Erebus 25 years on
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Ampan,
" If that descent had been made in a tropical or temperate zone, it would have been been a safe manouvre, wouldn't it?"
Perhaps, in fact likely, but it would never have been carried out on a scheduled passenger run, I mean if an third level operator carried out a manouver of that nature and ended up with the same result in something like an Aero Commander, without the support of NZALPA do you think Mahons findings would have been the same??? They were well aware they were operating in a hostile environment in which, due to internal politics, they had absolutely no experience, apart from the simulator ride that along with most other things, nobody can agree on what was covered and what was not.
I will try another tack, likely get shot down but hopefully will prove a point.
A leg from Auckland to Wellington, Wellington closed due weather, descend over Kapiti Island because you can see it through a hole in the cloud cover, then try and track around to Wellington via Makara and Sinclair Head, fly into a patch of cloud, certainly it is a sector whiteout, you can see nothing in the sector in front of you. Impact a hill. Who is at fault??? The pilot did not know that that patch of cloud would be in such a position, but considering the other known weather facts it would always be a possibility.
" If that descent had been made in a tropical or temperate zone, it would have been been a safe manouvre, wouldn't it?"
Perhaps, in fact likely, but it would never have been carried out on a scheduled passenger run, I mean if an third level operator carried out a manouver of that nature and ended up with the same result in something like an Aero Commander, without the support of NZALPA do you think Mahons findings would have been the same??? They were well aware they were operating in a hostile environment in which, due to internal politics, they had absolutely no experience, apart from the simulator ride that along with most other things, nobody can agree on what was covered and what was not.
I will try another tack, likely get shot down but hopefully will prove a point.
A leg from Auckland to Wellington, Wellington closed due weather, descend over Kapiti Island because you can see it through a hole in the cloud cover, then try and track around to Wellington via Makara and Sinclair Head, fly into a patch of cloud, certainly it is a sector whiteout, you can see nothing in the sector in front of you. Impact a hill. Who is at fault??? The pilot did not know that that patch of cloud would be in such a position, but considering the other known weather facts it would always be a possibility.
Last edited by prospector; 8th Mar 2008 at 08:22.
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Descending through a hole in the cloud would be unusual, but would it be unprecedented? And I'm reasonably sure that the captain would be familar with orbiting over a particular area, waiting for his turn to land. Also, looking at the Beaufort Island photos, which show the sunshine on the sea ice, it looks to be a decent-sized hole.
But I'm still at 25%, for different reasons.
But I'm still at 25%, for different reasons.
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Prospector:
When you write
You have just demonstrated that you do not have a clue what sector whiteout really is.
There is a very fundamental difference beween flying in cloud and having a sector whiteout. I suggest you do some research before writing such nonsense.
When you write
...fly into a patch of cloud, certainly it is a sector whiteout, you can see nothing in the sector in front of you.
There is a very fundamental difference beween flying in cloud and having a sector whiteout. I suggest you do some research before writing such nonsense.
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fly into a patch of cloud, certainly it is a sector whiteout, you can see nothing in the sector in front of you.
The pilot did not know that that patch of cloud would be in such a position
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I am well aware that the example given is not sector whiteout.
The point that I was trying to make is that in such conditions as were in force at the time one should not be suprised at encountering whiteout. It is the fact that one would deliberately proceed into such conditions and then be suprised to encounter whiteout that is suprising.
Encountering whiteout was to be expected, being down at that height in those conditions at all is when the situation turned to custard.
Brian Abraham,
You say "prospector, it would seem you have little understanding or appreciation of the hazards revolving around operations in the polar regions, else you would not be making that statement"
Now tell me what experience of Antarctic flying did this crew have?? before they made the decision to descend into weather that they had been advised was below minima's for the descent planned and approved by both the company and CAA, and which they had carried out training in the simulator for.
"This statement is even more telling, since it demonstrates a further complete lack of knowledge as to what flight in VMC is all about. I have detailed the principles in some depth in an early post. It seems that there may be little profit to be had in engaging in further discussion with you.
Well at least we have found some ground in common, but before I go tell me exactly what assuming responsibility for your own terrain clearance entails??
The point that I was trying to make is that in such conditions as were in force at the time one should not be suprised at encountering whiteout. It is the fact that one would deliberately proceed into such conditions and then be suprised to encounter whiteout that is suprising.
Encountering whiteout was to be expected, being down at that height in those conditions at all is when the situation turned to custard.
Brian Abraham,
You say "prospector, it would seem you have little understanding or appreciation of the hazards revolving around operations in the polar regions, else you would not be making that statement"
Now tell me what experience of Antarctic flying did this crew have?? before they made the decision to descend into weather that they had been advised was below minima's for the descent planned and approved by both the company and CAA, and which they had carried out training in the simulator for.
"This statement is even more telling, since it demonstrates a further complete lack of knowledge as to what flight in VMC is all about. I have detailed the principles in some depth in an early post. It seems that there may be little profit to be had in engaging in further discussion with you.
Well at least we have found some ground in common, but before I go tell me exactly what assuming responsibility for your own terrain clearance entails??
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In Prospector's defence, it should be noted that he prefaced his sector whiteout comment with an indication that he "was likely to be shot down", which he duly was.
Just to finish off my guess at what happened, the crew enter the final waypoint into the AINS, believing that it would take them to the Dailey Islands. They don’t check this. Once at cruising altitude, the captain probably briefed the two flight engineers and F/O Lucas (who didn’t attend the briefing). But there wasn’t that much else to do, was there? There might have been passenger visits to the flightdeck, but there was still plenty of time for Capt. Collins and F/O Cassin to discuss the briefing they had attended 19 days beforehand. The captain would have brought out his atlas/map showing the plotted track with distance segments marked on it, and with the final waypoint at the Dailey Islands. There would have been some further discussion of what Capt. Wilson had said re the final waypoint, if only to the effect that he should be told that the actual waypoint was in a different location. But it still seems strange that no-one bothered checking this final waypoint, given that there was plenty of time available to do so. Perhaps they did check? It should be noted that the crew now had two printouts of a flightplan, the first being that obtained from the briefing, with the second being that obtained on despatch. The crew though they were identical, but they were not. It may be that the check was performed using the earlier flightplan. But they shouldn’t have used either of the printed flightplans. The digits on the printed flightplans did not tell them where they were going. The digits that told them where they were going were those that had been entered into the AINS before take-off, and that’s where they should have looked.
