Erebus 25 years on
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Desert Dingo,
" Why should it “be taken with a shovel full of salt”?
Would you care to tell us exactly where Macfarlane and Allinson are in error when they say “…the very basis of the Law Lord’s ruling is a blatant contradiction.”
Well they cannot both be correct. We have either the Law Lords got it wrong or the Senior Law Lecturer has it wrong. Either way it is not a good look for the legal system.
Could you explain what is your interpretation of what what Mahon means when he states in his book "Verdict on Erebus",
" But the official view, as represented by Civil Aviation, was that the aircrew had no authority to descend below 16000ft. On this point the evidence was very clearly to the contrary. The officer in charge of the Route Clearance Unit of the company was plainly authorised on behalf of the company to brief the aircrews, as he had in fact done, by indicating that the aircraft could approach McMurdo at any altitude authorised or directed by the air traffic controllers at the American base."
As has plainly been shown many times the descent was requested VMC, and as stated many times VMC descent involves own responsibility for terrain clearance and avoidance of other traffic. The crew were never "authorised or directed" by the controllers for any descent, they obviously would have had to been identified on radar before such authorisation or direction could be given. They were never seen on the radar let alone identified.
Beaufort Island.
This was obviously sighted, in clear conditions as shown by the photographs salvaged from the wreckage, how could someone who had, as Mahon spent so much time pointing out, spent hours pooring over a "map" not realized, if they were on the track they thought they were on, was on the wrong side???
" Why should it “be taken with a shovel full of salt”?
Would you care to tell us exactly where Macfarlane and Allinson are in error when they say “…the very basis of the Law Lord’s ruling is a blatant contradiction.”
Well they cannot both be correct. We have either the Law Lords got it wrong or the Senior Law Lecturer has it wrong. Either way it is not a good look for the legal system.
Could you explain what is your interpretation of what what Mahon means when he states in his book "Verdict on Erebus",
" But the official view, as represented by Civil Aviation, was that the aircrew had no authority to descend below 16000ft. On this point the evidence was very clearly to the contrary. The officer in charge of the Route Clearance Unit of the company was plainly authorised on behalf of the company to brief the aircrews, as he had in fact done, by indicating that the aircraft could approach McMurdo at any altitude authorised or directed by the air traffic controllers at the American base."
As has plainly been shown many times the descent was requested VMC, and as stated many times VMC descent involves own responsibility for terrain clearance and avoidance of other traffic. The crew were never "authorised or directed" by the controllers for any descent, they obviously would have had to been identified on radar before such authorisation or direction could be given. They were never seen on the radar let alone identified.
Beaufort Island.
This was obviously sighted, in clear conditions as shown by the photographs salvaged from the wreckage, how could someone who had, as Mahon spent so much time pointing out, spent hours pooring over a "map" not realized, if they were on the track they thought they were on, was on the wrong side???
Last edited by prospector; 16th Feb 2008 at 20:17.
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Gary Parata,
"Yes it will be, but only to debunk it. No, I won't be drawn into doing that now, you will have to wait."
What debunk what is so obviously fact?? Were the crew experienced in Antarctic operations? No, they had never been down there. Was advice taken from the USAF, USN, RNZAF as to their experience requirements before going down there as PIC, obviously not, they certainly do not let anyone go down there as PIC on their first trip.
Why the wait? taking time to assemble your spin doctors and smoke and mirrors men?,
"Yes it will be, but only to debunk it. No, I won't be drawn into doing that now, you will have to wait."
What debunk what is so obviously fact?? Were the crew experienced in Antarctic operations? No, they had never been down there. Was advice taken from the USAF, USN, RNZAF as to their experience requirements before going down there as PIC, obviously not, they certainly do not let anyone go down there as PIC on their first trip.
Why the wait? taking time to assemble your spin doctors and smoke and mirrors men?,
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Prospector said:
No. After 29 years we have all got our stories straight.
Gary Parata
taking time to assemble your spin doctors and smoke and mirrors men?,
Gary Parata
Last edited by Gary Parata; 16th Feb 2008 at 20:14.
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Gary Parata,
Your forbearance is admirable, but does not explain how you can debunk fact.
" No. After 29 years we have all got our stories straight"
Really??? You mean they were not straight before 29 years???
Your forbearance is admirable, but does not explain how you can debunk fact.
" No. After 29 years we have all got our stories straight"
Really??? You mean they were not straight before 29 years???
Last edited by prospector; 16th Feb 2008 at 20:22.
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Facts are not debatable.
How they are presented, is.
I'm enjoying this game of tag, but I have to go off to work now. I'm sure we will resume this at a later stage, because if I've calibrated you correctly, you have the sort of ego that demands the last word.
I will save you that concern and allow you the luxury, but only because I've enjoyed reading your missives. They are good.
Gary
How they are presented, is.
I'm enjoying this game of tag, but I have to go off to work now. I'm sure we will resume this at a later stage, because if I've calibrated you correctly, you have the sort of ego that demands the last word.
I will save you that concern and allow you the luxury, but only because I've enjoyed reading your missives. They are good.
Gary
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Critical thinking
Prospector, perhaps an analysis of critical thinking is in order here.
You state “Well they cannot both be correct. We have either the Law Lords got it wrong or the Senior Law Lecturer has it wrong. Either way it is not a good look for the legal system.”
I agree with you there “. …either the Law Lords got it wrong or the Senior Law Lecturer has it wrong.”
The point we are debating is who got it wrong.
I have shown
1.Macfarland and Allinson’s conclusion that “the very basis of the Law Lord’s ruling is a blatant contradiction.”
2.The chain of logic he used to reach this conclusion, and
3.The facts (premises) on which his argument is based.
For a valid conclusion both the premises and the logic have to be correct.
I contend this is the case here, and as you have not shown there to be any errors in either their premises or logic, then their conclusion “the very basis of the Law Lord’s ruling is a blatant contradiction.” must stand.
When you state “If that is the opinion a senior law lecturer has of his peers in the Highest court in the land, than(sic) his opinion on anything to do with Erebus is surely to be taken with a shovel full of salt.”, your argument has the form;
1.Macfarland disagrees with the Law Lords
2.They are his peers in the highest court in the land.
3.Therefore his opinion on anything to do with Erebus is invalid.
In Logical Argument 101 that gets you an “F”.
The conclusion does not follow from the premises, and you are using an “Appeal to Authority” fallacy.
( just because they are Law Lords does not prevent them from making the odd mistake or two).
I’ll get back to you later to deconstruct your assertion about an unauthorized descent.
In the meantime you could brush up on how to present a valid argument.
You state “Well they cannot both be correct. We have either the Law Lords got it wrong or the Senior Law Lecturer has it wrong. Either way it is not a good look for the legal system.”
I agree with you there “. …either the Law Lords got it wrong or the Senior Law Lecturer has it wrong.”
The point we are debating is who got it wrong.
I have shown
1.Macfarland and Allinson’s conclusion that “the very basis of the Law Lord’s ruling is a blatant contradiction.”
2.The chain of logic he used to reach this conclusion, and
3.The facts (premises) on which his argument is based.
For a valid conclusion both the premises and the logic have to be correct.
I contend this is the case here, and as you have not shown there to be any errors in either their premises or logic, then their conclusion “the very basis of the Law Lord’s ruling is a blatant contradiction.” must stand.
When you state “If that is the opinion a senior law lecturer has of his peers in the Highest court in the land, than(sic) his opinion on anything to do with Erebus is surely to be taken with a shovel full of salt.”, your argument has the form;
1.Macfarland disagrees with the Law Lords
2.They are his peers in the highest court in the land.
3.Therefore his opinion on anything to do with Erebus is invalid.
In Logical Argument 101 that gets you an “F”.
The conclusion does not follow from the premises, and you are using an “Appeal to Authority” fallacy.
( just because they are Law Lords does not prevent them from making the odd mistake or two).
I’ll get back to you later to deconstruct your assertion about an unauthorized descent.
In the meantime you could brush up on how to present a valid argument.
Last edited by Desert Dingo; 16th Feb 2008 at 22:43.
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Desert Dingo,
"The point we are debating is who got it wrong."
