to the TIF.
Original signed
XXXXXXX XXXXX
Investigating Officer
ExtXXXX
These are the words of the investigating officer ,
Why don't the MOD ask the experts are the designers who put the ducts in the engine compartments then. Why spend thousands and thousands asking QQ to do reports to then turn round and say sorry we are ignoring your advice.
Having read the report on XV235's incident it appears there are no Nimrod experts at Kinloss either:
RAF Form 765B (Revised Jul 05)
g. The tradesmen involved in the rectification of XV235's leak in Sep and Oct were relatively inexperienced on the Nimrod ac and neither had previous experience of working on Avimo couplings. Furthermore, the supervisors of these tasks had not been trained on Avimo couplings. The importance of pipe alignment and stress, differing pipe lengths with the same part number, joint spacing and all types of coupling assembly and locking must be emphasized through training. The training requirement for FRS couplings had already been identified following inconsistencies noted in coupling locking by the XV230 BOI. After consultation with, and support from the Nimrod IPT, a Training Improvement Form (TIF) was submitted to TDF by the NLS Prop Trade Spec on 27 Apr 07. The TIF recommendation was supported by OC TDF and sent to SOS Evaluation on 11 Jun 07. A reply was received from SOS Evaluation, RAF High Wycombe, on 6 Sep 07 stating that they had carried out an investigation and had been assured by NIMS that the training was adequately covered in the propulsion course at Kinloss and suggested that if the training was still considered to be unsatisfactory then an external validation should be completed. Further investigation by the Prop Trade Spec revealed that the NIMS training was insufficient providing only an overview of couplings but the detailed maintenance requirement of fitment and assembly was lacking. On 7 Sep 07 a further explanation of this urgent training requirement was e-mailed to SOS Evaluation by the Prop Trade Spec; OC FSW also sent an unambiguous e-mail on 7 Sep 07 giving the TIF his full support. To date the Prop Trade Spec has received no formal response from SOS Evaluation with regard to the TIF.
Original signed
XXXXXXX XXXXX
Investigating Officer
ExtXXXX
These are the words of the investigating officer ,
Think we can safely say this is an industry problem, look at the recent report of a 747-300 written off in Bangladesh after an incorrectly assembled fuel coupling caused a fuel leak and fire. Just in my 30 odd years fixing aeroplanes the training has been drastically reduced, trades have disappeared . The newer generation aircraft are generally easier to work on. Legacy aircraft both civil and military require greater skills to maintain which takes time to learn, and then you need to retain those skills , how many people want to remain spannering an old fleet with minimal job prospects? No easy answers to any of it except investment in people and money , but we are in a culture of cutting costs and standards. Also look at the equivalent aircraft in this role , the P3 , severe corrosion problems , with a large chunk of US fleet grounded or out of service soon , soon to be replaced by a 1966 designed jet . So no different to our issues really. Think we need a rethink on our military investment , if we are going to do the job properly we have to pay for it . Looking at the job done by the Nimrods in well over 30 years has been very good value for money, so a few more million a year to keep what is not a large fleet going safely would be a good investment.
bvcu:
In my view it is a regulation problem, and very unsafe. Your analysis of the problems of maintaining and operating "legacy" aircraft is, I am sure, quite correct. It is one of the reasons that "legacy" aircraft tend to be shunted off the Civil Register where there is effective Airworthiness enforcement. In the case of the MOD that condition does not apply. It is not in anyone's legal discretion to determine by how much Airworthiness Regulations should be enforced. They must be fully enforced at all times. In the case of UK Military Aviation this can only be done by a stand alone independent Military Airworthiness Authority.
Think we can safely say this is an industry problem,
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The XV235 Kandahar investigation report has been published on the web at:
Ministry of Defence | About Defence | Corporate Publications | Air Safety and Aviation Publications | Flight Safety
Ministry of Defence | About Defence | Corporate Publications | Air Safety and Aviation Publications | Flight Safety
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Thanks Edsett, a most illuminating report. Numerous airworthiness issues, lack of engineering training and experience, lack of publicised technical procedures, failure to brief front line crews on essential BoI information. I am surprised by the criticism made of the Captain. This aircraft was landed 8 minutes after the fuel leak was detected and the aircraft was handed to engineers for investigation. SOPs are there for guidance. There is an infamous case of an airliner that allegedly crashed because of a failure to shorten the normal check-list. Swissair 111 Aftermath Difficult to judge in this case because the info on the emergency procedure has been removed.