Once at Cape Hallett, the crew would have discussed their options. Given that the NDB wasn’t working, they would have discussed flying under the cloudbase, using the nav track. The captain was aware of the potential visibility problems involved in flying between cloud and snow – but he had his nav track and he had his altimeter. The option of using the nav track to fly under the cloudbase below the height of the high ground should have focused the crew’s attention back onto the final waypoint. Captain Wilson told them that it was at the NDB at McMurdo Station. Whether he told them that the track was over Erebus is immaterial, as the crew would have already known that. (In fact, the captain knew it the night before.) Given the plan, doesn’t the final waypoint become a matter of critical importance? You have the briefing officer saying that the nav track goes over a 13000 foot mountain, you have a flightplan saying it doesn’t – and you propose following the nav track down to 2000 feet. It is very surprising that none of the five members of the crew requested a further check, or insisted on plotting the position before descending from FL180.
They descend through the hole, and level out at 1500 feet. A short time later, the F/E says “I don’t like this” and the captain decides to climb out. F/O Cassin recommends doing a 180 degree turn to the right. Note that F/O Cassin is in the right-hand seat, so he has the better view of the right. It was at this point, I believe, that the captain was starting to have doubts as to his position and he was rapidly reassessing things. He would have recalled what Capt. Wilson said and the possibility of Erebus being ahead would have occurred to him for the first time. He would have known that that if Erebus was ahead, Mount Bird would be to the right and behind, so when F/O Cassin recommends a right turn, the captain says “No. Negative.” At this point, the captain has decided to turn left, not as a matter of life & death urgency, but as a precautionary measure, just in case. So he disengages nav mode, which causes an initial roll to right, which he then corrects and as he initiates a left turn using heading select. Impact occurs a couple of seconds later.
If this is what happened, it must be a case of pilot error. If Capt. Wilson told Capt. Collins and F/O Cassin that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station, then they should have been alerted to a potential issue concerning the final waypoint, and should have checked.
Did Capt. Wilson tell the crew that the nav track was to the NBD at McMurdo Station? According to Mister Justice Mahon: Yes, he did.
Just to finish off my guess at what happened, the crew enter the final waypoint into the AINS, believing that it would take them to the Dailey Islands. They don’t check this. Once at cruising altitude, the captain probably briefed the two flight engineers and F/O Lucas (who didn’t attend the briefing). But there wasn’t that much else to do, was there? There might have been passenger visits to the flightdeck, but there was still plenty of time for Capt. Collins and F/O Cassin to discuss the briefing they had attended 19 days beforehand. The captain would have brought out his atlas/map showing the plotted track with distance segments marked on it, and with the final waypoint at the Dailey Islands. There would have been some further discussion of what Capt. Wilson had said re the final waypoint, if only to the effect that he should be told that the actual waypoint was in a different location. But it still seems strange that no-one bothered checking this final waypoint, given that there was plenty of time available to do so. Perhaps they did check? It should be noted that the crew now had two printouts of a flightplan, the first being that obtained from the briefing, with the second being that obtained on despatch. The crew though they were identical, but they were not. It may be that the check was performed using the earlier flightplan. But they shouldn’t have used either of the printed flightplans. The digits on the printed flightplans did not tell them where they were going. The digits that told them where they were going were those that had been entered into the AINS before take-off, and that’s where they should have looked.
Once at Cape Hallett, the crew would have discussed their options. Given that the NDB wasn’t working, they would have discussed flying under the cloudbase, using the nav track. The captain was aware of the potential visibility problems involved in flying between cloud and snow – but he had his nav track and he had his altimeter. The option of using the nav track to fly under the cloudbase below the height of the high ground should have focused the crew’s attention back onto the final waypoint. Captain Wilson told them that it was at the NDB at McMurdo Station. Whether he told them that the track was over Erebus is immaterial, as the crew would have already known that. (In fact, the captain knew it the night before.) Given the plan, doesn’t the final waypoint become a matter of critical importance? You have the briefing officer saying that the nav track goes over a 13000 foot mountain, you have a flightplan saying it doesn’t – and you propose following the nav track down to 2000 feet. It is very surprising that none of the five members of the crew requested a further check, or insisted on plotting the position before descending from FL180.
They descend through the hole, and level out at 1500 feet. A short time later, the F/E says “I don’t like this” and the captain decides to climb out. F/O Cassin recommends doing a 180 degree turn to the right. Note that F/O Cassin is in the right-hand seat, so he has the better view of the right. It was at this point, I believe, that the captain was starting to have doubts as to his position and he was rapidly reassessing things. He would have recalled what Capt. Wilson said and the possibility of Erebus being ahead would have occurred to him for the first time. He would have known that that if Erebus was ahead, Mount Bird would be to the right and behind, so when F/O Cassin recommends a right turn, the captain says “No. Negative.” At this point, the captain has decided to turn left, not as a matter of life & death urgency, but as a precautionary measure, just in case. So he disengages nav mode, which causes an initial roll to right, which he then corrects and as he initiates a left turn using heading select. Impact occurs a couple of seconds later.
If this is what happened, it must be a case of pilot error. If Capt. Wilson told Capt. Collins and F/O Cassin that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station, then they should have been alerted to a potential issue concerning the final waypoint, and should have checked.
Did Capt. Wilson tell the crew that the nav track was to the NBD at McMurdo Station? According to Mister Justice Mahon: Yes, he did.
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One last shot
If those interested in this thread would indulge me, I would like to digress for a moment in which to make one last attempt to show prospector that what may pass as pilot error ain’t necessarily pilot error.
