Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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SH:
If you are unable to disagree with my comments, how can you say that they are ill-informed?
DV:
Who is "everyone", DV? Let me guess: you and a few other critics on pprune. I've mentioned this before and I'll reiterate it: if anyone who works/flies on the Nimrod believes that it is unsafe, he/she does not need to write his/her concerns here to get the message heard. The lack of support for me, here, is simply because the vast majority of my colleagues have no interest in pprune so they do not come here. Furthermore, there is no ground swell of criticism or feelings of unease on the fleet, therefore I suggest that most of us, on the Nimrod, tacitly agree with the views I express here.
DV, you have raised a valid point in that I should not be in disagreement with the IPT over a safety issue. Therefore, I need to know exactly what you are referring to. You appear to have access to documents (Hazard Log) that are not available to me this weekend. So, lets set a baseline for this discussion about the OCCASIONAL/CATESTROPHIC risk set against Hazard NM/H66. Which ducts are detailed in that Hazard? I need to know which ducts you (and BAEs/QQ/IPT) are saying are a Cat "A" risk. We could be at cross purposes.
Regards
Ed Sett
DV, you post #1417 was an excellent reply to EdSett's ill informed comments. As a safety engineer of over 10 years, I read EdSett's comments with deep suspicion, but unable, without the detailed knowledge of the systems and that area of the aircraft to disagree.
DV:
Ed, I am begining to believe that in your eyes everyone is wrong apart from Ed Sett.
DV, you have raised a valid point in that I should not be in disagreement with the IPT over a safety issue. Therefore, I need to know exactly what you are referring to. You appear to have access to documents (Hazard Log) that are not available to me this weekend. So, lets set a baseline for this discussion about the OCCASIONAL/CATESTROPHIC risk set against Hazard NM/H66. Which ducts are detailed in that Hazard? I need to know which ducts you (and BAEs/QQ/IPT) are saying are a Cat "A" risk. We could be at cross purposes.
Regards
Ed Sett
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EdSett
You are begining to annoy people with your 'I know more than you know' attitude to everything and everyone on this forum. It matters not a jot what evidence is put before you or what anyone says here, you are always right and the rest of us are wrong.
Just who the hell are you Ed? Are the CAS in disguise or ACAS? or maybe even the AOC? Why not come clean and tell us, because you are obviously someone with far more knowledge and information than the rest of us on here all put together.
How much info/evidence has to be presented to you before you will even begin to see anyone elses point of view?
KIT, I have yet to hear anyone on this forum say a single derogatory remark about the groundcrew at all, and especially about the lineys. Unfortunately you have taken the comments of (ex) Nimrod aircrew such as myself to heart, out of context and reached the wrong conclusion, and there simply was no need for that. Get over it and understand that you are all highly respected by the aircrew - even ex Nimrod aircrew.
As davejb points out so well, the aircrew do NOT in any way hold you responsible, so please get over it, and don't read something that isn't there.
The Winco
You are begining to annoy people with your 'I know more than you know' attitude to everything and everyone on this forum. It matters not a jot what evidence is put before you or what anyone says here, you are always right and the rest of us are wrong.
Just who the hell are you Ed? Are the CAS in disguise or ACAS? or maybe even the AOC? Why not come clean and tell us, because you are obviously someone with far more knowledge and information than the rest of us on here all put together.
How much info/evidence has to be presented to you before you will even begin to see anyone elses point of view?
KIT, I have yet to hear anyone on this forum say a single derogatory remark about the groundcrew at all, and especially about the lineys. Unfortunately you have taken the comments of (ex) Nimrod aircrew such as myself to heart, out of context and reached the wrong conclusion, and there simply was no need for that. Get over it and understand that you are all highly respected by the aircrew - even ex Nimrod aircrew.
As davejb points out so well, the aircrew do NOT in any way hold you responsible, so please get over it, and don't read something that isn't there.
The Winco
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Winco, you've been annoying people on this Forum for at least the past year. I'm almost certain I will have served with you on an MR2 Sqn (I assume you did serve on one?) and I wonder if I thought then that you were as much of an arrogant dick as I think you are now.
EdSett100, you are 100% correct in your assumption that most of us still on the frontline have given up banging our heads against the wall trying to defend what we obviously view to be a perfectly safe aircraft to fly otherwise we wouldn't be doing it.
As someone who has worked at Boscombe Down and in an IPT, I can personaly vouch for having seen an enormous amount of rubbish spout from the lips of so-called experts over the years. I suspect it is just as likely (perhaps moreso when no-one is there to challenge them) to flow from their keyboards and appear in reports that are then touted as the 'fact of the matter'. I applaud your tenacity EdSett but I really do think you are wasting your time.
To all at Kinloss that have worked their butts off recently despite all the constraints - fantastic effort all round and you can be rightly proud that we continue to deliver the goods.
