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Presume the Police are asking Mark McKay exactly from who and via what channel he booked the aircraft concerned – which he apparently admits to having done. In pretty much every conceivable manner this appears to be what the CAA call 'grey charter', illegal, in this instance, on a multitude of fronts. A wholly avoidable tragedy.
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After checking it would seem that indeed a Derogation on the EASA mandatory carriage of Mode S transponders do exist both in France and in the UK. So contrary to what I have said previously ,this aircraft could indeed had been carrying an old Mode A/C. My bad.
the EASA text is here : Aircraft operating IFR/GAT in Europe are required to carry and operate Mode S Level 2s (i.e. with SI code capability) transponder(s) with Mode S Elementary Surveillance (ELS) capability. Aircraft compliance with this requirement shall be ensured by:
I also do not think , based on his experience, would file an IFR flight plan not being qualified. But , OK , we know how people pushed by events are sometimes short-cutting the basics ..The ground collision in Linate comes to mind... |
Originally Posted by rr84c
(Post 10368540)
Looks like he didn’t have a valid instrument rating either. If you look on the FAA Airman database (anyone can search it) there are two David Ibbotsons and neither has an IR. If he has an EASA IR, that’s irrelevant - he can’t fly N-reg in France IFR on a U.K. licence without it being on his American one. Yet he tells people on Facebook he’s doing ILSs. Frankly, I do a lot of ILS flying even on VFR flights. I usually call for practice ILS approach, nobody ever asked me on what kind of flight I am and practicing ILS to check instruments and skill is pretty common.
Originally Posted by EDMJ
(Post 10369067)
As to the "take off attempts": Big, cold, fuel-injected engine, difficulties in starting it, and the attempts to get it running were counted as "take off attempts"?
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Originally Posted by ChickenHouse
(Post 10369096)
...he most likely was not deep familiar with the aircraft all over - which would be a bad sign by itself.
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Press reporting
The one thing we can surely all agree on (unless we happen to be journalists pretending to be pilots) is this amply demonstrates just how really sloppy reporting is. In the early hours after with limited facts that might be forgiveable but almost every report several days on is peppered with things which self-evidently are wrong and would have taken a few seconds to correct from the obvious online sources. This demonstrates that reports are not written by people either with knowledge or any desire to get them right. It’s consistent with a dinner I once had with a group of journalists, one of whom was from the FT, some from the Express (the former was my friend!) where I was amazed when I made the passing comment that in my job I need to be right when I say something and every story I have read where I know the facts even the basic details are wrong - instead of them saying “we know it’s embarrassing, people should try harder” they all vehemently brazenly defended it saying “you don’t understand you don’t have time to worry about facts we just have to write a story”. So the telegraph today refers to it as a turbine. It refers to a social media post by the pilot saying I might be a bit rusty on the ILS “thought to refer to the plane’s instrument landing system”. So when a paper as esteemed as the sun refers to three “take-off attempts” rather than speculating as to how it might have got briefly airborne then safely landed and taxied back in remaining runway, let’s just assume that’s pure twaddle - it might mean the pilot went off to empty his bladder or got out to recheck something prudently, or nothing at all. People are instinctively keen to find guidance - at the pub on Tuesday after playing football my friends asked me for my opinion and I could have spouted any outlandish rubbish pet theory or said in hushed tones I’d heard it was deliberate but can’t say where and it would have been taken as authoritative and the more outlandish the more it would spread- I actually said at the time it seemed odd that what I had read (on here I think!) was the pilot was experienced at ferry crossings and it was an IFR flight plan so I thought it was surprising if he got suddenly disoriented and didn’t make a mayday call as notwithstanding the aviate navigate communicate rule if I were in a single there at night and had engine trouble I would be instantly making a mayday call as I pointed straight back at Alderney and hoped S&R got there before I froze and anyone who didn’t panic was likely to do similarly. The UK is currently a much less United Kingdom and likely to be in a terrible mess for a long time to come as a result of people simply taking at face value people who seem authoritative by without checking their assertions and journalists with an agenda printing plain rubbish. Let’s always not forget when speculating about a disaster that absent independent verification even consistent press reports may be a complete fabrication as well as the possibility of “having something to them”, and them being completely accurate is sadly unlikely! Having said all that the meta picture emerging by filtering the various reports is that the pilot may have been less experienced or qualified than optimal for the conditions and this may well have contributed both to the unexplained disappearance and failure to make a mayday call when getting into difficulties. Of course another possibility is that a sudden electrical failure perhaps due to having all the lights, deicing equipment overloading an electrical system with an underlying fault and aged battery with underperforming alternator perhaps coupled to an unheralded engine failure happened without reasonable warning soon after a perfectly reasonable decision to descend to 2300 into clear air and a well executed glide to ditch was then performed in complete silence and darkness. No information that is currently available or likely to emerge or makes good reporting is around to support this, but that doesn’t mean it wasn’t exactly what happened, pilot legality aside! |
One news article quoted above said something like, 'depending on which engine it had'. Do we know what engine was installed?