On the night of 13 September 1993 a RAAF F-111C A8-127 callsign Buckshot 18 impacted the ground while making its egress from a practice low level bombing run on a target near the town of Guyra in northern NSW. Both crewmembers, the pilot FLTLT Jeremy McNess and navigator FLTLT Mark Cairns-Cowan lost their lives.
The media, in their usual fashion, shouted PILOT ERROR from the rooftops, much to the distress of the pilot’s family, as you may well imagine.
From page 67 of http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S7494.pdf I don't think I need to bold any particular part, as a considered reading will highlight the lessons to be learnt.
Mrs McNess— Often it seemed to us that too much time was spent trying to find ways to blame the accident on the crew and too little on the systemic problems that led to it, thus affording protection to those within squadron hierarchy and abandonment to those killed. We had no wish to see any one person held responsible, but felt strongly that, unless roles and procedures were closely scrutinised and improved where necessary, similar circumstances would recur in the future and more lives would be lost. Unfortunately, there was another accident 5½ years later, when another F111 crashed, killing two more. Several similarities between the two accidents were immediately obvious. These were the lack of crew currency (my comment – due to defence budgetary constraints) for the exercise and the lack of crew rapport, both readily recognised by civilian airlines and the Air Force as prerequisites for safe flying.
Portion of letter by Air Marshal LB Fisher, AO RAAF
While Jeremy and Mark adequately prepared themselves for the mission, there were a number of latent factors that individually were incidental to the conduct of the flight until tested by the inflight circumstances during the approach to the target near Guyra. Flying supervisors appeared to be focused on regaining night proficiency for the squadron and were less vigilant in regard to the elementary matters of crew and cockpit rapport and the effect that these synergies have on operational efficiency.
Jeremy’s low night currency was tested to extreme by the inflight difficulty which also exposed a link to the pilots’ preference to manually fly the auto-TF approach during day operations. Two critical points stem from this factor. First, during the day pilots were able to maintain safe flight without total reliance on instruments because external visual references were available to them. Second, the ‘pickle-paddle-pull’ sequence at the pull-up point was not practised with every auto-TF flown and therefore did not become instinctive. The effect in Jeremy’s situation was that his familiarity with day time procedures prevailed and the TF was not disengaged at the pull-up point. Although the flight profile was not dangerous at that point, his low night currency may not have automatically directed his attention to critical flight instruments. This may have placed Jeremy under additional pressure and could have affected his recognition of the problem and the immediate actions required to rectify the situation. By allowing the crews more time to adjust to night operations before commencing demanding tasks, such as a night auto-TF, and a more rigid adherence to prescribed flying procedures may have alleviated some of the pressures that were brought to bear when Jeremy experienced the handling difficulty. Also associated with this particular point was that the guidance in flying orders could have been interpreted more stringently. Although flying supervisors expressed their concerns regarding the Squadron’s low night currency and stressed the need for caution, a less demanding mission may have been a more appropriate opening to the night flying program. Alternatively, the auto-TF could have been flown with a longer high-level leg that allowed crews more time to settle into the night environment before descending for the demanding low-level operations.
I also believe that Jeremy’s low night currency was exacerbated by crewing him with a navigator similarly inexperienced in night operations, and one with whom he had not frequently flown. This factor was insignificant during mission preparation on the ground and they adequately briefed the other crews on the conduct of the mission. Their approach to the target was initially uneventful until the critical pull-up point. Jeremy appeared to attempt to resolve the problem himself and the navigator remained fixed on his weapons delivery. The factor of inexperience may have allowed the seriousness of the problem to pass unnoticed because they had not established the rapport and synergy that is critical to cockpit proficiency. The clipped verbal commentary between the two indicated, to some extent, that they had not established the fluency of ‘crew-buddies’. I agree with the Accident Investigation Team’s finding that the pairing of Jeremy and Mark was ill-advised.
Jeremy’s low night currency and his pairing with Mark Cairns-Cowan were the two factors critical to events that occurred on 13 September 1993. Systemic supervisory shortfalls saw a crew, inexperienced in night operations, assigned a difficult but achievable task that later exceeded their individual and collective capabilities when the inflight handling difficulty was encountered. They had not had the opportunity to develop their professional cohesion and as a consequence neither was aware of the potential seriousness of the events that followed the handling problem. Crew rapport, and the inseparable crew confidence, in this case may have turned the course of events and led to a safe recovery. The other factors such as Jeremy’s first flight in A8-127, the maintenance history of the aircraft, weather conditions in the target area and their responsibilities as first crew were initially insignificant because their professional training equips them to fly any aircraft in the fleet through bad weather to a target. However, there remains a possibility that these factors may have also affected Jeremy’s reactions to the handling problem.
Anybody want to put up their hand and say the accident was the result of pilot error? Yes, the pilot flew a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the ground, that much is both true and a fact. To leave the analysis there is to fail to learn from their sacrifice and understand WHY. The why is well answered by Air Marshal Fisher, and I don’t think requires elaboration. PILOT ERROR? Definitely not (in my book).
Jeremy was a lad who grew up in our small town of Sale, and it was one of the pilots who I worked with who taught him to fly and encouraged him to join the RAAF.
To return to Erebus.
Well, why did you say
You do contradict yourself.
You are quite correct that when flying VMC the pilot is assuming responsibility for his own terrain clearance. The whole problem with the ANZ operation was the basis on which it was formulated. The 6,000 feet limit invoked by the company and the CAD provided absolutely no protection. Some points to remember.
A The flights were permitted to operate VMC with a cloud base of 7,000 feet
B Chippendale’s words – “A high potential for the white out phenomena is always likely when overcast conditions exist above a continuous snow covered slope. Those who have not been exposed to white out are often sceptical about the ability of those who have experienced it to estimate distance and to be aware of terrain changes and the separation of sky and earth. The condition may occur in a crystal clear atmosphere (your gin clear day prospector) or under a cloud ceiling.”