Not interested in what the legal people think, and not in a position to gainsay either the Law Lords or a senior law lecturer. All this happened long after the accident, and patently had nothing to do with the cause of the accident.
just because they are Law Lords does not prevent them from making the odd mistake or two).
By the same token is a senior law lecturer above making the odd mistake
"In the meantime you could brush up on how to present a valid argument"
Right brushed up, all the points I have put forward are from the perspective of a person who flew aeroplanes for a long time, all your arguments seem to be based on "He said, they said, no they did not they said that. they said this."
It is really quite simple and goes back to the first commandment of Flying.
"Thou shalt not make a stuff up or the ground will arise and smite thee"
The ground certainly arose and smote? this aircraft, and it was because a stuff up was made.
I was under the impression that the debate was about who bore the greater part of the blame for this stuff up.
Mahon said the crew bore no responsibility whatsoever, I cannot agree with that conclusion and have put forward many facts to support that argument,
There can be no discussion about the cause of the accident, the perfectly serviceable aircraft was flown into a mountain that everybody knew was there.
The question is then why did they do this. My argument has been, and always will be, that the descent was carried out in complete contradiction to their standing orders.
If you can answer my last question re authorisation of descent by McMurdo that Mahon said justified their action, when at no time that authorisation was given, VMC descent being what they decided contrary again to requirements of both CAA and Company, then perhaps one could start to agree with Mahon on the cause of the accident.
He did find much to fault in the operation of these flights, and certainly the company needed a shake up, and other associations involved with the company also needed to review their actions relating to the event.
But, if the flight had not descended in contradiction to the special requirements of descent for that area, those requirements necessitated by the crews known lack of experience in Antarctic operations, then it would not have hit the mountain.
"The point we are debating is who got it wrong."
Not interested in what the legal people think, and not in a position to gainsay either the Law Lords or a senior law lecturer. All this happened long after the accident, and patently had nothing to do with the cause of the accident.
just because they are Law Lords does not prevent them from making the odd mistake or two).
By the same token is a senior law lecturer above making the odd mistake
"In the meantime you could brush up on how to present a valid argument"
Right brushed up, all the points I have put forward are from the perspective of a person who flew aeroplanes for a long time, all your arguments seem to be based on "He said, they said, no they did not they said that. they said this."
It is really quite simple and goes back to the first commandment of Flying.
"Thou shalt not make a stuff up or the ground will arise and smite thee"
The ground certainly arose and smote? this aircraft, and it was because a stuff up was made.
I was under the impression that the debate was about who bore the greater part of the blame for this stuff up.
Mahon said the crew bore no responsibility whatsoever, I cannot agree with that conclusion and have put forward many facts to support that argument,
There can be no discussion about the cause of the accident, the perfectly serviceable aircraft was flown into a mountain that everybody knew was there.
The question is then why did they do this. My argument has been, and always will be, that the descent was carried out in complete contradiction to their standing orders.
If you can answer my last question re authorisation of descent by McMurdo that Mahon said justified their action, when at no time that authorisation was given, VMC descent being what they decided contrary again to requirements of both CAA and Company, then perhaps one could start to agree with Mahon on the cause of the accident.
He did find much to fault in the operation of these flights, and certainly the company needed a shake up, and other associations involved with the company also needed to review their actions relating to the event.
But, if the flight had not descended in contradiction to the special requirements of descent for that area, those requirements necessitated by the crews known lack of experience in Antarctic operations, then it would not have hit the mountain.
Last edited by prospector; 16th Feb 2008 at 23:57.
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Quote GP..."I will save you that concern and allow you the luxury, but only because I've enjoyed reading your missives. They are good."
Gary P...that may be so,but he raises a very good point
Gary P...that may be so,but he raises a very good point
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Originally Posted by prospector
The question is then why did they do this. My argument has been, and always will be, that the descent was carried out in complete contradiction to their standing orders.
Originally Posted by prospector
But, if the flight had not descended in contradiction to the special requirements of descent for that area, those requirements necessitated by the crews known lack of experience in Antarctic operations, then it would not have hit the mountain.
About the only way you could put in down to 1 IF that could be attributed to the crew is if they had mistyped the co-ordinates into the computer at the beginning of the flight, or if Collins had plotted the path onto his map incorrectly (if they were following a line he had drawn on a map, had anyone else checked that the line he had drawn was in the correct place)
Originally Posted by prospector
Beaufort Island.
This was obviously sighted, in clear conditions as shown by the photographs salvaged from the wreckage, how could someone who had, as Mahon spent so much time pointing out, spent hours pooring over a "map" not realized, if they were on the track they thought they were on, was on the wrong side???
This was obviously sighted, in clear conditions as shown by the photographs salvaged from the wreckage, how could someone who had, as Mahon spent so much time pointing out, spent hours pooring over a "map" not realized, if they were on the track they thought they were on, was on the wrong side???
Originally Posted by ampan
Gentlemen, Who really gives a toss about what the lawyers think, whether it be Justice Mahon, or Stuart McFarlane, or Judge Greene, or the NZ Court of Appeal, or the Privy Council? I just want to be able to see the information that these lawyers saw, so that I can make up my own mind.
Originally Posted by Desert Dingo
Can you give me some more details about this case? I have tracked down a Judge Harold H. Greene of the US District Court in Washington DC but can’t find the case you mention.
Can you give me any info on the case number, date plaintiffs/respondents etc.?
Did this judge conduct a separate accident investigation, or did he rely on Chippindale’s report?
Can you give me any info on the case number, date plaintiffs/respondents etc.?
Did this judge conduct a separate accident investigation, or did he rely on Chippindale’s report?
Originally Posted by ampan
(Some criticism had been made of the slight delay in attempting to climb out after the GPWS sounded, but it should be noted that the first officer had just recommended climbing out to the right, which the captain was starting to have doubts about. The GPWS sounded and then the captain had to decide between the left and the right, which he does in a remarkably short time, and manages to get it right.)
Originally Posted by prospector
The following statement from Ron Chippendale would be what I find sums up the situation best, but it would appear I am in a minority with this belief, but hopefully it has made people rethink Mahons findings.
"The errors in the briefing were serious but not an absolute excuse for the accident when the means were readily available for the pilot in command to make certain he knew where he was."
"The errors in the briefing were serious but not an absolute excuse for the accident when the means were readily available for the pilot in command to make certain he knew where he was."
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Beaufort Island
The links posted yesterday by Desert Dingo demonstrate the point: The 3D diagram is at page 103 of the Chippendale Report. At the position marked "P" on the track, the flight commentator says: “There you go. There’s some land ahead.”
Mahon Report, page 154: These are two photos taken by passengers seated on the right-hand side of the plane. They must have been taken just after the completion of the final 180 degree orbit. The scanned versions of the photos shown in the link posted yesterday are not as quite as good as those shown in the original Mahon Report, but they demonstrate the point. This is not an anonymous rock in the middle of the ocean. (In fact, it is about 4 nautical miles long and its maximum height above sea level is 2428 feet.)
It has to be assumed that the crew saw what the passengers and the flight commentator saw. The sighting of this island should have resulted in an appreciation that things were not quite right. If the McMurdo Sound nav track had been plotted on a map/chart, then the plain fact is that there should not have been an island of significant size and height in that position. If this had been appreciated, it would have been a simple matter to check the current coordinates being generated by the AINS, at which point, the appreciation of the things being not quite right would have become an appreciation of things being very wrong. The crew would then have done a 180 degree turn, climbed back to 18000 feet, and then tried to figure things out.
It appears that the crew saw the island but never appreciated that it wasn’t supposed to there. That failure in itself is not necessarily pilot error. However, the failure supports Chippendale’s finding that the crew did not attempt to verify their position before commencing their descent to McMurdo Station. It is useful, in my opinion, to ask what the situation would have been if it was intended to land at McMurdo Station. In that event, verification of the aircraft’s position independently of the AINS would have been an absolute requirement. There could have been no landing approach unless and until the position had been verified. The approach that the crew were about to commence was similar to a landing approach. It is reasonable to expect the crew to have taken similar precautions, before commencing their descent from 18000 feet. There were only two available methods to verify their position: (1) Visually, using a chart, or: (2) By ground radar. (Although McMurdo Station had an NDB and a TACAN, the NDB wasn’t working and the TACAN only provided the distance from the TACAN to the aircraft, not the distance and bearing.) Visual verification from 18000 feet was difficult, given the cloud cover. And the crew had not been advised that Air Traffic Control had located the aircraft on radar. In those circumstances, the aircraft should have stayed at 18000 feet. (This, of course, would have meant that the passengers would not see McMurdo Station, because no cloud-break procedure was available, because the NDB wasn’t working. So there was an obvious temptation to take the opportunity presented by the hole in the cloud cover.)
