Erebus 25 years on
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A loooong time ago I attended a GAS (General Aviation Safety) seminar about the BAC-111 deep stall incident in the south of the UK in which Mike Lithgow was killed. His last test flight commentary in real time astounded all of us and ended with "well that's it, no more we can do here, cheers." The room then went somewhat silent for a couple of minutes!
However, I well recall the moment when the CAA briefly talked about it at the end of the meet and simply said; "Accidents don't happen, they are caused!" Can anyone argue with that?
However, I well recall the moment when the CAA briefly talked about it at the end of the meet and simply said; "Accidents don't happen, they are caused!" Can anyone argue with that?
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"Accidents don't happen, they are caused!" Can anyone argue with that?
Firstly, there should be an acknowledgment that if and when the pilot makes a mistake, his will probably be the final enabling one at the apex of a whole pyramid of errors down below. This will, in turn, take the heat off investigations – the ‘we intend to find and punish the culprit’ syndrome. Only then can the pilots come forward and admit to mistakes they made or nearly made, and the reasons why can be coolly analysed and lessons learned
Professor Reason in Human Error (1990) distinguishes between active error, the effects of which are felt almost immediately, and latent error, the adverse consequences of which may lie dormant within the system for a long time. This can clearly be seen in aviation, where pilots at the sharp end make an active error, while latent error lies behind the lines within the management support system. Many of these are already there awaiting a trigger, usually supplied by the pilot. ‘There is a growing awareness within the human reliability community that attempts to discover and neutralise those latent failures will have a greater beneficial effect upon system safety than will localised efforts to minimise active errors.’
As long ago as 1980, Stanley Roscoe wrote that:
The tenacious retention of ‘pilot error’ as an accident ‘cause factor’ by governmental agencies, equipment manufacturers and airline management, and even by pilot unions indirectly, is a subtle manifestation of the apparently natural human inclination to narrow the responsibility for tragic events that receive wide public attention. If the responsibility can be isolated to the momentary defection of a single individual, the captain in command, then other members of the aviation community remain untarnished. The unions briefly acknowledge the inescapable conclusion that pilots can make errors and thereby gain a few bargaining points with management for the future.
Everyone else, including other crew members, remains clean. The airline accepts the inevitable financial liability for losses but escapes blame for inadequate training programmes or procedural indoctrination. Equipment manufacturers avoid product liability for faulty design,. Regulatory agencies are not criticised for approving an unsafe operation, failing to invoke obviously needed precautionary restrictions, or, worse yet, contributing directly by injudicious control or unsafe clearance authorisations. Only the pilot who made the ‘error’ and his family suffer, and their suffering may be assuaged by a liberal pension in exchange for his quiet early retirement – in the event that he was fortunate enough to survive the accident
Yet it is only recently that very dubious management malpractices are being identified and their contribution to accidents given sufficient weight. For though the pilot’s actions are at the tip of the iceberg of responsibility, many other people have had a hand in it – faceless people in aircraft design and manufacture, in computer technology and software, in maintenance, in flying control, in accounts departments and in the corridors of power. But the pilot is available and identifiable.
David Beaty - my bolding, and quite relevent to this discussion don't you think?
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The Last Half Hour, Documented
Prospector queried: "Would you know if this information was available to Justice Mahon, or to the Accident investigator Ron Chippendale??."
I don't know who witnessed the first playback, or if there were subsequent playbacks, but it was certain that at the least, the US NTSB, who were helping in the investigation, and the NZ Civil Aviation authority were provided printouts of the data. Whether the data was distributed further, or was suppressed, is worth asking.
Probably never before had there been so much onboard data recovered from a commercial accident, and in such an unlikely and remote place. Had they been equipped with triple INS, like Qantas, and like their later 747 fleet, the only data likely to survive would have been their final lat/long.
I rode ANZ in April, 1986, and visited the cockpit enroute. I mentioned how the triple INS they were using seemed pretty crude compared to the AINS-70 in their old DC-10 fleet.
"Yeh, it was good; almost too good," as the pilots looked at each other. That was the end of that conversation.
GB
I don't know who witnessed the first playback, or if there were subsequent playbacks, but it was certain that at the least, the US NTSB, who were helping in the investigation, and the NZ Civil Aviation authority were provided printouts of the data. Whether the data was distributed further, or was suppressed, is worth asking.
Probably never before had there been so much onboard data recovered from a commercial accident, and in such an unlikely and remote place. Had they been equipped with triple INS, like Qantas, and like their later 747 fleet, the only data likely to survive would have been their final lat/long.
I rode ANZ in April, 1986, and visited the cockpit enroute. I mentioned how the triple INS they were using seemed pretty crude compared to the AINS-70 in their old DC-10 fleet.
"Yeh, it was good; almost too good," as the pilots looked at each other. That was the end of that conversation.
GB
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SR71,
(4) Don't bother taking any account of an island that's 4 miles long and 2800 foot high that isn't supposed to be there.
Justice Mahon never came up, or anybody else, why Beaufort Island was not identified on the aircraft radar, plenty of rock faces there for a good return, and not a lot of "Dry Ice", and not many Islands to confuse the situation.
Greybeard,
1500ft on that flight is hard to accept, 700ft, if true is ludicrous, what were they thinking???
(4) Don't bother taking any account of an island that's 4 miles long and 2800 foot high that isn't supposed to be there.
Justice Mahon never came up, or anybody else, why Beaufort Island was not identified on the aircraft radar, plenty of rock faces there for a good return, and not a lot of "Dry Ice", and not many Islands to confuse the situation.
Greybeard,
1500ft on that flight is hard to accept, 700ft, if true is ludicrous, what were they thinking???
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Found the following at http://www.volcano.si.edu/world/volc...=var#sean_0909
"Most explosions ejected a small number of very vesicular bombs that were typically 2-4 m in diameter but sometimes reached 6-8 m. Some of the bombs were ejected to heights of 500 m or more, possibly to as much as 1 km."
and
"incandescent bombs were ejected to ~600 m above the summit"
As I remarked previously on the wisdom of overflying Erebus, meeting a 2 meter rock at above the mountain could spoil your whole day. What did you say the LSALT was? 12,448 + 3,280 = 15,728 A bit close for comfort over flying the mountain. Lack of planning? You betcha. Pilots fault? Not on your nelly.
