Erebus 25 years on

[prospector]

"In other words, the nav track was supposed to go over the active volcano to the NDB, and that’s where all the AirNZ witnesses thought it went."

From John King publication.

"Nineteen days earlier, Jim Collins and Greg Cassin had attended a route qualification briefing in preparation for the flight. It consisted of an audio visual presentation, a review of a printed briefing sheet and a 45 minute session in the DC10 simulator to familiarise each pilot with cloud penetration and visual meteorological conditions (VMC) letdown procedures at McMurdo. Those were based on the McMurdo non directional beacon (NDB), which was at that time the most suitable radio beacon near Williams field, and the simulator exercise started from about 50 nautical miles north on the direct Cape Hallett McMurdo NDB track which passed over the top of Mount Erebus at 16,000ft before letting down."

And then we have on 8 November 1979

"Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let down procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows."

Requirements have been printed on thread a number of times.

A copy of this memorandum was recovered from the cockpit wreckage.

No ifs or buts, the crew must have been aware of the requirements, a written copy was with them.

[Brian Abraham]

only let down procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft

Descent below the LSALT of FL160 had to be made in VMC as you say. What advantages accrue from specifying the VMC descent to be made in the stipulated sector overhead McMurdo? Assuming the descent was made in the sector and did not go below 6,000 what weather parameters ruled operations from that point on? 7,000 foot overcast permissible? At no time were the operations immune from whiteout, the point of impact would just be 4,500 feet higher, that’s all. It matters not in the scheme of things (to my mind) where the descent is made if being made in VMC conditions. And there is no evidence that the aircraft was in anything but VMC from FL160 right up to the point of collision. The argument that the other aircraft had gin clear conditions is moot, VMC is VMC, you either are or you aren’t. The only problem being the crews had no business to be tooling around in VMC due to a complete lack of both experience and training. Had the flights continued in the manner in which they were being conducted it was just a matter of time before some one stubbed their toe. And it would not have been the crews fault, however much the apologists for management duck and weave.

the simulator exercise started from about 50 nautical miles north on the direct Cape Hallett McMurdo NDB track which passed over the top of Mount Erebus at 16,000ft before letting down

Not according to Captain Simpson, who said the simulator was never placed in a position 50 miles north as claimed by Captain Johnson. If that were the case I’m sure Collins would have questioned it as it did not tally with his understanding of tracking down the sound. You train how you’re going to fight, and fight as you’ve trained. When applying Prof. Reason’s Swiss Cheese model to this accident there are so many holes as to lead one to believe that insufficient cheese remains to sustain one mouse for one day.

I leave it to Arthur Marcel who teaches at the Queensland University of Technology in Brisbane and is interested in systems analysis to have the final word (seems he has read Prof. Reason, and perhaps David Beaty as well who wrote “it is only recently that very dubious management malpractices are being identified and their contribution to accidents given sufficient weight. For though the pilot’s actions are at the tip of the iceberg of responsibility, many other people have had a hand in it – faceless people in aircraft design and manufacture, in computer technology and software, in maintenance, in flying control, in accounts departments and in the corridors of power. But the pilot is available and identifiable”).

Perhaps, though, the paradigms for determining who is in command, who is in direct control and who is responsible, are changing. The levels of complexity of modern transportation systems are such that the notion of the sole commander and his executive crew, all powerful and totally responsible for the safety of the ship, a notion developed over many millennia of maritime (and more lately of aerial) navigation, is not as relevant as it used to be. We now live in an era of transportation systems in which many minds are involved in the operation of any particular vehicle, and the safe delivery of that vehicle to any particular destination can be seen as the product of systematic co-operation by a team of decision makers. There has to be trust at all levels for such systems to function properly. The pilots of modern aircraft have to place their trust in the organisation behind them for the system to work. The crew of November Zulu Papa were let down by a system they not only had little option other than to trust, but one which they were given every conceivable reason to trust. In the paraphrased words of the Royal Commissioner, 'The cause of this accident was programming an aircraft to fly directly at a mountain and not telling the crew.' Certainly, the pilots of November Zulu Papa were directed into a very subtle trap and, even though it was they who took that sixth and final step, it's difficult to blame them for it.