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Originally Posted by jolihokistix
(Post 10369127)
One news article quoted above said something like, 'depending on which engine it had'. Do we know what engine was installed?
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Originally Posted by jolihokistix
(Post 10369127)
One news article quoted above said something like, 'depending on which engine it had'. Do we know what engine was installed?
I’m apparently not allowed to post a link or picture with the entry but obviously anyone can find it. |
Originally Posted by jolihokistix
(Post 10369127)
One news article quoted above said something like, 'depending on which engine it had'. Do we know what engine was installed?
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Originally Posted by Cambridge172
(Post 10369156)
Lycoming TSIO-520-BE
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Originally Posted by _pudknocker_
(Post 10369077)
Not sure about EASA regs these days but when I used to fly charter in pistons, it was always in a twin. Any length overwater always with life jackets and raft, immersion suits were always available if requested. Pilots were all current multi engine instrument rated. I doubt your flights were conducted under an AOC. You would not get me sat in the back of a piston single overwater with any pilot. The fact the pilot on flight two deemed it necessary to rush the departure due to incoming fog demonstrates a worrying lack of descion making and airmanship. I pose the question to him, what would you have done in the event of a technical malfunction with your aircraft that required you to land after your departure? With the fog rolling in, my estimate is that the only place to land would be in the drink. Unfortunately there are a lot of pilots out there carrying out these ‘moody’ charters, I would hazard a guess that the the majority seriously overestimate their own abilities. Under pressure they are unlikely to be able to perform, their knowledge base and exposure are likely to be lacking. I would say that you exposed yourself to a high level of risk on both flights just in the fact you travelled in an single engine piston overwater, never mind that the pilots more than likely we’re not overly experienced or competent. It's an interesting insight from an SLF point of view that we don't perceive (or think much about) how particular factors change risk levels. I've flown in Trislanders to and from CI many times and from a layman's perspective, while it's clear there are more engines, the overall experience is similar compared to a larger aircraft. Would any regular CI pilots like to comment on the above analysis? My perception is that this kind of flying goes on there all the time. A few years ago I was on the same Cherokee with a senior French official (the decision to travel this way being due to industrial action at the nearest port and the imperative for them not remaining stuck outside French territory. He was a heavy guy, too.) Also, can anybody offer further clarification about the regulatory differences between N- and G- aircraft in this airspace? I may count the engines, but I'd never attached any importance to the tail number when evaluating risk (just happened to have photos)! |
Originally Posted by rr84c
(Post 10368887)
Except it’s wrong as the poster above says. What is definitely correct is that to fly an N-reg aircraft outside of the state that issued your licence you need to have a valid FAA licence for that operation. So flying a US aircraft IFR in France without a French-issued EASA licence with an IR, or having an IR on your FAA licence, is not valid. What I am amazed by is how few people know these regulations for a professional pilots forum... |
Icaruss: an excellent, well reasoned and rational post at #248, without the hysteria which seems to be evident in much of this thread,
As to the FAA Airman Database, I have no idea as to how that operates, but I have searched it for various pilots I know, from highly experienced airline pilots (Fleet Managers, TRIs, TREs etc) as well as private pilots and most do not even appear on the database, so ChickenHouse is probably correct – even if I don’t fully understand his post! What’s a 61.75 piggyback? In short anything gleaned from that database appears to me to probably be completely inaccurate, at least for any non-FAA licensed pilot. |
Who is in charge?
Originally Posted by Cambridge172
(Post 10369072)
Presume the Police are asking .........