EdSett100, you are 100% correct in your assumption that most of us still on the frontline have given up banging our heads against the wall trying to defend what we obviously view to be a perfectly safe aircraft to fly otherwise we wouldn't be doing it.
As someone who has worked at Boscombe Down and in an IPT, I can personaly vouch for having seen an enormous amount of rubbish spout from the lips of so-called experts over the years. I suspect it is just as likely (perhaps moreso when no-one is there to challenge them) to flow from their keyboards and appear in reports that are then touted as the 'fact of the matter'. I applaud your tenacity EdSett but I really do think you are wasting your time.
To all at Kinloss that have worked their butts off recently despite all the constraints - fantastic effort all round and you can be rightly proud that we continue to deliver the goods.
I don’t want to get involved in the debate about ducts, couplings etc. The simple fact is that Air Chief Marshall Loader rose above that and stated;
(a)“I conclude that the loss of XV230 and, far more importantly, of the 14 Service personnel who were aboard, resulted in shortcomings in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”.
(b)“I am clear that further activity must be undertaken for our other aircraft types to check whether there is any read-across of lessons we have learned from this accident at such enormous (and immensely sad) cost”.
By “application of the processes”, he can only be talking about those MANDATED processes designed to ensure compliance with JSP 553 (Military Airworthiness Regulations).
In the context of Nimrod, and the other in-service aircraft he refers to at (b), the key component is the requirement set out in Chapter 5 - “Management of Airworthiness In Service”.
There is a very simple process that underpins the ability to comply with Chapter 5, and it is MANDATED by the Chief Accounting Officer, PUS (on behalf of the Secretary of State).
Now, if I may, a little verifiable history.
In 1992 the (RAF) 2 Star responsible for “Management of Airworthiness In Service” ruled that it was an offence, punishable by dismissal, to comply with PUS’s MANDATED rules. (I know, certifiable, but read on……).
In an effort to avoid dismissal of the individual charged with this “offence”, a “junior” (Air Cdre equivalent) instigated an internal audit aimed at ascertaining to what extent this MANDATED process was actually applied.
In 1996 the 1 Star Auditor reported direct to PUS, advising him that “….. reductions and relocation has diluted the experience of staff involved in the management and control” (of this process) and was therefore “unable to provide an assurance to PUS that (the aforesaid MANDATED process) is operating effectively”.
(The “offender” was not sacked).
This was not your typical narrowly targeted report. The areas covered included almost all in-service front-line aircraft and their equipment, across all 3 Services; and included HQ policy departments. There were 22 recommendations and MoD cannot say which, if any, were implemented. Many of the 22 simply state that MANDATED processes should be implemented. The report is unclassified and was copied to the principals for retention and (supposedly!) protection against future action.
Two years later, in a separate ruling, the Chief of Defence Procurement (i.e. the 4 Star charged with attaining airworthiness, and maintaining it for in-service aircraft not yet transferred to AML/DLO/CDL) upheld the 1992 ruling for MoD(PE) staffs, except that the threat of dismissal was downgraded to formal verbal warning. This has subsequently been upheld by four Mins(AF), most recently last month.
THAT, my friends, is what those who seek to achieve and maintain airworthiness, safety, serviceability and fitness for purpose are up against. And THAT is precisely why the various reports discussed here are one huge catalogue of failures…….
“in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”.
I’m an agreeable chap really, and I agree with ACM Loader.
(a)“I conclude that the loss of XV230 and, far more importantly, of the 14 Service personnel who were aboard, resulted in shortcomings in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”.
(b)“I am clear that further activity must be undertaken for our other aircraft types to check whether there is any read-across of lessons we have learned from this accident at such enormous (and immensely sad) cost”.
By “application of the processes”, he can only be talking about those MANDATED processes designed to ensure compliance with JSP 553 (Military Airworthiness Regulations).
In the context of Nimrod, and the other in-service aircraft he refers to at (b), the key component is the requirement set out in Chapter 5 - “Management of Airworthiness In Service”.
There is a very simple process that underpins the ability to comply with Chapter 5, and it is MANDATED by the Chief Accounting Officer, PUS (on behalf of the Secretary of State).
Now, if I may, a little verifiable history.
In 1992 the (RAF) 2 Star responsible for “Management of Airworthiness In Service” ruled that it was an offence, punishable by dismissal, to comply with PUS’s MANDATED rules. (I know, certifiable, but read on……).
In an effort to avoid dismissal of the individual charged with this “offence”, a “junior” (Air Cdre equivalent) instigated an internal audit aimed at ascertaining to what extent this MANDATED process was actually applied.
In 1996 the 1 Star Auditor reported direct to PUS, advising him that “….. reductions and relocation has diluted the experience of staff involved in the management and control” (of this process) and was therefore “unable to provide an assurance to PUS that (the aforesaid MANDATED process) is operating effectively”.
