Erebus 25 years on
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Ampan,
"But the "26 miles" comment probably came from the his AINS read-out, which gave the distance to go to the next waypoint."
Yes, that is what I said, an AINS readout, the point being, as i said, from whence were they 26 miles from? the disputed waypoint or the coordinates of the NDB, or perhaps TACAN.
"Various contributors have said that Mahon's findings as to the cause of the accident were not "overturned" by either the Court of Appeal or the Privy Council. Quite correct."
But "Peter Mahon concluded that Exhibit 164 was the track and distance chart supplied to Antarctic crews". Now it is obvious that a lot of the conclusions Justice Mahon came to were based on this belief. Now what did the Appeal Court state about Exhibit 164???
"They demolished his case item by item, including exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be intended to be used for the purpose of navigation".
This obviously is not only about orchestrated litanies,
And the Privy Council agreed with the findings of the Appeal Court.
That to my way of thinking is not agreeing with the Commissioner's finding wholeheartedly, but could they have been disagreeing with him in a "Polite way"???
From John King publication, "For his part, Morrie Davis is angry that the Mahon report remains unqualified, still the version quoted in law schools, without the rebuttals formed by the subsequent Court of Appeal and Privy Council judgements. There has been no movement, he says, to record these officially and correct the Mahon version of the reasons behind the disaster."
And when we get politicians such as Anderton banging his gums together quoting the Mahon report as gospel, history will have a hard time getting the final findings after the Appeal Court and Privy Council findings known to the general public.
And how many of the general public have ever heard of Judge Harold S.Greene's finding in the Distict Court of Washington D,C.
"The operational crew of FLT901 acted unreasonably in several respects, including not plotting their actual position from the AINS and descending 'below 16,000ft contrary to both prudent airmanship and Air New Zealand policy without first ascertaining what was there or following the other requirementd for such descent".
Now there are some who disagree with anything concerning this accident except what came out of Mahon's report, but for my money Judge Greene would have had a lot more facts to hand to form his judgement than anyone on this forum.
"But the "26 miles" comment probably came from the his AINS read-out, which gave the distance to go to the next waypoint."
Yes, that is what I said, an AINS readout, the point being, as i said, from whence were they 26 miles from? the disputed waypoint or the coordinates of the NDB, or perhaps TACAN.
"Various contributors have said that Mahon's findings as to the cause of the accident were not "overturned" by either the Court of Appeal or the Privy Council. Quite correct."
But "Peter Mahon concluded that Exhibit 164 was the track and distance chart supplied to Antarctic crews". Now it is obvious that a lot of the conclusions Justice Mahon came to were based on this belief. Now what did the Appeal Court state about Exhibit 164???
"They demolished his case item by item, including exhibit 164 which they said could not "be understood by any experienced pilot to be intended to be used for the purpose of navigation".
This obviously is not only about orchestrated litanies,
And the Privy Council agreed with the findings of the Appeal Court.
That to my way of thinking is not agreeing with the Commissioner's finding wholeheartedly, but could they have been disagreeing with him in a "Polite way"???
From John King publication, "For his part, Morrie Davis is angry that the Mahon report remains unqualified, still the version quoted in law schools, without the rebuttals formed by the subsequent Court of Appeal and Privy Council judgements. There has been no movement, he says, to record these officially and correct the Mahon version of the reasons behind the disaster."
And when we get politicians such as Anderton banging his gums together quoting the Mahon report as gospel, history will have a hard time getting the final findings after the Appeal Court and Privy Council findings known to the general public.
And how many of the general public have ever heard of Judge Harold S.Greene's finding in the Distict Court of Washington D,C.
"The operational crew of FLT901 acted unreasonably in several respects, including not plotting their actual position from the AINS and descending 'below 16,000ft contrary to both prudent airmanship and Air New Zealand policy without first ascertaining what was there or following the other requirementd for such descent".
Now there are some who disagree with anything concerning this accident except what came out of Mahon's report, but for my money Judge Greene would have had a lot more facts to hand to form his judgement than anyone on this forum.
Last edited by prospector; 9th Mar 2008 at 09:04.
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Prospector:
I'm sure that when he said "26 miles out" he meant 26 miles from the waypoint by the Dailey Islands that he had plotted the night before. But very shortly after he said that, various pennies started to drop. Hence the turn to the left, rather than the right.
As for the Court of Appeal and Privy Council, although the cause of the accident was not part of their brief, they're only human, and they probably got a little bit interested in the case - as most people do. AirNZ, no doubt, would have encouraged this, and would have tried to dress up Mahon's findings about the cause as findings about something else, being a something else they could argue about. So I don't think you can take anything that the Court of Appeal or Privy Council said as being some sort of higher authority re the cause. All you can do is borrow their argument.
The problem is that there is no forum to present any further argument. It's all done and dusted. Crew completely exonerated. So if you get conflicting information at a briefing, take your pick, and assume you're right. So much for flight safety.
I'm sure that when he said "26 miles out" he meant 26 miles from the waypoint by the Dailey Islands that he had plotted the night before. But very shortly after he said that, various pennies started to drop. Hence the turn to the left, rather than the right.