Whenever the aircraft was being operated at an altitude below the height of the hard bits (Erebus 12,448 feet) it ran the risk of running into those hard bits, just as Captain Collins did, the fact that he was below the stipulated minimum altitude of 6,000 feet had very little to do with the nature of the accident and its underlying cause. This is why I keep beating the drum that an incident/accident was inevitable at some stage. Had the crews obeyed the airlines and CAD’s instructions to the letter, they still ran the gauntlet and danger of imitating what was to befall Captain Collins flight.
My own personal experience as SLF on a flight to Antarctica – we were flying in VMC conditions at FL200 and immediately below an overcast. The only thing that could be seen, other than a milky whiteness in every direction you looked, whether it be up, down or sideways, was the shadow of an odd isolated puff ball cloud on the snow surface (could not see the cloud making the shadow of course). Visibility at the time? You would have been able to see around the world so to speak.
So what may be the cause of the accident. It is both true and a fact that the crew flew a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the ground, as did Jeremy. Why? Lack of training and experience partly, but fore most, unrealistic limits placed on operations by the airline and CAD, in that they failed to recognise that white out would always be a problem and a danger to operations when operating below the LSALT. Are the people within the respective organisations to blame? I very much doubt it, as it comes back to “you don’t know what you don’t know”. Although you may have thought they would have picked the brains of DEEP FREEZE personel at Christchurch. I’d be very surprised if in fact the airline did not have pilots with Antarctic experience in their ranks, the RNZAF operated Austers and Beavers starting 1956 and C-130 from 1965. It must say something about relationships within the airline that the briefing officer was not permitted to make a trip to Antarctica, despite having made a number of requests. You would think a briefing officer would have some experience about what it was he was briefing. Works that way in most endevours.
Hope I have helped in leading you to the light prospector.
PS O’Hare DC-10 The pilots had a flyable, albeit unserviceable, aircraft on their hands and their training was one thing that brought them undone. Our town and company lost a project engineer on that flight, and a wife and two daughters, aged 3 and 1 years respectively, a husband and father, Dale Whitthoft,. RIP.
On the night of 13 September 1993 a RAAF F-111C A8-127 callsign Buckshot 18 impacted the ground while making its egress from a practice low level bombing run on a target near the town of Guyra in northern NSW. Both crewmembers, the pilot FLTLT Jeremy McNess and navigator FLTLT Mark Cairns-Cowan lost their lives.
The media, in their usual fashion, shouted PILOT ERROR from the rooftops, much to the distress of the pilot’s family, as you may well imagine.
From page 67 of http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S7494.pdf I don't think I need to bold any particular part, as a considered reading will highlight the lessons to be learnt.
Mrs McNess— Often it seemed to us that too much time was spent trying to find ways to blame the accident on the crew and too little on the systemic problems that led to it, thus affording protection to those within squadron hierarchy and abandonment to those killed. We had no wish to see any one person held responsible, but felt strongly that, unless roles and procedures were closely scrutinised and improved where necessary, similar circumstances would recur in the future and more lives would be lost. Unfortunately, there was another accident 5½ years later, when another F111 crashed, killing two more. Several similarities between the two accidents were immediately obvious. These were the lack of crew currency (my comment – due to defence budgetary constraints) for the exercise and the lack of crew rapport, both readily recognised by civilian airlines and the Air Force as prerequisites for safe flying.
Portion of letter by Air Marshal LB Fisher, AO RAAF
While Jeremy and Mark adequately prepared themselves for the mission, there were a number of latent factors that individually were incidental to the conduct of the flight until tested by the inflight circumstances during the approach to the target near Guyra. Flying supervisors appeared to be focused on regaining night proficiency for the squadron and were less vigilant in regard to the elementary matters of crew and cockpit rapport and the effect that these synergies have on operational efficiency.
Jeremy’s low night currency was tested to extreme by the inflight difficulty which also exposed a link to the pilots’ preference to manually fly the auto-TF approach during day operations. Two critical points stem from this factor. First, during the day pilots were able to maintain safe flight without total reliance on instruments because external visual references were available to them. Second, the ‘pickle-paddle-pull’ sequence at the pull-up point was not practised with every auto-TF flown and therefore did not become instinctive. The effect in Jeremy’s situation was that his familiarity with day time procedures prevailed and the TF was not disengaged at the pull-up point. Although the flight profile was not dangerous at that point, his low night currency may not have automatically directed his attention to critical flight instruments. This may have placed Jeremy under additional pressure and could have affected his recognition of the problem and the immediate actions required to rectify the situation. By allowing the crews more time to adjust to night operations before commencing demanding tasks, such as a night auto-TF, and a more rigid adherence to prescribed flying procedures may have alleviated some of the pressures that were brought to bear when Jeremy experienced the handling difficulty. Also associated with this particular point was that the guidance in flying orders could have been interpreted more stringently. Although flying supervisors expressed their concerns regarding the Squadron’s low night currency and stressed the need for caution, a less demanding mission may have been a more appropriate opening to the night flying program. Alternatively, the auto-TF could have been flown with a longer high-level leg that allowed crews more time to settle into the night environment before descending for the demanding low-level operations.
I also believe that Jeremy’s low night currency was exacerbated by crewing him with a navigator similarly inexperienced in night operations, and one with whom he had not frequently flown. This factor was insignificant during mission preparation on the ground and they adequately briefed the other crews on the conduct of the mission. Their approach to the target was initially uneventful until the critical pull-up point. Jeremy appeared to attempt to resolve the problem himself and the navigator remained fixed on his weapons delivery. The factor of inexperience may have allowed the seriousness of the problem to pass unnoticed because they had not established the rapport and synergy that is critical to cockpit proficiency. The clipped verbal commentary between the two indicated, to some extent, that they had not established the fluency of ‘crew-buddies’. I agree with the Accident Investigation Team’s finding that the pairing of Jeremy and Mark was ill-advised.
