Erebus 25 years on
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That of, course, was what I was leading to.
Aerial rpm varies a lot from one make/type to the next, and that number would dictate how many paints would show, assuming they did.
Assuming some paints did show, the age of the tube would very likely affect the afterglow of each return.
If the aerial was not located on the tower there might have been some sort of obstruction in the direction of Erebus which could affect the coverage in that sector.
Aerial rpm varies a lot from one make/type to the next, and that number would dictate how many paints would show, assuming they did.
Assuming some paints did show, the age of the tube would very likely affect the afterglow of each return.
If the aerial was not located on the tower there might have been some sort of obstruction in the direction of Erebus which could affect the coverage in that sector.
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Investigation of Civil Aviation Division
prospector,
Your Post #366,
In the docu-drama "Erebus: The Aftermath", the following is said by the narrator towards the end of the series:
"The director of Civil Aviation, Captain Kippenberger, refuses to accept Mahon's finding that his division was also culpable. Civil Aviation's role in the didaster was reviewed by a State Services Committee. One month later, this committee, comprising a former chief of defence staff and a senior civil servant, absolve Civil Aviation of any culpability, despite acknowlodging what it called "Signficant shortfalls by the Division"".
Whilst I'm not implying that this series is the definitive version of events, surely TVNZ got their facts right before producing a programme portraying such controversial issues.
So perhaps Sir Richard Bolt is the person to which the programme referred (?)
Was this Bolt/Kennedy report released for public view, ie similar to the way both the Office of Air Accidents and Royal Commission Reports were available for sale to the public?
Your Post #366,
That was the Bolt/Kennedy report, far from a State Services Commission.
Sir Richard Bolt would have had to been the most highly qualified aviator in New Zealand at the time.
Sir Richard Bolt would have had to been the most highly qualified aviator in New Zealand at the time.
"The director of Civil Aviation, Captain Kippenberger, refuses to accept Mahon's finding that his division was also culpable. Civil Aviation's role in the didaster was reviewed by a State Services Committee. One month later, this committee, comprising a former chief of defence staff and a senior civil servant, absolve Civil Aviation of any culpability, despite acknowlodging what it called "Signficant shortfalls by the Division"".
Whilst I'm not implying that this series is the definitive version of events, surely TVNZ got their facts right before producing a programme portraying such controversial issues.
So perhaps Sir Richard Bolt is the person to which the programme referred (?)
Was this Bolt/Kennedy report released for public view, ie similar to the way both the Office of Air Accidents and Royal Commission Reports were available for sale to the public?
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The chapter of Mahon's book on the CAD (at p98) contains yet another example of his irrational fear of "active volcanos". I'm wondering if this has something to do with his being from Christchurch (although I know several people from Christchurch who have managed to cope with a visit to Mount Ruapehu).
Having noted Mahon's paranoia, the Auckland-based union lawyers, who probably spent half of August at Ruapehu, structured the evidence accordingly. And so it transpired that Capt. S. would have screamed blue murder if he had known that his nav track went over Erebus. Strange, then, that he thought it was unusual when it didn't.
Having noted Mahon's paranoia, the Auckland-based union lawyers, who probably spent half of August at Ruapehu, structured the evidence accordingly. And so it transpired that Capt. S. would have screamed blue murder if he had known that his nav track went over Erebus. Strange, then, that he thought it was unusual when it didn't.
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An active volcano is not in a constant state of eruption. An eruption is a 1 in 20 year event, or thereabouts. (And if the volcano happened to be erupting, what about heading select? ) There was a permanent plume, but this was mainly water vapour, the stuff clouds are made of. I think a DC10 could have handled it.
The chapter of Mahon's book on the CAD (at p98) contains yet another example of his irrational fear of "active volcanos".
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Good stuff, Brian. But one reason why the military route might have run down McMurdo Sound to the Byrd Reporting Point is that the military aircraft intended to land at McMurdo Sound - not to turn around and go back home.