Several contributors cite the alleged prohibition against descent below 18000 feet before passing Erebus, as did Ron Chippendale. But if you plough through Mahon’s Report, it’s difficult to see an unequivocal prohibition against descent below 18000 feet in VMC. When the issue is pilot error, however, does there have to be a breach of an express rule? You can’t have a rule for every conceivable situation. Where the rules are silent, you are left with the rules of good airmanship, and the pilots are to be judged against the standard of the average pilot - not the best, and not the worst. If the crew of TE901 were guilty of pilot error at any point, it was when they commenced their descent from 18000 feet before verifying their position. The crew might have thought that they could obtain a visual fix once below the cloud, or that they would be picked up on radar. But at the time they began the descent, the only positional information they had was from the AINS, yet they were going to descent to an altitude that was below the height of an obvious hazard. If they made an error, that was it.
Mahon, and his legal lapdogs, such as Stuart Macfarlane, have devoted hundreds of words to the reliability of the AINS. From this, they conclude that the crew was entitled to descend from 18000 feet, because their position did not need to be verified, because the AINS is never wrong. Yet they make these statements in the context of an accident where the AINS directed the aircraft into the side of a mountain. Of course the AINS can be wrong. It requires human input. Humans make mistakes. In the case of TE901, a print-out of the waypoints was provided before take-off. Wasn’t it possible that the Navigation Section might have made an error? The waypoints on the print-out were then entered into the AINS by one of the crew. Wasn’t it possible for a typing error to have been made and not picked up in the cross-checks? It is always possible for the AINS to be wrong, which is why the position had to be verified before descending. If that basic principle had been adhered to, the accident would not have occurred.
So the crew has to bear a share of the responsibility. How much? Although Mahon was a one-man band, he had an experienced aviator to assist him: Sir Rochford Hughes. After the report was published, Sir Rochford said that although he agreed with much of the report, he believed that the crew had to bear a share of the blame, and he put that share at 10%. If Mahon had said the same thing, this argument would have been over decades ago.
On the topic of Messrs Mahon and MacFarlane, anyone reading MacFarlane’s book will note the constant attempts to find contradictions between what someone said on one occasion and what they said on another. (His attempts usually fail. On the rare occasions that he succeeds, it’s to a nitpicking degree.) Yet MacFarlane never puts Mahon under his forensic microscope. If he had done so, he might have noted something a little strange about Mahon’s statements concerning Beaufort Island.
In his report, at paragraph (i) on page 115, Mahon says:
“It therefore follows that because Captain Collins believed that his nav track was taking him down the centre of McMurdo Sound, no one on the flight deck would ever identify any island on or near their path as being Beaufort Island. They would all be aware that it was far away to the north-east, and I venture to say, that although no direct reference is made to the point in the CVR transcript apart from Mr Mulgrew’s “land ahead”, the five persons on the flight deck undoubtedly saw Beaufort Island, and mistook it for a different island altogether, probably, as Mr Shannon thought, Dunlop Island, which is off the Victoria Land coastline. Anyhow, in the minds of the crew the island they must have seen could not possibly have been Beaufort Island, because as previously indicated, the latter landmark would be many miles away in quite a different location.”
Then, at page 153, while discussing AirNZs failure to ensure that a member of the crew has previous Antarctic experience, Mahon says:
“But a previous flight under supervision would almost certainly have resulted in Captain Collins noting the distinctive feature of Beaufort Island which would have been apparent as the only identifiable island in the area. Figure 16, page 154, consists of prints developed from passengers’ cameras, in which Beaufort Island is clearly visible. The film in each case was slightly damaged, and the actual view of Beaufort Island would have been more distinct than the view displayed on the prints. Had Captain Collins seen Beaufort Island previously, and identified it on the fatal flight, he would certainly have realised that his nav track had been changed.”
In his report, Mahon also refers to his visit to Antarctica, one year after the accident. His report, obviously, was published after that visit and it contains the conclusions he formed as a result of the visit.
It is clear, from the report, that Mahon concluded that Peter Mulgrew was on the flightdeck when Beaufort Island was visible. He says that the five persons on the flightdeck, one of whom was Mulgrew, “undoubtedly” saw the island. And Mahon had no difficulty accepting that when Mulgrew said “land ahead”, Mulgrew was referring to Beaufort Island.
After the report was published, Mahon’s findings concerning Beaufort Island were criticised, deservedly. Then, three years later, Mahon wrote his book, “Verdict on Erebus”. In his book he again describes his visit to Antarctica, and he again describes the conclusions he drew from that visit - and he again refers to Beaufort Island, at pages 199-203 of his book.
At page 199, Mahon begins with
“But, equally significantly, was the view I has seen from the Hercules of Beaufort Island. Again I has seen exactly what the crew of the DC10 had seen and from the same height and angle of vision. And I thought I had discovered why the crew never identified Beaufort Island, and I was now sure now why Peter Mulgrew had not realised that Beaufort Island was on the wrong side of the aircraft.”
Gents, please read these pages in Mahon’s book. There is absolutely no doubt that he is referring to the conclusions he reached during his visit to Antarctica, which visit occurred, obviously, before he wrote his report. And having visited Anarctica and having reached various conclusions as a result of the visit, one would think that Mahon would have included those conclusions in his report, that being the whole point of the taxpayer paying for him to go down there. So he goes down to Antarctica, forms his conclusions, and then writes his report. In that report, he says that Mulgrew saw the island. But in the book, he says that Mulgrew didn’t.
Don’t take my word for this: Read the report, and then read the book that was written three years later. Both describe exactly the same thing, namely, the conclusions that Mahon reached as a result of his visit to Antarctica. Mahon’s report says that Mulgrew saw the island. Mahon’s book says that Mulgrew did not see the island.
In his book, Mahon suggests that Mulgrew was not on the flightdeck when Beaufort Island was visible. Instead, he paints a dramatic picture of Mulgrew struggling up the aisle of the aircraft on his artificial legs, being detained by passengers wanting to chat, and reaching the cockpit two minutes too late. I’m probably labouring the point here, but if Mahon, on his visit to Antarctica, formed the view that Mulgrew was not on the flightdeck when Beaufort Island was visible, then why didn’t he say so in his report? .
So, can any of the d8ckhead lawyers out there in internetland explain this clear and obvious contradiction? The only explanation is that Mahon was just like most others: On occasions, this one in particular, he did not let the truth get in the way of a good story. If ALPA are going to simply shove the Mahon Report onto the website and say that it is the definitive verdict, there should at least be an asterisk referring readers to the passages referred to above.
My fingers are starting to get a bit sore, but the other contentious aspect of Mahon’s report is his finding that the two AirNZ briefing officers lied under oath when they gave evidence that the crew were told that the nav track went over Erebus, not down McMurdo Sound. This finding was not supported in the subsequent litigation, but, as I’ve said before, I don’t care what another load of lawyers might think. AirNZ’s position was that the nav track was always supposed to be direct to McMurdo Station, over Erebus. AirNZ said that errors were made, which caused the final waypoint to be shifted to a position in McMurdo Sound. AirNZ said that the error was discovered as a result of the conversation between Captain S and Captain J that took place about two weeks before the fatal flight, when Captain S told Captain J that the waypoint was not where he expected it to be. AirNZ said that the error was corrected on the morning of the fatal flight and admitted that the crew was not told. AirNZ accepted that a sample flightplan shown at the briefing contained the erroneous track, down McMurdo Sound. So the allegedly-brilliant piece of forensic analysis by Mahon was on the table right from the outset. All of the relevant facts are recorded in Chippendale’s report. Having admitted to an appalling series of blunders, AirNZ still maintained that the two briefing officers had told the crew that the nav track went over Erebus. The two briefing officers attended the hearing, put their hands on the bible, and gave evidence under oath as to what they told the crew: The nav track goes over Erebus. Mahon found that both briefing officers committed perjury.