Some whiteout yarns

One of my SDOs had been a PBY Catalina pilot in Patrol Squadron Six (VP-6 CG) at Bluie West One (BW-1), that frigid, fog-bound, wind-driven outpost in Greenland responsible for ant-sub patrols, SAR, and other missions in that part of the North Atlantic. Among the many stories this SDO told was a fantastic one of a pilot landing on the Greenland ice cap. It seems this pilot and his PBY crew were flying on instruments in thick clouds and falling snow. As the pilot concentrated on the gauges, he noticed something moving out of the corner of his eye. And when he glanced out the window, there standing in the snow was his crew chief ... waving his arms and giving the “cut engines” signal! They had unintentionally landed on the ice cap! It seems they had flown onto a very gradually rising slope in white-out conditions, and the snow was so soft and featureless they did not even feel it when the “Cat” touched down and slid to a stop.

Many years ago an Air Force PBY flying out of (I believe) Elmendorf AFB in Alaska found itself in a white out in a mountainous area. The pilot was familiar with the various peaks and their respective altitude. Knowing where he was when he entered the whiteout he began to climb with the intention of flying over the mountain range. He was several minutes into the climb when the aircraft lurched. The airspeed dropped to zero and his rate of climb indicated no climb and no dive. His altimeter also stopped indicating an increase in climb. His first thought was his pitot sensing or his static port had frozen over. He turned on the pitot heat with no effect. It seems that the P Boat intersected the rising surface of the mountain at a very slight angular difference and became stuck in the snow

I was at CGAS Savannah aboard Hunter AFB, then home of the 63rd Troop Carrier Wing (Heavy). The 63rd was operating C-124 Globemasters at the time. While one of their planes was operating in Antarctica, and flying in white-out conditions, the observer in the after station noticed the props were starting to kick up snow! Imagine the panic on the flight deck when the observer yelled, PULL UP! ... PULL UP!” on the ICS!

[prospector]

Brian Abraham,
"Not according to Captain Simpson, who said the simulator was never placed in a position 50 miles north as claimed by Captain Johnson."

That is why the Company memorandaum to Antarctic crews OAA:14/13/28 dated 8 Nov 1979, Headed McMurdo NDB NOT AVAILABLE.

" it was succinct and unambiguous." is important, and it is known the crew knew of these requirements. It is a fact, not who said what and who said he did not.


"What advantages accrue from specifying the VMC descent to be made in the stipulated sector overhead McMurdo?"

To ensure what happened could not happen, to avoid Mt Erebus.

[ampan]

I'm just wondering what would have happened if that first crew didn't have the guy waving his arms available. They probably would have "flown on" until out of fuel, waited in vain for the aircraft to hit the deck, and then concluded that they were already dead and heaven wasn't all it was cracked up to be.

As regards the simulator, there would be no room for any argument if the simulator had been positioned 50 miles north of the NDB and then flown over Ross Island to overhead the NBD. It would have been blindingly obvious that the intended nav track was over Erebus. The problem is that the three surviving pilots denied it. They said that the simulator was positioned directly over the NDB, not 50 miles north.

But there is still something very strange about the evidence of the three surviving pilots. I assumed that there would be a clear-cut conflict between their evidence and that of Capt. Wilson, with Capt. Wilson saying “I told them that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station” and the three pilots saying “No, he told us that the nav track went down the sound”.

Had another look through McFarlane’s book (feeling suitably guilty as per Desert Dingo’s comments at the end of #456) and discovered that there was, in fact, no clear conflict re the nav track. (The surviving pilot’s evidence is at pages 228-239 of McFarlane’s book.)