As for the Court of Appeal and Privy Council, although the cause of the accident was not part of their brief, they're only human, and they probably got a little bit interested in the case - as most people do. AirNZ, no doubt, would have encouraged this, and would have tried to dress up Mahon's findings about the cause as findings about something else, being a something else they could argue about. So I don't think you can take anything that the Court of Appeal or Privy Council said as being some sort of higher authority re the cause. All you can do is borrow their argument.
The problem is that there is no forum to present any further argument. It's all done and dusted. Crew completely exonerated. So if you get conflicting information at a briefing, take your pick, and assume you're right. So much for flight safety.
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Tracking to the NDB?
Ampan: I’m having difficulty following your logic.
Then why show me the flight plan from the previous flight which has a NAV track that goes somewhere else? You are supposed to be briefing me on a flight I will do in the near future.
But the pilots did not walk out of the briefing thinking that the track is to the NDB.
The evidence shows that the pilots did not believe the track went to the NDB. They all worked out from the co-ordinates on the flight plan they were shown that the final waypoint was west of McMurdo Station.
Collins and Cassin demonstrated in the most conclusive way possible that they did not believe the track went over Erebus to a now non-existent NDB.
If I say "your nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station", and if I know that this track goes over Erebus, then I will believe that I am communicating that information to the pilots.
But because of the paucity of decent charts, that information is not actually conveyed. So the pilots walk out of the briefing thinking that their track is direct to the NDB at McMurdo Station, not appreciating that this track will take them over Erebus.
The evidence shows that the pilots did not believe the track went to the NDB. They all worked out from the co-ordinates on the flight plan they were shown that the final waypoint was west of McMurdo Station.
Collins and Cassin demonstrated in the most conclusive way possible that they did not believe the track went over Erebus to a now non-existent NDB.
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Desert Dingo: The evidence of the three surviving pilots simply doesn't wash. Two of them, allegedly, are sitting there listening to the briefing and simultaneously engaging in this strange eye-balling exercise, one guessing that the waypoint is 10 miles from McMurdo Station, while the other is guessing that it is 50 miles from McMurdo Station. As this is going on, Captain Wilson is making it quite clear to them where he thinks the final waypoint is, and yet neither gentleman says anything. Wherever the f*ck Capt. Wilson might have said it was, it must have been at a position that was at variance with the position estimated by one or other - and yet there is no comment by either.
Then there is their flight down, and the "10 miles" nonsense, followed by the phone call from Capt S. to advise Capt. J. that he can't use the scale on a map and that other pilots should be advised of what an idiot he is.
Then there is their flight down, and the "10 miles" nonsense, followed by the phone call from Capt S. to advise Capt. J. that he can't use the scale on a map and that other pilots should be advised of what an idiot he is.
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Capt Wilson did in fact, if my memory serves me right, do a trip to the ice. It was on the trip that diverted due weather at McMurdo, to the alternate advertised sites, South Magnetic pole I think
Mahon Page 60(e) Captain Wilson, the supervisor of the RCU briefing procedures, had not flown to McMurdo Sound. He had applied to go on such a flight, so as to improve his knowledge of antarctic conditions, but his application had been declined by Flight Operations Division.
The one item that was always going to lead to grief is contained right here, and is what precipitated the whole event.
Chippendale 2.10 There was no explanation of the horizon and surface definition terms in the operators’ route qualification briefing or pre-flight dispatch planning, and only a passing reference to white out conditions.
As you say prospector
but if people will not accept that going VMC in the reported conditions, was not a clever thing to do
I've ploughed through the Senate's hansard, and it's mostly irrelevent - which is typical of politicians. This accident was, clearly, the result of inadequate training in night-flying
Your reference to "a low run in a light plane at night" has no bearing on the ability to operate in white out conditions. An anolgy I might make is the ability to fly formation. You may be an ace in the day time but you need to step very carefully and ease into it by way of training to do it at night, and we had occasion to do it with no lights.
For background, I spent a goodly part of my 20,000 hour career attempting to maintain VMC, and a lot of times not succeeding, in an area noted for its lousy weather. And had occasion to experience whiteout, brown out, grey out and black out, depending on the surface medium.
I quote from Post No 1 by Wirraway:
The world aviation community owes so much to the Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice Peter Mahon.
It is always too easy to blame pilot error for a particularly inconvenient accident. This is especially so, when the crew involved are unable to defend themselves. The punishment for the so identified "perpetrators" of such accidents is of course, their own demise in the accident. It is then ever so easy for the politicians to "clear the decks", and "to move on".
The enquiring mind of Justice Peter Mahon and his strength of character in reporting precisely what he found has re-set the baseline for subsequent and all future aircraft accident investigations forever.
The pain continued as New Zealanders tried to understand what had happened. On one side of what was to become a bitter national debate, air accident chief inspector Ron Chippindale ruled it was pilot error. He said the pilots were flying too low when they had not established where they were. On the other, Commission of Inquiry head Justice Peter Mahon blamed Air New Zealand for a last-minute change to the flight path that took the plane over towering Mt Erebus. It was a change of which the pilots were unaware. Mahon also leveled the charge of an attempted cover-up by the national airline.