Jeremy’s low night currency and his pairing with Mark Cairns-Cowan were the two factors critical to events that occurred on 13 September 1993. Systemic supervisory shortfalls saw a crew, inexperienced in night operations, assigned a difficult but achievable task that later exceeded their individual and collective capabilities when the inflight handling difficulty was encountered. They had not had the opportunity to develop their professional cohesion and as a consequence neither was aware of the potential seriousness of the events that followed the handling problem. Crew rapport, and the inseparable crew confidence, in this case may have turned the course of events and led to a safe recovery. The other factors such as Jeremy’s first flight in A8-127, the maintenance history of the aircraft, weather conditions in the target area and their responsibilities as first crew were initially insignificant because their professional training equips them to fly any aircraft in the fleet through bad weather to a target. However, there remains a possibility that these factors may have also affected Jeremy’s reactions to the handling problem.
Anybody want to put up their hand and say the accident was the result of pilot error? Yes, the pilot flew a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the ground, that much is both true and a fact. To leave the analysis there is to fail to learn from their sacrifice and understand WHY. The why is well answered by Air Marshal Fisher, and I don’t think requires elaboration. PILOT ERROR? Definitely not (in my book).
Jeremy was a lad who grew up in our small town of Sale, and it was one of the pilots who I worked with who taught him to fly and encouraged him to join the RAAF.
To return to Erebus.
I am well aware that the example given is not sector whiteout
fly into a patch of cloud, certainly it is a sector whiteout, you can see nothing in the sector in front of you
tell me exactly what assuming responsibility for your own terrain clearance entails
A The flights were permitted to operate VMC with a cloud base of 7,000 feet
B Chippendale’s words – “A high potential for the white out phenomena is always likely when overcast conditions exist above a continuous snow covered slope. Those who have not been exposed to white out are often sceptical about the ability of those who have experienced it to estimate distance and to be aware of terrain changes and the separation of sky and earth. The condition may occur in a crystal clear atmosphere (your gin clear day prospector) or under a cloud ceiling.”
Whenever the aircraft was being operated at an altitude below the height of the hard bits (Erebus 12,448 feet) it ran the risk of running into those hard bits, just as Captain Collins did, the fact that he was below the stipulated minimum altitude of 6,000 feet had very little to do with the nature of the accident and its underlying cause. This is why I keep beating the drum that an incident/accident was inevitable at some stage. Had the crews obeyed the airlines and CAD’s instructions to the letter, they still ran the gauntlet and danger of imitating what was to befall Captain Collins flight.
My own personal experience as SLF on a flight to Antarctica – we were flying in VMC conditions at FL200 and immediately below an overcast. The only thing that could be seen, other than a milky whiteness in every direction you looked, whether it be up, down or sideways, was the shadow of an odd isolated puff ball cloud on the snow surface (could not see the cloud making the shadow of course). Visibility at the time? You would have been able to see around the world so to speak.
So what may be the cause of the accident. It is both true and a fact that the crew flew a perfectly serviceable aircraft into the ground, as did Jeremy. Why? Lack of training and experience partly, but fore most, unrealistic limits placed on operations by the airline and CAD, in that they failed to recognise that white out would always be a problem and a danger to operations when operating below the LSALT. Are the people within the respective organisations to blame? I very much doubt it, as it comes back to “you don’t know what you don’t know”. Although you may have thought they would have picked the brains of DEEP FREEZE personel at Christchurch. I’d be very surprised if in fact the airline did not have pilots with Antarctic experience in their ranks, the RNZAF operated Austers and Beavers starting 1956 and C-130 from 1965. It must say something about relationships within the airline that the briefing officer was not permitted to make a trip to Antarctica, despite having made a number of requests. You would think a briefing officer would have some experience about what it was he was briefing. Works that way in most endevours.
Hope I have helped in leading you to the light prospector.
PS O’Hare DC-10 The pilots had a flyable, albeit unserviceable, aircraft on their hands and their training was one thing that brought them undone. Our town and company lost a project engineer on that flight, and a wife and two daughters, aged 3 and 1 years respectively, a husband and father, Dale Whitthoft,. RIP.
Last edited by Brian Abraham; 9th Mar 2008 at 04:38.
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Will prvvide a considered reponse in due course, Brian. But why can't you, and, more to the point, NZALPA, leave out the emotive aspect? To put it bluntly, the captain's wife is the last person to ask for an objective response to an accident that killed her husband and the father of her three children.
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leave out the emotive aspect
captain's wife is the last person to ask for an objective response to an accident that killed her husband and the father of her three children
Now pull your head in and read the Hansard.
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Some more on the briefing and the final track
ampan #510
Thanks, ampan. Good to see some of us can admit a mistake and keep a civilized discussion going.
I’d like to engage you on your position where you state
Well, I’m not convinced at all.
I don’t think he told them that the track was over Erebus, or that it was to the NDB.
Let’s look at the evidence available.
Agreed. You would definitely say something.
I disagree. The testimony of the pilots is that they did it at the briefing while they had access to the flight plan.
Yeah, maybe. It wouldn’t be much of a briefing if he did that.
Good point. It is possible that he never said anything along the lines of “the final waypoint is here’ *pointing to map*. However, by passing around copies of the flight plan it is obvious that he gave the information to the pilots and they worked it out for themselves.
I submit that is completely wrong for all the reasons above.
Even more wrong. You have no evidence that they believed the track went there, and in addition there was no longer an NDB there.
No. Captain Simpson expected to track via the head of Mc Murdo Sound. He was only surprised that the offset distance was more than he expected when he got to McMurdo Station. (M.p242)
No. All the testimony indicates the “eye-balling” was done at the briefing when they had access to the sample flight plan. See above.
We can all agree that it was a pretty crummy briefing. A briefing is supposed to be a run through of what you are about to do in real life in the near future. To not have a single aeronautical map with the actual track shown on it is incompetence. For Captain Wilson to have all the briefing material (maps, slides and flight plan) implying that the track went down McMurdo Sound and then to claim that he briefed that the real track actually went over Erebus defies belief.
The conclusion I make is that Captain Wilson did NOT tell the crews that the track was over Erebus.
Why he said that he did tell them so, in the face of all the contrary evidence, is another argument.
Over to you.
Retraction - Captain Wilson
At #223, #266 and #403 I said that Mahon labelled Captain Wilson as a perjurer. I was completely wrong about that. No such finding was made by Mahon – which explains why Captain Wilson was not involved in the Court of Appeal and Privy Council cases.