It is important to examine what happened immediately after the accident. Ron Chippendale was obviously involved right from the outset. In his evidence to the Royal Commission, Chippendale said he was aware of the change in co-ordinates at a very early stage, but he didn’t know whether it was a cause. So he spoke with the crew who attended the same briefing as the crew of the fatal flight. According to Chippendale, these crew-members told him that they believed that the nav track went over Erebus. Although Mahon does not mention it, Ron Chippendale gave evidence to the Royal Commission that the crew-members who attended the same briefing as the crew on the fatal flight told him that they believed that the nav track went over Erebus. As a result, Chippendale found that the change in co-ordinates was not a cause of the accident, because the crew were told at the briefing that the nav track went over Erebus.
Mr MacFarlane babbles on about Chippendale’s failure to take formal written statements from the pilots he spoke with. In hindsight, that might have been a good idea – but Chippendale didn’t know that this accident would be the subject of 30 years worth of books and articles and internet postings. His job was to investigate the accident and the first thing he had to decide was where he should look. The change in co-ordinates was an obvious avenue if inquiry, so he spoke with the briefing officers and with the surviving pilots who attended the briefing. According to Chippendale, there was no significant dispute. The two briefing officers said that they told the pilots that the nav track went over Erebus, and the surviving pilots who attended the briefing agreed. Given that, Chippendale reported that there was no evidence that the change in co-ordinates had misled the crew.
Some months later, at the hearing before the Royal Commission, the surviving pilots who attended the briefing gave evidence. They said, in summary, that they were not told that the nav track went over Erebus. They said that they believed that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound.
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be room for any middle ground here. Either the briefing officers lied as a result of pressure from AirNZ, or the surviving pilots lied as a result of pressure from the union. Mahon decided that the two briefing officers were lying, but his finding to that effect was based on an assumption that the erroneous McMurdo Sound waypoint was, in fact, a deliberate change, known to the briefing officers. If the briefing officers knew that the nav track actually went down McMurdo Sound, they would not have told the crew that the nav track went over Erebus.
Mahon’s conspiracy theory, to the effect that the McMurdo Sound nav track was deliberate was, in my considered opinion, b8llocks. If the Navigation Section had hatched some bizarre plan to change the track to the military route, then they would have selected the waypoint used on the military route, being the Byrd Reporting Point. They did not. The waypoint was down by the Dailey Islands, in no-man’s land. And its co-ordinates were consistent with an error in data-entry.
Mahon got it into his head that the McMurdo Sound route was the obvious route, so much so that he thought that a route over Erebus could never have been intended. His reason for thinking the McMurdo Sound route to be obvious was the high ground on Ross Island. But lets think about this a little bit. In blue sky conditions, the nav track doesn’t really matter, because you can see the high ground on Ross Island. What if Ross Island and McMurdo Station are covered in cloud? In that situation, if you wanted to see McMurdo Station you had to perform a cloud-break manouvre using the NDB. And how are you going to get to the NDB? Via the nav track. So it makes perfect sense to align the nav track from Cape Hallett with the NDB at McMurdo Station, with the track going over Erebus. If I’m wrong about this, I look forward to being corrected.
The point I’m trying to make is that Mahon’s impression of the evidence of the two briefing officers was affected by incorrect conclusions he drew about other evidence. Isn’t it possible that these two gentlemen might have been telling the truth? In other words, isn’t it possible that the crew were, in fact, told that the nav track went over Erebus? It might be said that this could not have happened, given that the aircraft was flown into Erebus in nav mode. It should be noted, however, that the briefing occurred many days before the flight, and that copies of the McMurdo Sound co-ordinates were available and might have been noted by members of the crew. If that occurred, the pilots might have assumed that the written material was correct, rather than the oral material. The making of such an assumption without seeking clarification would be a clear case of pilot error, but it cannot be discounted.
The issue as to what was said at the briefing is directly linked to the issue concerning the final change of the waypoint. There is no dispute as to the initiating cause of the change: It was the result of the communication between Captain S and Captain J. Captain S attended the briefing. He then commanded a flight to Antarctica, during which he noted that the waypoint (then located at the end of McMurdo Sound) was not where he expected it to be. Captain S gave evidence before the Royal Commission and said that the two briefing officers did not say that the nav track went over Erebus. He said that be believed that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound.
Why, then, was the waypoint not where Captain S expected it be. If the briefing officers did not tell Captain S that the track was over Erebus, and if Captain S believed that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound, then Captain S would have expected the waypoint to be at the end of McMurdo Sound – which is where it was.
So was there anything unusual for Captain S. to report? No – as long as his evidence about the briefing was correct.
The links posted yesterday by Desert Dingo demonstrate the point: The 3D diagram is at page 103 of the Chippendale Report. At the position marked "P" on the track, the flight commentator says: “There you go. There’s some land ahead.”
Mahon Report, page 154: These are two photos taken by passengers seated on the right-hand side of the plane. They must have been taken just after the completion of the final 180 degree orbit. The scanned versions of the photos shown in the link posted yesterday are not as quite as good as those shown in the original Mahon Report, but they demonstrate the point. This is not an anonymous rock in the middle of the ocean. (In fact, it is about 4 nautical miles long and its maximum height above sea level is 2428 feet.)
It has to be assumed that the crew saw what the passengers and the flight commentator saw. The sighting of this island should have resulted in an appreciation that things were not quite right. If the McMurdo Sound nav track had been plotted on a map/chart, then the plain fact is that there should not have been an island of significant size and height in that position. If this had been appreciated, it would have been a simple matter to check the current coordinates being generated by the AINS, at which point, the appreciation of the things being not quite right would have become an appreciation of things being very wrong. The crew would then have done a 180 degree turn, climbed back to 18000 feet, and then tried to figure things out.
It appears that the crew saw the island but never appreciated that it wasn’t supposed to there. That failure in itself is not necessarily pilot error. However, the failure supports Chippendale’s finding that the crew did not attempt to verify their position before commencing their descent to McMurdo Station. It is useful, in my opinion, to ask what the situation would have been if it was intended to land at McMurdo Station. In that event, verification of the aircraft’s position independently of the AINS would have been an absolute requirement. There could have been no landing approach unless and until the position had been verified. The approach that the crew were about to commence was similar to a landing approach. It is reasonable to expect the crew to have taken similar precautions, before commencing their descent from 18000 feet. There were only two available methods to verify their position: (1) Visually, using a chart, or: (2) By ground radar. (Although McMurdo Station had an NDB and a TACAN, the NDB wasn’t working and the TACAN only provided the distance from the TACAN to the aircraft, not the distance and bearing.) Visual verification from 18000 feet was difficult, given the cloud cover. And the crew had not been advised that Air Traffic Control had located the aircraft on radar. In those circumstances, the aircraft should have stayed at 18000 feet. (This, of course, would have meant that the passengers would not see McMurdo Station, because no cloud-break procedure was available, because the NDB wasn’t working. So there was an obvious temptation to take the opportunity presented by the hole in the cloud cover.)
Several contributors cite the alleged prohibition against descent below 18000 feet before passing Erebus, as did Ron Chippendale. But if you plough through Mahon’s Report, it’s difficult to see an unequivocal prohibition against descent below 18000 feet in VMC. When the issue is pilot error, however, does there have to be a breach of an express rule? You can’t have a rule for every conceivable situation. Where the rules are silent, you are left with the rules of good airmanship, and the pilots are to be judged against the standard of the average pilot - not the best, and not the worst. If the crew of TE901 were guilty of pilot error at any point, it was when they commenced their descent from 18000 feet before verifying their position. The crew might have thought that they could obtain a visual fix once below the cloud, or that they would be picked up on radar. But at the time they began the descent, the only positional information they had was from the AINS, yet they were going to descent to an altitude that was below the height of an obvious hazard. If they made an error, that was it.