The strange thing is that none of the three say anything about what Capt. Wilson actually said about the nav track. Desert Dingo can go through it as many times as he pleases, but I guarantee that he will not find any statement by any of the three surviving pilots referring to what Capt. Wilson actually said on the subject of nav track. All they say is that they “do not recall” Capt. Wilson saying that the nav track went over Erebus. So what, in fact, could they recall of what Capt. Wilson said about the nav track? We aren’t told.

Whatever Capt. Wilson might have said, he must, surely, have said something. The briefing was over an hour long, and referred to the RNC chart and the NDB letdown document. In addition, a copy of the flightplan was handed out and discussed. Capt. Wilson must have made numerous comments about the nav track – and yet none of the three surviving pilots can recall a single one of them. All they can recall is what he didn’t say.

Here’s one possible explanation: Assume you’re one of the three surviving pilots. You’re very annoyed by AirNZ’s minimum altitude stance and you have the union swarming all over you, wanting you to support the team. You’re happy to do so but certainly don’t want to put your hand on the bible and tell an outright blatant lie, because you don’t fancy spending a couple of months in jail. The union arranges for you to see one of their lawyers and you are asked various questions:
What did Capt. Wilson say about the nav track?
He said that it went to the NDB at McMurdo Station.
Did he say that it went over Erebus?
I don’t specifically recall him saying that.
You know now, don’t you, that on a track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station, McMurdo Station is behind Erebus, so the track will be over Erebus?
Yes.
Did you know that at the time of the briefing?
Well, I knew that Erebus was slightly to the north of McMurdo Station, but we weren’t shown a map with the track marked on it. So it wasn’t completely clear to me that Erebus was on the nav track to the NDB at McMurdo Station.


The lawyer then prepares the typewritten statement. Note that the lawyer is one of the union’s team of lawyers, and is probably one at the lower end of the foodchain. One particular comment by the pilot would present a wee problem, namely, the pilot’s comment that Capt. Wilson said that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station. The lawyer might ask himself, or herself, whether it might be possible to leave that bit out. The lawyer wants to help the client union, but the lawyer would also not want to be involved in the preparation of false evidence. Thinking outloud, the lawyer asks ‘Isn’t the important issue the nav track in relation to Erebus?’. ‘And after all, the AirNZ lawyers peppered Capt. Wilson’s evidence with numerous “over Erebus” remarks, didn’t they?’ So, in what the lawyer might describe as a “tight call”, the typewritten statement omits any reference to what Capt. Wilson said about the nav track.

Just a theory, but I don’t believe that Capt. Wilson would have said nothing about the nav track. If he was in on the alleged navigation conspiracy, then he would have told the pilots that the nav track went down the sound. But if he told the pilots that the nav track went down the sound, then why don’t any of the three surviving pilots say so?

[SR71]

Question...

If Annex F & Annex I and Exhibit 164 (& 165) all show a track to the Bryd Reporting Point, why was Collins not alerted to an issue when Bryd did not appear on the flight plan (Pg 37, Vette's book)?

Vette plots the old flight plan route on Pg 38 of his book and suggests Collins must have plotted this route on his Antarctic charts, but surely at that point you have to ask what the signficance of the random 77.53S 164.48E "Dailey Islands" waypoint is and why isn't Bryd listed?

Maybe the point is moot because it was merely a point selected to allow you a safe VMC let down? If you weren't VMC by then, in lieu of the NDB being out of action, you're off somewhere else having dropped no lower than FL160....

Simpson says as much in his submission(s).

In an attempt to answer my own question, if, of course, the Dailey Island waypoint only ever came into being as a result of an error in constructing the flight plan, had Collins asked this question on or around the 16th November, in association with Simpson's observation, the airline might have been a little more diligent in correcting any mis-understandings rather than just changing them and not telling anyone.

I'm absolutely staggered that the briefing material did not include a copy of a single appropriately sized topographical map with the exact proposed nav track that was going to be uploaded to the AINS marked on it and that any discrepancies were not ironed out at that stage...