At #223, #266 and #403 I said that Mahon labelled Captain Wilson as a perjurer. I was completely wrong about that. No such finding was made by Mahon – which explains why Captain Wilson was not involved in the Court of Appeal and Privy Council cases.
I’d like to engage you on your position where you state
I’m convinced that Captain Wilson told the crew that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station. What he didn’t tell the crew, or, more likely, didn’t make clear, was that the nav track was over Erebus.
I don’t think he told them that the track was over Erebus, or that it was to the NDB.
Let’s look at the evidence available.
- All of the maps at the briefing showed tracks down McMurdo Sound. Not one showed a track over Mt Erebus or to the NDB.
- All the briefing slides appeared to be taken from over McMurdo Sound or flat terrain.
- Captain Simpson’s testimony: “I certainly did not get the impression from the audio-visual that our approach would be over Ross Island or Mt Erebus.” (M.p236) and about the McMurdo waypoint on the flight plan “I did not record this position but only noted it mentally. It seemed to be a logical position in that it was at the head of the sound clear of high terrain and a good position to start sightseeing….” (M.p237)
- Captain Gabriel’s testimony: “ …. noting the heading of the aircraft was to the right of the high ground depicted in the slide. I consequently expected the aircraft to approach the McMurdo area on a track which would take the aircraft to the west of Mt Erebus. Nothing that I saw or heard during the audio visual presentation gave me the impression that the aircraft would overfly Mt Erebus during its approach to the McMurdo area.”
- F/O Irvine’s testimony: “I am certain that at no stage during the briefing conducted by Captain Wilson was anything said to the effect that our flight plan track would go over Ross Island or Mt Erebus".
- Captain Collins and F/O Cassin demonstrated that they did not believe the track was over Erebus when they engaged NAV and flew straight into the side of Mt Erebus. Pretty convincing evidence that was, I think!
If you accept that the pilots at the briefing were told that the final waypoint was at the NDB at McMurdo Station, what about the evidence of two of the surviving pilots concerning this rough “eye-balling” exercise they both allegedly carried out, where they estimated, they said, that the final waypoint was somewhere other than at the NBD at McMurdo Station? That could not have happened: If the briefing officer is saying that the waypoint is at X, and you think it might somewhere else, you would definitely say something.
- F/O Irvine’s testimony: “If mention had been made that out track passed over Ross Island or Mt Erebus, I would most certainly have questioned Captain Wilson about it to clarify my own understanding”
The “eye-balling” evidence never made much sense in any event. It’s not the sort of thing you would expect a pilot to do during the briefing. You might do it home afterwards, while flicking through the briefing documents. Or you might do it on the flightdeck. But during the briefing, you would be listening to the briefing.
- Captain Simpson: “When I looked at one of these flight plans …<snip>… (the McMurdo position)… I did not record this position but only noted it mentally. It seemed to be a logical position in that it was at the head of the sound clear of high terrain and a good position to start sightseeing….”
- Captain Gabriel: “At some stage during the talk through I made a comparison of the TACAN co-ordinates ….<snip> …… and the co-ordinates of the McMurdo waypoint on the flight plan…<snip> In making that comparison I realized that the flight plan ‘McMurdo’ waypoint was to the west of the TACAN position.” (M.p233)
But let’s do a cross-check: Assume that the eye-balling occurred. We know that none of the five pilots at the briefing raised an issue concerning the final waypoint. So these two pilots, having formed the impression that the final waypoint was not at the NDB at McMurdo Station, sat there and said nothing. There are only two ways that this could have happened. The first possibility is that Captain Wilson never made any reference to the nav track and completely avoided the subject – which possibility can be discounted.
The second possibility is that Captain Wilson did refer to the nav track and indicated that it went somewhere other than the NDB at McMurdo Station, to a position that roughly accorded with the position that was estimated by the two pilots. But if this is what happened, you would expect the two pilots to say so in their evidence. They don’t. Instead, the subject is avoided.
So all five pilots walked out of the briefing room believing that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station – and one of them, Captain Collins, was holding a print-out of the flightplan, which he believed was to the NDB at McMurdo Station.
Capts. S and G. meet on the morning of their flight, collect the flightplan, and manually enter the waypoints, believing that the track they are entering will take them to the NDB at McMurdo Station.
On reaching Cape Hallett, they find blue skies, and fly heading select, right of track, closer to Victoria Land. Once at the end of the sound, by the Dry Valleys, they turn left and head for McMurdo Station, which they can see. As they pass the Dailey Islands, Capt. S. notices that they are going left of track. This is unusual, because he didn’t expect to be going left of track until passing McMurdo Station – because he believes that the track goes to McMurdo Station.
This concerns him, because there might be a problem with the AINS, which he has to rely on to get back to NZ. So he performs an update once over the TACAN. This is the point in time, I think, when the charts came out and when the eye-balling occurred.
We can all agree that it was a pretty crummy briefing. A briefing is supposed to be a run through of what you are about to do in real life in the near future. To not have a single aeronautical map with the actual track shown on it is incompetence. For Captain Wilson to have all the briefing material (maps, slides and flight plan) implying that the track went down McMurdo Sound and then to claim that he briefed that the real track actually went over Erebus defies belief.
The conclusion I make is that Captain Wilson did NOT tell the crews that the track was over Erebus.
Why he said that he did tell them so, in the face of all the contrary evidence, is another argument.
Over to you.
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Thank you ampan, your comment is appreciated, if somewhat pre-emptive. Just be advised that discussion of the technical aspects forms only part of the proposed website content. It is also intended as a commemoration, and therefore family input is not only appropriate, but quite possibly, essential. Family input is intended not to be restricted to the flight crews', but also those of the passengers. But that will take some time to appear fully. This is in line with commemorative-type sites relating to other disasters, examples of which are many and varied on the web.
It would be nice if you could at least wait until the website is up, before picking holes in it - and I'm sure there will be many. But if that's not possible, never mind. I'm sure you will get your chance with some alacrity in due course.