(The “offender” was not sacked).
This was not your typical narrowly targeted report. The areas covered included almost all in-service front-line aircraft and their equipment, across all 3 Services; and included HQ policy departments. There were 22 recommendations and MoD cannot say which, if any, were implemented. Many of the 22 simply state that MANDATED processes should be implemented. The report is unclassified and was copied to the principals for retention and (supposedly!) protection against future action.
Two years later, in a separate ruling, the Chief of Defence Procurement (i.e. the 4 Star charged with attaining airworthiness, and maintaining it for in-service aircraft not yet transferred to AML/DLO/CDL) upheld the 1992 ruling for MoD(PE) staffs, except that the threat of dismissal was downgraded to formal verbal warning. This has subsequently been upheld by four Mins(AF), most recently last month.
THAT, my friends, is what those who seek to achieve and maintain airworthiness, safety, serviceability and fitness for purpose are up against. And THAT is precisely why the various reports discussed here are one huge catalogue of failures…….
“in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”.
I’m an agreeable chap really, and I agree with ACM Loader.
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Winco
Im not looking for self sympathy or **** that you say , I have never once asked for that. I do my job and i do my job well and i know I do.I come here and i get a lot of stick but I know im good at my job and im happy to be Nimrod. I for a while hated my employers but until now I know we do a fecking damm good job and every day im happy knowing that a few hundred army guys are safe what the Nimrod does. I hated politics just like this conversation goes but thats one thing I cant change , i just give the best I can , its just a shame that everyone is blinded by money and self importance.
*** my spelling , bad
*****
Im not looking for self sympathy or **** that you say , I have never once asked for that. I do my job and i do my job well and i know I do.I come here and i get a lot of stick but I know im good at my job and im happy to be Nimrod. I for a while hated my employers but until now I know we do a fecking damm good job and every day im happy knowing that a few hundred army guys are safe what the Nimrod does. I hated politics just like this conversation goes but thats one thing I cant change , i just give the best I can , its just a shame that everyone is blinded by money and self importance.
*** my spelling , bad
*****
tucumseh:
Thank you for bringing this navel contemplating thread back to reality tuc! Your post underlines the fundamental point that the airworthiness of HM' s aircraft is the responsibility of the Airworthiness Authority, the MOD, not lineys at KSS but the MOD! That responsibility has been reneged on deliberately and it would seem with some malice by those senior officers charged with its implementation. The airworthiness process, as you say, is clear and unambiguous. Action by the MOD over the past two decades has been clear and unambiguous; it has turned its back on implementing airworthiness action and endeavoured to persecute those who attempted to carry out their responsibilities as required by law. The MOD is unfit to hold such serious responsibilities which should be rested from it by the establishment of a dedicated independent MAA.
(a)“I conclude that the loss of XV230 and, far more importantly, of the 14 Service personnel who were aboard, resulted in shortcomings in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”....
By “application of the processes”, he can only be talking about those MANDATED processes designed to ensure compliance with JSP 553 (Military Airworthiness Regulations)....
There is a very simple process that underpins the ability to comply with Chapter 5, and it is MANDATED by the Chief Accounting Officer, PUS (on behalf of the Secretary of State)....
In 1992 the (RAF) 2 Star responsible for “Management of Airworthiness In Service” ruled that it was an offence, punishable by dismissal, to comply with PUS’s MANDATED rules....
By “application of the processes”, he can only be talking about those MANDATED processes designed to ensure compliance with JSP 553 (Military Airworthiness Regulations)....
There is a very simple process that underpins the ability to comply with Chapter 5, and it is MANDATED by the Chief Accounting Officer, PUS (on behalf of the Secretary of State)....
In 1992 the (RAF) 2 Star responsible for “Management of Airworthiness In Service” ruled that it was an offence, punishable by dismissal, to comply with PUS’s MANDATED rules....
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NG:
The QC is often out and about and, like most busy execs, he probably trusts his private secretary in his office in Chambers to read his e-mails and forward all XV230 business to his MOD address. I do agree with you, though, that it is not the job of a secretary to infer what is important or not (unless the QC read it and directed the sec to write the reply on his behalf).
Someone with a keen interest in this review sent numerous e-mails, Secretariat A eventually acknowledged receipt of the first submission, but inferred it contained nothing of interest. In an effort to submit it direct to the QC, it was then sent it to his chambers - and got a rather curt reply from.... Secretariat A...... It would seem the Review's MoD staff has direct access to ALL the QC's e-mail!
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EdSett
You are either in a ground tour or don't listen to people speaking in the crew room. Although the majority of aircrew seem to be either worried but prepared to accept the risk, or not worried at all; most of my squadron colleagues take a keen interest in PPrune.
The lack of support for me, here, is simply because the vast majority of my colleagues have no interest in pprune so they do not come here.