Damn good reason the RNC route runs down the sound. Pity the airline didn't follow it. And shows Mahon had good reason to make his comments on Erebus over flight.
"Most explosions ejected a small number of very vesicular bombs that were typically 2-4 m in diameter but sometimes reached 6-8 m. Some of the bombs were ejected to heights of 500 m or more, possibly to as much as 1 km."
and
"incandescent bombs were ejected to ~600 m above the summit"
As I remarked previously on the wisdom of overflying Erebus, meeting a 2 meter rock at above the mountain could spoil your whole day. What did you say the LSALT was? 12,448 + 3,280 = 15,728 A bit close for comfort over flying the mountain. Lack of planning? You betcha. Pilots fault? Not on your nelly.
Damn good reason the RNC route runs down the sound. Pity the airline didn't follow it. And shows Mahon had good reason to make his comments on Erebus over flight.
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ampan:
Ha! Trick question! 
Well, he says he did.
From Captain Wilson’s description of Collin’s briefing (B.376)
...I had a coloured copy of the RNC4 with me and, while still standing in the vicinity of Captain Collins and the others with the person in the front row having moved back into the group, I referred to the RNC4 chart and said that you will note that your flight plan is not the military route shown on the RNC4. Your flight plan on departing New Zealand is from Invercargill to Auckland Islands to the Balleny Islands to Cape Hallett to McMurdo and as I spoke I pointed out the Air New Zealand route with my pen on the RNC4 chart.
...I then referred to the approach chart headed HI-NDB-A. Still being present near the participants with the approach chart on the table I said you are coming from Cape Hallett over Erebus to McMurdo and at that point I was using my pen and running it down the page. I pointed to the figure of 12,450 and said you will note that Mt Erebus is 12,450 feet 20 miles from McMurdo (I was following with my pen the circle around the 20 mile radius as I talked) -that the Company minimum safe altitude was 16,000 feet to McMurdo but the emergency safe altitude on the let-down chart was 14,600 feet within a 100 nautical miles and within 25 miles of McMurdo was 13,500 feet only 1,000 feet above Mt Erebus. I said this surprises me because I would have thought they would have wanted at least 2,000 [feet] of minimum safe altitude crossing Mt Erebus.
Nice instructor technique; verbal and visual. Says track is over Mt Erebus - runs pen down chart.
The only trouble is that all the remaining (surviving) pilots who were at that briefing flatly contradict him and say that it never happened.
Captain Simpson’s testimony (B.423)
...Captain Wilson refers to standing in the vicinity of Captain Collins and indicating the Air New Zealand route on the RNC4 chart with his pen. I do not recall him describing the Air New Zealand route in this manner although I do recall him telling us that we would get our topographical maps on the day of the flight.
...Captain Wilson describes running his pen down the HI-NDB-A chart] and says that he mentioned to us that the track would come "from Cape Hallett over Erebus to McMurdo". I have absolutely no recollection of him saying this either with reference to the HI-NDB-A chart or at any other time during the briefing. If Captain Wilson had made such a comment to the effect that our track passed over Erebus or over Ross Island on route to McMurdo Station it would have been in conflict with my understanding that the NAV track proceeded from Cape Hallett to a position west and south of the Byrd Reporting Point. I am positive that in such circumstances I would have queried his remark. To overfly Mt Erebus and Ross Island would seem such an unwise manner of approaching McMurdo Station and in addition I would not have been happy overflying an active volcano only 3,500 feet above its summit especially if the conditions were IMC. In such circumstances turbulence would be likely and you would not know the extent to which the mountain was erupting.
...Captain Wilson refers to a reference to Coulman Island. I do not recall any reference during our briefing to this.
And from Captain Gabriel’s testimony (B.528) where he also points out that running a pen down the HI-NDB-A chart would be a bit stupid as the chart is aligned to Grid North and the inbound track is up the chart.
...I do not recall him indicating or pointing out the Air New Zealand route on the RNC4 chart with his pen as he states. I certainly gained no impression from any reference made by Captain Wilson to the RNC4 chart that our flight plan would programme the aircraft for a track over Ross Island.
...Captain Wilson refers to indicating with his pen the flight plan route on the HI-NDB-A chart and running his pen down the page. I do not recall him doing this at all. However, if he did do this, he would have to run his pen up the page, as the approach that he says he indicated would have crossed Ross Island which is at the bottom of the page on the HI-NDB-A plate.
I certainly do not recall Captain Wilson telling us as he states: "You are coming from Cape Hallett over Erebus to McMurdo". If Captain Wilson had said this, it would have been contrary to the impression that I had gained that Erebus would be to our left as we approached McMurdo. In such circumstances I am sure that I would have asked him to clarify what was a contradiction to the impression which I had already gained. I have absolutely no recollection of Captain Wilson advising us at any stage during the briefing that our flight plan track would overfly Mt Erebus or overfly Ross Island.
Then there is the testimony of FO Irvine. (B.552)
...Captain Wilson refers to pointing out the Air New Zealand route with his pen on the RNC4 chart. I do not recall him doing this. However, if it was done, the moving of a pen over such a small-scale chart would not have given a clear indication of the route, and certainly if he did this, it was not done in a manner that indicated to me that our route would pass over Ross Island and Mt Erebus.
...Captain Wilson states that whilst referring to the HI-NDB-A chart he said that we were coming from Cape Hallett over Erebus to McMurdo and he states that he indicated that route with his pen by running it down the page. I would dispute this occurred at all. I certainly do not have any recollection of it. Captain Wilson in referring to the NDB chart pointed out the spot height of Erebus but I do not recall him pointing out the track.
So once again the company argument that Collins was briefed that his track would take him over Mt Erebus falls apart, and this helps explain why Justice Mahon became just a tiny bit sceptical about some of the company testimony.
RNC4 chart here http://members.optuszoo.com.au/d.dingo/RNC4.jpg
HI-NDB-A chart here http://members.optuszoo.com.au/d.dingo/HI-NDB-A.jpg
Capt. Wilson - "The nav track is from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station".
True or False? Did he, or did he not, say that?
True or False? Did he, or did he not, say that?
Well, he says he did.