Obviously, I've been bagging Capt. S. But can anyone out there explain the clear and obvious contradiction in his evidence? He said that he was told by Captain Wilson at the briefing that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound. In the same breath, he said that when overflying the TACAN at McMurdo Station, he noted that he was an unusual distance off-track. Gents: please think about this. If you had been told at the briefing that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound, you would expect to be left of track when over McMurdo Station. So what the f8ck do you have to report? Nothing.
The NZALPA boys out there are always going to have to answer that question one day. It's been hanging around for 30 years.
Obviously, I've been bagging Capt. S. But can anyone out there explain the clear and obvious contradiction in his evidence? He said that he was told by Captain Wilson at the briefing that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound. In the same breath, he said that when overflying the TACAN at McMurdo Station, he noted that he was an unusual distance off-track. Gents: please think about this. If you had been told at the briefing that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound, you would expect to be left of track when over McMurdo Station. So what the f8ck do you have to report? Nothing.
The NZALPA boys out there are always going to have to answer that question one day. It's been hanging around for 30 years.
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For the avoidance of doubt:
I'm saying that the union and its lawyers 'heavyed' at least three pilots into committing perjury before the Royal Commission.
If that's an outrageous allegation, compare it to that of Mahon.
If that's an outrageous allegation, compare it to that of Mahon.
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Brian Abraham,
Perhaps you are looking from the perspective of a normal operation, that is if the weather is bad then a let down is required.
This was never the intention of these flights, they were sightseeing only.
Ampan,
Careful, you may well be right but proof is a different animal.
Perhaps you are looking from the perspective of a normal operation, that is if the weather is bad then a let down is required.
This was never the intention of these flights, they were sightseeing only.
Ampan,
Careful, you may well be right but proof is a different animal.
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Bizarre Obvious Contradiction
Ampan,
Your post #422,
You also describe this evidence at the end of your post #266
I'm honestly a bit surprised that this hasn't really generated much comment on the forum. The way you have pointed it out, it just seems to damn obvious. How is it that this wasn't picked up by the Royal Commission? Or by the press after reading the report? Or by Air NZ's lawyers, etc?
I have watched the video of Captain S giving this evidence (at least the part that they showed) on the "Flight 901: The Erebus Disaster" documentary video several times, and for some reason just overlooked the obvious.
I must be missing something here?
I recall that Stuart Macfarlane made quite a substantial reference to this evidence (and fair enough too) in his "The Erebus Papers" book. Although I don't have it with me right at the moment, I recall that Captain S's affidavit, which I believe he read at the commencement of his testimony, was actually included (hand written but fairly legible) in the book. For memory, there seemed to have been several amendments (words crossed out, etc) made to this affidavit.
Perhaps you can refer to it to see if it sheds any light.
Your post #422,
Obviously, I've been bagging Capt. S. But can anyone out there explain the clear and obvious contradiction in his evidence? He said that he was told by Captain Wilson at the briefing that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound. In the same breath, he said that when overflying the TACAN at McMurdo Station, he noted that he was an unusual distance off-track. Gents: please think about this. If you had been told at the briefing that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound, you would expect to be left of track when over McMurdo Station. So what the f8ck do you have to report? Nothing.
The NZALPA boys out there are always going to have to answer that question one day. It's been hanging around for 30 years.
The NZALPA boys out there are always going to have to answer that question one day. It's been hanging around for 30 years.
Why, then, was the waypoint not where Captain S expected it be. If the briefing officers did not tell Captain S that the track was over Erebus, and if Captain S believed that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound, then Captain S would have expected the waypoint to be at the end of McMurdo Sound – which is where it was.
So was there anything unusual for Captain S. to report? No – as long as his evidence about the briefing was correct.
So was there anything unusual for Captain S. to report? No – as long as his evidence about the briefing was correct.
I'm honestly a bit surprised that this hasn't really generated much comment on the forum. The way you have pointed it out, it just seems to damn obvious. How is it that this wasn't picked up by the Royal Commission? Or by the press after reading the report? Or by Air NZ's lawyers, etc?