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Hugh S;
Great to hear from active aircrew. I like several other people on this thread are simply trying to ensure that aircrew and ground crew have as much information as possible so that you can make their own calls. For me, statements like "It is a good jet" and " I would not be flying it if I did not think it was safe" are not back up with evidence. The 14 people who lost their lives on 2nd Sep 2006 thought it was "a good jet" and would not have flown if they thought it was not safe. They made their call based on the evidence that was made available to them at the time. They new nothing about, unprotected pipe sections, coupling misalignment, excessive fuel transfer rates, life expired hot air pipes, a second duct failure, the casual way in which the SCP had been reactivated and the fact that the whole fleet was not airworthy.
DV
DV
Great to hear from active aircrew. I like several other people on this thread are simply trying to ensure that aircrew and ground crew have as much information as possible so that you can make their own calls. For me, statements like "It is a good jet" and " I would not be flying it if I did not think it was safe" are not back up with evidence. The 14 people who lost their lives on 2nd Sep 2006 thought it was "a good jet" and would not have flown if they thought it was not safe. They made their call based on the evidence that was made available to them at the time. They new nothing about, unprotected pipe sections, coupling misalignment, excessive fuel transfer rates, life expired hot air pipes, a second duct failure, the casual way in which the SCP had been reactivated and the fact that the whole fleet was not airworthy.
DV
DV
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Just received this from the MOD:
My Question
“Can you please tell me the name of the Nimrod IPT Leader between
2004 and the end of September 2006?”
“Can you also tell me the name and the rank of the person with
delegated airworthiness responsibility for the Nimrod fleet prior to and
including September 2006?”
MOD Answer
2. I have now conducted an independent review looking at both the
handling of your request and the substance of the reply.
Some of the information you sought is not available in the public
domain in precisely the form that you have requested, but I consider that this should also be provided to you. The answers to your specific questions are therefore as follows:
a. Between 2004 and 21 July 2006 the position of Nimrod IPT
Leader was held by Group Captain (now Air Commodore) XXXXX
XXXXX.
b. From 18 September 2006 to the end of that month this position
was held by Group Captain XXXXX XXXXXX.
c. From 2003 until the end of September 2006, Group Captain
(now Air Commodore) XXXXXX XXXXX was the delegated airworthiness
holder for the Nimrod fleet.
Between 22 July and 17 September 2006 the post of Nimrod IPT
Leader was held on a temporary basis by a person whose name is not
already in the public domain and does not meet any of the criteria I set out above. Their name therefore remains withheld under s40(2).
I have redacted the names not the MOD.
Interesting that they won't tell me who the IPT leader was at the time of the Crash of XV230.
The Raf/MOD and SOS for Defence and Armed forces Minister have all told us they have nothing to hid.Well it appears that they have!! ........
My Question
“Can you please tell me the name of the Nimrod IPT Leader between
2004 and the end of September 2006?”
“Can you also tell me the name and the rank of the person with
delegated airworthiness responsibility for the Nimrod fleet prior to and
including September 2006?”
MOD Answer
2. I have now conducted an independent review looking at both the
handling of your request and the substance of the reply.
Some of the information you sought is not available in the public
domain in precisely the form that you have requested, but I consider that this should also be provided to you. The answers to your specific questions are therefore as follows:
a. Between 2004 and 21 July 2006 the position of Nimrod IPT
Leader was held by Group Captain (now Air Commodore) XXXXX
XXXXX.
b. From 18 September 2006 to the end of that month this position
was held by Group Captain XXXXX XXXXXX.
c. From 2003 until the end of September 2006, Group Captain
(now Air Commodore) XXXXXX XXXXX was the delegated airworthiness
holder for the Nimrod fleet.
Between 22 July and 17 September 2006 the post of Nimrod IPT
Leader was held on a temporary basis by a person whose name is not
already in the public domain and does not meet any of the criteria I set out above. Their name therefore remains withheld under s40(2).
I have redacted the names not the MOD.
Interesting that they won't tell me who the IPT leader was at the time of the Crash of XV230.
The Raf/MOD and SOS for Defence and Armed forces Minister have all told us they have nothing to hid.Well it appears that they have!! ........
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Hi All, I’m now up to date with the thread, the BOI and the XV235 report, though I still have the QQ report to read. There are a few questions I'd like to ask and comments to make form an outsiders point of view seeing I have never been inside a Nimrod (though I hope to address this soon as I have requested a visit to Kinloss)
Having just flown back from my hols, and read both the above reports while there (I know I was bored just sitting on the beach) one thing that no one seems to have mentioned in great detail is the strains put on the airframe during operations including AAR.
A civil aircraft such as the Boeing 737-800 I flew in just flies straight and level with no excessive turns etc. However the Nimrod does totally the opposite, its flight parameters are totally different i.e. height, rate of ascent/descent tight turns etc, but also during AAR it is tucked in behind and slightly below another large aircraft usually the Tri-star. The turbulence must be very large and also doing in bad weather if and when required must but increased stresses on the airframe and more important the Couplings, Seals and Joints which and the main crux of this thread has/was this taken in to account when designing the aircraft and it maintenance schedule.