¿ Which "police" ? Welsh? French? Channel Islands; which one(s) ? Monaqesque? Second thoughts: US? Which state? |
Accepting it looks the pilot had been ticking enough boxes for an incident to occur I have not spotted in this thread any real discussion on other safety aspects, I have only P2'd a Malibu a few times but dare I say there is a chance its so much like the feel of a "proper" executive aircraft rather than the overgrown Arrow i.e a single engine piston I fly they were probably both up front where you have to climb forward from the rear stepped door and having got to the incident phase were they putting the limited survival odds in their favour? Such as already wearing life jackets but then assuming the 88% chance of surviving the water landing in very good conditions which they clearly wern't would a footballer be confident of opening a pressurised rear door having clambered from the front possibly wet, in shock and with head injury in the dark and losing valuable time to exit, at least a P28 series you can wedge the door open in flight so it does not jam. Someone above said it probably was not equipped with ADSB etc because of its age, my aircraft is 40 years old and I have had mode s 330 for many years and more recently ADSB in and out and FLARM in and out and its not all just for collision avoidance its all part of a safety attitude so a tad unfair to assume all owners are the same but if you are going to become a needle in a haystack of sea getting an accurate position report out is crucial as is wearing your PLB in advance and any passenger faced with any of this would not have a clue of what to do for the best. Add all this together with the comments above and I cant see that anything was in their favour from the start and sadly they will have perished, probably within hours. The FAT one above has made safety comments elsewhere with links and they are worth a read as that aspect of planning is as important as anything else. I am not in the camp of don't fly a single piston over water, yes there is a risk and we cant all afford to fly a King Air but this is unlikely to be an engine failure and the aircraft does not know if its night or over water and they don't fail very often, the last tragic Alderney ditching I believe was a PA28 a few years back who ran out of fuel, his wife survived by clinging onto a tyre but sadly but it was a whole list of ticking error boxes in advance and as we all know flying is completely unforgiving if the human input is all wrong. Here's hoping everyone here manages to avoid the same mistakes and fly's safe as about the only good that can now come out of this one and those two poor chaps, RIP, is that a few learn something new and others like me are very clearly reminded of the risks and do everything possible to minimise them. All very sad :(
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Originally Posted by ChickenHouse
(Post 10369166)
Sorry to correct, such a Malibu is Continental TSIO-520-BE, 310HP, built 404 pieces of PA46-310P before they discontinued in 1988 ('following a series of incidents and accidents attributed to engine failures', the early TCM TSIO-520 had a slightly too weak crankcase) and went for PA46-350P Malibu Mirage on Lycoming TIO-540-A2EA.
Sorry correct - Continental, not Lycoming |
Originally Posted by GWYN
(Post 10369197)
As to the FAA Airman Database, I have no idea as to how that operates, but I have searched it for various pilots I know, from highly experienced airline pilots (Fleet Managers, TRIs, TREs etc) as well as private pilots and most do not even appear on the database, so ChickenHouse is probably correct – even if I don’t fully understand his post! What’s a 61.75 piggyback? In short anything gleaned from that database appears to me to probably be completely inaccurate, at least for any non-FAA licensed pilot.
As a holder of a foreign license you can apply to get granted the rights of a FAA pilot license based on your existing = to let pilots from abroad fly N-reg aircraft on their license without having to do a full FAA pilot license. If you apply for a validation of your foreign license, its law base will be US legal under: CFR > Title 14 > Chapter I > Subchapter D > Part 61 > Subpart C > Section 61.75 > Private pilot certificate issued on the basis of a foreign pilot license, or short CFR 61.75. During the validation process you will enter your data through the corresponding FAA portal, the Integrated Airman Certification and Rating Application (IACRA). If your initial application for the 61.75 based FAA pilot license, which states 'based on foreign license' = piggyback of the rights of your original license, runs through the validation process and gets countersigned in IACRA by the authority doing your test, your required signing of the countersignature results in your agreement for the data also going into the airman database (if you actively uncheck the permit, the database will receive no entry). Initial validation is only granted PPL rights, everything else usually requires further testing and exam sitting. If you later do additions to your 61.75 piggyback license, it will also run through IACRA, is countersigned there by your test authority and valid by that. If you do not enter IACRA thereafter and sign permit to let the data flow to the database, additions and alterations are valid by the IACRA management, but will not transfer to the database. Most pilots don't do the last step and it is totally legal fine with that, but so only the initial data usually appears in public search. |
Originally Posted by Icaruss
(Post 10369124)
Of course another possibility is that a sudden electrical failure perhaps due to having all the lights, deicing equipment overloading an electrical system with an underlying fault and aged battery with underperforming alternator perhaps coupled to an unheralded engine failure happened without reasonable warning soon after a perfectly reasonable decision to descend to 2300 into clear air and a well executed glide to ditch was then performed in complete silence and darkness. No information that is currently available or likely to emerge or makes good reporting is around to support this, but that doesn’t mean it wasn’t exactly what happened, pilot legality aside! Of course this is all just thinking out loud, but my feeling, having assisted in this search, is that I doubt very much that they'll ever be found, or if they are, it'll be on the north coast of France in an extended period of time. |
On the possibility that the aircraft was heavy with a reasonable amount of luggage, presumably the handlers in charge that evening at Aviapartner Executive (assuming that's the agent/handler/FBO used) will recall how much stuff they carried over to the aircraft. Likewise they might enlighten the AAIB on other pertinant facts - the rumoured attempt to start-up several times etc.
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Mr Mckay added that the plane was "not owned in any way or part by either myself or any member of my family". He said he began looking into arranging a private flight to take him to Nantes after his medical and signing in Cardiff on Saturday, at the footballer's request. The question for Mr McKay 1) Who did he call to “arrange” the flight and did he borrow the aircraft from a friend or was this a commercial transaction? The questions for Fay Keely 1) Are you the owner of the aircraft? 2) If so, who did you rent it to? 3) Did you provide the pilot? 4) If not, did you ask what the aircraft was to be used for and check the qualifications of the pilot? |
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