I have watched the video of Captain S giving this evidence (at least the part that they showed) on the "Flight 901: The Erebus Disaster" documentary video several times, and for some reason just overlooked the obvious.
I must be missing something here?
I recall that Stuart Macfarlane made quite a substantial reference to this evidence (and fair enough too) in his "The Erebus Papers" book. Although I don't have it with me right at the moment, I recall that Captain S's affidavit, which I believe he read at the commencement of his testimony, was actually included (hand written but fairly legible) in the book. For memory, there seemed to have been several amendments (words crossed out, etc) made to this affidavit.
Perhaps you can refer to it to see if it sheds any light.
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Malcolm,
If Captain S. was told that the nav track went over Erebus, then Jim Collins was told that the nav track went over Erebus - because they both attended the same breifing.
If Jim Collins was told that the nav track went over Erebus, then it was a clear-cut case of pilot error.
If it was a clear-cut case of pilot error, then NZALPA are full of sh8t, and have been so for the past 30 years.
So you can see why there might be some resistance to the suggestion that Capt. S. was told that the nav track went over Erebus.
If Captain S. was told that the nav track went over Erebus, then Jim Collins was told that the nav track went over Erebus - because they both attended the same breifing.
If Jim Collins was told that the nav track went over Erebus, then it was a clear-cut case of pilot error.
If it was a clear-cut case of pilot error, then NZALPA are full of sh8t, and have been so for the past 30 years.
So you can see why there might be some resistance to the suggestion that Capt. S. was told that the nav track went over Erebus.
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A recent Australian "Flight Safety" magazine review of the accident.
http://www.casa.gov.au/fsa/2004/dec/25-31.pdf
I repeat a section of the article because it focuses on the systems failures which are a feature of the modern day "Why the !@##$ did that happen" investigation process. Its does not always hang on the front seaters who pull the trigger. Its others who quite often have loaded the gun.
A systems story
In his conduct of the inquiry, the Royal Commissioner showed considerable foresight in taking into account the system failures that allowed the accident to develop, rather than simply concentrating on the immediate operational factors that triggered the disaster.
Mr Justice Mahon in fact foreshadowed by 10 years, the reasoning in a Commission of Inquiry, appointed by the Canadian Privy Council, on a fatal Air Canada F-28 take-off accident in freezing conditions at Dryden, Ontario, in March 1989.
That Commission found that although the captain bore responsibility for the decision to takeoff, the “system” had failed him, placing him in a situation where he did not have the resources to make a proper decision.
The “system” also failed the crew in the case of the Mt Erebus accident. Although the judicial processes of its Royal Commission overrode technical issues that are traditionally the prerogative of the pilot-in-command, it introduced the concept of “system safety”, putting air transport managers on notice that they too have a responsibility for the safety of their flights.
In today’s highly technical, complex and computer-controlled airline operations, it is clearly not reasonable for pilots-in-command to bear all the responsibility for the safety of their aircraft – the traditional concept of command inherited from countless generations of seafaring experience.
Modern air transport by contrast, with its various administrative, technical and operational functions, is a complex socio-technical system requiring constant vigilance by all the parties concerned.
Throughout the western world today, the concept of enquiring into this “total system” has become the standard in aircraft accident investigation. The Canadian Commission of Inquiry in 1989 is generally regarded as the turning point for this style of investigation.
Although later court decisions questioned the way the 1979 Mt Erebus Royal Commission was conducted, perhaps Mr Justice Mahon was simply ahead of his time.
http://www.casa.gov.au/fsa/2004/dec/25-31.pdf
I repeat a section of the article because it focuses on the systems failures which are a feature of the modern day "Why the !@##$ did that happen" investigation process. Its does not always hang on the front seaters who pull the trigger. Its others who quite often have loaded the gun.
A systems story
In his conduct of the inquiry, the Royal Commissioner showed considerable foresight in taking into account the system failures that allowed the accident to develop, rather than simply concentrating on the immediate operational factors that triggered the disaster.