Has any analysis been done on the affects of the AAR on the Nimrod, before the crash and also now that it is mostly done from behind a Tri-Star rather than a VC10? It seems that no analysis was done on the different flow rates from the VC10 to the Tri-Star, did this put extra pressure on the Joints/cupping/seals?
From the XV235 report there seems to be a distinct lack of training for new and existing Ground crew am I right or wrong??? Any comments Hugh S!!!!!
Has there ever existed a Nimrod ground crew training school? Or at least instructors to teach/coach and advice new and existing ground crews?
From the BOI it seems that the No 7 Dry bay is an essential part of the aircraft with both the Blue and Green Hydraulic systems going through it,
amongst other important equipment essential to the running of the aircraft, if this is such an important part of the aircraft then why no fire detection and suppression systems and does all that equipment need to be together in one bay? This was also commented on by AOC No 2 Group.
In the BOI the AOC No 2 Group commented that the SO1 engineer post at Kinloss has been re-instated. Was this post removed across the RAF?? And if so has the post been Re-instated across the force or just Kinloss?
That’s all the questions for the moment, I’m still listening and learning and getting my head round it all, is there non classified drawings/photo’s available of the Nimrod?
Regards
Duncan
Having just flown back from my hols, and read both the above reports while there (I know I was bored just sitting on the beach) one thing that no one seems to have mentioned in great detail is the strains put on the airframe during operations including AAR.
A civil aircraft such as the Boeing 737-800 I flew in just flies straight and level with no excessive turns etc. However the Nimrod does totally the opposite, its flight parameters are totally different i.e. height, rate of ascent/descent tight turns etc, but also during AAR it is tucked in behind and slightly below another large aircraft usually the Tri-star. The turbulence must be very large and also doing in bad weather if and when required must but increased stresses on the airframe and more important the Couplings, Seals and Joints which and the main crux of this thread has/was this taken in to account when designing the aircraft and it maintenance schedule.
Has any analysis been done on the affects of the AAR on the Nimrod, before the crash and also now that it is mostly done from behind a Tri-Star rather than a VC10? It seems that no analysis was done on the different flow rates from the VC10 to the Tri-Star, did this put extra pressure on the Joints/cupping/seals?
From the XV235 report there seems to be a distinct lack of training for new and existing Ground crew am I right or wrong??? Any comments Hugh S!!!!!
Has there ever existed a Nimrod ground crew training school? Or at least instructors to teach/coach and advice new and existing ground crews?
From the BOI it seems that the No 7 Dry bay is an essential part of the aircraft with both the Blue and Green Hydraulic systems going through it,
amongst other important equipment essential to the running of the aircraft, if this is such an important part of the aircraft then why no fire detection and suppression systems and does all that equipment need to be together in one bay? This was also commented on by AOC No 2 Group.
In the BOI the AOC No 2 Group commented that the SO1 engineer post at Kinloss has been re-instated. Was this post removed across the RAF?? And if so has the post been Re-instated across the force or just Kinloss?
That’s all the questions for the moment, I’m still listening and learning and getting my head round it all, is there non classified drawings/photo’s available of the Nimrod?
Regards
Duncan
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Dunc, this thread normally resembles a battlefield rather than a free flow of views and information. So much of this saga has been played out in the full glare of the media it might be useful to place your questions in some kind of context.
For example, who are you? what is your interest? Are you a journo?
Might get some answers then,
Regards,
Nige
For example, who are you? what is your interest? Are you a journo?
Might get some answers then,
Regards,
Nige
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erh nope, not Journo, I'm a deprtment Manager for a large Tesco Store. Been on here and Arrse for some time now, I started the thread about a protest march on Arrse,
My interest is the RAF and the Armed forces in General, my brother serves in the RAF, but due to poor eye sight I have been unable to do so myself, beleive me I have tried everyway possible,
if you look at me website www.ukcoldwar.org.uk might give you a better idea about my interests, there are a few people like magic mushroom who might be able to describe me better than I can do myself lol
Regards
Duncan
any other questions please pm me happy to answer
My interest is the RAF and the Armed forces in General, my brother serves in the RAF, but due to poor eye sight I have been unable to do so myself, beleive me I have tried everyway possible,
if you look at me website www.ukcoldwar.org.uk might give you a better idea about my interests, there are a few people like magic mushroom who might be able to describe me better than I can do myself lol
Regards
Duncan
any other questions please pm me happy to answer
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TD
It is clear from your posting that Group Captain (Now Air Commadore) xxxxxx was in-charge of the Nimrod IPT when they issued the RTI to reactivate the SCP in April 2005, following the XV227 incident in late 2004. This was done at a time when it was known that serveral ducts in the hot air system were "life expired and require replacement". In fact the 5-way duct (adjacent to No. 7 tank dry bay) had a safe life and inspection period determined back in 1982 of 3200hrs and 800hrs respectively, however this was never translated into any maintenance documentation. In 2005 the fleet had exceeded 3200hrs.