However, there would appear to be a disconnect between the public pronouncements of the safety of Nimrod by CAS and the actual feeling on the front line at the time. A leadership issue? I haven't seen the word emotion used so widely in a report of this nature before. You could easily replace that word with experience, but it handily places responsibility for a supposedly unnecessary diversion squarely with the crew. And what if the Captain hadn't ordered one of his crew to monitor the bomb bay? A procedure that was not official at the time.......
One question screaming out to me, why not carry out an AAR air test in these circumstances? Testing equipment capable of delivering less than 50% of actual AAR flow rate would appear to be woefully inadequate. Interested in your comments?
Thumbs up to the crew who were in the dark as to circumstances that had killed their colleagues a year earlier.
However, there would appear to be a disconnect between the public pronouncements of the safety of Nimrod by CAS and the actual feeling on the front line at the time. A leadership issue? I haven't seen the word emotion used so widely in a report of this nature before. You could easily replace that word with experience, but it handily places responsibility for a supposedly unnecessary diversion squarely with the crew. And what if the Captain hadn't ordered one of his crew to monitor the bomb bay? A procedure that was not official at the time.......
One question screaming out to me, why not carry out an AAR air test in these circumstances? Testing equipment capable of delivering less than 50% of actual AAR flow rate would appear to be woefully inadequate. Interested in your comments?
Thumbs up to the crew who were in the dark as to circumstances that had killed their colleagues a year earlier.
Last edited by nigegilb; 24th Sep 2008 at 10:49.
nige, I haven't had time yet to read the whole thing, but the underlying tone I detect is acute MoD embarrassment over something they hoped would simply go away.
The aircraft commander's prompt actions in landing as soon as reasonably possible with this leaky old beast are indeed praiseworthy; that the incident then leaked out into the public domain seems to have given cause to spite - hence the irrelevant comments about ' unnecessarily increased workload due to flying and communicating at the same time' or whatever to stick the knife in where it doesn't belong.
Seconded!!
The aircraft commander's prompt actions in landing as soon as reasonably possible with this leaky old beast are indeed praiseworthy; that the incident then leaked out into the public domain seems to have given cause to spite - hence the irrelevant comments about ' unnecessarily increased workload due to flying and communicating at the same time' or whatever to stick the knife in where it doesn't belong.
Thumbs up to the crew who were in the dark as to circumstances that had killed their colleagues a year earlier.
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Beags, couldn't agree more with your comments about sticking the knife in without good reason.
Initiating a MAYDAY call is common practice by the operating pilot in the event of EFATO and is a call with which every pilot should be familiar. Comms in Afg are notoriously poor, the Captain correctly continued to make RT transmissions until a response was received/relayed.
The crew were criticized for failing to complete the post AAR checklist and field approach check list. However, the Air Eng allowed the fuel pressure to dissipate in the refuelling gallery and completed a purge of the probe before landing. He was clearly continuing to carry out his duties dilligently. The Captain had initiated a break out and presumably an emergency rate/speed descent, but still managed to brief procedures in the event of a ground evacuation and gave thought to opening up the bomb bay doors in the limited time available to him. Clearly, the Captain was fully in control of events and was thinking ahead and managing the high workload situation in a highly professional way.
The only person whose judgement I would question is CAS, Sir Glenn Torpy. He was the person who sat on essential information contained in the BoI. He must have known about safety concerns regarding AAR on the Nimrod front line but chose to do nothing. Indeed he publically pronounced the safety of AAR on a television program. After this incident AAR was suspended and has now been banned!
Latest rumour reaching my ears following the tear down at Boscombe, is very worrying. I won't state what I have heard publically, but I and many others are watching closely.
Initiating a MAYDAY call is common practice by the operating pilot in the event of EFATO and is a call with which every pilot should be familiar. Comms in Afg are notoriously poor, the Captain correctly continued to make RT transmissions until a response was received/relayed.
The crew were criticized for failing to complete the post AAR checklist and field approach check list. However, the Air Eng allowed the fuel pressure to dissipate in the refuelling gallery and completed a purge of the probe before landing. He was clearly continuing to carry out his duties dilligently. The Captain had initiated a break out and presumably an emergency rate/speed descent, but still managed to brief procedures in the event of a ground evacuation and gave thought to opening up the bomb bay doors in the limited time available to him. Clearly, the Captain was fully in control of events and was thinking ahead and managing the high workload situation in a highly professional way.