Mr Justice Mahon in fact foreshadowed by 10 years, the reasoning in a Commission of Inquiry, appointed by the Canadian Privy Council, on a fatal Air Canada F-28 take-off accident in freezing conditions at Dryden, Ontario, in March 1989.
That Commission found that although the captain bore responsibility for the decision to takeoff, the “system” had failed him, placing him in a situation where he did not have the resources to make a proper decision.
The “system” also failed the crew in the case of the Mt Erebus accident. Although the judicial processes of its Royal Commission overrode technical issues that are traditionally the prerogative of the pilot-in-command, it introduced the concept of “system safety”, putting air transport managers on notice that they too have a responsibility for the safety of their flights.
In today’s highly technical, complex and computer-controlled airline operations, it is clearly not reasonable for pilots-in-command to bear all the responsibility for the safety of their aircraft – the traditional concept of command inherited from countless generations of seafaring experience.
Modern air transport by contrast, with its various administrative, technical and operational functions, is a complex socio-technical system requiring constant vigilance by all the parties concerned.
Throughout the western world today, the concept of enquiring into this “total system” has become the standard in aircraft accident investigation. The Canadian Commission of Inquiry in 1989 is generally regarded as the turning point for this style of investigation.
Although later court decisions questioned the way the 1979 Mt Erebus Royal Commission was conducted, perhaps Mr Justice Mahon was simply ahead of his time.
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Like you, Prospector, I'm becoming a bit tired of these various comfy exhortations about how we can all learn from this accident to advance flight safety. The thing that everyone is supposed to learn from this accident is that the crew did nothing wrong and were completely blameless. In that event, these are the things we can learn to advance flight safety:
(1) If required to manually enter your waypoints, don't bother checking.
(2) Don't bother checking your nav track at any stage.
(3) Descend below the height of a known hazard without an independent fix (as long as you're VMC).
(4) Don't bother taking any account of an island that's 4 miles long and 2800 foot high that isn't supposed to be there.
(5) Fly a perfectly-functioning aircraft into the side of mountain.
(1) If required to manually enter your waypoints, don't bother checking.
(2) Don't bother checking your nav track at any stage.
(3) Descend below the height of a known hazard without an independent fix (as long as you're VMC).
(4) Don't bother taking any account of an island that's 4 miles long and 2800 foot high that isn't supposed to be there.
(5) Fly a perfectly-functioning aircraft into the side of mountain.
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Not being funny or anything ampan, but your premise is increasingly looking like:
Crew do not deserve to be 100% exonerated.
Now how can I make the evidence fit that supposition?
How is that better than what some appear to be suggesting Mahon did?
I believe the system was collectively at fault.
Pilots behaving like sunday afternoon tour operators?
Yeah and an airline facilitating that with super hand-drawn briefing material, a state of the art navigation department that doesn't seem to have even provided the guys at a coalface with a f*****g chart, that wanted to plan them right over the top of an active volcano (some things you just don't need to be told are stupid - its called common sense), let alone document when it changed a route waypoint, a CEO who never wrote anything down, a governmental department that didn't know what the hell was going on either way...
I'd eat my hat if, out of a 100 pilots you sent down there in the same situation, with the same level of polar ops experience, and without the benefit of 25 years ruminations, you'd get a different result with any of them on that day....
I'll bite.
(1) If required to manually enter your waypoints, don't bother checking.
Yeah, but you only check against your paper copy. Or are you suggesting I get a chart out at that stage too?
(2) Don't bother checking your nav track at any stage.
Surely exactly what they were doing. They knew it was safe, so why orbit randomly. Lock back on.
(3) Descend below the height of a known hazard without an independent fix (as long as you're VMC).
So whats the inherent accuracy of my AINS 2200 nm out of Auckland? At Cape Hallet it was good - maybe +/- 2 nm? Erebus is ~25 nm out to my left. Lets orbit right first. Anyhow, I'm VMC out over an ice-shelf so if I see anything I don't like the look of, I'll climb back out north, the way I've come.
(4) Don't bother taking any account of an island that's 4 miles long and 2800 foot high that isn't supposed to be there.