Furthermore, after a second duct failure and pressure testing of selected ducts from XV227 and XV228 showed corrosion and cracking (5-way duct included), confirming the ealier fears, the IPT allowed the use of the SCP to continue. On 3rd Sept 2006 the SCP was switched off, never to be used again. TOO LATE IPTL.
Here is a question for the IPTL. If you have a problem with a power socket in your house, and a specilatist electrician tells you that because of age, and the risk of fire, all sockets in your house should be replaced, do you.
(a) Stop using the sockets and have them all replaced? or
(b) Replace the defective socket and continue to use the others?
If you select (b) and your house burns down you are NEGLIGENT. If lives are lost its MANSLAUGHTER.
DV
It is clear from your posting that Group Captain (Now Air Commadore) xxxxxx was in-charge of the Nimrod IPT when they issued the RTI to reactivate the SCP in April 2005, following the XV227 incident in late 2004. This was done at a time when it was known that serveral ducts in the hot air system were "life expired and require replacement". In fact the 5-way duct (adjacent to No. 7 tank dry bay) had a safe life and inspection period determined back in 1982 of 3200hrs and 800hrs respectively, however this was never translated into any maintenance documentation. In 2005 the fleet had exceeded 3200hrs.
Furthermore, after a second duct failure and pressure testing of selected ducts from XV227 and XV228 showed corrosion and cracking (5-way duct included), confirming the ealier fears, the IPT allowed the use of the SCP to continue. On 3rd Sept 2006 the SCP was switched off, never to be used again. TOO LATE IPTL.
Here is a question for the IPTL. If you have a problem with a power socket in your house, and a specilatist electrician tells you that because of age, and the risk of fire, all sockets in your house should be replaced, do you.
(a) Stop using the sockets and have them all replaced? or
(b) Replace the defective socket and continue to use the others?
If you select (b) and your house burns down you are NEGLIGENT. If lives are lost its MANSLAUGHTER.
DV
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dv the last part of your last post rings so true, having read the BOI and the qq report this point seem to ring true throughout the whole thread. I would go a long way to say that this problem is not the fault of the hard working and dedicated ground crew but much higher up the ladder.
Duncan
Duncan
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DV
I think you have just hit the nail fair and square on the head, well done, can't better that at all.
KIT
What on earth is your problem? Perhaps you could advise us all on here whereabouts it is, that you are getting a lot of stick? Maybe you could point out where there is a single derogatory comment about the groundcrew on this forum? You won't be able too, because there are NONE! No one has ever laid or apportioned any blame whatsoever to any groundcrew on this forum for the loss of 230. On the contrary infact, there has been nothing but praise from everyone, aircrew and groundcrew alike, about how you have had to deal with an extremely difficult situation in appalling circumstances. So, stop feeling sorry for yourself, and thinking that everyone is against you, because they are not, and certainly not me. I am sure that you do a great job on the aircraft, but you now need to stop telling us.
EdSett,
I spoke to a Sqn Ldr (aircrew) mate a Kinloss last night, and we discussed your comment about nobody in the crew rooms interested in PPrune. Well, I'm not sure what crewroom you visit, but on his squadron, it is still the main topic of conversation. (He is a Nav, but hey, he is still at the coal face) Are you sure you arn't the CAS??!!
TD
Keep up the fantastic work Sir!
I think you have just hit the nail fair and square on the head, well done, can't better that at all.
KIT
What on earth is your problem? Perhaps you could advise us all on here whereabouts it is, that you are getting a lot of stick? Maybe you could point out where there is a single derogatory comment about the groundcrew on this forum? You won't be able too, because there are NONE! No one has ever laid or apportioned any blame whatsoever to any groundcrew on this forum for the loss of 230. On the contrary infact, there has been nothing but praise from everyone, aircrew and groundcrew alike, about how you have had to deal with an extremely difficult situation in appalling circumstances. So, stop feeling sorry for yourself, and thinking that everyone is against you, because they are not, and certainly not me. I am sure that you do a great job on the aircraft, but you now need to stop telling us.
EdSett,
I spoke to a Sqn Ldr (aircrew) mate a Kinloss last night, and we discussed your comment about nobody in the crew rooms interested in PPrune. Well, I'm not sure what crewroom you visit, but on his squadron, it is still the main topic of conversation. (He is a Nav, but hey, he is still at the coal face) Are you sure you arn't the CAS??!!
TD
Keep up the fantastic work Sir!