Mahon, and his legal lapdogs, such as Stuart Macfarlane, have devoted hundreds of words to the reliability of the AINS. From this, they conclude that the crew was entitled to descend from 18000 feet, because their position did not need to be verified, because the AINS is never wrong. Yet they make these statements in the context of an accident where the AINS directed the aircraft into the side of a mountain. Of course the AINS can be wrong. It requires human input. Humans make mistakes. In the case of TE901, a print-out of the waypoints was provided before take-off. Wasn’t it possible that the Navigation Section might have made an error? The waypoints on the print-out were then entered into the AINS by one of the crew. Wasn’t it possible for a typing error to have been made and not picked up in the cross-checks? It is always possible for the AINS to be wrong, which is why the position had to be verified before descending. If that basic principle had been adhered to, the accident would not have occurred.
So the crew has to bear a share of the responsibility. How much? Although Mahon was a one-man band, he had an experienced aviator to assist him: Sir Rochford Hughes. After the report was published, Sir Rochford said that although he agreed with much of the report, he believed that the crew had to bear a share of the blame, and he put that share at 10%. If Mahon had said the same thing, this argument would have been over decades ago.
On the topic of Messrs Mahon and MacFarlane, anyone reading MacFarlane’s book will note the constant attempts to find contradictions between what someone said on one occasion and what they said on another. (His attempts usually fail. On the rare occasions that he succeeds, it’s to a nitpicking degree.) Yet MacFarlane never puts Mahon under his forensic microscope. If he had done so, he might have noted something a little strange about Mahon’s statements concerning Beaufort Island.
In his report, at paragraph (i) on page 115, Mahon says:
“It therefore follows that because Captain Collins believed that his nav track was taking him down the centre of McMurdo Sound, no one on the flight deck would ever identify any island on or near their path as being Beaufort Island. They would all be aware that it was far away to the north-east, and I venture to say, that although no direct reference is made to the point in the CVR transcript apart from Mr Mulgrew’s “land ahead”, the five persons on the flight deck undoubtedly saw Beaufort Island, and mistook it for a different island altogether, probably, as Mr Shannon thought, Dunlop Island, which is off the Victoria Land coastline. Anyhow, in the minds of the crew the island they must have seen could not possibly have been Beaufort Island, because as previously indicated, the latter landmark would be many miles away in quite a different location.”
Then, at page 153, while discussing AirNZs failure to ensure that a member of the crew has previous Antarctic experience, Mahon says:
“But a previous flight under supervision would almost certainly have resulted in Captain Collins noting the distinctive feature of Beaufort Island which would have been apparent as the only identifiable island in the area. Figure 16, page 154, consists of prints developed from passengers’ cameras, in which Beaufort Island is clearly visible. The film in each case was slightly damaged, and the actual view of Beaufort Island would have been more distinct than the view displayed on the prints. Had Captain Collins seen Beaufort Island previously, and identified it on the fatal flight, he would certainly have realised that his nav track had been changed.”
In his report, Mahon also refers to his visit to Antarctica, one year after the accident. His report, obviously, was published after that visit and it contains the conclusions he formed as a result of the visit.
It is clear, from the report, that Mahon concluded that Peter Mulgrew was on the flightdeck when Beaufort Island was visible. He says that the five persons on the flightdeck, one of whom was Mulgrew, “undoubtedly” saw the island. And Mahon had no difficulty accepting that when Mulgrew said “land ahead”, Mulgrew was referring to Beaufort Island.
After the report was published, Mahon’s findings concerning Beaufort Island were criticised, deservedly. Then, three years later, Mahon wrote his book, “Verdict on Erebus”. In his book he again describes his visit to Antarctica, and he again describes the conclusions he drew from that visit - and he again refers to Beaufort Island, at pages 199-203 of his book.
At page 199, Mahon begins with
“But, equally significantly, was the view I has seen from the Hercules of Beaufort Island. Again I has seen exactly what the crew of the DC10 had seen and from the same height and angle of vision. And I thought I had discovered why the crew never identified Beaufort Island, and I was now sure now why Peter Mulgrew had not realised that Beaufort Island was on the wrong side of the aircraft.”
Gents, please read these pages in Mahon’s book. There is absolutely no doubt that he is referring to the conclusions he reached during his visit to Antarctica, which visit occurred, obviously, before he wrote his report. And having visited Anarctica and having reached various conclusions as a result of the visit, one would think that Mahon would have included those conclusions in his report, that being the whole point of the taxpayer paying for him to go down there. So he goes down to Antarctica, forms his conclusions, and then writes his report. In that report, he says that Mulgrew saw the island. But in the book, he says that Mulgrew didn’t.
Don’t take my word for this: Read the report, and then read the book that was written three years later. Both describe exactly the same thing, namely, the conclusions that Mahon reached as a result of his visit to Antarctica. Mahon’s report says that Mulgrew saw the island. Mahon’s book says that Mulgrew did not see the island.
In his book, Mahon suggests that Mulgrew was not on the flightdeck when Beaufort Island was visible. Instead, he paints a dramatic picture of Mulgrew struggling up the aisle of the aircraft on his artificial legs, being detained by passengers wanting to chat, and reaching the cockpit two minutes too late. I’m probably labouring the point here, but if Mahon, on his visit to Antarctica, formed the view that Mulgrew was not on the flightdeck when Beaufort Island was visible, then why didn’t he say so in his report? .
So, can any of the d8ckhead lawyers out there in internetland explain this clear and obvious contradiction? The only explanation is that Mahon was just like most others: On occasions, this one in particular, he did not let the truth get in the way of a good story. If ALPA are going to simply shove the Mahon Report onto the website and say that it is the definitive verdict, there should at least be an asterisk referring readers to the passages referred to above.
My fingers are starting to get a bit sore, but the other contentious aspect of Mahon’s report is his finding that the two AirNZ briefing officers lied under oath when they gave evidence that the crew were told that the nav track went over Erebus, not down McMurdo Sound. This finding was not supported in the subsequent litigation, but, as I’ve said before, I don’t care what another load of lawyers might think. AirNZ’s position was that the nav track was always supposed to be direct to McMurdo Station, over Erebus. AirNZ said that errors were made, which caused the final waypoint to be shifted to a position in McMurdo Sound. AirNZ said that the error was discovered as a result of the conversation between Captain S and Captain J that took place about two weeks before the fatal flight, when Captain S told Captain J that the waypoint was not where he expected it to be. AirNZ said that the error was corrected on the morning of the fatal flight and admitted that the crew was not told. AirNZ accepted that a sample flightplan shown at the briefing contained the erroneous track, down McMurdo Sound. So the allegedly-brilliant piece of forensic analysis by Mahon was on the table right from the outset. All of the relevant facts are recorded in Chippendale’s report. Having admitted to an appalling series of blunders, AirNZ still maintained that the two briefing officers had told the crew that the nav track went over Erebus. The two briefing officers attended the hearing, put their hands on the bible, and gave evidence under oath as to what they told the crew: The nav track goes over Erebus. Mahon found that both briefing officers committed perjury.
It is important to examine what happened immediately after the accident. Ron Chippendale was obviously involved right from the outset. In his evidence to the Royal Commission, Chippendale said he was aware of the change in co-ordinates at a very early stage, but he didn’t know whether it was a cause. So he spoke with the crew who attended the same briefing as the crew of the fatal flight. According to Chippendale, these crew-members told him that they believed that the nav track went over Erebus. Although Mahon does not mention it, Ron Chippendale gave evidence to the Royal Commission that the crew-members who attended the same briefing as the crew on the fatal flight told him that they believed that the nav track went over Erebus. As a result, Chippendale found that the change in co-ordinates was not a cause of the accident, because the crew were told at the briefing that the nav track went over Erebus.
Mr MacFarlane babbles on about Chippendale’s failure to take formal written statements from the pilots he spoke with. In hindsight, that might have been a good idea – but Chippendale didn’t know that this accident would be the subject of 30 years worth of books and articles and internet postings. His job was to investigate the accident and the first thing he had to decide was where he should look. The change in co-ordinates was an obvious avenue if inquiry, so he spoke with the briefing officers and with the surviving pilots who attended the briefing. According to Chippendale, there was no significant dispute. The two briefing officers said that they told the pilots that the nav track went over Erebus, and the surviving pilots who attended the briefing agreed. Given that, Chippendale reported that there was no evidence that the change in co-ordinates had misled the crew.