From Captain Wilson’s description of Collin’s briefing (B.376)
...I had a coloured copy of the RNC4 with me and, while still standing in the vicinity of Captain Collins and the others with the person in the front row having moved back into the group, I referred to the RNC4 chart and said that you will note that your flight plan is not the military route shown on the RNC4. Your flight plan on departing New Zealand is from Invercargill to Auckland Islands to the Balleny Islands to Cape Hallett to McMurdo and as I spoke I pointed out the Air New Zealand route with my pen on the RNC4 chart.
...I then referred to the approach chart headed HI-NDB-A. Still being present near the participants with the approach chart on the table I said you are coming from Cape Hallett over Erebus to McMurdo and at that point I was using my pen and running it down the page. I pointed to the figure of 12,450 and said you will note that Mt Erebus is 12,450 feet 20 miles from McMurdo (I was following with my pen the circle around the 20 mile radius as I talked) -that the Company minimum safe altitude was 16,000 feet to McMurdo but the emergency safe altitude on the let-down chart was 14,600 feet within a 100 nautical miles and within 25 miles of McMurdo was 13,500 feet only 1,000 feet above Mt Erebus. I said this surprises me because I would have thought they would have wanted at least 2,000 [feet] of minimum safe altitude crossing Mt Erebus.
The only trouble is that all the remaining (surviving) pilots who were at that briefing flatly contradict him and say that it never happened.
Captain Simpson’s testimony (B.423)
...Captain Wilson refers to standing in the vicinity of Captain Collins and indicating the Air New Zealand route on the RNC4 chart with his pen. I do not recall him describing the Air New Zealand route in this manner although I do recall him telling us that we would get our topographical maps on the day of the flight.
...Captain Wilson describes running his pen down the HI-NDB-A chart] and says that he mentioned to us that the track would come "from Cape Hallett over Erebus to McMurdo". I have absolutely no recollection of him saying this either with reference to the HI-NDB-A chart or at any other time during the briefing. If Captain Wilson had made such a comment to the effect that our track passed over Erebus or over Ross Island on route to McMurdo Station it would have been in conflict with my understanding that the NAV track proceeded from Cape Hallett to a position west and south of the Byrd Reporting Point. I am positive that in such circumstances I would have queried his remark. To overfly Mt Erebus and Ross Island would seem such an unwise manner of approaching McMurdo Station and in addition I would not have been happy overflying an active volcano only 3,500 feet above its summit especially if the conditions were IMC. In such circumstances turbulence would be likely and you would not know the extent to which the mountain was erupting.
...Captain Wilson refers to a reference to Coulman Island. I do not recall any reference during our briefing to this.
...I do not recall him indicating or pointing out the Air New Zealand route on the RNC4 chart with his pen as he states. I certainly gained no impression from any reference made by Captain Wilson to the RNC4 chart that our flight plan would programme the aircraft for a track over Ross Island.
...Captain Wilson refers to indicating with his pen the flight plan route on the HI-NDB-A chart and running his pen down the page. I do not recall him doing this at all. However, if he did do this, he would have to run his pen up the page, as the approach that he says he indicated would have crossed Ross Island which is at the bottom of the page on the HI-NDB-A plate.
I certainly do not recall Captain Wilson telling us as he states: "You are coming from Cape Hallett over Erebus to McMurdo". If Captain Wilson had said this, it would have been contrary to the impression that I had gained that Erebus would be to our left as we approached McMurdo. In such circumstances I am sure that I would have asked him to clarify what was a contradiction to the impression which I had already gained. I have absolutely no recollection of Captain Wilson advising us at any stage during the briefing that our flight plan track would overfly Mt Erebus or overfly Ross Island.
...Captain Wilson refers to pointing out the Air New Zealand route with his pen on the RNC4 chart. I do not recall him doing this. However, if it was done, the moving of a pen over such a small-scale chart would not have given a clear indication of the route, and certainly if he did this, it was not done in a manner that indicated to me that our route would pass over Ross Island and Mt Erebus.
...Captain Wilson states that whilst referring to the HI-NDB-A chart he said that we were coming from Cape Hallett over Erebus to McMurdo and he states that he indicated that route with his pen by running it down the page. I would dispute this occurred at all. I certainly do not have any recollection of it. Captain Wilson in referring to the NDB chart pointed out the spot height of Erebus but I do not recall him pointing out the track.
RNC4 chart here http://members.optuszoo.com.au/d.dingo/RNC4.jpg
HI-NDB-A chart here http://members.optuszoo.com.au/d.dingo/HI-NDB-A.jpg
Last edited by Desert Dingo; 29th Feb 2008 at 07:24. Reason: Added links to charts
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Last edited by Desert Dingo : Today at 08:24. Reason: Added links to charts
I would have sworn I read something about NZALPA and evidence given, but reply in the making and now the statement has been edited out.
Links were added to the chart so I suppose it is half correct.
Been down this road so many times, who said what and where, obviously you believe who you want to believe, but from John Kings' publication again.
" The union showed more cohesion, too. The NZALPA evidence was all clearly rehearsed, declares Ian Gemmel, who had visited all the the other Antarctic pilots with chief accidents inspector Ron Chippendale when he was gathering evidence for his report. Their evidence differed from the interviews with Chippendale, Their answers then were not the same as given to the Court of Inquiry, under oath, but they all agreed with NZALPA's stance. NZALPA's plan was to get the pilot off the hook. They socialised with the judge during and after the case."
So you chose on knowledge of people, what is feasible, what are the motives behind some of these statements, and the only thing for certain is that no one will ever get to the truth at this stage of history.
I would have sworn I read something about NZALPA and evidence given, but reply in the making and now the statement has been edited out.
Links were added to the chart so I suppose it is half correct.
Been down this road so many times, who said what and where, obviously you believe who you want to believe, but from John Kings' publication again.
" The union showed more cohesion, too. The NZALPA evidence was all clearly rehearsed, declares Ian Gemmel, who had visited all the the other Antarctic pilots with chief accidents inspector Ron Chippendale when he was gathering evidence for his report. Their evidence differed from the interviews with Chippendale, Their answers then were not the same as given to the Court of Inquiry, under oath, but they all agreed with NZALPA's stance. NZALPA's plan was to get the pilot off the hook. They socialised with the judge during and after the case."