It is always too easy to blame pilot error for a particularly inconvenient accident. This is especially so, when the crew involved are unable to defend themselves. The punishment for the so identified "perpetrators" of such accidents is of course, their own demise in the accident. It is then ever so easy for the politicians to "clear the decks", and "to move on".
The enquiring mind of Justice Peter Mahon and his strength of character in reporting precisely what he found has re-set the baseline for subsequent and all future aircraft accident investigations forever.
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Make a Novel of It
I'm not of a suspicious nature, but sometimes I wonder if you take most of the facts of a tragedy and build a crime scene, that it might not be instructional.
How would you build this accident into a crime? Nigel is a field service engineer for the mainframe computer co. that maintains the system used by ANZ dispatch. The passenger in 16A for this flight is banging Nigel's wife, and Nigel is angry.
Nigel, not a pilot, writes a little routine into the computer that changes the lat/long of McMurdo, putting Erebus in its path. It is a routine that then self destructs, leaving no clue.
How plausible is this plot?
Scenario 1: the crew avoids Erebus by discovering the wrong lat/long, or by lack of white-out. The ensuing investigation is chalked up as a computer error. News of it leaks, and Nigel's enemy gets religion and gives up adultery.
Scenario 2: The plane hits Erebus and Nigel is avenged. The AINS-70 data does not survive, so it appears they were just off course. McDonnell-Douglas, Collins Avionics and Litton Industries are sued for more than $2 Billion US.
Any more? Can the facts of this case ever be made into a credible plot?
GB
How would you build this accident into a crime? Nigel is a field service engineer for the mainframe computer co. that maintains the system used by ANZ dispatch. The passenger in 16A for this flight is banging Nigel's wife, and Nigel is angry.
Nigel, not a pilot, writes a little routine into the computer that changes the lat/long of McMurdo, putting Erebus in its path. It is a routine that then self destructs, leaving no clue.
How plausible is this plot?
Scenario 1: the crew avoids Erebus by discovering the wrong lat/long, or by lack of white-out. The ensuing investigation is chalked up as a computer error. News of it leaks, and Nigel's enemy gets religion and gives up adultery.
Scenario 2: The plane hits Erebus and Nigel is avenged. The AINS-70 data does not survive, so it appears they were just off course. McDonnell-Douglas, Collins Avionics and Litton Industries are sued for more than $2 Billion US.
Any more? Can the facts of this case ever be made into a credible plot?
GB
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AINS-70 Navigation
Ampan wrote in #523, "The crew thought they were identical, but they were not. It may be that the check was performed using the earlier flightplan. But they shouldn’t have used either of the printed flightplans. The digits on the printed flightplans did not tell them where they were going. The digits that told them where they were going were those that had been entered (my bold) into the AINS before take-off, and that’s where they should have looked."
That makes it sound as if some anonymous person or device had entered the waypoints into the AINS-70. Remember, there was no company route for Antarctica on the AINS-70 flight data tape. Waypoints had to be entered manually, just as in any INS of the day.
I have never seen or heard of an airline operation where manual waypoints are entered by anybody other than the flight crew. That person would have used the flightplan as source of the waypoints' lats/longs.
When another of the crew verified the correctness of the waypoints, he would have used the same flightplan. If they had used an earlier flightplan, they would have been steered clear of Erebus.
Having a National Geographic map of Antarctica onboard for plotting their course - would have made the difference.
GB
That makes it sound as if some anonymous person or device had entered the waypoints into the AINS-70. Remember, there was no company route for Antarctica on the AINS-70 flight data tape. Waypoints had to be entered manually, just as in any INS of the day.
I have never seen or heard of an airline operation where manual waypoints are entered by anybody other than the flight crew. That person would have used the flightplan as source of the waypoints' lats/longs.
When another of the crew verified the correctness of the waypoints, he would have used the same flightplan. If they had used an earlier flightplan, they would have been steered clear of Erebus.
Having a National Geographic map of Antarctica onboard for plotting their course - would have made the difference.
GB
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Greybeard: Yes, it was a member of the crew who typed the waypoints into the AINS, using the printout of the flightplan provided at despatch. As the McMurdo waypoint was being entered, it should have been checked against the chart (and they had charts, although not by National Geographic). Why? Because this waypoint had a question-mark next to it, or should have done.
If they didn't check the waypoint against the chart as it was entered, maybe they did it on the way down? If they did it on the way down, why was there an accident? One possible explanation is that they used the other printout of the flightplan - the one retained by Capt. Collins at the end of the briefing 19 days before. If you took the McMurdo waypoint from that flightplan and checked it against the chart, you would simply be repeating the plotting exercise that Capt. Collins did the night before.
If they didn't check the waypoint against the chart as it was entered, maybe they did it on the way down? If they did it on the way down, why was there an accident? One possible explanation is that they used the other printout of the flightplan - the one retained by Capt. Collins at the end of the briefing 19 days before. If you took the McMurdo waypoint from that flightplan and checked it against the chart, you would simply be repeating the plotting exercise that Capt. Collins did the night before.