Some months later, at the hearing before the Royal Commission, the surviving pilots who attended the briefing gave evidence. They said, in summary, that they were not told that the nav track went over Erebus. They said that they believed that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound.
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be room for any middle ground here. Either the briefing officers lied as a result of pressure from AirNZ, or the surviving pilots lied as a result of pressure from the union. Mahon decided that the two briefing officers were lying, but his finding to that effect was based on an assumption that the erroneous McMurdo Sound waypoint was, in fact, a deliberate change, known to the briefing officers. If the briefing officers knew that the nav track actually went down McMurdo Sound, they would not have told the crew that the nav track went over Erebus.
Mahon’s conspiracy theory, to the effect that the McMurdo Sound nav track was deliberate was, in my considered opinion, b8llocks. If the Navigation Section had hatched some bizarre plan to change the track to the military route, then they would have selected the waypoint used on the military route, being the Byrd Reporting Point. They did not. The waypoint was down by the Dailey Islands, in no-man’s land. And its co-ordinates were consistent with an error in data-entry.
Mahon got it into his head that the McMurdo Sound route was the obvious route, so much so that he thought that a route over Erebus could never have been intended. His reason for thinking the McMurdo Sound route to be obvious was the high ground on Ross Island. But lets think about this a little bit. In blue sky conditions, the nav track doesn’t really matter, because you can see the high ground on Ross Island. What if Ross Island and McMurdo Station are covered in cloud? In that situation, if you wanted to see McMurdo Station you had to perform a cloud-break manouvre using the NDB. And how are you going to get to the NDB? Via the nav track. So it makes perfect sense to align the nav track from Cape Hallett with the NDB at McMurdo Station, with the track going over Erebus. If I’m wrong about this, I look forward to being corrected.
The point I’m trying to make is that Mahon’s impression of the evidence of the two briefing officers was affected by incorrect conclusions he drew about other evidence. Isn’t it possible that these two gentlemen might have been telling the truth? In other words, isn’t it possible that the crew were, in fact, told that the nav track went over Erebus? It might be said that this could not have happened, given that the aircraft was flown into Erebus in nav mode. It should be noted, however, that the briefing occurred many days before the flight, and that copies of the McMurdo Sound co-ordinates were available and might have been noted by members of the crew. If that occurred, the pilots might have assumed that the written material was correct, rather than the oral material. The making of such an assumption without seeking clarification would be a clear case of pilot error, but it cannot be discounted.
The issue as to what was said at the briefing is directly linked to the issue concerning the final change of the waypoint. There is no dispute as to the initiating cause of the change: It was the result of the communication between Captain S and Captain J. Captain S attended the briefing. He then commanded a flight to Antarctica, during which he noted that the waypoint (then located at the end of McMurdo Sound) was not where he expected it to be. Captain S gave evidence before the Royal Commission and said that the two briefing officers did not say that the nav track went over Erebus. He said that be believed that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound.
Why, then, was the waypoint not where Captain S expected it be. If the briefing officers did not tell Captain S that the track was over Erebus, and if Captain S believed that the nav track went down McMurdo Sound, then Captain S would have expected the waypoint to be at the end of McMurdo Sound – which is where it was.
So was there anything unusual for Captain S. to report? No – as long as his evidence about the briefing was correct.
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Cleared for descent?
Prospector says:
Right. So when you make the bald assertion “If that is the opinion a senior law lecturer has of his peers in the Highest court in the land, than his opinion on anything to do with Erebus is surely to be taken with a shovel full of salt” which is plainly wrong and you get called on it, suddenly you are not interested any more.
Don’t blame me if your statement turns around and bites. It was you who made it.
And continues:
Sure. Let’s look at each point you are asserting:
1.VMC descent involves own responsibility for terrain clearance and avoidance of other traffic.
Agreed.
2.The crew were never "authorised or directed" by the controllers for any descent
Wrong:
From the CVR
Shortly before 1.32pm the aircraft reported on H/F: “Still nothing [on VHF] – we’d like further descent – or we could orbit in our present position which is approximately 43 miles north?”
McMurdo: “Roger – VMC descent is approved – and keep Mac centre advised of your altitude.”
(and later)
McMurdo: “New Zealand 901 – maintain VMC – keep us advised of your altitude as you approach McMurdo – report 10 DME from McMurdo.”
Aircraft (at 1.45pm): “We are now at 6000, descending to 2000 and we’re VMC.”
You cannot claim that was not a request for, and approval of, a descent.
3.they obviously would have had to been identified on radar before such authorisation or direction could be given
Wrong again.
a)On 8 November 1979, Captain RT Johnson issued a revised descent restrictions memo removing the requirement for ASR to be available and used for descent below FL160 (item 3 of the original memo exhibit 1/8). There was now no company requirement for radar monitoring if the descent was VMC
b)McMurdo ATC initially offered a cloud break descent under radar control when within 40 dme, but when New Zealand 901 said they could descend VMC, McMurdo ATC said in effect “Go for it – keep us advised of your level and report 10 dme. (see CVR record above)
4.They were never seen on the radar let alone identified.
Debatable.
There was an analysis of the flight path that showed that the aircraft would have been in line-of-sight of the radar for a period of about 30 to 60 seconds while descending in the right hand orbit. This time coincided with McMurdo ATC’s request to squawk 0400. The telex message when the flight was overdue reported the last estimated position as 38 miles due north of McMurdo when the CVR shows that the flight never reported any 38 mile position. Then there is the “accidental erasure” of the last 4 minutes 42 seconds of the ATC tape. This gave rise to the theory that McMurdo ATC saw the aircraft on radar, tried to warn it, but transmitted on VHF only and was not successful. Justice Mahon decided not to open this particular Pandora’s box and it remains an unsubstantiated theory.
So, in answer to your question, I totally agree with Justice Mahon when he says “The officer in charge of the Route Clearance Unit of the company was plainly authorised on behalf of the company to brief the aircrews, as he had in fact done, by indicating that the aircraft could approach McMurdo at any altitude authorised or directed by the air traffic controllers at the American base."
Conclusion:
New Zealand 901 plainly asked for, and was approved for a descent that was completely in accordance with their briefing authorisation.
Not interested in what the legal people think, and not in a position to gainsay either the Law Lords or a senior law lecturer. All this happened long after the accident, and patently had nothing to do with the cause of the accident.
Don’t blame me if your statement turns around and bites. It was you who made it.
And continues:
Could you explain what is your interpretation of what Mahon means when he states in his book "Verdict on Erebus",
" But the official view, as represented by Civil Aviation, was that the aircrew had no authority to descend below 16000ft. On this point the evidence was very clearly to the contrary. The officer in charge of the Route Clearance Unit of the company was plainly authorised on behalf of the company to brief the aircrews, as he had in fact done, by indicating that the aircraft could approach McMurdo at any altitude authorised or directed by the air traffic controllers at the American base."
As has plainly been shown many times the descent was requested VMC, and as stated many times VMC descent involves own responsibility for terrain clearance and avoidance of other traffic. The crew were never "authorised or directed" by the controllers for any descent, they obviously would have had to been identified on radar before such authorisation or direction could be given. They were never seen on the radar let alone identified.
" But the official view, as represented by Civil Aviation, was that the aircrew had no authority to descend below 16000ft. On this point the evidence was very clearly to the contrary. The officer in charge of the Route Clearance Unit of the company was plainly authorised on behalf of the company to brief the aircrews, as he had in fact done, by indicating that the aircraft could approach McMurdo at any altitude authorised or directed by the air traffic controllers at the American base."
As has plainly been shown many times the descent was requested VMC, and as stated many times VMC descent involves own responsibility for terrain clearance and avoidance of other traffic. The crew were never "authorised or directed" by the controllers for any descent, they obviously would have had to been identified on radar before such authorisation or direction could be given. They were never seen on the radar let alone identified.
1.VMC descent involves own responsibility for terrain clearance and avoidance of other traffic.