So you chose on knowledge of people, what is feasible, what are the motives behind some of these statements, and the only thing for certain is that no one will ever get to the truth at this stage of history.
Last edited by prospector; 29th Feb 2008 at 07:53.
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ampan:
Maybe this will help explain. ( it helps a lot if you can get back to the original testimony and not get side-tracked by people making unfounded assertions.)
The clue is in your statement “he noted he was an unusual distance off track.”
Unusual. = Not what he expected.
He initially estimated the McMurdo waypoint to be about 10 nm from McMurdo station and Williams field
Extracts from Captain Simpson’s evidence (B.428)
Then when he overflew the TACAN it was more than he expected
So he thought it would be a good idea if other crews knew this too.
Our return flight to New Zealand landed at Christchurch and the following day I operated a flight to Auckland. I plotted our flight plan McMurdo position on a chart I had and, on measuring the distance with dividers, found that it was indeed approximately 26 miles to the true west of the TACAN. The following morning, 16 November 1979, I telephoned Captain R. T .Johnson for the purpose of asking him if the Company was intending thanking the Deep Freeze com*mander for the extra work his personnel, and in particular the forecasters down there, were doing for our flight. During this conversation which was fairly brief, and as an entirely secondary matter, I told him that I had been surprised at seeing approximately 27 miles across track distance when I was overhead the TACAN area and had carried out an unnecessary updating of our navigation computer.
I suggested that it would probably be a good idea to advise allother crews doing Antarctic flights of this distance between the flight plan McMurdo position and the T ACAN position, so that they would not be surprised as I had been, and would consider carefully their across-track distance before doing a manual update of their computer positions. I did not report this matter to Captain R. T . Johnson as an error in position as I had no reason to believe the McMurdo position on the flight plan was other than a logical place to terminate the southern point of the flight plan track. If I had thought there was an error involved I would have included it in my flight report and would have advised the nav section in the same manner as I have reported other matters on previous occasions.
Obviously, I've been bagging Capt. S. But can anyone out there explain the clear and obvious contradiction in his evidence? He said that he was told by Captain Wilson at the briefing that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound. In the same breath, he said that when overflying the TACAN at McMurdo Station, he noted that he was an unusual distance off-track. Gents: please think about this. If you had been told at the briefing that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound, you would expect to be left of track when over McMurdo Station. So what the f8ck do you have to report? Nothing.
The clue is in your statement “he noted he was an unusual distance off track.”
Unusual. = Not what he expected.
He initially estimated the McMurdo waypoint to be about 10 nm from McMurdo station and Williams field
Extracts from Captain Simpson’s evidence (B.428)
When checking the flight plan co-ordinates which had been entered in the navigation computer, I mentally related the latitude and longitude of that flight plan McMurdo position on one of the topographical charts of the area. From this comparison I noted that our flight plan "McMurdo" position was to the true west of Williams Field and McMurdo Station. This seemed to me to be a reasonably logical place to terminate the flight plan track into McMurdo Sound.
Without actually plotting the position and measuring the distance accu*rately, and also considering the convergence of the lines of longitude at that latitude, I got the impression that it would be a position l0 miles or thereabouts to the true west of McMurdo Station. This was also in accordance with the mental plot I had done during the RCU briefing when I noted that "McMurdo" waypoint was to the south and west of the Byrd Reporting Point co-ordinates on the RNC4.
Without actually plotting the position and measuring the distance accu*rately, and also considering the convergence of the lines of longitude at that latitude, I got the impression that it would be a position l0 miles or thereabouts to the true west of McMurdo Station. This was also in accordance with the mental plot I had done during the RCU briefing when I noted that "McMurdo" waypoint was to the south and west of the Byrd Reporting Point co-ordinates on the RNC4.
As we flew over the TACAN site our across track distance was reading approximately 27 miles left. This was a good deal more than the I0miles or so that I had expected the flight plan to be to the west of McMurdo Station.
Our return flight to New Zealand landed at Christchurch and the following day I operated a flight to Auckland. I plotted our flight plan McMurdo position on a chart I had and, on measuring the distance with dividers, found that it was indeed approximately 26 miles to the true west of the TACAN. The following morning, 16 November 1979, I telephoned Captain R. T .Johnson for the purpose of asking him if the Company was intending thanking the Deep Freeze com*mander for the extra work his personnel, and in particular the forecasters down there, were doing for our flight. During this conversation which was fairly brief, and as an entirely secondary matter, I told him that I had been surprised at seeing approximately 27 miles across track distance when I was overhead the TACAN area and had carried out an unnecessary updating of our navigation computer.
I suggested that it would probably be a good idea to advise allother crews doing Antarctic flights of this distance between the flight plan McMurdo position and the T ACAN position, so that they would not be surprised as I had been, and would consider carefully their across-track distance before doing a manual update of their computer positions. I did not report this matter to Captain R. T . Johnson as an error in position as I had no reason to believe the McMurdo position on the flight plan was other than a logical place to terminate the southern point of the flight plan track. If I had thought there was an error involved I would have included it in my flight report and would have advised the nav section in the same manner as I have reported other matters on previous occasions.
- There was no contradiction in his evidence.
- He expected the track to be down McMurdo Sound.
- He did not report an error in the track.
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Culture of Complacency
It seems that for every mistake made by the crew , there was a mistake made by the company; and for every mistake made by the company, there was a mistake made by the crew.
The crew, save for the F/E, failed to recognize the whiteout.
The co. failed to caution about whiteout.
The crew failed to use the Wx radar for navigation.
The co. had failed to investigate the use of Wx radar for navigation in Antarctica on prior flights.
The co. put the route over Erebus after briefing that the route would go beside Erebus.
The crew failed to check the waypoint lat/long they entered into the AINS-70 against any chart.
The co. failed to provide adequate charts.
The crew failed to use the charts they had.
Wasn't ANZ enough of a govt owned airline that didn't really have to make a profit? Would a totally private airline be more diligent?
GB
The crew, save for the F/E, failed to recognize the whiteout.
The co. failed to caution about whiteout.
The crew failed to use the Wx radar for navigation.
The co. had failed to investigate the use of Wx radar for navigation in Antarctica on prior flights.