[ampan]

Briefing documents

The problem with the material handed out at the briefing was that almost all of it was borrowed from the military (ie, the airforces of NZ, Australia, and the USA). The only documents prepared by AirNZ were the two maps for the passengers (Vette pp 40,41) but these had no navigational significance.

The military aircraft, obviously, went to Antarctica with the intention of landing – and the Byrd Reporting Point was selected for that purpose: If you turned left at Byrd you had a nice straight approach to the runway at Williams Field.

Assuming that Capt. Collins plotted the nav track the night before the flight, he probably assumed that the point of Dailey Islands waypoint was to get him into the vicinity, whereupon he would fly visually for the allocated time, and make sure he was back near the Dailey Islands as the available time was getting close to running out.

At first glance, it’s difficult to reconcile Capt. Wilson’s evidence with what actually happened: the aircraft was flown into Erebus in nav mode, so how is it possible that Capt. Wilson told the crew that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station? But 19 days is a long time – far too long. You’re getting close to the point at which you might no longer rely on your own memory. But you don’t need to rely on you own memory, because you have a printout of the flightplan. So the night before the flight you plot it on your atlas and discover that the nav track is down the sound and that it doesn’t go to the NDB at McMurdo Station. It seems a little strange that the briefing officer said otherwise, but maybe you misheard him? After all, it was 19 days ago. The following morning, you meet the F/O, who also recalls Capt. Wilson saying that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station. But you tell the F/O that you retained a copy of the flightplan and plotted it out and it goes down the sound. So you and the F/O proceed to manually enter the waypoints, assuming that they are the same as on the flightplan used at the briefing – and so you don’t check the McMurdo waypoint against your chart.

SR71: You ask why you should be getting your charts out before take-off. Normally, you shouldn’t be mucking around with charts. But what about in the situation outlined in the previous paragraph? If you had this vague memory in the back of your brain about Capt. Wilson saying that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station, then there is a potential issue re that final waypoint, and I suggest that having been alerted to a potential issue, you would check, either before take-off, or on the way down.

[prospector]

Ampan,

"So you and the F/O proceed to manually enter the waypoints, assuming that they are the same as on the flightplan used at the briefing – and so you don’t check the McMurdo waypoint against your chart."

The First Officer, according to Mahon's "Verdict on Erebus" had left his briefing documents at home.

Once again this fact was used by Mahon to weave a story about who collected what from whom and to whom it was all delivered.

[ampan]

The difficult that most conspiracy theorists face is that their one conspiracy is never enough, because contradictory facts exist. So to continue with the theory, the conspiracy theorist has to postulate a further conspiracy, and so on.

Before labelling the AirNZ witnesses as perjurers, why didn't Mahon try and reconcile their evidence with that given by the line pilots? If you have a close look at Capt. Wilson's evidence and the evidence of the three surviving pilots, you can, in fact, reconcile the evidence, by finding that Capt. Wilson said that the nav track went direct to the NDB at McMurdo Station but also finding he didn't say that the track went over Erebus. If looked at like that, no-one told an outright blatant lie on the subject (although Capt. Wilson might have gilded the lily a bit by inserting various references to "over Erebus", and the three surviving pilots would definitely have sailed extremely close to the wind.)

[jack red]

Changing position co-ordinates on a flight plan without advising the crew is NOT a conspiracy theory

Mahon got it 100% right - game over!

[SR71]

I have to say that even if you could establish categorically that the briefing officer said that the track went over Erebus, so what?

Whatever was said, the commander of the flight was still under the impression when he took off, that he was on his way down McMurdo Sound.

How did he get that impression if not from other contradictory briefing material? (Let alone the experience of previous commander(s)...)

What really bothers me is that, as far as I understand, whoever changed the flight plan coordinates, did just that.

The spherical trigonometry doesn't stack up. (The Privvy Council ruling mentions this.)