Agreed.
2.The crew were never "authorised or directed" by the controllers for any descent
Wrong:
From the CVR
Shortly before 1.32pm the aircraft reported on H/F: “Still nothing [on VHF] – we’d like further descent – or we could orbit in our present position which is approximately 43 miles north?”
McMurdo: “Roger – VMC descent is approved – and keep Mac centre advised of your altitude.”
(and later)
McMurdo: “New Zealand 901 – maintain VMC – keep us advised of your altitude as you approach McMurdo – report 10 DME from McMurdo.”
Aircraft (at 1.45pm): “We are now at 6000, descending to 2000 and we’re VMC.”
You cannot claim that was not a request for, and approval of, a descent.
3.they obviously would have had to been identified on radar before such authorisation or direction could be given
Wrong again.
a)On 8 November 1979, Captain RT Johnson issued a revised descent restrictions memo removing the requirement for ASR to be available and used for descent below FL160 (item 3 of the original memo exhibit 1/8). There was now no company requirement for radar monitoring if the descent was VMC
b)McMurdo ATC initially offered a cloud break descent under radar control when within 40 dme, but when New Zealand 901 said they could descend VMC, McMurdo ATC said in effect “Go for it – keep us advised of your level and report 10 dme. (see CVR record above)
4.They were never seen on the radar let alone identified.
Debatable.
There was an analysis of the flight path that showed that the aircraft would have been in line-of-sight of the radar for a period of about 30 to 60 seconds while descending in the right hand orbit. This time coincided with McMurdo ATC’s request to squawk 0400. The telex message when the flight was overdue reported the last estimated position as 38 miles due north of McMurdo when the CVR shows that the flight never reported any 38 mile position. Then there is the “accidental erasure” of the last 4 minutes 42 seconds of the ATC tape. This gave rise to the theory that McMurdo ATC saw the aircraft on radar, tried to warn it, but transmitted on VHF only and was not successful. Justice Mahon decided not to open this particular Pandora’s box and it remains an unsubstantiated theory.
So, in answer to your question, I totally agree with Justice Mahon when he says “The officer in charge of the Route Clearance Unit of the company was plainly authorised on behalf of the company to brief the aircrews, as he had in fact done, by indicating that the aircraft could approach McMurdo at any altitude authorised or directed by the air traffic controllers at the American base."
Conclusion:
New Zealand 901 plainly asked for, and was approved for a descent that was completely in accordance with their briefing authorisation.
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May I raise one point which seems to be missed by many.
The Commander of the USN Support Force Antarctica had advised the airline, "Air traffic control/flight following shall take the form of location advisory of DEEP FREEZE aircraft and position report only."
The airline in its briefing sheets advised, "Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area."
Hence any mention of the aircraft requiring, or having, authorisation or clearance to descend, or to do anything else, is mis-placed, as all the crew had to do was advise McMurdo of their intent and effect their own seperation from any other traffic. Nor was the descent required to be radar monitored as has been suggested.
The Commander of the USN Support Force Antarctica had advised the airline, "Air traffic control/flight following shall take the form of location advisory of DEEP FREEZE aircraft and position report only."
The airline in its briefing sheets advised, "Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area."
Hence any mention of the aircraft requiring, or having, authorisation or clearance to descend, or to do anything else, is mis-placed, as all the crew had to do was advise McMurdo of their intent and effect their own seperation from any other traffic. Nor was the descent required to be radar monitored as has been suggested.
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Good point, which is why it is better to look at the rules of good airmanship, rather than at the various memos. The administration was obviously a bit of a mess.
Although radar monitoring might not have been required, verification of position before descent was, not because of any particular memo saying so, but because of the general principles and practices of good airmanship. If the crew couldn't verify their position visually, the only other available method was radar. And if a radar fix wasn't forthcoming? Then don't go down.
Although radar monitoring might not have been required, verification of position before descent was, not because of any particular memo saying so, but because of the general principles and practices of good airmanship. If the crew couldn't verify their position visually, the only other available method was radar. And if a radar fix wasn't forthcoming? Then don't go down.
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Ampan
Sorry, can’t agree with that.
They were locked on to their Nav track until the orbits started, and then again when the orbits were completed.
I’ll bet (without any evidence to back it up, unfortunately
) that one of the crew looked at the NAV distance to run, stuck his finger on the track line on the famous never-to-be-recovered map and thought “with xx miles to run, we are about here in the middle of McMurdo sound with no high ground within about 20 miles, and it looks OK outside, so I’m happy with a VMC descent”.
You are implying that they could not trust the phenomenal accuracy of their 3 NAV systems.
It all gets back to the fact that they were relying on the McMurdo waypoint they were using, and it had been changed without their knowledge.
Perhaps we all should never accept or trust our flight plan data unless we have personally verified every digit on it. Hardly a practical proposition, I think.
If the crew couldn't verify their position visually, the only other available method was radar
They were locked on to their Nav track until the orbits started, and then again when the orbits were completed.
I’ll bet (without any evidence to back it up, unfortunately
) that one of the crew looked at the NAV distance to run, stuck his finger on the track line on the famous never-to-be-recovered map and thought “with xx miles to run, we are about here in the middle of McMurdo sound with no high ground within about 20 miles, and it looks OK outside, so I’m happy with a VMC descent”.You are implying that they could not trust the phenomenal accuracy of their 3 NAV systems.
It all gets back to the fact that they were relying on the McMurdo waypoint they were using, and it had been changed without their knowledge.
Perhaps we all should never accept or trust our flight plan data unless we have personally verified every digit on it. Hardly a practical proposition, I think.
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AINS
I’m not suggesting that the crew couldn’t trust the three gyroscopes and the computer hardware in the AINS. Pieces of steel and silicon do not tend to make mistakes. But the AINS required input from a human being or two at various stages, and it’s the human input that created the potential for the AINS to be wrong. The Navigation Section might have made an error. The crew might have made an error when entering the coordinates. The crew might have made an error while fiddling around with the AINS on the way down from NZ.
There’s probably no need for any evidence to back up your reconstruction of the decision to descend, because that’s probably exactly what happened. But what was the basis for the crew believing that they were in the middle of McMurdo Sound? It was the AIMS – and only the AIMS. There was nothing else. Could they see the high ground and get a visual fix? No. Did the ATC have them on radar? No. Did they have both NBD and TACAN? No. All they had was the AINS.
It’s obviously not practical to continually verify one’s position for the whole flight. But what about landing? And what about going down to 2000 feet when there’s a 13000 foot mountain around? You may think it’s 20 miles left of track, but why do you think that? Because of the AINS. Anything else? No. So wouldn't the average commercial pilot, exercising a reasonable amount of care and attention, stay at the safe altitude until his position had been verified?
There’s probably no need for any evidence to back up your reconstruction of the decision to descend, because that’s probably exactly what happened. But what was the basis for the crew believing that they were in the middle of McMurdo Sound? It was the AIMS – and only the AIMS. There was nothing else. Could they see the high ground and get a visual fix? No. Did the ATC have them on radar? No. Did they have both NBD and TACAN? No. All they had was the AINS.
It’s obviously not practical to continually verify one’s position for the whole flight. But what about landing? And what about going down to 2000 feet when there’s a 13000 foot mountain around? You may think it’s 20 miles left of track, but why do you think that? Because of the AINS. Anything else? No. So wouldn't the average commercial pilot, exercising a reasonable amount of care and attention, stay at the safe altitude until his position had been verified?
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Quote..."New Zealand 901 plainly asked for, and was approved for a descent that was completely in accordance with their briefing authorisation."
..and that makes the Capt responsible for any and all decisions made as to whether or not to decend into the known and/or percievced conditions....
Ive read the papers and the book....and now that this issue has reared its ugly head, again,Ive taken the time to go back over both..,,looking at exerts being posted here.....talk about scalpel posts....and the torment in several posts.....
I would hope that in the end,this tradgedy has evolved our thinking about Air accidents,and there have been many of this nature and magnitude.....and that present day thinking would move us forward....
there is nothing worse that having to listen to monday morning half-back,20/20,hindsight debate ,for the sake of argueing ones point......because in the end,we all look for(hopefully) a common goal....no matter what one,s view, concerning the outcome of this inquiry.....have we learned anything?,.......
they want video recorders in our cockpits,they have just about everything else....would they have solved this issue??...