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Brian Abraham,
"The crews received zip training to prepare them for operating VMC in antarctica at any altitude below the LSALT"
That is of course correct, but to put the blame on the company only for this state of affairs does not tell the whole story. Capt Gemmel explained that he spent time with the Deep Freeze operators to glean as much knowledge as possible before these flights were commenced. He states he was informed that if the flights stayed above 6,000ft, and in weather minima as laid down, there would be no problem with whiteout.
We all know the experience requirements of the other operators who operate down there regularly in as much as experience required before going down in command. No doubt the company would also have like to implement this policy. But who was it that insisted that these "perk" flights be shared amongst its members, thereby diluting any pool of experience amongst the available captains for these flights??.
And a bit more on Exhibit 164. This from Keith Amies from the Nav Section.
" Exhibit 164 had no significance at all in the operations to McMurdo. However, it was the only piece of evidence that could support the Commissioners contention that the DC10 was intentionally flight planned to somewhere other than McMurdo" and a lot more in the same vein.
We have seen what the Appeal Court thought of the amount of credence Justice Mahon put on Exhibit 164.
From Gordon Vette's book Impact Erebus,
"Among a number of maps and documents placed on the table before the pilots at the RCU briefing were four copies of an actual flight plan, one used only two days previously on Captain Wilson's Antarctic flight".
I have another reference somewhere stating that Capt Wilson was on the flight that diverted but cannot find it at this time.
"The crews received zip training to prepare them for operating VMC in antarctica at any altitude below the LSALT"
That is of course correct, but to put the blame on the company only for this state of affairs does not tell the whole story. Capt Gemmel explained that he spent time with the Deep Freeze operators to glean as much knowledge as possible before these flights were commenced. He states he was informed that if the flights stayed above 6,000ft, and in weather minima as laid down, there would be no problem with whiteout.
We all know the experience requirements of the other operators who operate down there regularly in as much as experience required before going down in command. No doubt the company would also have like to implement this policy. But who was it that insisted that these "perk" flights be shared amongst its members, thereby diluting any pool of experience amongst the available captains for these flights??.
And a bit more on Exhibit 164. This from Keith Amies from the Nav Section.
" Exhibit 164 had no significance at all in the operations to McMurdo. However, it was the only piece of evidence that could support the Commissioners contention that the DC10 was intentionally flight planned to somewhere other than McMurdo" and a lot more in the same vein.
We have seen what the Appeal Court thought of the amount of credence Justice Mahon put on Exhibit 164.
From Gordon Vette's book Impact Erebus,
"Among a number of maps and documents placed on the table before the pilots at the RCU briefing were four copies of an actual flight plan, one used only two days previously on Captain Wilson's Antarctic flight".
I have another reference somewhere stating that Capt Wilson was on the flight that diverted but cannot find it at this time.
Last edited by prospector; 9th Mar 2008 at 21:55.
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Ampan,
"I'm not really sure about the legal situation concerning the Chippendale and Mahon reports."
This from John Kings publication, which I am sure was very well researched and had the benefit of hind sight.
"Because the findings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the cause of the disaster were limited in scope, being legally an opinion and not a statement of fact, they could not be appealed in legal terms, unlike the Office of Air Accidents Investigation report, which remains the sole official account--and has never been officially challenged."
"I'm not really sure about the legal situation concerning the Chippendale and Mahon reports."
This from John Kings publication, which I am sure was very well researched and had the benefit of hind sight.
"Because the findings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the cause of the disaster were limited in scope, being legally an opinion and not a statement of fact, they could not be appealed in legal terms, unlike the Office of Air Accidents Investigation report, which remains the sole official account--and has never been officially challenged."
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FlexibleResponse, an all too objective, factual and sensible post. I think the
is alive and well and of a nature where no argument of fact will be allowed to influence entrenched positions. I'm taking the advice contained in your post
bitter national debate
to "clear the decks", and "to move on".
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OK: give it a break.
If you are not prepared to put up the time and money to challenge the findings, decisions in court it is over; finished, Kaput.
Raking over old coals with suspicions, innuendo, irrelevant theories will achieve little and is highly boring.
If you have a bone to pursue, put your cash where your mouth is.
Time for the thread to be locked?
DK
If you are not prepared to put up the time and money to challenge the findings, decisions in court it is over; finished, Kaput.
Raking over old coals with suspicions, innuendo, irrelevant theories will achieve little and is highly boring.
If you have a bone to pursue, put your cash where your mouth is.
Time for the thread to be locked?
DK
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"The enquiring mind of Justice Peter Mahon and his strength of character in reporting precisely what he found has re-set the baseline for subsequent and all future aircraft accident investigations forever"
"If you are not prepared to put up the time and money to challenge the findings, decisions in court it is over; finished, Kaput."
"Because the findings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the cause of the disaster were limited in scope, being legally an opinion and not a statement of fact, they could not be appealed in legal terms, unlike the Office of Air Accidents Investigation report, which remains the sole official account--and has never been officially challenged.
"Raking over old coals with suspicions, innuendo, irrelevant theories will achieve little and is highly boring."
Does this thread jump onto your computer or do you select the thread???
Does that clear up those statements?? you will note that that Chippendales accident report has never been officially challenged, and it is not possible to legally challenge Mahon's findings.