As I've said before, this thread may very well have a significant influence into some of the editorial that will be contained within the site, so pardon me if I just continue to lurk in it without much reaction for the time being.
Gary Parata
It would be nice if you could at least wait until the website is up, before picking holes in it - and I'm sure there will be many. But if that's not possible, never mind. I'm sure you will get your chance with some alacrity in due course.
As I've said before, this thread may very well have a significant influence into some of the editorial that will be contained within the site, so pardon me if I just continue to lurk in it without much reaction for the time being.
Gary Parata
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Brian, I've ploughed through the Senate's hansard, and it's mostly irrelevent - which is typical of politicians. This accident was, clearly, the result of inadequate training in night-flying. If proper training had been provided and checked, I'm quite happy to put up my hand with the frenzied media and label the accident as 100% pilot error. Given the inadequate training, it's still pilot error, but to a diminished extent. This might cause ructions in Sale, but those ructions pale in comparison to the the ructions in NZ concerning TE901.
I don't think anyone can say that Jim Collins had inadequate training. Even 20 years on from the 7 years he spent in the RNZAF, a low run in a light plane at night would not have presented him with any degree of difficulty. So he has to be judged against a much higher standard. Desert Dingo complains about my reference to the money he was being paid, and says that it's irrelevant. I do not agree. Of all the Air NZ staff who made c*ck-ups, he was being paid the most. (Forget the exec pilots: they got hardly anything extra for their admin work, which might tend to explain why the superstar Vette was not amongst them).
I don't think anyone can say that Jim Collins had inadequate training. Even 20 years on from the 7 years he spent in the RNZAF, a low run in a light plane at night would not have presented him with any degree of difficulty. So he has to be judged against a much higher standard. Desert Dingo complains about my reference to the money he was being paid, and says that it's irrelevant. I do not agree. Of all the Air NZ staff who made c*ck-ups, he was being paid the most. (Forget the exec pilots: they got hardly anything extra for their admin work, which might tend to explain why the superstar Vette was not amongst them).
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Brian Abraham,
" It must say something about relationships within the airline that the briefing officer was not permitted to make a trip to Antarctica, despite having ma!
de a number of requests. You would think a briefing officer would have some experience about what it was he was briefing. Works that way in most endevours"
Capt Wilson did in fact, if my memory serves me right, do a trip to the ice. It was on the trip that diverted due weather at McMurdo, to the alternate advertised sites, South Magnetic pole I think, as has been stated on this thread it weas the unpopularity of this decision to divert to the alternate plan that may have influenced Capt Collins decision to proceed as he did.
"A The flights were permitted to operate VMC with a cloud base of 7,000 feet"
And what was the cloud base at McMurdo station that was reported to the crew, well below 7,000ft. And the actual cloud base over Ross Island was even lower, 2,000ft or below, and to the North of Ross Island, or why the requirement to descend to 1500ft?
"Hope I have helped in leading you to the light prospector."
Fraid not, Still believe that Sir Geoffrey Roberts who said "I say quite flatly the main cause was the fact a pilot failed to locate himself in relation to ground features and flew his aircraft into the side of a mountain".
Or, from Capt Dereck Ellis. "The effect of reading Gordon Vette's book, which is dedicated to supporting the views of the commissioner, has in fact been to convince me that the findings of the New Zealand Office of Air Accidents investigation are infinitely more realistic.
Or the publication of CHN L'Estrange, The Erebus Enquiry, a Tragic Misscarriage of Justice, were all penned by people with a vastly greater insight and experience then all the hair splitting of who said what where and no they did not that has been going on in this thread.
The job of the crew was to take the aircraft down to the ice for a sightseeing trip, the pax had all been briefed that if the weather was unsuitable than an alternate site to McMurdo would be required. At the end of the day the requirement to get all these punters home safely was far more important than missing out on a bit of sightseeing.
" It must say something about relationships within the airline that the briefing officer was not permitted to make a trip to Antarctica, despite having ma!
de a number of requests. You would think a briefing officer would have some experience about what it was he was briefing. Works that way in most endevours"
Capt Wilson did in fact, if my memory serves me right, do a trip to the ice. It was on the trip that diverted due weather at McMurdo, to the alternate advertised sites, South Magnetic pole I think, as has been stated on this thread it weas the unpopularity of this decision to divert to the alternate plan that may have influenced Capt Collins decision to proceed as he did.
"A The flights were permitted to operate VMC with a cloud base of 7,000 feet"
And what was the cloud base at McMurdo station that was reported to the crew, well below 7,000ft. And the actual cloud base over Ross Island was even lower, 2,000ft or below, and to the North of Ross Island, or why the requirement to descend to 1500ft?
"Hope I have helped in leading you to the light prospector."
Fraid not, Still believe that Sir Geoffrey Roberts who said "I say quite flatly the main cause was the fact a pilot failed to locate himself in relation to ground features and flew his aircraft into the side of a mountain".
Or, from Capt Dereck Ellis. "The effect of reading Gordon Vette's book, which is dedicated to supporting the views of the commissioner, has in fact been to convince me that the findings of the New Zealand Office of Air Accidents investigation are infinitely more realistic.
Or the publication of CHN L'Estrange, The Erebus Enquiry, a Tragic Misscarriage of Justice, were all penned by people with a vastly greater insight and experience then all the hair splitting of who said what where and no they did not that has been going on in this thread.
The job of the crew was to take the aircraft down to the ice for a sightseeing trip, the pax had all been briefed that if the weather was unsuitable than an alternate site to McMurdo would be required. At the end of the day the requirement to get all these punters home safely was far more important than missing out on a bit of sightseeing.
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Over to me
Desert Dingo: We get back to the "trick question", don't we? I think that this question lies at the heart of the whole problem. If I say "your nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station", and if I know that this track goes over Erebus, then I will believe that I am communicating that information to the pilots. But because of the paucity of decent charts, that information is not actually conveyed. So the pilots walk out of the briefing thinking that their track is direct to the NDB at McMurdo Station, not appreciating that this track will take them over Erebus.