The co. put the route over Erebus after briefing that the route would go beside Erebus.
The crew failed to check the waypoint lat/long they entered into the AINS-70 against any chart.
The co. failed to provide adequate charts.
The crew failed to use the charts they had.
Wasn't ANZ enough of a govt owned airline that didn't really have to make a profit? Would a totally private airline be more diligent?
GB
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Captain Wilson
Desert Dingo #443:
My question at #442 is, indeed, a trick question. Let’s assume that Capt. Wilson told the pilots that the nav track went directly from Cape Hallett to the NDB at McMurdo Station. To Capt. Wilson, who knows that McMurdo Station is behind Erebus, his statement is the same as saying that the track goes over Erebus. To him, it’s implicit. But if it was implicit, it might not have actually been said. So a pilot who attended the briefing could put his hand on the bible and swear under oath that “Capt. Wilson did not say the nav track went over Erebus”.
When considering the evidence given before the Royal Commission, it is important to take account the procedure under which it was given. Each witness read out from a typewritten statement. The statement was not drafted by the witness. It was drafted by a lawyer. I’m not saying that the lawyers made it all up, but there would be plenty of opportunity to slant the statement in the desired direction. For example, take Capt. Wilson’s evidence. Mahon criticises him for putting in references to “over Erebus” at every opportunity. But it wasn’t Capt. Wilson who actually did that. It was one of AirNZ’s lawyers. My guess is that Capt. Wilson, to his eternal regret, simply went along with it, seeing no harm in emphasising the point.
NZALPA, no doubt, would say that Capt. Wilson was prepared to say whatever AirNZ wanted him to say, and that the truth was irrelevant to him. There are a number of things that should be taken account of in assessing Capt. Wilson’s credibility. Firstly, he doesn’t seem the sort who would commit perjury for a few extra bucks or to help out his mates or to cover his backside. He wasn’t some glue-sniffing street urchin. He was a former RNZAF officer, who served in the Pacific in WWII and who received the Air Force Cross. Secondly, where are extra bucks? Capt. Wilson had already been compulsorily retired from flying, on reaching 55. The job as Route Clearance Officer would have involved a big drop in pay, and, given his age, it would have come to an end in a couple of years in any event. Thirdly, if he lied to help out his mates, then who were his supposed mates? He wasn’t one of Mahon’s “executive pilots”. No doubt he was on friendly terms with several of them, but he would also have been on friendly terms with many of the line pilots. Fourthly, how did Captain Wilson’s evidence assist in covering his backside? He was going to get hammered, wherever he said the nav track went. Fifthly, if Capt. Wilson was the AirNZ lacky that he is alleged to be, why did he add those additional paragraphs to his written statement disclosing that he had verbally authorised descent below FL160 with ATC clearance? As Desert Dingo has pointed out, those paragraphs completely ruined AirNZ’s altitude argument.
But for me, the clincher is the NBD cloudbreak procedure, as set out in the diagram in the link at the end of #443. Just look at the diagram, and ask yourselves whether it suggests an intended waypoint at the NBD, or an intended waypoint 27 miles to the west of the NDB. The obvious intention is to overhead the NDB and descend from that position. And how do you overhead the NDB? By following the nav track. If the intended waypoint was 27 miles away at the end of McMurdo Sound, why would there be the type of cloudbreak procedure shown in the diagram? Far less complicated to simply do a straightline descent from 27 miles out after reaching the waypoint.
Note that of all the line pilots who gave evidence about the briefings, not a single one made any reference to any discussion about how one was supposed to get from the final waypoint to overhead the NDB. The reason, I suggest, was because there was no such discussion, because the issue never arose, because the intended final waypoint and the NDB were one and the same thing.
This accident makes far more sense if Mahon’s conspiracy theories re the waypoint are disregarded. If you do that, and accept that Capt.Wilson believed that the nav track went directly to McMurdo Station, then that’s what he would have said. He certainly would not have said anything inconsistent with that belief. Having just completed an Antartic flight two days before, Capt. Wilson runs off some copies of the flightplan to bring to the briefing, believing that the waypoints on the flightplan represent a nav track direct to McMurdo Sound, over Erebus. He is wrong (hence my earlier reference to him being hammered wherever he said the nav track went). Given Capt. Wilson’s mistake, those photocopies would have been presented to the pilots as “the nav track for your flight”. Capt. Wilson would not have been concerned if he saw the coordinates being noted down, or if one of the photocopies was not returned, because to Capt. Wilson, the flightplan was accurate.
One might ask how Capt. Wilson could have still believed that the nav track was direct to McMurdo Station, over Erebus, when he had just been on an Antartic flight. Assuming he was standing in the cockpit during the final leg to McMurdo, he would have been aware of when the aircraft was in nav mode and he would have noticed that Erebus was left of track. Unfortunately, the flight that Capt. Wilson was on did not go down McMurdo Sound. Instead, it diverted to the alternative route.
Will say something about Capt. S. and others after ploughing through McFarlane’s awful book again. (Am assuming that this is Desert Dingo’s source, rather than the actual transcript.)
My question at #442 is, indeed, a trick question. Let’s assume that Capt. Wilson told the pilots that the nav track went directly from Cape Hallett to the NDB at McMurdo Station. To Capt. Wilson, who knows that McMurdo Station is behind Erebus, his statement is the same as saying that the track goes over Erebus. To him, it’s implicit. But if it was implicit, it might not have actually been said. So a pilot who attended the briefing could put his hand on the bible and swear under oath that “Capt. Wilson did not say the nav track went over Erebus”.
When considering the evidence given before the Royal Commission, it is important to take account the procedure under which it was given. Each witness read out from a typewritten statement. The statement was not drafted by the witness. It was drafted by a lawyer. I’m not saying that the lawyers made it all up, but there would be plenty of opportunity to slant the statement in the desired direction. For example, take Capt. Wilson’s evidence. Mahon criticises him for putting in references to “over Erebus” at every opportunity. But it wasn’t Capt. Wilson who actually did that. It was one of AirNZ’s lawyers. My guess is that Capt. Wilson, to his eternal regret, simply went along with it, seeing no harm in emphasising the point.