"If you are not prepared to put up the time and money to challenge the findings, decisions in court it is over; finished, Kaput."
"Because the findings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the cause of the disaster were limited in scope, being legally an opinion and not a statement of fact, they could not be appealed in legal terms, unlike the Office of Air Accidents Investigation report, which remains the sole official account--and has never been officially challenged.
"Raking over old coals with suspicions, innuendo, irrelevant theories will achieve little and is highly boring."
Does this thread jump onto your computer or do you select the thread???
Does that clear up those statements?? you will note that that Chippendales accident report has never been officially challenged, and it is not possible to legally challenge Mahon's findings.
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Lock the thread?! No way.
Dark Knight #549:
Lock the thread?! This thread has managed to chop things right down to the bare bones. Closing it off would be premature, at this stage.
Instead of throwing your hands up and tipping over the chess board, why not do some research and then post it?
Lock the thread?! This thread has managed to chop things right down to the bare bones. Closing it off would be premature, at this stage.
Instead of throwing your hands up and tipping over the chess board, why not do some research and then post it?
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Dark Knight:
If you find this thread boring then go away or otherwise pull your head in.
I’m having a great debate with ampan as to whether Captain Willson really told the crews that the track went over Erebus. Some good points are being made on each side, and hopefully when the dust settles we will both agree on what really happened.
Back to the fray:
Captain Wilson briefed crews that the track was over Erebus?
Then cop this: These dates are for the briefings/flights made after the flight plan McMurdo waypoint was “accidentally changed” to be at the head of McMurdo sound. At the same time some briefing material in the Antarctic pack also “accidentally changed” to show a track down McMurdo Sound. Quite a coincidence that.
Date of flight-- Pilot’s Name-- Evidence showed he believed track went to:
07.11.78 -- McWilliams-- McMurdo Sound
14.11.78 -- Calder -- Uncertain
21.11.78 -- Griffiths -- No evidence
28.11.78 -- Ruffell -- Ambiguous McMurdo
07.11.79 -- Dalziel --McMurdo Sound
14.11.79 -- Simpson -- McMurdo Sound
14.11.79 -- Gabriel -- McMurdo Sound
21.11.79 -- White -- McMurdo Sound
21.11.79 -- Irvine -- McMurdo Sound
So Captain Wilson must have been pretty good at mumbling incoherently to be able to say the track went over Erebus and at the same time let all these pilots convince themselves that the track went down McMurdo Sound /sarc
ampan:
And what is your evidence to support this?
I have in Mahon’s report (p87 245(b))
“........ I accept without reservation what Captain Simpson had to say in evidence.”
If you find this thread boring then go away or otherwise pull your head in.
I’m having a great debate with ampan as to whether Captain Willson really told the crews that the track went over Erebus. Some good points are being made on each side, and hopefully when the dust settles we will both agree on what really happened.
Back to the fray:
Captain Wilson briefed crews that the track was over Erebus?
Then cop this: These dates are for the briefings/flights made after the flight plan McMurdo waypoint was “accidentally changed” to be at the head of McMurdo sound. At the same time some briefing material in the Antarctic pack also “accidentally changed” to show a track down McMurdo Sound. Quite a coincidence that.
Date of flight-- Pilot’s Name-- Evidence showed he believed track went to:
07.11.78 -- McWilliams-- McMurdo Sound
14.11.78 -- Calder -- Uncertain
21.11.78 -- Griffiths -- No evidence
28.11.78 -- Ruffell -- Ambiguous McMurdo
07.11.79 -- Dalziel --McMurdo Sound
14.11.79 -- Simpson -- McMurdo Sound
14.11.79 -- Gabriel -- McMurdo Sound
21.11.79 -- White -- McMurdo Sound
21.11.79 -- Irvine -- McMurdo Sound
So Captain Wilson must have been pretty good at mumbling incoherently to be able to say the track went over Erebus and at the same time let all these pilots convince themselves that the track went down McMurdo Sound /sarc
ampan:
Did Capt. Wilson tell the crew that the nav track was to the NBD at McMurdo Station? According to Mister Justice Mahon: Yes, he did.
I have in Mahon’s report (p87 245(b))
“........ I accept without reservation what Captain Simpson had to say in evidence.”
- Mahon accepts Simpson’s testimony without qualification
- Simpson ‘s testimony says (in part) that Wilson did not say the track went over Erebus
- Therefore Mahon cannot be agreeing that Wilson said the track was over Erebus.
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Desert Dingo:
Given that the only available records are the excerpts contained in MacFarlane's book, and given that MacFarlane is clearly a Mahon supporter, I may well have to go back to the Auckland Public Library and ask the nice lady to wheel up seven big volumes of evidence - which will then have to be photocopied, scanned, edited, and posted.
Happy to do this, but only if it's going to make a difference. So here's the question: If Captain Wilson told the crew, at the briefing, that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station, is it pilot error, of the 10-25% order?
Given that the only available records are the excerpts contained in MacFarlane's book, and given that MacFarlane is clearly a Mahon supporter, I may well have to go back to the Auckland Public Library and ask the nice lady to wheel up seven big volumes of evidence - which will then have to be photocopied, scanned, edited, and posted.