..and that makes the Capt responsible for any and all decisions made as to whether or not to decend into the known and/or percievced conditions....
Ive read the papers and the book....and now that this issue has reared its ugly head, again,Ive taken the time to go back over both..,,looking at exerts being posted here.....talk about scalpel posts....and the torment in several posts.....
I would hope that in the end,this tradgedy has evolved our thinking about Air accidents,and there have been many of this nature and magnitude.....and that present day thinking would move us forward....
there is nothing worse that having to listen to monday morning half-back,20/20,hindsight debate ,for the sake of argueing ones point......because in the end,we all look for(hopefully) a common goal....no matter what one,s view, concerning the outcome of this inquiry.....have we learned anything?,.......
they want video recorders in our cockpits,they have just about everything else....would they have solved this issue??...
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I’d just like to throw another view into the ring.
With VFR flight we can imagine the aircraft as being at the centre of a bubble or sterile area, that is, a minimum height above ground or cloud, a minimum height below cloud, and a minimum distance horizontally from cloud or ground. All of that is achieved by estimation with the Mk. 1 Mod. 0 eyeball (the V in VFR). That pre-supposes that you do not need to know where you are since any obstacle, it is assumed, will be seen. Normal obscurations to our vision are caused by such phenomena as smoke, dust, mist, fog, cloud or precipitation. Both the cause and degree of obscuration is easily discernible. That is a pilots real world experience, but there are always exceptions and caveats. The exception and caveat in this case is EXCEPT IN POLAR REGIONS. Mention has been made that other flights were made on gin clear days. Maybe so, but even in such conditions you may still very well fall afoul of the tricks of light and depth perception unique to polar operations. There is good reason the US military, in their wisdom, required crewmembers to have made three familiarisation flights to the ice before embarking on the adventure them selves.
I have worked with a few helicopter pilots who have extensive Antarctic experience and they all find it incomprehensible that a crew with absolutely no experience should be operating down there, let alone trying to drive a jet VFR at a minimum speed of 260 knots. Prior to them (the helo guys) being let loose they were subject to much indoctrination, training (prior to and on the job) and much mentoring.
Given the above, I personally, lay absolutely no blame at the feet of the crew. Captain Collins and his crew were operating within the bounds of their understanding and previous experience with regard to VMC. They were way in over their heads through having no experience and lack of training in polar operations. As Donald Rumsfeld famously said, “You don’t know what you don’t know.” The shame of it all is that a repository of knowledge was readily available just down the street, so to speak, in Christchurch.
Not trying to be smart ampan, but are you suggesting that a pilot should be checking the co-ordinates that Jeppersen has put in a data base before conducting a GPS approach for example. Guys doing an NPA approach into Queenstown may have their work cut out for them. A clerk doing the data entry could just as well have made a blue. Any changes to nav data in the general scheme of things is promulgated by a NOTAM, are we to blame the crew for the airline not having procedures in place, or if they did, for not following those procedures, to alert crews of changes to nav data. You don't, if you are an airline jock, do your own water drains, yet it is the captains responsibility (without getting into a debate about the delegation of responsibility).
Fly safe and Blue Skies.
With VFR flight we can imagine the aircraft as being at the centre of a bubble or sterile area, that is, a minimum height above ground or cloud, a minimum height below cloud, and a minimum distance horizontally from cloud or ground. All of that is achieved by estimation with the Mk. 1 Mod. 0 eyeball (the V in VFR). That pre-supposes that you do not need to know where you are since any obstacle, it is assumed, will be seen. Normal obscurations to our vision are caused by such phenomena as smoke, dust, mist, fog, cloud or precipitation. Both the cause and degree of obscuration is easily discernible. That is a pilots real world experience, but there are always exceptions and caveats. The exception and caveat in this case is EXCEPT IN POLAR REGIONS. Mention has been made that other flights were made on gin clear days. Maybe so, but even in such conditions you may still very well fall afoul of the tricks of light and depth perception unique to polar operations. There is good reason the US military, in their wisdom, required crewmembers to have made three familiarisation flights to the ice before embarking on the adventure them selves.
I have worked with a few helicopter pilots who have extensive Antarctic experience and they all find it incomprehensible that a crew with absolutely no experience should be operating down there, let alone trying to drive a jet VFR at a minimum speed of 260 knots. Prior to them (the helo guys) being let loose they were subject to much indoctrination, training (prior to and on the job) and much mentoring.
Given the above, I personally, lay absolutely no blame at the feet of the crew. Captain Collins and his crew were operating within the bounds of their understanding and previous experience with regard to VMC. They were way in over their heads through having no experience and lack of training in polar operations. As Donald Rumsfeld famously said, “You don’t know what you don’t know.” The shame of it all is that a repository of knowledge was readily available just down the street, so to speak, in Christchurch.
But what about landing? And what about going down to 2000 feet when there’s a 13000 foot mountain around? So wouldn't the average commercial pilot, exercising a reasonable amount of care and attention, stay at the safe altitude until his position had been verified
A clerk doing the data entry could just as well have made a blue. Any changes to nav data in the general scheme of things is promulgated by a NOTAM, are we to blame the crew for the airline not having procedures in place, or if they did, for not following those procedures, to alert crews of changes to nav data. You don't, if you are an airline jock, do your own water drains, yet it is the captains responsibility (without getting into a debate about the delegation of responsibility).Fly safe and Blue Skies.
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Point taken about the torment and scalpel posts, Pakeha Boy. Will try to limit the size of my rantings. One of the reasons why "the anti-Mahon faction", of which I am an obvious member, gets so hot under the collar is that there is a group of victims that hardly anyone considers, namely, the AirNZ employees that Mahon labelled as perjurers. Most of them were immediately suspended when Mahon's report was released. The Police investigated, given that perjury is a serious criminal offence. They and their families were publicly flogged. Then they had to spend many thousands of dollars to clear their names, which they actually did. Unfortunately, the general public never seemed to take any notice of that.
The other thing that p*sses me off is the general public's complete acceptance of everything Mahon said. We have even had Jim Anderton, the ultimate politician (which is not intended to be a compliment), proposing that Mahon's findings should be enshrined in a statute. (His next move will probably be to propose another statute whereby anyone criticising Mahon is to be prosecuted for "Mahon-Denial".)
The other thing that p*sses me off is the general public's complete acceptance of everything Mahon said. We have even had Jim Anderton, the ultimate politician (which is not intended to be a compliment), proposing that Mahon's findings should be enshrined in a statute. (His next move will probably be to propose another statute whereby anyone criticising Mahon is to be prosecuted for "Mahon-Denial".)
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To Brian Abraham:
Didn't mean to suggest that Queenstown pilots should be looking over Jepperson's shoulder, Brian. All I'm saying is that you don't go down until you know where you are.
Lets assume that TE901 had GPS. GPS is not dependant on the AINS. If the GPS confirmed that the aircraft was in the middle of McMurdo Sound, fine: go down.
Didn't mean to suggest that Queenstown pilots should be looking over Jepperson's shoulder, Brian. All I'm saying is that you don't go down until you know where you are.
Lets assume that TE901 had GPS. GPS is not dependant on the AINS. If the GPS confirmed that the aircraft was in the middle of McMurdo Sound, fine: go down.
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ampan,
(His next move will probably be to propose another statute whereby anyone criticising Mahon is to be prosecuted for "Mahon-Denial".)
Please do not even suggest such a thing, even in jest,
" The other thing that p*sses me off is the general public's complete acceptance of everything Mahon said."
Jim is capable of putting 2 and 2 together,just, and mention of the "general public" will likely ring bells of more votes
(His next move will probably be to propose another statute whereby anyone criticising Mahon is to be prosecuted for "Mahon-Denial".)
Please do not even suggest such a thing, even in jest,
" The other thing that p*sses me off is the general public's complete acceptance of everything Mahon said."
Jim is capable of putting 2 and 2 together,just, and mention of the "general public" will likely ring bells of more votes
Last edited by prospector; 18th Feb 2008 at 02:28.