He didn't even generate a new flight plan, merely manually changed a coordinate digit. The tracks are virtually identical, as are the distances. But when you do the trigonometry, the tracks should vary by almost 5 degrees, and the distances by 7 nm (Post #285).

Conceivably, if you're sitting there for 340 nm and your tracking is ~5 degrees out compared to your flight plan, you might start to wonder why? But the crew didn't even get the chance to do that, because for that particular leg, the flight plans now bear no resemblance to what was being flown.

Frankly, for someone in an airline navigation department, thats s**t.

What was the big deal in routing the aircraft via Bryd anyway? It seems the glaringly obvious point to route towards. The US had done all the donkey work for them already...

[Desert Dingo]

Put yourself in their place

If during the briefing you are shown:
In the Antarctic pack

• GNC21N a large topographic chart (105 x 145 cm) showing New Zealand, Tasmania and Antarctica. No flight plan track lines on it.
• NZMC135 another large topographic chart showing Antarctic coastline (Victoria Land) and a McMurdo Station inset. No flight plan track lines on it.
• Strip Chart (annex 1) Topographic chart showing military tracks, including the two down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint and left turn to McMurdo Station.
• (DOD Strip chart Exhibit 165) Shows military route down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint then left turn to McMurdo Station. Similar to Strip Chart (annex 1) but without topographic detail, just some bits of the coastline more than 100 nm from McMurdo Station.
• RNC4 Radionavigation chart showing (among others) direct track from New Zealand down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint where the track ends. Flight plan track not shown.
• The famous Exhibit 164. An ANZ Nav department chart with no topographic detail but showing the two military tracks down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint ending at a common waypoint with the track from New Zealand via Cape Hallet.
• A copy of a previous flight plan (flown 2 days previous to the briefing) which has the final leg from Cape Hallet down McMurdo Sound to McMurdo waypoint and return to Cape Hallet.

In the passenger pack

• Passenger map (exhibit 47) Clearly shows track down McMurdo Sound although not in great detail.

Then the slides

• Map of proposed route (Exhibit 197/8) showing track (you guessed it) down McMurdo Sound.
• Slide showing Mt Erebus “to left of track”
• Slide showing Erebus to the left “on approach from Cape Hallet” (They got this wrong. It was actually Mt Erebus viewed from the south)
• The slides appear to be taken with the aircraft over a flat surface of ice or snow, with a mountain in the distance. ( i.e. as it would appear if taken from somewhere over McMurdo Sound.)

OK, I’m starting to notice a pattern here. Maybe the track runs down McMurdo Sound!


This is not particularly brilliant briefing material. The final waypoint (McMurdo) on the flight plan is not shown on any of the charts. So let’s locate it ourselves. The Byrd waypoint is on a lot of the charts and is in the same area.
Byrd is S77.30.0 E165.00.0
McMurdo is S77.53.0 E164.48.0
That’s 23 minutes (or 23 nm) further south and 12 minutes (or - stuffed if I know – sin or cos something or other, but less than 12 miles) further west.

Still not much use, but RNC4 shows Byrd in the middle of McMurdo Sound, and <looking at the inset to NZNC135> that is about “here” which makes McMurdo about “here” (still roughly the middle of McMurdo Sound).

So, after a left turn, the distance to McMurdo Station will be about (insert guess- Simpson & White got 10 nm, Gabriel got 50 nm.) Maybe I should do some home work and accurately plot this waypoint before I do the flight?

Now, on the day of your flight you get the same documents, with only 2 digits transposed on the flight plan, and you are expected to know that the track is (and has always been) over Mt. Erebus!

Give me a break!


Some objections:

• There was the HI-NDB-A chart, and the NDB would have to be the final waypoint.

Yeah, fat lot of good that is. The NDB was withdrawn from service. Let’s do a let down using a non-existent aid.