Happy to do this, but only if it's going to make a difference. So here's the question: If Captain Wilson told the crew, at the briefing, that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station, is it pilot error, of the 10-25% order?
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ampan:
Nah. If that was the case I would give you more than that. I would be straight over into the Chippindale camp – 100% pilot error.
There are these two scenarios:
I don’t follow your argument against McFarlane. I agree that much of the records of transcripts and briefs we are working with now come from his book, and it would be great if we could get back to the original transcripts. But your argument seems to be along the lines
Maybe he is a Mahon supporter because he has checked all the conclusions Mahon made and can’t find anything wrong with them.
To sustain your proposition that Wilson told Collins that the track was over Erebus you have to find an explanation as to why
How about this for a real simple explanation: Wilson did not say that the track was over Erebus.
That would be a good explanation for all the above.
If Captain Wilson told the crew, at the briefing, that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station, is it pilot error, of the 10-25% order?
There are these two scenarios:
- If Collins was told and believed that the track was over Erebus then it was a suicidal act of his to point the aircraft at Erebus and engage NAV with less than 10 miles to run
- If Collins was told, but did not believe the track was over Erebus because he had plotted a track down Mc Murdo Sound, then he was monumentally irresponsible not to question the difference in tracks.
I don’t follow your argument against McFarlane. I agree that much of the records of transcripts and briefs we are working with now come from his book, and it would be great if we could get back to the original transcripts. But your argument seems to be along the lines
- We are using data from McFarlane’s book
- McFarlane is clearly a Mahon supporter
- Therefore we should not trust anything in McFarlane’s book.
Maybe he is a Mahon supporter because he has checked all the conclusions Mahon made and can’t find anything wrong with them.
To sustain your proposition that Wilson told Collins that the track was over Erebus you have to find an explanation as to why
- All the briefing material implied the track was not over Erebus
- Why the final waypoint was in McMurdo Sound for 14 months and Wilson did not notice it.
- Why all those pilots said Wilson did not say that to them.
- Why did Collins engage NAV and fly a collision course with Erebus
- Why did Cassin not object to Collins doing this.
How about this for a real simple explanation: Wilson did not say that the track was over Erebus.
That would be a good explanation for all the above.
Last edited by Desert Dingo; 10th Mar 2008 at 09:43. Reason: Pedant mode: your "to the NDB" implies the "over Erebus" I have used.
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Desert Dingo:
We need to get the hypothesis straight, and also the “to the NDB” / “over Erebus” thing. Here’s the hypothesis:
(1) Capt. Wilson tells the crew that the nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station.
(2) He does not tell the crew that the nav track crosses Erebus.
(3) Capt. Collins, therefore, leaves the briefing believing that the nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station – but not knowing that the track goes over Erebus.
(4) Capt. Collins takes one of the copies of the flightplan that were available at the briefing.
(5) 18 days later, Capt. Collins gets out the copy of the flightplan and gets out his charts.
(6) He recalls that Capt. Wilson said that the nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station.
(7) He notes, from his charts, that a track from Cape Hallett to the NDB at McMurdo Station crosses Erebus.
(8) He plots the nav track, using the flightplan, and notes that it does not go to the NDB at McMurdo Station. Instead, it goes to a point near the Dailey Islands.
(9) He assumes that the nav track is as shown on the flightplan, and retains this assumption right through until a few seconds before impact. This was an error: he should have checked.
(10)F/O Cassin also left the briefing believing that the nav track went to
the NDB at McMurdo Station.
(11)On the morning of the flight, his captain tells him that it doesn’t. The captain
tells him that the nav track goes to a point near the Dailey Islands.
(12)F/O Cassin accepts what the captain says and adopts the captain’s
assumption. That was an error: he should have questioned the captain.
That’s the hypotheseis, which obvioiusly depends on establishing that Capt. Wilson told the crew that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station – but which does not depend on establishing that Capt. Wilson said that the nav track crossed Erebus.
So the question is this: If it is established that Capt. Wilson said that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station, would you accept, on the basis of the above, that there was a degree of pilot error? It appears that you answer would be ‘yes’, based on your scenario numbered (2).
As for McFarlane, although I’ve got no reason to doubt the accuracy of MacFarlane’s extracts, it’s MacFarlane who decides which pieces of the evidence to include. Given that he would appear to be an almost-rabid supporter of Mahon, it is preferable to cut out the middle-man and go straight to the transcript.
So it seems that I have some work to do.
We need to get the hypothesis straight, and also the “to the NDB” / “over Erebus” thing. Here’s the hypothesis:
(1) Capt. Wilson tells the crew that the nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station.
(2) He does not tell the crew that the nav track crosses Erebus.
(3) Capt. Collins, therefore, leaves the briefing believing that the nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station – but not knowing that the track goes over Erebus.
(4) Capt. Collins takes one of the copies of the flightplan that were available at the briefing.
(5) 18 days later, Capt. Collins gets out the copy of the flightplan and gets out his charts.
(6) He recalls that Capt. Wilson said that the nav track is to the NDB at McMurdo Station.
(7) He notes, from his charts, that a track from Cape Hallett to the NDB at McMurdo Station crosses Erebus.