NZALPA, no doubt, would say that Capt. Wilson was prepared to say whatever AirNZ wanted him to say, and that the truth was irrelevant to him. There are a number of things that should be taken account of in assessing Capt. Wilson’s credibility. Firstly, he doesn’t seem the sort who would commit perjury for a few extra bucks or to help out his mates or to cover his backside. He wasn’t some glue-sniffing street urchin. He was a former RNZAF officer, who served in the Pacific in WWII and who received the Air Force Cross. Secondly, where are extra bucks? Capt. Wilson had already been compulsorily retired from flying, on reaching 55. The job as Route Clearance Officer would have involved a big drop in pay, and, given his age, it would have come to an end in a couple of years in any event. Thirdly, if he lied to help out his mates, then who were his supposed mates? He wasn’t one of Mahon’s “executive pilots”. No doubt he was on friendly terms with several of them, but he would also have been on friendly terms with many of the line pilots. Fourthly, how did Captain Wilson’s evidence assist in covering his backside? He was going to get hammered, wherever he said the nav track went. Fifthly, if Capt. Wilson was the AirNZ lacky that he is alleged to be, why did he add those additional paragraphs to his written statement disclosing that he had verbally authorised descent below FL160 with ATC clearance? As Desert Dingo has pointed out, those paragraphs completely ruined AirNZ’s altitude argument.
But for me, the clincher is the NBD cloudbreak procedure, as set out in the diagram in the link at the end of #443. Just look at the diagram, and ask yourselves whether it suggests an intended waypoint at the NBD, or an intended waypoint 27 miles to the west of the NDB. The obvious intention is to overhead the NDB and descend from that position. And how do you overhead the NDB? By following the nav track. If the intended waypoint was 27 miles away at the end of McMurdo Sound, why would there be the type of cloudbreak procedure shown in the diagram? Far less complicated to simply do a straightline descent from 27 miles out after reaching the waypoint.
Note that of all the line pilots who gave evidence about the briefings, not a single one made any reference to any discussion about how one was supposed to get from the final waypoint to overhead the NDB. The reason, I suggest, was because there was no such discussion, because the issue never arose, because the intended final waypoint and the NDB were one and the same thing.
This accident makes far more sense if Mahon’s conspiracy theories re the waypoint are disregarded. If you do that, and accept that Capt.Wilson believed that the nav track went directly to McMurdo Station, then that’s what he would have said. He certainly would not have said anything inconsistent with that belief. Having just completed an Antartic flight two days before, Capt. Wilson runs off some copies of the flightplan to bring to the briefing, believing that the waypoints on the flightplan represent a nav track direct to McMurdo Sound, over Erebus. He is wrong (hence my earlier reference to him being hammered wherever he said the nav track went). Given Capt. Wilson’s mistake, those photocopies would have been presented to the pilots as “the nav track for your flight”. Capt. Wilson would not have been concerned if he saw the coordinates being noted down, or if one of the photocopies was not returned, because to Capt. Wilson, the flightplan was accurate.
One might ask how Capt. Wilson could have still believed that the nav track was direct to McMurdo Station, over Erebus, when he had just been on an Antartic flight. Assuming he was standing in the cockpit during the final leg to McMurdo, he would have been aware of when the aircraft was in nav mode and he would have noticed that Erebus was left of track. Unfortunately, the flight that Capt. Wilson was on did not go down McMurdo Sound. Instead, it diverted to the alternative route.
Will say something about Capt. S. and others after ploughing through McFarlane’s awful book again. (Am assuming that this is Desert Dingo’s source, rather than the actual transcript.)
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10 miles?????
Desert Dingo #445:
What map did he use to estimate that the way point was about 10 miles west of McMurdo Station? It must have been the inset to NZMS135, which was included in the despatch documents. The whole map is shown on pages 90 and 91 of McFarlane’s book. Note that the boundaries of the inset are marked in red, and it covers the area from Beaufort Island, down past McMurdo Station, past the Black and White Islands, finishing well south of Moore Bay. At page 37 of his book, McFarlane purports to provide a copy of the inset, but you will note that this copy comes to an end to the south of the Blank and White Islands, and has no scale. Moore Bay is missing. In the caption, McFarlane says that the inset map is substantially the same as the map on p185 of Jim Collins’ atlas, a copy of which is on p38 of Vette’s book. This copy in Vette’s book shows the whole of the area from Beaufort Island in the north down to Moore Bay in the south, with the scale drawn in the Moore Bay area.
The point is that McFarlane’s depiction of the map does not include the scale, so the reader is not able to assess Capt. S.’s evidence that he thought the distance from the waypoint to McMurdo Station was 10 miles.
For those who don’t have Vette’s book, the following map demonstrates the point:
http://ortho.linz.govt.nz/antarctic/RossSeaRegions.jpg
This is the current version of NZMS135. It has the same inset map, with the scale drawn below Moore Bay.
Note that the map only has the even-numbered lines of longitide. So it has 164 degrees and 166 degrees marked, but not 165 degrees.
The longitude of the waypoint on the flightplan was “16448.0E”. For the purpose of the rough “eye-balling” exercise that Capt S. allegedly carried out, let’s call it around 165 degrees – half-way between the 164 and 166 lines marked on the map. Then look at McMurdo Station, and then look at the scale. How could you possibly estimate that the distance from the waypoint to McMurdo Station was 10 miles?
What map did he use to estimate that the way point was about 10 miles west of McMurdo Station? It must have been the inset to NZMS135, which was included in the despatch documents. The whole map is shown on pages 90 and 91 of McFarlane’s book. Note that the boundaries of the inset are marked in red, and it covers the area from Beaufort Island, down past McMurdo Station, past the Black and White Islands, finishing well south of Moore Bay. At page 37 of his book, McFarlane purports to provide a copy of the inset, but you will note that this copy comes to an end to the south of the Blank and White Islands, and has no scale. Moore Bay is missing. In the caption, McFarlane says that the inset map is substantially the same as the map on p185 of Jim Collins’ atlas, a copy of which is on p38 of Vette’s book. This copy in Vette’s book shows the whole of the area from Beaufort Island in the north down to Moore Bay in the south, with the scale drawn in the Moore Bay area.
The point is that McFarlane’s depiction of the map does not include the scale, so the reader is not able to assess Capt. S.’s evidence that he thought the distance from the waypoint to McMurdo Station was 10 miles.