• Then there is prospector’s favourite memo. NDB withdrawn. ASR monitoring requirement removed. (Quite smart that. The radar can’t see you while you are overhead doing a let-down anyway). So it is VMC descent only and in specified sector within 20 nm. Just how are you supposed to do that? Got the DME from the TACAN, but no azimuth guidance from any ground aid. Maybe that is the reason the briefing officer said to hell with that mission impossible, and you are cleared to descend visually to anything McMurdo ATC clears you to.

• Should have verified waypoint by plotting on a chart. No. The company SOPs are to check waypoint entries against flight plan data.

• Should have used the aircraft radar to verify position. No. The company SOPs prohibit using weather radar for navigation.

• Should have verified AINS accuracy before descending. No. There are 3 of the buggers for a good reason.If one develops an error it gets out-voted by the other two. Three IRSs are quite accurate, thank you. (The C141 required radar identification before his IMC descent because he had only 2 inertial systems and so was not error proof). Anyway, a VMC descent, by its very nature does not require a position fix. (Thank you Brian)

Right. Tell me again why Collins was told and should have known his track was directly over Mt Erebus, and I’ll ask you, if he knew that, was he insane or just suicidal when he engaged NAV mode when he was down at 1500 feet altitude with less than 10 miles to run to the side of a 12,450 foot high mountain.


The only rational conclusion to make is that Collins was never told anything about a track over Mt Erebus, and had every reason to believe it was down McMurdo Sound.

[Graybeard]

Offset Navigation

from #456:
"Fercrissake, even the AirNZ board knew that Collin’s track went down the middle of McMurdo sound.
Board meeting minutes 5 December 1979

Quote:
“Strictly confid. Not to be used.”
Wreckage was “off track(considerably)...Aeroplane ...was left of centre.”
-----
This is from a witness to the data retrieval at Collins Avionics:

Basically, we established the flight path was not changed, the waypoints were not changed, the AINS-70 system was functioning per design, and the parameter data at the time of the crash was in the computer memory. That data, such as altitude, true airspeed, ground speed, heading, the points we were flying between, the inertial updated positions for each of the 3 inertial LTN-58's. Every thing that we found was in agreement with the DFDR data..

The most important point that I remember is that we established that no offset had been entered. As you remember, the offset feature allowed one to enter an offset of say 5 miles R or L of the track you were flying and you would continue to fly parallel to that track until you cancelled it. The data established no offset was involved.
----

Again, they were flying 260 knots at 700 feet.

GB

[prospector]

"The only rational conclusion to make is that Collins was never told anything about a track over Mt Erebus, and had every reason to believe it was down McMurdo Sound."

"Again, they were flying 260 knots at 700 feet."

And that is rational, even if they thought they were in the middle of McMurdo Sound??

[ampan]

Prospector / Greybeard #468:

It has to be said that the data-recovery guys did a fantastic job (putting aside the question of missing atlases). As for the 700 feet altitude, could that have been at the point they reached the base of Mt Erebus, just before the GPWS sounded? Or maybe they forgot to reset the altimeter?


Desert Dingo #467:

Descending below FL160 without getting a radar fix – Can’t speak for Prospector, but I'v given up on that argument, even though it was the one advanced by Sir Rochford Hughes. The objection to such a descent is that the AINS might be wrong, so you might hit the high ground. But if you’re VMC, you’ll see the high ground before you hit it (you think) – which is basically what Bryan Abraham has been saying.

Desert Dingo asks for an explanation as to why Collins was told at the briefing that his nav track “went over Mt Erebus”. Before getting into that, it has to accepted that Capt. Wilson said something about the nav track. He could not have managed to completely avoid the subject. So what did he say? It depends on what he believed. If Capt. Wilson was in on the alleged navigation conspiracy, then he would have told the crew that the final waypoint was in middle of the sound, near the Dailey Islands. If he was not in on the alleged navigation conspiracy, then he would have said that the final waypoint was at McMurdo Station. He would not have said both. It’s either one or the other.