(8) He plots the nav track, using the flightplan, and notes that it does not go to the NDB at McMurdo Station. Instead, it goes to a point near the Dailey Islands.
(9) He assumes that the nav track is as shown on the flightplan, and retains this assumption right through until a few seconds before impact. This was an error: he should have checked.
(10)F/O Cassin also left the briefing believing that the nav track went to
the NDB at McMurdo Station.
(11)On the morning of the flight, his captain tells him that it doesn’t. The captain
tells him that the nav track goes to a point near the Dailey Islands.
(12)F/O Cassin accepts what the captain says and adopts the captain’s
assumption. That was an error: he should have questioned the captain.
That’s the hypotheseis, which obvioiusly depends on establishing that Capt. Wilson told the crew that the nav track went to the NDB at McMurdo Station – but which does not depend on establishing that Capt. Wilson said that the nav track crossed Erebus.
So the question is this: If it is established that Capt. Wilson said that the nav track was to the NDB at McMurdo Station, would you accept, on the basis of the above, that there was a degree of pilot error? It appears that you answer would be ‘yes’, based on your scenario numbered (2).
As for McFarlane, although I’ve got no reason to doubt the accuracy of MacFarlane’s extracts, it’s MacFarlane who decides which pieces of the evidence to include. Given that he would appear to be an almost-rabid supporter of Mahon, it is preferable to cut out the middle-man and go straight to the transcript.
So it seems that I have some work to do.
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Desert Dingo #552:
Your summary of the previous flights is adapted from the table at p326 of MacFarlane’s book. Your adaptation of MacFarlane’s table is accurate, but Macfarlane’s table isn’t. According to MacFarlane, the table was constructed as follows: “The final column which is headed “Believed Flight Path Evidence” indicates which route, Erebus or McMurdo Sound, the pilot said in evidence he believed, as a result of the RCU briefing, the flightpath followed.” (p325)
We get back, again, to the trick question. What if a pilot’s evidence was “I don’t recall Captain Wilson saying that the track was over Erebus” and what if that pilot said nothing about what they actually recall Capt. Wilson saying concerning the nav track? Given that the choice is between “Erebus” and “McMurdo Sound”, that pilot’s evidence, given that he can’t recall being told the track was over Erebus, would receive the alternative tag: “McMurdo Sound”. But this is misleading, because the pilot, in his evidence, has not said “I recall Captain Wilson saying that the nav track went to a position in McMurdo Sound, by the Dailey Islands”. The pilot has said nothing on that subject. So a more accurate tag for the pilot’s evidence is “Not Erebus”.
Of the nine pilots listed in Desert Dingo's adaptation of MacFarlane’s table, eight say nothing about what they recall Capt. Wilson saying concerning the nav track – although six say that they cannot recall Capt. Wilson saying that the track went over Erebus (those six being tagged “McMurdo Sound” in the adapted table.)
The only pilot who gets close to giving evidence about their recall of what Capt. Wilson said is Capt McWilliams, as follows: “Following the briefing I received, I had a general understanding that the route south of Cape Hallett would proceed to a position west of McMurdo Base.” (p198) Apart from that one single vague reference by one of the nine pilots, there’s nothing else.
Capt. Ruffell’s evidence is interesting, because MacFarlane gives it an expanded treatment. Desert Dingo has labelled his evidence as “Ambiguous McMurdo”, but if you have a close look at it, it all makes perfect sense. From Capt. Ruffell’s typewritten statement, drafted by the union lawyers:
Capt. Ruffell is much more clear about the situation when his words are not sifted by the union lawyers. On 13 December 1979, two weeks after the accident, Ron Chippendale interviewed Capt. Ruffell. No notes were taken, but the AirNZ Flight Ops manager asked Capt. Ruffell to write out his own recollections. In those recollections, a copy of which was presumably made available to the union lawyers, Capt. Ruffell makes no bones about it. He recalls a question from Chippendale about the position of Erebus in relation to the track, and he records his answer as “My understanding was that [Mt Erebus] was more or less on the direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo.” He is quite clear as to where he understood the nav track to run: from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station – not to a position by the Dailey Islands.
There is no conflict in what Capt. Ruffell says re Erebus. He realised that the nav track went over Erebus after the briefing, not during it. This is confirmed in cross-examination:
MacFarlane appears to be a little bit unhappy with Capt. Ruffell’s evidence, because he attempts to pick holes in it. One attempt, at p206, is to point to the above answer and say “ … he appears to have believed that the NDB and airfield were west over the sea ice.” In other words, he appears to have believed that the runway was in the sea.
MacFarlane obviously thinks himself to be very clever. I think not. It is obvious what Capt. Ruffell means. He thought the track ran from McMurdo Station to the northwest, over the sea ice, to Cape Hallett.