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DV,
There are quite a few aircrew who are completely happy with the safety of the Nimrod and I am very happy for them. There are also a reasonable number, just like me, who have completed their own personal risk assessment of flying the Nimrod. They are not completely happy with the safety of the aircraft but do not think they they are taking unacceptable risk by flying the Nimrod.
If the pressure placed on the MOD by the likes of TD, Tuc, Nige, yourself and many others helps to improve the safety of the Nimrod then even EdSett must surely be happy. Keep up the good work!
Duncan,
My instinct was to ignore your post or make a purile but witty response, but I'm not AIDU so I have taken your post seriously.
The Nimrod engineering school has been in here at Kinloss for years and provides top-quality specialist training for Nimrod engineers. The school is staffed mainly by experience Nimrod tradesmen with years of experience.
The training referred to in the BOI is in a specific area and involves components that are very rarely replaced. Although this is a problem that needs to be addressed, it is a failing of senior management - NOT the Nimrod school.
Just for the record I'm aircrew and am a firm believer in the ability and dedication of the line engineers.
There are quite a few aircrew who are completely happy with the safety of the Nimrod and I am very happy for them. There are also a reasonable number, just like me, who have completed their own personal risk assessment of flying the Nimrod. They are not completely happy with the safety of the aircraft but do not think they they are taking unacceptable risk by flying the Nimrod.
If the pressure placed on the MOD by the likes of TD, Tuc, Nige, yourself and many others helps to improve the safety of the Nimrod then even EdSett must surely be happy. Keep up the good work!
Duncan,
My instinct was to ignore your post or make a purile but witty response, but I'm not AIDU so I have taken your post seriously.
The Nimrod engineering school has been in here at Kinloss for years and provides top-quality specialist training for Nimrod engineers. The school is staffed mainly by experience Nimrod tradesmen with years of experience.
The training referred to in the BOI is in a specific area and involves components that are very rarely replaced. Although this is a problem that needs to be addressed, it is a failing of senior management - NOT the Nimrod school.
Just for the record I'm aircrew and am a firm believer in the ability and dedication of the line engineers.
Last edited by Hugh S; 30th Sep 2008 at 21:41. Reason: Typo
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Hugh S;
Thank you for the comments. That's all we are trying to do, keep up the pressure to improve safety, and keep you informed of all the facts we uncover. No one is knocking what you do and what the ground crews do, it his highly commendable and respected. We simply want you to be in a position to make the call based on the best information available.
Thanks again.
DV
Thank you for the comments. That's all we are trying to do, keep up the pressure to improve safety, and keep you informed of all the facts we uncover. No one is knocking what you do and what the ground crews do, it his highly commendable and respected. We simply want you to be in a position to make the call based on the best information available.
Thanks again.
DV
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As an outsider it's hard to gauge the opinion on the squadrons - mind you, it's a lot easier now there are so few to canvas - I post on this thread because I still care about old crewmates and friends who are still in, I imagine they might feel somewhat constrained in what they say online...I don't.
Airworthiness is regulated, although like all regs when you get right down to the nitty gritty some of the regs turn into some sort of cloudbank.
The RAF has clearly gone for saving money instead of making sure the airworthiness of the 6 or 7 aircraft currently in service is maintained, after a long period of 'all okay so far' things have turned round and bitten them on the aspidistra...to the extent that a genuine 'proper' fix is probably too expensive. I see the current prevarication as a means to spin out the life of MR2 to ensure MR4 finally gets into service before MR2 goes to the knacker's yard. (or MR5 arrives - a rebadged Chipmunk with a very powerful set of binos in the back.) Call me a cynic.
What the RAF/MOD has done over decades is despicable, although you can understand perhaps that the defence budget never allowed the RAF to do otherwise. Money is the root of all imcompetence, to paraphrase.
Dunc - well done for trying, as a complete outsider, to understand this stuff. Ultimately this is about money and backbone - nobody failed to do things through malice, although stupidity is another matter. They probably felt virtuous as they cut essential programs by saying they were the guys willing to make the hard choices - this is a term the banking industry of the western economies is now learning means 'self opinionated, clueless w***er'. This is a boom time for soup, if the late 1920's early 30's are anything to go by.
Nimrod groundies are taught a lot of stuff, it turns out that some pretty important things were omitted and it took a while to find that out because the people supposedly teaching it said they WERE teaching it. (Confusingly it seems they weren't. You kind of have to wonder if they were a bit dim, lying, or hoping a magic flying pony or similar would sort it all out like happens on the TV.) Unfortunately when this was finally realised nobody sorted it out quickly enough, possibly because they were also a bit dim (lazy is an alternative opinion), or they didn't have the cash/backing to do anything about it....which is what I'd put my fiver on to be honest.
