I don’t want to get involved in the debate about ducts, couplings etc. The simple fact is that Air Chief Marshall Loader rose above that and stated;
(a)“I conclude that the loss of XV230 and, far more importantly, of the 14 Service personnel who were aboard, resulted in shortcomings in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”.
(b)“I am clear that further activity must be undertaken for our other aircraft types to check whether there is any read-across of lessons we have learned from this accident at such enormous (and immensely sad) cost”.
By “application of the processes”, he can only be talking about those MANDATED processes designed to ensure compliance with JSP 553 (Military Airworthiness Regulations).
In the context of Nimrod, and the other in-service aircraft he refers to at (b), the key component is the requirement set out in Chapter 5 - “Management of Airworthiness In Service”.
There is a very simple process that underpins the ability to comply with Chapter 5, and it is MANDATED by the Chief Accounting Officer, PUS (on behalf of the Secretary of State).
Now, if I may, a little verifiable history.
In 1992 the (RAF) 2 Star responsible for “Management of Airworthiness In Service” ruled that it was an offence, punishable by dismissal, to comply with PUS’s MANDATED rules. (I know, certifiable, but read on……).
In an effort to avoid dismissal of the individual charged with this “offence”, a “junior” (Air Cdre equivalent) instigated an internal audit aimed at ascertaining to what extent this MANDATED process was actually applied.
In 1996 the 1 Star Auditor reported direct to PUS, advising him that “….. reductions and relocation has diluted the experience of staff involved in the management and control” (of this process) and was therefore “unable to provide an assurance to PUS that (the aforesaid MANDATED process) is operating effectively”.
(The “offender” was not sacked).
This was not your typical narrowly targeted report. The areas covered included almost all in-service front-line aircraft and their equipment, across all 3 Services; and included HQ policy departments. There were 22 recommendations and MoD cannot say which, if any, were implemented. Many of the 22 simply state that MANDATED processes should be implemented. The report is unclassified and was copied to the principals for retention and (supposedly!) protection against future action.
Two years later, in a separate ruling, the Chief of Defence Procurement (i.e. the 4 Star charged with attaining airworthiness, and maintaining it for in-service aircraft not yet transferred to AML/DLO/CDL) upheld the 1992 ruling for MoD(PE) staffs, except that the threat of dismissal was downgraded to formal verbal warning. This has subsequently been upheld by four Mins(AF), most recently last month.
THAT, my friends, is what those who seek to achieve and maintain airworthiness, safety, serviceability and fitness for purpose are up against. And THAT is precisely why the various reports discussed here are one huge catalogue of failures…….
“in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”.
I’m an agreeable chap really, and I agree with ACM Loader.