Your summary of the previous flights is adapted from the table at p326 of MacFarlane’s book. Your adaptation of MacFarlane’s table is accurate, but Macfarlane’s table isn’t. According to MacFarlane, the table was constructed as follows: “The final column which is headed “Believed Flight Path Evidence” indicates which route, Erebus or McMurdo Sound, the pilot said in evidence he believed, as a result of the RCU briefing, the flightpath followed.” (p325)
We get back, again, to the trick question. What if a pilot’s evidence was “I don’t recall Captain Wilson saying that the track was over Erebus” and what if that pilot said nothing about what they actually recall Capt. Wilson saying concerning the nav track? Given that the choice is between “Erebus” and “McMurdo Sound”, that pilot’s evidence, given that he can’t recall being told the track was over Erebus, would receive the alternative tag: “McMurdo Sound”. But this is misleading, because the pilot, in his evidence, has not said “I recall Captain Wilson saying that the nav track went to a position in McMurdo Sound, by the Dailey Islands”. The pilot has said nothing on that subject. So a more accurate tag for the pilot’s evidence is “Not Erebus”.
Of the nine pilots listed in Desert Dingo's adaptation of MacFarlane’s table, eight say nothing about what they recall Capt. Wilson saying concerning the nav track – although six say that they cannot recall Capt. Wilson saying that the track went over Erebus (those six being tagged “McMurdo Sound” in the adapted table.)
The only pilot who gets close to giving evidence about their recall of what Capt. Wilson said is Capt McWilliams, as follows: “Following the briefing I received, I had a general understanding that the route south of Cape Hallett would proceed to a position west of McMurdo Base.” (p198) Apart from that one single vague reference by one of the nine pilots, there’s nothing else.
Capt. Ruffell’s evidence is interesting, because MacFarlane gives it an expanded treatment. Desert Dingo has labelled his evidence as “Ambiguous McMurdo”, but if you have a close look at it, it all makes perfect sense. From Capt. Ruffell’s typewritten statement, drafted by the union lawyers:
“The briefing was conducted by Captain J.P. Wilson. We were first shown an audio-visual presentation and briefing notes were distributed. There followed a talk though of the briefing notes page by page. I do not recall Captain Wilson making any statement to the effect that we would be overflying Mt Erebus.
I was not clear, following the briefing, of the relationship of the route south of Hallett to the topography. I had spoken to crew members of earlier flights and had learned that their flights flew up McMurdo Sound to the west of Mt Erebus.
Prior to my flight of 28 November 1978 I studied this NZMS135 chart and noted that a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Sation would overfly Ross Island and Mt Erebus. Prior to studying the map I had been unclear , as I stated above, that this would be the case, and I do not recall Captain Wilson making any clear statement to the effect that we would overfly Mt Erebus.” (pp203,204)
Note how the typewritten statement avoids any reference to where Captain Wilson actually said the nav track went. If you read between the lines, however, doesn’t Capt. Ruffell appear to be saying that Capt. Wilson told him that the nav track went to McMurdo Station? Note that NZMS135 was not available at the briefing. All that was available at the briefing was a photocopy of the inset diagram, which did not show Cape Hallett, so you couldn’t use it to picture the line from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station. . After the briefing, Capt. Ruffell obtains the full chart, and notes that the line from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station goes over Erebus. He says that prior to studying the chart he “had been unclear … that this would be the case.” So he appears to be saying the Capt. Wilson told him that the nav track was from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station.I was not clear, following the briefing, of the relationship of the route south of Hallett to the topography. I had spoken to crew members of earlier flights and had learned that their flights flew up McMurdo Sound to the west of Mt Erebus.
Prior to my flight of 28 November 1978 I studied this NZMS135 chart and noted that a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Sation would overfly Ross Island and Mt Erebus. Prior to studying the map I had been unclear , as I stated above, that this would be the case, and I do not recall Captain Wilson making any clear statement to the effect that we would overfly Mt Erebus.” (pp203,204)
Capt. Ruffell is much more clear about the situation when his words are not sifted by the union lawyers. On 13 December 1979, two weeks after the accident, Ron Chippendale interviewed Capt. Ruffell. No notes were taken, but the AirNZ Flight Ops manager asked Capt. Ruffell to write out his own recollections. In those recollections, a copy of which was presumably made available to the union lawyers, Capt. Ruffell makes no bones about it. He recalls a question from Chippendale about the position of Erebus in relation to the track, and he records his answer as “My understanding was that [Mt Erebus] was more or less on the direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo.” He is quite clear as to where he understood the nav track to run: from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station – not to a position by the Dailey Islands.
There is no conflict in what Capt. Ruffell says re Erebus. He realised that the nav track went over Erebus after the briefing, not during it. This is confirmed in cross-examination:
If you had not had that map for some time before your flight, do you think you would have appreciated that the aircraft’s path was over Ross Island from the briefing?
No, I think that prior to doing that I was under the impression that the track went north or west over the sea ice.”(p204) (I would question whether “north or west” is an accurate transcription of what Capt. Ruffell said.)
MacFarlane appears to be a little bit unhappy with Capt. Ruffell’s evidence, because he attempts to pick holes in it. One attempt, at p206, is to point to the above answer and say “ … he appears to have believed that the NDB and airfield were west over the sea ice.” In other words, he appears to have believed that the runway was in the sea.
MacFarlane obviously thinks himself to be very clever. I think not. It is obvious what Capt. Ruffell means. He thought the track ran from McMurdo Station to the northwest, over the sea ice, to Cape Hallett.