Historically this isn't really that unusual - it's only the advent of instant worldwide chat via the internet that has allowed the dirty washing to be displayed so readily and that has allowedgeneral revulsion to be expressed at the apparently callous attitude to the loss of life...the guys bombing the Belgian bridges in Fairey Battles got a few gongs and the odd barrack block named after them (not my idea of an honour, mind)? What about the Coastal crews who were tasked to take Hudsons over Germany to make the numbers up - not much H&S there, I'd suggest! I think it's a sign of progress that we are so concerned about this sort of thing, compared to previous generations.
Airworthiness is regulated, although like all regs when you get right down to the nitty gritty some of the regs turn into some sort of cloudbank.
The RAF has clearly gone for saving money instead of making sure the airworthiness of the 6 or 7 aircraft currently in service is maintained, after a long period of 'all okay so far' things have turned round and bitten them on the aspidistra...to the extent that a genuine 'proper' fix is probably too expensive. I see the current prevarication as a means to spin out the life of MR2 to ensure MR4 finally gets into service before MR2 goes to the knacker's yard. (or MR5 arrives - a rebadged Chipmunk with a very powerful set of binos in the back.) Call me a cynic.
What the RAF/MOD has done over decades is despicable, although you can understand perhaps that the defence budget never allowed the RAF to do otherwise. Money is the root of all imcompetence, to paraphrase.
Dunc - well done for trying, as a complete outsider, to understand this stuff. Ultimately this is about money and backbone - nobody failed to do things through malice, although stupidity is another matter. They probably felt virtuous as they cut essential programs by saying they were the guys willing to make the hard choices - this is a term the banking industry of the western economies is now learning means 'self opinionated, clueless w***er'. This is a boom time for soup, if the late 1920's early 30's are anything to go by.
Nimrod groundies are taught a lot of stuff, it turns out that some pretty important things were omitted and it took a while to find that out because the people supposedly teaching it said they WERE teaching it. (Confusingly it seems they weren't. You kind of have to wonder if they were a bit dim, lying, or hoping a magic flying pony or similar would sort it all out like happens on the TV.) Unfortunately when this was finally realised nobody sorted it out quickly enough, possibly because they were also a bit dim (lazy is an alternative opinion), or they didn't have the cash/backing to do anything about it....which is what I'd put my fiver on to be honest.
Historically this isn't really that unusual - it's only the advent of instant worldwide chat via the internet that has allowed the dirty washing to be displayed so readily and that has allowedgeneral revulsion to be expressed at the apparently callous attitude to the loss of life...the guys bombing the Belgian bridges in Fairey Battles got a few gongs and the odd barrack block named after them (not my idea of an honour, mind)? What about the Coastal crews who were tasked to take Hudsons over Germany to make the numbers up - not much H&S there, I'd suggest! I think it's a sign of progress that we are so concerned about this sort of thing, compared to previous generations.
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Winco, Hugh S, I wrote:
OK, granted, an unknown percentage of my colleagues visit the site. It could be most of them or it could be just a few. Who knows? The point I was trying to make is that there is clearly not a significant number of Nimrod people actively arguing against me, in writing, here. That is a fact. If people read this discussion and feel strongly against my opinion, they are welcome to get stuck in and join the debate. Other subjects on pprune (JPA, data security, etc) attract many serving critics, but its not happening here. So far, it appears to me that the majority of the foremost critics of current Nimrod safety are not currently associated with the aircraft. I therefore suggest that most of my colleagues are content that the aircraft is safe, but I do not have absolute proof, of course.
I simply responded to DV's assertion that I believe that I am right and that everyone else is wrong. I questioned his use of the word, "everyone".
Hugh S I am intrigued by your comment:
Firstly, the Safety Case is currently being re-written, with aircrew representation (Staneval) right there in the mix with the engineers and safety analysts. Speak with the Staneval to get the info you and the others need to decide for yourself. Staneval has all the reports to hand together with the expertise to answer any queries you have. Your last sentence is self-contradictory. Either you are happy it is safe and you are not taking unacceptable risks or you are not happy it is safe and you are taking unacceptable risks. If its of any help to you, BAeS, IPT, FSW and Staneval all have a stake and a veto. None of them are saying its unsafe and using their veto. I suggest you trust their individual and collective judgement.
DV, et al, are asking good questions and testing the robustness of the judgement. I try to answer them with facts.
Finally, I am on a flying sqn and I am current.
The lack of support for me, here, is simply because the vast majority of my colleagues have no interest in pprune so they do not come here.
I simply responded to DV's assertion that I believe that I am right and that everyone else is wrong. I questioned his use of the word, "everyone".
Hugh S I am intrigued by your comment:
There are also a reasonable number, just like me, who have completed their own personal risk assessment of flying the Nimrod. They are not completely happy with the safety of the aircraft but do not think they they are taking unacceptable risk by flying the Nimrod.
DV, et al, are asking good questions and testing the robustness of the judgement. I try to answer them with facts.
Finally, I am on a flying sqn and I am current.