The evidence supports the proposition that Capt. Wilson told the crew that the final waypoint was at McMurdo Station, for the following reasons:
(a) He said so.
(b) None of the three surviving pilots said he didn’t say so.
(c) Capt. S’s conduct of his flight is consistent with a McMurdo Station waypoint.
(d) Mahon’s navigation conspiracy theory is tenuous, and in any event, if a conspiracy occurred, it was conducted by the nav section. There is no evidence that Capt. Wilson might have been in on it.
(e) The NDB letdown diagram is consistent with a final waypoint at McMurdo Station. The fact that the NDB wasn’t working does not affect the point. Capt. Wilson had conducted three previous briefings, when the NDB was working, and when the same diagram was used.

So let’s assume that Capt. Wilson told the crew that the final waypoint was at McMurdo Station. It does not necessarily follow that he told them that the nav track was over Erebus. We know, with the benefit of hindsight, that a track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station goes over Erebus. But we only know that because we have seen a topo map with the track marked on it. The only topo map available at the briefing was a photocopy of the inset to NZMC135. This photocopy does not show Cape Hallett, so it’s not possible to picture the line of the track using that map. In other words, the pilots at the briefing might not have been aware that a nav track to McMurdo Station would be over Erebus.


SR71 #466: What’s the point of all this? If the crew of TE901 were told that the final waypoint was at McMurdo Station, they should have been alerted to a potential issue when they discovered that it wasn’t. I’m not suggested they were insane or suicidal. I’m suggesting they were careless, in that they disregarded the potential issue concerning the final waypoint, and went ahead without checking. That was a clear-cut error, in my opinion.

[SR71]

ampan,

Good reasoning but if Collins has an old flightplan which uses the words MCMDO MCMURDO to represent the end waypoint, why is it unreasonable to suppose that this point is, indeed, McMurdo Station?

After all, with the NDB out of action, getting into the overhead isn't the aim of the game anymore...

Surely it is infinitely more careless for the company to have issued the numerous materials listed by Desert Dingo indicating anything but a track going down to the NDB or TACAN or overhead, take your pick?!

To plagiarize a phrase:

I’m not suggested they were insane or murderers. I’m suggesting they were careless, in that they disregarded the potential issue concerning the final waypoint, and went ahead without checking. That was a clear-cut error, in my opinion.

Greybeard,

Again, they were flying 260 knots at 700 feet.

What? All the way from Auckland?

When were they doing that?

I bet the crew wish they had offset their track 27 miles to the west of what they programmed...

What is min clean in a DC-10 at ~200T?

[ampan]

SR71: Although the final waypoint was named "McMurdo", the co-ordinates were written underneath. All the crew had to do was check this waypoint on the chart that was included in the despatch documents, either before take-off, or on the way down. If there was no potential issue concerning this waypoint, then it is not reasonable to expect the crew to check. But in this case, there was a potential issue, if you accept that Capt. Wilson told them that the nav track went to McMurdo Station.

Can't argue with the proposition that AirNZ were far more careless than the crew. So what about 75%/25%?

[Desert Dingo]

700 feet?

Chippindale Aircraft accident report

Annex D p6
The final approach to the accident site was with the autothrottles in the “Speed’ mode with 260 kts commanded. “Nav Track” was in the roll mode with the aircraft maintaining a grid heading of 357-358 degrees, “Alt Hold” was in the pitch mode with 1500 feet commanded.

and report 1.1.9
The accident occurred in daylight at 0050 hours (Z) at a position 77.25.30S 177.27.30E and at an altitude of 1467 feet AMSL.

Now, although I disagree completely with some of the conclusions made by Chippindale, there is nothing wrong with his source data.
(Well – not much anyway. Apart from his putting a bit extra into the CVR transcript, and claiming that Annex ‘J’ was in the documentation – but that last bit was a misdirection fed to him by the company, so you can’t really blame him for that, although it did give him a pre-conceived idea as to the cause of the accident.)