You can't account for something you can't or didn't see. Do you see every significant landmark when you go flying? That said, this is one of the more puzzling questions of the whole episode....
(5) Fly a perfectly-functioning aircraft into the side of mountain.
I don't believe they would have if they'd been where they thought they were. And the reason for that we all know...
Curiously though, what was the plan once they got round the back of Erebus and into the overhead? Or was that left to the remit of the crew based on fuel left in tanks etc etc?
Still reading.
Crew do not deserve to be 100% exonerated.
Now how can I make the evidence fit that supposition?
How is that better than what some appear to be suggesting Mahon did?
I believe the system was collectively at fault.
Pilots behaving like sunday afternoon tour operators?
Yeah and an airline facilitating that with super hand-drawn briefing material, a state of the art navigation department that doesn't seem to have even provided the guys at a coalface with a f*****g chart, that wanted to plan them right over the top of an active volcano (some things you just don't need to be told are stupid - its called common sense), let alone document when it changed a route waypoint, a CEO who never wrote anything down, a governmental department that didn't know what the hell was going on either way...
I'd eat my hat if, out of a 100 pilots you sent down there in the same situation, with the same level of polar ops experience, and without the benefit of 25 years ruminations, you'd get a different result with any of them on that day....
I'll bite.
(1) If required to manually enter your waypoints, don't bother checking.
Yeah, but you only check against your paper copy. Or are you suggesting I get a chart out at that stage too?
(2) Don't bother checking your nav track at any stage.
Surely exactly what they were doing. They knew it was safe, so why orbit randomly. Lock back on.
(3) Descend below the height of a known hazard without an independent fix (as long as you're VMC).
So whats the inherent accuracy of my AINS 2200 nm out of Auckland? At Cape Hallet it was good - maybe +/- 2 nm? Erebus is ~25 nm out to my left. Lets orbit right first. Anyhow, I'm VMC out over an ice-shelf so if I see anything I don't like the look of, I'll climb back out north, the way I've come.
(4) Don't bother taking any account of an island that's 4 miles long and 2800 foot high that isn't supposed to be there.
You can't account for something you can't or didn't see. Do you see every significant landmark when you go flying? That said, this is one of the more puzzling questions of the whole episode....
(5) Fly a perfectly-functioning aircraft into the side of mountain.
I don't believe they would have if they'd been where they thought they were. And the reason for that we all know...
Curiously though, what was the plan once they got round the back of Erebus and into the overhead? Or was that left to the remit of the crew based on fuel left in tanks etc etc?
Still reading.
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Like anything, no single factor ever ends up causing something like this. Were the crew at fault? No doubt. Was the system at fault? Obviously. It's a sad reality of this litigious world we live in that accidents no longer "just happen", there has to be someone to blame. If you want to argue semantics, or percentages, go ahead, but to place the "blame" fairly and squarely at one or another persons feet is not only unfair but also wrong.
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AINS-70 Tells All
It was very early December, 1979, when a large wooden crate arrived at McDonnell Douglas in Long Beach, Calif, from the ANZ Antarctica crash. The Douglas cognizant engineer for AINS-70 and the local Collins rep opened it. The Collins Ground Proximity Warning Computer and a Navigation Computer Unit were inside, padded by clothing. The shipment had been from Christchurch, but it made the engineers wonder if the clothing hadn't come from the crash site.
It was later learned the onsite investigators had no real idea what they had found, but the units looked important.
The Collins GPWS computer has a row of four or five latching magnetic indicators that trip when a warning is sounded. That was its nonvolatile memory. The engineers examined it just long enough to determine that the expected warnings had been given.
On to the NCU - a busted mess it was. The front was missing; The whole left side containing the circuit cards was bashed in; the back was hanging by about 300 wires that ran between the innards and the rear connectors. The power supply modules on the right rear half appeared physically intact, as were the two 8K magnetic core memory modules just in ahead of them.