The only person whose judgement I would question is CAS, Sir Glenn Torpy. He was the person who sat on essential information contained in the BoI. He must have known about safety concerns regarding AAR on the Nimrod front line but chose to do nothing. Indeed he publically pronounced the safety of AAR on a television program. After this incident AAR was suspended and has now been banned!
Latest rumour reaching my ears following the tear down at Boscombe, is very worrying. I won't state what I have heard publically, but I and many others are watching closely.
Last edited by nigegilb; 24th Sep 2008 at 15:50.
The only person whose judgement I would question is CAS, Sir Glenn Torpy. He was the person who sat on essential information contained in the BoI.
Of all the people involved in the incident to XV235 on 5th November 2007 the very last one to be criticised is surely the aircraft captain! The MOD should have, and no doubt did, breathe a collective sigh of relief that his rehearsed game plan had his crew safely landed and evacuated within an amazingly short time of receiving the initial call indicating a bomb bay fuel leak during AAR. That the sigh of relief soon turned to irritation at the MOD when it was surmised that the fuel leak had stopped almost as soon as it had started, again thanks to an alert crew, and thus didn't constitute a threat in their eyes justifying a Mayday and immediate diversion is more a comment on that inept institution rather than anyone else. Perhaps the captain should be grateful that he has not been deemed to have been "Grossly Negligent"! Emotional? You bet given such a craven and corrupt system undoing the work of generations before, who indeed knew and applied TOFO's maxim:
The principle purpose of any accident investigation is to learn lessons and apply resolutions. All other outcomes (apportioning blame, commercial factors etc) are secondary.
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Nigegilb
Well I hear them rumours too but its going to be blown out of all proportion just to make a good press story.
Latest rumour reaching my ears following the tear down at Boscombe, is very worrying. I won't state what I have heard publically, but I and many others are watching closely.
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XV235: For the little this is worth, I think the captain did a stirling job there -
look at the total flying hours, without intending any offence this isn't a flight deck occupied by swaggering, hoary old Shacklebomber types with a fund of stories about Ballykelly and a back support.... to my mind this looks like very sensible preplanning combined with decisive action from a crew who don't have that big a fund of experience to call on when the brown stuff hits the fan. I can easily imagine myself echoing the S1's calls too.
Dave
look at the total flying hours, without intending any offence this isn't a flight deck occupied by swaggering, hoary old Shacklebomber types with a fund of stories about Ballykelly and a back support.... to my mind this looks like very sensible preplanning combined with decisive action from a crew who don't have that big a fund of experience to call on when the brown stuff hits the fan. I can easily imagine myself echoing the S1's calls too.
Dave
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Usual dross.
Badly spun kack, as you might expect from the Mail on Sunday.
Nothing that will make me, or a couple of hundred other aircrew, think twice about flying.
Still happy to fly in it. Still happy to go to war in it. Still happy to be thrown around at 200 feet over the sea in it. Still happy to save lives and guard our nation in it.
Usual dross.
Badly spun kack, as you might expect from the Mail on Sunday.
Nothing that will make me, or a couple of hundred other aircrew, think twice about flying.
Still happy to fly in it. Still happy to go to war in it. Still happy to be thrown around at 200 feet over the sea in it. Still happy to save lives and guard our nation in it.
People that know **** all can say what they want but those who work there are happy to work on her and know she is good to go , if people dont know what engineers and crew say then balls to you all you have no idea and never will . take as much money as you want from the MOD but the aircraft is taking flak from wrong guns. I think as soon as the money guns have gone then the aircraft will fly safely and we can all get back to doing what we do best. Saving lives
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KIT
Interesting words there.........................
'as soon as the money guns have gone then the aircraft will fly safely'
It kind of suggests that the aircraft ISN'T flying safely??
Interesting words there.........................
'as soon as the money guns have gone then the aircraft will fly safely'
It kind of suggests that the aircraft ISN'T flying safely??
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mileandahalf
Yes, a fair point I suppose! I'm currently on a stop over in Auckland and I hadn't noticed the time, so that's my excuse!!
Fishing? Me? .....well maybe just a little, but it does have a serious note when someone who (appears) to be current groundcrew comes out with a statement like that, pi$$ed or not!
Regards
The Winco
Yes, a fair point I suppose! I'm currently on a stop over in Auckland and I hadn't noticed the time, so that's my excuse!!
Fishing? Me? .....well maybe just a little, but it does have a serious note when someone who (appears) to be current groundcrew comes out with a statement like that, pi$$ed or not!
Regards
The Winco