For those who don’t have Vette’s book, the following map demonstrates the point:
http://ortho.linz.govt.nz/antarctic/RossSeaRegions.jpg
This is the current version of NZMS135. It has the same inset map, with the scale drawn below Moore Bay.
Note that the map only has the even-numbered lines of longitide. So it has 164 degrees and 166 degrees marked, but not 165 degrees.
The longitude of the waypoint on the flightplan was “16448.0E”. For the purpose of the rough “eye-balling” exercise that Capt S. allegedly carried out, let’s call it around 165 degrees – half-way between the 164 and 166 lines marked on the map. Then look at McMurdo Station, and then look at the scale. How could you possibly estimate that the distance from the waypoint to McMurdo Station was 10 miles?
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Cross-Examination of Capt. S. re "10 miles" (Macfarlane pp 682-686)
Just looking at this copy of [NZMS135], the insert part of it. It would be fairly easy to make a quick check as to roughly where [the waypoint] was on the map, wouldn’t it?
Yes. Somewhere over the ice shelf.
Now as I understand you captain, you were a little surprised in your flight as to the distance that waypoint in fact turned out to be from McMurdo Station when you got down there?Yes.
Can you help me as to why you were surprised – because it seems to me, looking at the map, that clearly the McMurdo position is about 20 plus miles west of McMurdo [Station]?Yes. I know that to be a fact now. At the time I had just simply visually related the position to the chart. And knowing that the distance east/west is not a direct relationship in the actual degrees of longitude, but proportion of this, I had just mentally related 78 degrees of latitude as being something like – sort of looked – across the distance across the sound. That is about 20 miles, and that is about half way – 10 miles west. But having actually measured it, it is actually 26 miles. However it didn’t have much significance at the time, apart from relating to the geographical features, because at that point I thought I would be flying visually for sightseeing.
What I find puzzling is your thinking initially you might only be looking at a point 10 miles west. Once you even had a less than detailed look at the map, the coordinates of your McMurdo waypoint would clearly show it is well in excess of 10 miles. You must have made an easy mistake.How do you come to the conclusion that by looking at the coordinates it is easy to estimate 26 miles?
If you have a look at the map, you can readily place the approximate position of the McMurdo waypoint by reference to its coordinates. Once you do that, it clearly shows a position in excess of 20 miles west of McMurdo Station.If you look at this chart here, from there to there is one degree of latitude, whereas from there to there is 2 degrees of longitude. So obviously the scale east/west is quite considerably different from the scale north/south. And without actually measuring it with dividers that was my first impression – that it was around 10 miles.
I can readily understand why you may have had that first impression. But having that brought to your attention, I am wondering why you did not ascertain readily [realise] that – if only by reference to the scale which is contained in this plan itself?You are now talking about after the event and this in fact is what happened. Having seen my cross-track distance in the TACAN area was in fact in the order of 26-28 miles, and doing a manual update, and finding there was no difference to the changing in coodinates, it then occurred to me that the distance in fact must have been correct on the computer and I had been in error. So I did another check over Coulman Island on the way north, which confirmed that our computers were in fact correct. And it was this as you say, my mistaken belief of being 10 miles instead of 26 miles, that prompted me to ring Captain Johnson when I arrived in Auckland. With the thought that it had surprised me, it would probably surprise other pilots going down there. And although having seen two out two flightplans with the same coordinates I believed the McMurdo waypoint on my plan was in fact the intended one. I thought it would be wise to let other pilots know it was in fact 26 miles across so they wouldn’t be possibly as surprised or worried about the accuracy of their computers as had been my first reaction when I saw the cross-track display.
But captain, if any pilot wished to ascertain his distance from that waypoint to McMurdo Station, he could easily do it roughly, even from this [NZMS135]?Yes.
And it would show an answer in excess of 20 miles?Yes.
Can you help me as to what basis any other pilot could have for thinking it might only be 10?Because the flightplan simply has or had latitudes and longitudes on it. There are no tracks drawn on that chart. And they could well have just visually related their position as I had. So although another pilot possibly would have been perhaps more meticulous in drawing a line from the Cape Hallett position to that McMurdo waypoint to measure, it seemed little point in a flight that was flying visually and not necessarily flying that track. In fact on my flight at no time did I actually follow the flightplan track from Cape Hallett southwards.
Can you help us any further as to why you thought other pilots would be misled as to the distance?It just struck me that I had been misled, and I had considered myself to be, well, fairly proficient. And it’s one of the things of the aviation world where one shares one’s experiences. So although I thought I might have perhaps been a little remiss in not measuring it and saying it is 26 miles exactly, I was prepared to share my experience so that somebody else wouldn’t do the same thing.
Have you done any check to see where your flightpath would have taken you in relation to Ross Island had that waypoint been 10 miles to the west of McMurdo Staion?No I haven’t. But I would imagine it would pass very close to the edge of the rising ground.
Or perhaps even over it?Yes. Perhaps over it.
But you were clear in the thought at the time of the flight that it came down over the sea ice, well clear of Ross Island?Yes. Because although, as you say, I didn’t know it was 26 miles, I could relate that latitude and longitude visually to a point in relation to the ground. So I could see that my track should have taken me down the middle of McMurdo Sound, clear of the high ground if I had maintained the flightplan track.
I don’t want to press the point any more, but just looking at [NZMS 135] and the approximate McMurdo position, it is clear now if you look at it, that the distance between that and McMurdo Station must be of the order of 20 plus miles?Yes.
Looking at it, is it not a little bit hard to understand how you made your initial mistake?Yes it is having measured it. And I thought I had made that clear. That having made this mistake, I actually plotted the position and measured it with dividers, so I knew the same day it was actually 26 miles.
But nevertheless thought it of sufficient importance to mention for passing on to other pilots?Yes.
Now leaving that and passing on to the question of altitude …
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McMurdo
"Can you help me as to why you were surprised – because it seems to me, looking at the map, that clearly the McMurdo position is about 20 plus miles west of McMurdo [Station]?"
What is this "McMurdo Position?" Was it a formal waypoint on a chart, or just an error in converting the flight plans to the new flight ops office computer? I had remembered from back then that there was a designated McMurdo point in McMurdo Sound on the ice shelf, and that had caused the confusion; yes or no?