Let’s have a look at the FDR traces http://members.optuszoo.com.au/d.dingo/Appendix 4.jpg
The altitude trace comes down to 1500 feet and stays there. Nowhere does it go near 700 feet.

Let’s have a look at the map of the wreckage http://members.optuszoo.com.au/d.dingo/Annex E.jpg
This shows the wreckage extending up the slope from 1465 to 1900 feet.
That is a pretty good trick to get all your wreckage up there from 700 feet.

Perhaps the 700 feet Greybeard quotes is raw uncalibrated data. Even that does not seem right. The QNH was set to 29.30 “Hg (that is an offset of 570 feet from standard). That only gets the FDR down to 930 feet if it was using 29.92 as a reference. Maybe there was a fixed -230 ft error as well? I dunno.

There is no substantiated evidence to support the flight at 700 feet claim, and there is any amount of evidence that they were at 1500 feet.

I note Prospector seized on the flight at 260 kts and 700 feet claim as proof that the crew were irrational to support his “pilot error” case.

Flying at 260 kts was perfectly rational. They were not permitted to extend flaps to fly slowly, in case there was a problem retracting them. If the flaps stuck extended they would be unable to get back to New Zealand because of the performance penalty. The 0/RET minimum clean manouvering speed was around 240-250 kts (it is in the reports somewhere, but I can’t be bothered looking it up), so 260 kts would be a good choice.

Where is the evidence they were flying at 700 feet altitude? There is none.

A quote from Captain Vette seems appropriate here:

....... an excellent insight into the mind of that category of pilot who fails to understand the role of human factors in accident investigation and analysis.
Peter Garrison, in his book 'Pilot Error', clearly articulated some of the characteristics of such pilots when he stated;
"Again and again, pilots are found to show little sympathy for their colleagues who are hurt or die; some simplifying explanation is immediately hit upon to reassure the others that the same fate will not be theirs."
Some senior and highly experienced pilots who have had long careers in the aviation industry often play an influential role in masking the true cause of an accident. Such pilots find a superficial study of evidence sufficient to inform themselves of the underlying cause of an accident. The years of experience which they have accumulated are thus both an advantage and a threat to aviation. Such pilots are a threat to aviation when they do not entertain an analytical presentation of the facts. As a consequence they divorce themselves from establishing the true causes of aircraft accidents.
They are further sustained in this position by the self confidence which comes from the completion of a long and successful career in aviation. This at once affirms the correctness of their views and gives their views an aura of authority.
All of this has the unfortunate effect of lending respectability to superficial analyses of accident data, and simplistic assertions of 'pilot error'. Accordingly it can contribute nothing to accident prevention and often supports positions damning to professional colleagues who are in no position to respond. This is the worst of both worlds.

I have to agree.

[Desert Dingo]

ampan:

Can't argue with the proposition that AirNZ were far more careless than the crew. So what about 75%/25%?

Nah. 100%/0% until you can show me something that the crew did that was not a reasonable thing to do in the circumstances. I'll stick with Mahon on this and lay it all on the company.

[ampan]

That's always been the problem with Erebus case. Current AirNZ flightcrew charge out of restaurants as soon as anyone suggests that there might have been a tiny hint of pilot error. (It's like the idiotic response of extreme members of the Jewish faith, who go completely nuts if you suggest that 6 million might be a wee bit of an exaggeration.) In other words, the whole saga has become tied up in political knots. So let's ignore all that PC sh8t: If Capt. Wilson said that the nav track went to McMurdo Station, then the crew have to share part of blame. If not, they don't.

[prospector]

"Nah. 100%/0% until you can show me something that the crew did that was not a reasonable thing to do in the circumstances. I'll stick with Mahon on this and lay it all on the company"

"I have no difficulty concluding that I would probably have done exactly the same and also finished spread all over the mountain. As you have pointed out before, it is hard to find one instance where the crew did something that did not seem reasonable at the time."

Any more need to be said???