Again, Non-Volatile Memory in the NCU consisted of two magnetic core memory modules, roughly 8 inches tall, 3 inches wide, and six inches deep. They had the appearance of aluminum bricks. Each one had a capacity of 8 kilobytes of data, and they were 4-bit bytes, IIRC. Each bit of data was held by a tiny ferrite donut with five wires passing through it, and all the donuts were arrayed in a three dimensional grid. Being magnetic ferrites suspended by wires, they were not expected to survive a severe mechanical shock.
While the DAC engineer looked on, the Collins rep gingerly removed the two core modules from the battered NCU. The DAC engineer put them in his briefcase and the next day flew them to Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and the Collins factory.
The Collins team applied just enough voltage to tickle the memory modules, and copied their contents onto two like modules.
The copies were then installed into an NCU and the system powered up. Amazingly, the modules revealed the whole last half hour of the flight; the (31,000?) cruise altitude, the race track while descending, the 260 knots at 700 feet over the ocean, the latitude and longitude...
With this evidence that the airplane had performed exactly as programmed, there was no point trying to blame the DC-10, McDonnell Douglas, Collins Avionics, or Litton, the maker of the Inertial Sensor Units.
Recovering that flight data was a singular event in the careers of some of those involved.
GB
It was later learned the onsite investigators had no real idea what they had found, but the units looked important.
The Collins GPWS computer has a row of four or five latching magnetic indicators that trip when a warning is sounded. That was its nonvolatile memory. The engineers examined it just long enough to determine that the expected warnings had been given.
On to the NCU - a busted mess it was. The front was missing; The whole left side containing the circuit cards was bashed in; the back was hanging by about 300 wires that ran between the innards and the rear connectors. The power supply modules on the right rear half appeared physically intact, as were the two 8K magnetic core memory modules just in ahead of them.
Again, Non-Volatile Memory in the NCU consisted of two magnetic core memory modules, roughly 8 inches tall, 3 inches wide, and six inches deep. They had the appearance of aluminum bricks. Each one had a capacity of 8 kilobytes of data, and they were 4-bit bytes, IIRC. Each bit of data was held by a tiny ferrite donut with five wires passing through it, and all the donuts were arrayed in a three dimensional grid. Being magnetic ferrites suspended by wires, they were not expected to survive a severe mechanical shock.
While the DAC engineer looked on, the Collins rep gingerly removed the two core modules from the battered NCU. The DAC engineer put them in his briefcase and the next day flew them to Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and the Collins factory.
The Collins team applied just enough voltage to tickle the memory modules, and copied their contents onto two like modules.
The copies were then installed into an NCU and the system powered up. Amazingly, the modules revealed the whole last half hour of the flight; the (31,000?) cruise altitude, the race track while descending, the 260 knots at 700 feet over the ocean, the latitude and longitude...
With this evidence that the airplane had performed exactly as programmed, there was no point trying to blame the DC-10, McDonnell Douglas, Collins Avionics, or Litton, the maker of the Inertial Sensor Units.
Recovering that flight data was a singular event in the careers of some of those involved.
GB
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Greybeard,
"the 260 knots at 700 feet over the ocean, the latitude and longitude..."
Now there is an interesting bit of information, of course it makes sense when the impact point was 1560ft after reacting to the GPWS. but don't think I have ever seen 700ft published before in any of the literature I have perused.
" With this evidence that the airplane had performed exactly as programmed, there was no point trying to blame the DC-10, McDonnell Douglas, Collins Avionics, or Litton, the maker of the Inertial Sensor Units."
Would you know if this information was available to Justice Mahon, or to the Accident investigator Ron Chippendale??.
"the 260 knots at 700 feet over the ocean, the latitude and longitude..."
Now there is an interesting bit of information, of course it makes sense when the impact point was 1560ft after reacting to the GPWS. but don't think I have ever seen 700ft published before in any of the literature I have perused.
" With this evidence that the airplane had performed exactly as programmed, there was no point trying to blame the DC-10, McDonnell Douglas, Collins Avionics, or Litton, the maker of the Inertial Sensor Units."
Would you know if this information was available to Justice Mahon, or to the Accident investigator Ron Chippendale??.