GB
What is this "McMurdo Position?" Was it a formal waypoint on a chart, or just an error in converting the flight plans to the new flight ops office computer? I had remembered from back then that there was a designated McMurdo point in McMurdo Sound on the ice shelf, and that had caused the confusion; yes or no?
GB
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16448.0e
Have checked this out Greybeard. When using the phrase "McMurdo position" both the lawyer and Capt. S. were definitely referring to the waypoint in McMurdo SOUND (cf McMurdo STATION):
7753.0 S 16448.0 E
7753.0 S 16448.0 E
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As I understand it the original flight plan was to "McMurdo" (the station) and then the digit error was made which put the position 27NM away in the sound, but of course the position retained the name "McMurdo". When the correction was made on the fateful flight only the co-ordinates changed and the name remained "McMurdo" because thats where it was going and where it was always meant to go. Had the point out in the sound been named something other than "McMurdo" there would have been no confusion, but of course it wasn't because all the time it was surposed to be the "real" "McMurdo". Boy, I'm confused now.
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"McMurdo"
All correct.
But the name "McMurdo" wasn't much of an issue for the crew, because the coodinates were recorded next to the name. The major issue concerning "McMurdo" was the summary of the flightplan sent to McMurdo Station on the morning of the flight. As I understand things, this summary only recorded the coordinates of a waypoint if the waypoint didn't have a name. So on the summary sent to Mac Centre, all that was provided was "McMurdo", with no coordinates. Hence Mahon's belief that the Nav Section were engaging in some sort of cover-up, trying to prevent Mac Centre from finding out about something. (What that something might possibly be is something that I havn't the faintest idea about.)
But the name "McMurdo" wasn't much of an issue for the crew, because the coodinates were recorded next to the name. The major issue concerning "McMurdo" was the summary of the flightplan sent to McMurdo Station on the morning of the flight. As I understand things, this summary only recorded the coordinates of a waypoint if the waypoint didn't have a name. So on the summary sent to Mac Centre, all that was provided was "McMurdo", with no coordinates. Hence Mahon's belief that the Nav Section were engaging in some sort of cover-up, trying to prevent Mac Centre from finding out about something. (What that something might possibly be is something that I havn't the faintest idea about.)
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Digit Error
It wasn't merely a different long, but a difference in lat, too, which would require very sloppy transcription to achieve. There has to be more to it.
Note in the pages quoted above, the pilot was using the McMurdo tacan for distance, which meant they knew what VOR frequency to tune to get the paired DME.
The fact the crew of the fatal flight wasn't receiving the Tacan was one more clue there was an obstruction in their path.
GB
Note in the pages quoted above, the pilot was using the McMurdo tacan for distance, which meant they knew what VOR frequency to tune to get the paired DME.
The fact the crew of the fatal flight wasn't receiving the Tacan was one more clue there was an obstruction in their path.
GB
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The floating waypoint
Greybeard: see #389 & #392. If you look at the sequence of the four different waypoints in #392, the change you are referring to is from (2) to (3). But the nav officer who made the change thought the waypoint was (1) – hence the one digit error.
I suppose you can’t blame old Mahon for getting a little bit tired of hearing about all these errors, but I can’t see how anyone can say that the McMurdo Sound waypoint was anything other than an error. In other words, the nav track was supposed to go over the active volcano to the NDB, and that’s where all the AirNZ witnesses thought it went.
I suppose you can’t blame old Mahon for getting a little bit tired of hearing about all these errors, but I can’t see how anyone can say that the McMurdo Sound waypoint was anything other than an error. In other words, the nav track was supposed to go over the active volcano to the NDB, and that’s where all the AirNZ witnesses thought it went.
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ampan:
It was a pretty incredible error though.
Fercrissake, even the AirNZ board knew that Collin’s track went down the middle of McMurdo sound.
Board meeting minutes 5 December 1979
ampan- you hypocritical old dog. I get back to this thread to find you using “McFarlane’s awful book” for your source of data to back up your arguments. 
Seriously though, you raise some good questions about Captain Simpson and his 10 mile estimate.
I have some ideas that might explain why this could have happened.
Remember, Captain White also estimated about 10 miles, and Captain Gabriel thought it was about 50 miles!
I’ll reply to this question with a later post.
but I can’t see how anyone can say that the McMurdo Sound waypoint was anything other than an error.
- It may have been finger trouble in the first place, but then it became a good place to have the waypoint as it was much the same as the military track and kept the aircraft away from high terrain. (Quite smart these military guys, eh?)
- Then the briefing documents changed from Exhibit “J” (over Erebus) to Exhibit 164 (down McMurdo Sound). That makes it a bit hard to say nobody in the Nav department knew about the change. They changed the briefing documents to fit in with the “error”.
- Then all the crews that plotted their track did not report it as an error because it was what they were briefed on. Several captains testified that they would have been most unhappy about the track if it had been over Mt Erebus.
- McMurdo ATC were given the flight plan details that showed the lat/long of the McMurdo “error” waypoint. They approved this route. They too would have been most unhappy about a route passing over Mt Erebus as they could not provide radar surveillance as their radar could not point straight up. “I would have regarded such a plan as extremely ill advised for the reason stated” (MAC Centre supervisor).
- Then when the waypoint was changed to the TACAN (ie a track over Erebus) the change in position was concealed on the flight plan details sent to McMurdo ATC by just showing the waypoint as “McMurdo” with no lat/long shown as it had been before. To make the computer print out in this way required an additional separate keyboard entry. (just another “mistake” that could happen to anybody, I suppose.)
Fercrissake, even the AirNZ board knew that Collin’s track went down the middle of McMurdo sound.
Board meeting minutes 5 December 1979
“Strictly confid. Not to be used.”
Wreckage was “off track (considerably)...Aeroplane ...was left of centre.”
Wreckage was “off track (considerably)...Aeroplane ...was left of centre.”
Seriously though, you raise some good questions about Captain Simpson and his 10 mile estimate.
I have some ideas that might explain why this could have happened.
Remember, Captain White also estimated about 10 miles, and Captain Gabriel thought it was about 50 miles!
I’ll reply to this question with a later post.