This doesn't explain everything, by any means. But then you have to factor in the union and the lawyers.
This doesn't explain everything, by any means. But then you have to factor in the union and the lawyers.
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Prospector #531:
We can quote luminaries till the cows come home, Prospector, but the only way to prevent Mahon's report going down in history as the definitive account of this accident is to establish at least one act/ommission of pilot error that no properly-informed pilot can realistically argue with. Failing that, we are left with adding up various "could have done better" incidents.
We can quote luminaries till the cows come home, Prospector, but the only way to prevent Mahon's report going down in history as the definitive account of this accident is to establish at least one act/ommission of pilot error that no properly-informed pilot can realistically argue with. Failing that, we are left with adding up various "could have done better" incidents.
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Desert Dingo #528:
“Pretty convincing evidence that was, I think.” Not convincing at all, Desert Dingo. The evidence given by the three surviving pilots was all in the negative. Each and every one of them confined their evidence to what they did NOT recall Captain Wilson saying. Not one of them gave any evidence about what they DID recall him saying about the nav track..
So are you suggesting that the briefing officer said nothing on the subject of the nav track?
Or are you blocking your nose to the smell of the hot breath of the union, and the sweaty palms of some overly-eager law clerk?
“Pretty convincing evidence that was, I think.” Not convincing at all, Desert Dingo. The evidence given by the three surviving pilots was all in the negative. Each and every one of them confined their evidence to what they did NOT recall Captain Wilson saying. Not one of them gave any evidence about what they DID recall him saying about the nav track..
So are you suggesting that the briefing officer said nothing on the subject of the nav track?
Or are you blocking your nose to the smell of the hot breath of the union, and the sweaty palms of some overly-eager law clerk?
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Ampan,
Granted, but if people will not accept that going VMC in the reported conditions, was not a clever thing to do, and accepting responsibility for your own terrain clearance and then flying into a mountain was not a massive stuff up then what can one do.
To my understanding the only official accident report was the one compiled by Ron Chippendale, Mahons was a Commission of Enquiry, his findings could not be challenged on legal grounds, I do not have to advise who are the people who are forever pushing the Mahon enquiry as the definitive text.
There are many well informed pilots who do not agree with Mahons findings, all the people that I have quoted are not only luminaries they are,or were, very experienced pilots. I have quoted three but there are many more.
One thing that you hair splitters have not discussed yet is that Collins said we are 26 miles North we will have to climb out of this, From whence were they 26 miles North of?? how far to the NDB coordinates when this statement was made? where else could they have have been 26 miles North of? this was a very precise statement, no doubt read straight of the AINS readout. I dont have any charts of a sufficient scale to interpret this statement, but it has not been questioned by anyone who listened to the tape to my knowledge.
Granted, but if people will not accept that going VMC in the reported conditions, was not a clever thing to do, and accepting responsibility for your own terrain clearance and then flying into a mountain was not a massive stuff up then what can one do.
To my understanding the only official accident report was the one compiled by Ron Chippendale, Mahons was a Commission of Enquiry, his findings could not be challenged on legal grounds, I do not have to advise who are the people who are forever pushing the Mahon enquiry as the definitive text.
There are many well informed pilots who do not agree with Mahons findings, all the people that I have quoted are not only luminaries they are,or were, very experienced pilots. I have quoted three but there are many more.
One thing that you hair splitters have not discussed yet is that Collins said we are 26 miles North we will have to climb out of this, From whence were they 26 miles North of?? how far to the NDB coordinates when this statement was made? where else could they have have been 26 miles North of? this was a very precise statement, no doubt read straight of the AINS readout. I dont have any charts of a sufficient scale to interpret this statement, but it has not been questioned by anyone who listened to the tape to my knowledge.
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Prospector: My guess is that Capt. Collins marked out 10 mile segments on the nav track that he plotted on his atlas/map. But the "26 miles" comment probably came from the his AINS read-out, which gave the distance to go to the next waypoint.
I'm not really sure about the legal situation concerning the Chippendale and Mahon reports. Logically, Mahon's must be the final version as to the cause of the accident. The "orchestrated litany of lies"/NZ Court of Appeal/Privy Council thing is a red herring. That had nothing to do with the finding as to the cause of the accident. One thing, however, should be noted: Various contributors have said that Mahon's findings as to the cause of the accident were not "overturned" by either the Court of Appeal or the Privy Council. Quite correct. But that does not mean that Mahon's findings as to the cause were supported by either of those courts. The plain fact of the matter is that the cause of the accident wasn't a matter at issue. Why? Because AirNZ could not appeal against Mahon's findings as to the cause of the accident - however much they might have wanted to. They were stuck with it. The only things that they could argue about were issues concerning Mahon's stepping outside the brief he had been given by the government. There was never any dispute that the government appointed Mahon to inquire into, and make findings as to, the cause of the accident. What was disputed was whether the government appointed Mahon to conduct a quasi-criminal trial to find various persons guilty of engaging in a conspiracy to commit organised perjury.
I'm not really sure about the legal situation concerning the Chippendale and Mahon reports. Logically, Mahon's must be the final version as to the cause of the accident. The "orchestrated litany of lies"/NZ Court of Appeal/Privy Council thing is a red herring. That had nothing to do with the finding as to the cause of the accident. One thing, however, should be noted: Various contributors have said that Mahon's findings as to the cause of the accident were not "overturned" by either the Court of Appeal or the Privy Council. Quite correct. But that does not mean that Mahon's findings as to the cause were supported by either of those courts. The plain fact of the matter is that the cause of the accident wasn't a matter at issue. Why? Because AirNZ could not appeal against Mahon's findings as to the cause of the accident - however much they might have wanted to. They were stuck with it. The only things that they could argue about were issues concerning Mahon's stepping outside the brief he had been given by the government. There was never any dispute that the government appointed Mahon to inquire into, and make findings as to, the cause of the accident. What was disputed was whether the government appointed Mahon to conduct a quasi-criminal trial to find various persons guilty of engaging in a conspiracy to commit organised perjury.